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2ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an analysis of the electronics in-bond 
industry in the Mexican Northern Border. It is argued that the 
location or subcontracting by foreign firms of the assembly 
phase of electronics production in Mexico constitutes a new 
pattern of industrial location different from that of the 
heavy industrial concentrations in the the three biggest 
cities, Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadalajara. As this new 
pattern consolidates and spreads into the interior of the 
country, the labour processes upgrade, requiring a more 
skilled labour force with the consequent changes in the 
structure of the labour force.
This process is linked to the general process of 
internationalisation of capital which has had as a result the 
integration of more countries into world trade thus changing 
the structure of world production capacity and the subsequent 
geographical redistribution of worldwide production. In this 
way, firms have located production facilities in the the Newly 
Industrialising Countries (NICs) and, nowadays, the New-NICs. 
However, in opposition to the somewhat one-sided views 
developed hitherto of the phenomena, the research undertaken 
on the electronics industry at world level and the empirical 
data gathered on in-bond electronic firms in the Mexican 
Northern Border identifies several factors as interacting in 
the emergence of new patterns of location in countries 
integrated into international trade: a) the role of
technological innovation; b) increasing capital-intensiveness 
of industry versus labour intensity in certain phases of the 
production processes; c) intense competition at world scale; 
d) the characteristics of labour force in the host countries 
and e) the role of the nation-states -both home and host 
countries- which through economic and social policies 
influence the relocation offshore (in the former case) and 
establish the conditions for the successful performance of the 
labour processes relocated in the latter.
the memory of my little daughter Maryam 
and to my sons Ibrahim and lamail.
4ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author thanks Dr. F E I Hamilton for his helpfu] 
suggestions, comments and criticisms throughout the course of 
this work and the final version of this work and to 
Dr. Ruppert Hodder for his comments on an earlier draft of 
this thesis. A special acknowledgment is due to the several 
In-bond Industry Associations in the cities along the Mexican 
Northern Border for the information and helpful hints about 
the in-bond plants and to the managers and other managerial 
staff in the in-bond plants for their patience and interest in 
answering all the questions.
This research was possible thanks to the financial support 
(scholarship No. 56533) from the Mexican government through 
CONACYT (Nacional Council for Science and Technology).
Special thanks are due to my family in Mexico for their 
encouragement and logistical support. My final debt of 
gratitude is to my husband Dr. Serif Askin whose support, 
enthusiasm and encouragement made possible the culmination of 
this research but more importantly he helped me and pulled me 
out of the low times inevitable in all research work.
5TITLE PAGE.........  1
ABSTRACT...........................  2
DEDICATORY.............................................. 3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........   4
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................. ..........5
LIST OF TABLES...............................     .9
LIST OF GRAPHS..........................  15
LIST OF FIGURES........................................ 16
INTRODUCTION......   17
I. THE ELECTRONICS IN-BOND INDUSTRY IN MEXICO.
A review of the literature........................ 23
INTRODUCTION.
1.- PRODUCT-CYCLE APPROACH. ......  24
2.- THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR...... 2 7
3.- THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CAPITAL........... 30
4.- OTHER NEO-MARXISTS DEVELOPMENTS............... 34
5.- APPROACHES ON THE STRATEGIES OF THE FIRMS. 39
6.- THE RESTRUCTURING OF CAPITAL APPROACH....... 46
7.- CONCLUSIONS. ................................. 58
II. PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE ELECTRONICS
INDUSTRY. 1970 - 1985............................. 60
INTRODUCTION.
1. ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY. ......................... 61
a) Classification......... 61
b) International Trade in the Electronics 
Industry.................................. 64
2. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SEMICONDUCTORS...........66
a) Characteristics of the Industry............67
b) Development of Offshore Assembly.......... 69
c) The Nature of Competition................. 7 6
d) International Trade in Semiconductors..... 80
3.- INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN PERSONAL COMPUTERS. 84
a) Characteristics of the Industry........... 84
b) Development of Offshore Assembly.......... 85
c) Nature of Competition..................... 87
d) International Trade in Personal Computers..90
64. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN CONSUMER ELECTRONICS 93
a) Characteristics of the Industry............93
b) International Trade in Consumer
Electronics.............................. 101
5. CONCLUSIONS .................................. 106
III. MEXICO: FROM INWARD TO OUTWARD DEVELOPMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE.......................... 109
INTRODUCTION.
1. ANTECEDENTS; THE MEXICAN ECONOMY UP TO 1 989.... 110
a) From Import-Substitution to the
Oil Bonanza....................   ..110
b) The Manufacturing Industry up to 1980...  116
c) From Boom to Bust, Economic Crisis
in the 1980s............................. 118
2. MEXICO’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE...................124
a) Main trading partners.................... 125
b) Export profile........... .............. 128
c) Exports of electronic products and 
components.......     131
d) Conclusions.............................. 14 2
5. CONCLUSIONS.....................  143
IV. THE IN-BOND ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY. 1965 - 1990..... 148
INTRODUCTION.
1.- THE BORDER INDUSTRIALISATION PROGRAMME.
1965-1970................................... 151
a) Antecedents......   151
b) Importance of In-bond Plants............ 157
2. GROWTH AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IN-BOND 
ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY. 1970-1990..................  165
a) Number of Plants, Employment
and Value-added......................... 165
b) Location and Size....................... 173
c) Ownership............................... 177
d) Use of Local Inputs..................... 182
e) Labour Force: Gender
Relations and Skill..................... 187
d) Patterns of Specialization.............. 199
3. CRITICISMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE IN-BOND 
INDUSTRY...............................   205
a) Criticisms............................. 206
b) Prospects....,......................... 209
4. CONCLUSIONS  .....................  211
V. THE SURVEY: IN-BOND ELECTRONIC FIRMS IN MEXICO- 
CHARACTERISTICS AND LOCATION FACTORS................. 215
INTRODUCTION.
1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRMS..........218
a) Selection of Firms....................... 218
b) Some Characteristics of the Electronics 
Industry per City and State.............. 220
c) Production, Employment and Plant Size
by Locality.............................. 231
d) Start of Production, Ownership and 
Location of Headquarters................. 233
2. MARKETS. INPUTS. LABOUR AND LABOUR-PROCESSES...23 7
a) Products and the Importance of Markets.... 237
b) Sources of Input Supply.................. 240
c) Characteristics of the Labour-force...... 244
d) The Role of Government..........   256
3. CRITERIA FOR CHOICE OF CURRENT LOCATION....... 257
a) The Choice of City.....   258
b) The Choice of Country.................... 262
c) Problems of Past and Present Location.....264
4. CONCLUSIONS..  ...............  267
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE LOCATION OF IN-BOND INDUSTRY
IN MEXICO. Issues for Regional and Industrial
Development.................................. ,...270
INTRODUCTION.
1. THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY AND THE CHANGING 
INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR.........   272
2. THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ELECTRONICS 
PRODUCTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY........... 275
3. THE ELECTRONICS IN-BOND INDUSTRY: A NEK PATTERN 
OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL 
POSSIBILITIES.......................   278
8BIBLIOGRAPHY QUOTED AND CONSULTED................... 283
APPENDIX I. QUESTIONNAIRE L_ 1 LOCATION OF IN-BOND
ELECTRONICS PLANTS IN MEXICO”.............309
APPENDIX II. STATISTICS TABLES........................318
APPENDIX III. ELECTRONICS FIRMS IN MEXICO..............329
APPENDIX IV. IN-BOND ELECTRONICS PLANTS VISITED
IN THE FIELDWORK......................... 336
CHAPTER 
TABLE 2. 
TABLE 2.
TABLE 2.
TABLE 2
TABLE 2 
TABLE 2 
TABLE 2 
TABLE 2
TABLE 2
TABLE 2
TABLE 2
CHAPTER 
TABLE 3
TABLE 3
TABLE 3 
TABLE 3
TABLE 3
LIST OF TABLES
II
1: ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY: Classification........62
2: Electronics Industry Exports: percentage
composition by sector, 1982................ 65
3: National Shares of the World IC Market: by
Product Type, 1982.................... .....79
4: Exports of Transistors, Valves, etc. (Valves as
percentage of world market economies, rate of
growth in brackets) 1975 - 1985............ 81
5: Worldwide PC Unit Shipments, 1988...........89
6: U.S. Personal Computer Market, 1988.........89
7: European Personal Computer Market, 1989......89
8: Exports of Digital Computers (Value as
percentage of World Market Economies, rate of
growth in brackets), 1980 - 1985........... 91
9: Exports of Television Receivers (Value as
percentage of World Market Economy, rate of
growth in brackets) 1971 - 1985........... 101
10: Exports of Radio Broadcast Receivers (Value as
percentage of World Market Economy, rate of
growth in brackets), 1971-1985.....   104
,11: Exports of Sound Records and Phonographs (Value 
as percentage of World Market Economy, rate of 
growth in brackets), 1971 - 1985.......... 105
III.
,1: MEXICO: Share of the Central Region in the
Manufacturing Industry, 1965-1975..........  112
2: MEXICO: Distribution of Employment in
Manufacturing by Industry 1965, 1975 and 1985
(and percentage shares)............... ....117
,3: MEXICO: Employment in Manufacturing, rate of
growth, 1965-1975, 1975-1985...     117
,4: MEXICO: Trade by Principal Countries of
Consignment (Value in thousand of U.S.
dollars).......     126
,5: MEXICO’S main trade partners,
1985-1989 (US$bn)......... ............... 127
TABLE 3.6:
TABLE 3.7:
TABLE 3.8:
TABLE 3.9:
TABLE 3.10:
TABLE 3.11:
TABLE 3.12: 
TABLE 3.13:
CHAPTER IV, 
TABLE 4.1:
TABLE 4.2:
TABLE 4.3: 
TABLE 4.4: 
TABLE 4.5: 
TABLE 4.6:
TABLE 4.7:
TABLE 4.8:
TABLE 4.9:
10
MEXICO: Exports, 1976, 1980-87 (million US
dollars)...................................130
MEXICO: Exports, 1976, 1980-87 (million US
dollars )................... ...............131
Exports of main electronic products by country,
1975 and 1985 (thousand US dollars)....... 133
Exports of main electronic products by country,
1975 and 1985 (percentages)............... 134
MEXICO: Exports of electronic products by
country, 1985 (thousand US dollars)....... 136
MEXICO: Exports of electronic products by
country 1985, (percentages)................138
Semiconductor Exports from the NICs, 1976..140 
Value of electronic component products 
exported to US under items 806/807 by Country, 
1969 and 1983 (US million dollars)........ 141
MEXICO: Population of the Border States and the 
Most Important Cities along the Border,
1900-1980.....................  153
MEXICO: Population growth of the border states 
and the most important cities along the border
(yearly rate of growth)....................154
MEXICO: In-bond Industry by Plants, Employees, 
Labour Costs and Value-added, 1967-1973.... 159 
MEXICO: In-bond Industry Border and Interior 
Average Operative Wages, 1975, 1980, 1985..162 
Assembly Plants Costs, International
Comparison, 1983.    162
Rank of MEXICO among Countries from which the 
United Sates Imports Assembled Manufactured 
Products under Tariff Items 807.00/806.30, by 
Selected ITC Category, 1970-71 and 1980....165 
MEXICO: Value-Added in the In-Bond Industry,
1974-1989 (million of pesos)......  166
MEXICO: Employment in the In-Bond Industry,
1974-1989 (yearly average).................167
MEXICO: Plants in the In-Bond Industry,
1974-1989 (yearly average).................167
11
TABLE 4 . 10:
TABLE 4.11:
TABLE 4.12:
TABLE 4.13:
TABLE 4.14:
TABLE 4.15:
TABLE 4.16:
TABLE 4.17:
TABLE 4.18:
TABLE 4.19:
TABLE 4.20:
TABLE 4.21:
MEXICO: Plant Size in the In-Bond Industry,
1974-1989 .................................  176
Share of Foreign Capital in the Social 
Capital of the In-bond Industry, 1982
(million pesos)................ .......... 179
Share of Foreign Capital in the In-bond
Industry by Sector, 1982 (million pesos)...180
Share of National Value-added and Total 
Output in the Social Capital of the In-bond
Industry, 1982 (million pesos)............ 182
In-bond's Industry Inputs by Source and 
Geographical Location of Plants, 1975-1989
(percentages)........... 183
In-bond Electronics Industry Inputs by Source 
and Geographical Location of Plants,
1979-1988 (percentages)....................184
Employment in the In-bond Industry by 
Geographical Location of Plants and Category,
1975-1988 (percentages)................... 192
Employment in the In-bond Electronics Industry
by Geographical Location of Plants and Category,
1975-1988 (percentages)................... 193
MEXICO: In-Bond industry's most competitive 
products by customs district (USA) in 1986 
(Value-Added in Items 806/807, millions of
dollars)...........     201
MEXICO: In-Bond industry's most competitive 
products by customs district (USA) in 1986 
(Value-Added in Items 806/807,
percentages).......   ..201
MEXICO: Geographical Distribution of 
Exports by product and customs district (USA) 
in 1986 (Value-Added in Items 806/807,
percentages). . *  ...............  202
MEXICO: In-Bond Industry, Value-Added in 
Electronics and Electrical Products by Customs 
District, 1986. (Items 806/807, 
percentages)............... 204
12
CHAPTER V.
TABLE 5.1: Number of Plants and Employment in Manufacturing
and Electronics by State, 1989............ 222
TABLE 5.2: Plant Size in the Manufacturing and Electronics
Industry by State, 1989................... 225
TABLE 5.3: Characteristics of In-bond Industry by State
and Locality, 1988........................ 227
TABLE 5.4: Characteristics of the In-bond Electronics
Industry by Industrial Group and Geographical
Location, 1988.....................  228
TABLE 5.5: Localisation Coefficients in the Electronics
Industry by State............... ..229
TABLE 5.6: Number of Firms by Locality and
Product, 1990............................. 232
TABLE 5.7: Employment and Plant Size by
Locality, 1990............................ 233
TABLE 5.8: Date of Start of Production by
Locality, 1990............................234
TABLE 5.9: Firms by Kind of Ownership and
Locality, 1990............................ 235
TABLE 5.10: Location of Headquarters by Firm
and Locality, 1990........... 236
TABLE 5.11: Destination of Production by
Locality, 1990............................ 238
TABLE 5.12: Geographical Location of Main
Markets, 1990....   ...238
TABLE 5.13: Main Characteristics of the
Products, 1990........................... 239
TABLE 5.14: Main Characteristics of the Inputs, 1990...242
TABLE 5.15: Employment in In-bond Electronics Firms by
Category, Firm and Locality, 1990......... 246
TABLE 5.15.A: Employment in In-bond Electronics Firms by
Category, Firm and Locality, 1990....... 248
TABLE 5.16: Qualifications Required for Employment in 
In-bond Electronics Firms by Category and
Locality, 1990.............. ............ 255
TABLE 5.17: Localisation Coefficients for In-bond 
Electronics Industry by Job
Category, 1988.......................... 256
TABLE 5.18: Reasons for Choice of Location
IN THE CITY, by Firm and Locality, 1990.... 261
TABLE 5.19: Reasons for Choice of Location
IN THE COUNTRY, by Firm and Locality, 1990..263
APPENDIX II.
TABLE 4.7.A: MEXICO: Value-Added in the In-Bond Industry,
1974-1989 (percentages).................. 319
TABLE 4.7.B: MEXICO: Rate of Growth of the Value-Added in
the In-Bond Industry (selected years) 319
TABLE 4.8.A: MEXICO: Employment in the In-Bond Industry,
1974-1989 (percentages)....... *..........320
TABLE 4.8.B: MEXICO: Rate of Growth of the Employment
in the In-Bond Industry (selected years)..320 
TABLE 4.9.A: MEXICO: Number of Plants in the In-Bond
Industry, 1974-1989 (percentages)........ 321
TABLE 4.9.B: MEXICO: Rate of Growth of the No.
of Plants in the In-Bond Industry
(selected years)......................... 321
TABLE 4.14.A: In-bond*s Industry Inputs by Source and
Geographical Location of Plants, 1975-1989
(million pesos)......................... 322
TABLE 4.15.A: In-bond Electronics Industry Inputs by
Source and Geographical Location of Plants,
1979-1988 (million pesos)............... 323
TABLE 4.16.A: Employment in the In-bond Industry by 
Geographical Location of Plants and
Category, 1975-1988...........   324
TABLE 4.16.B: Growth of Employment in the In-bond
Industry by Sex 1975-1988............ ...325
TABLE 4.16.C: Growth of Employment in the In-bond
Industry by Category, 1975-1988......... 325
TABLE 4.17.A: Employment in the In-bond Electronics 
Industry by Geographical Location of
Plants and Category, 1975-1988.......... 326
TABLE 4.17.B: Growth of Employment in the Electronics
In-bond Industry by Sex, 1980-1988 ....... 327
TABLE 4.17.C: Growth of Employment in the In-bond 
Electronics Industry by Category,
1980-1988 327
TABLE 4.23: MEXICO: In-Bond Industry, Value-Added in
Electronics and Electrical Products by 
Customs District, 1986. (Items 806/807, 
millions of dollars) ............... 328
15
LIST OF GRAPHS
GRAPH 4.1: MEXICO: In-bond Industry, % Increase
in Value-Added, 1974-1989................. 168
GRAPH 4.2: MEXICO: In-bond Industry, % Increase
in Employment, 1974-1989...................169
GRAPH 4.3: MEXICO: In-bond Industry, % Increase
in No. of Plants, 1974-1989............... 170
GRAPH 4.4: Plant Size in the In-bond Industry,
Selected years............................ 178
GRAPH 4.5: Female Labour in the In-bond Industry,
Rates of Growth, selected years........... 191
GRAPH 4.6: Technicians in the In-bond Industry,
Rates of growth, selected years........... 195
GRAPH 4.7: Female Labour in the Electronics In-bond
Industry, Rates of Growth, selected years..196
GRAPH 4.8: Technicians in the Electronics In-bond
Industry, Rates of growth, selected years..197
16
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 2.1: Top Ten Worlwide Integrated Circuit Producers, 
1979 Sales (million US dollars)......  78
FIGURE 2.2: Top Ten Worlwide Integrated Circuit Producers,
1988 Sales (million US dollars)............ 78
FIGURE 2.3: Consumers’ Choice, % Penetration of US
Market..................................... 94
FIGURE 2.4: SONY, Sales by Products (% of Sales)....... 98
FIGURE 2.5: MATSUSHITA, Sales by Products (% of Sales)..99
FIGURE 3.1: Political Map of Mexico................... 114
FIGURE 3.2: NAFTA, Value of Intra-North American Exports,
1989 (US$bn)............................  129
FIGURE 4.1: The Mexico-United States Border Area...... 150
17
INTRODUCTION
During recent decades the international mobility of capital 
has reached an unprecedent level. This is particularly evident 
in the industrial activity. Manufacturing sectors such as 
electronics, electrical machinery and transportation 
equipment, for example, have shown a high degree of 
international integration, forming a complex pattern of 
production and trade linkages.
Since the mid-1960s there were some signs of relocation of 
particular sectors or, more specifically, of particular 
segments within those sectors from the core industrial regions 
to areas in less developed countries (LDCs). The host 
countries were the most advanced of the developing world, a 
group of which came to be known as the Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NICs). South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
India, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were initially included 
within that group. Subsequently, in the 1970s, a number 
countries were added to the list of NICs (Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Venezuela, Yugoslavia), By the late 
1970s there was a relatively significant redistribution of 
world industrial capacity. Part of this was located in free 
production zones (FPZs) in developing countries where 
exceptional conditions for lowering costs of production were 
offered. Since the early 1960s tariff reductions, improvements 
in transportation and communication systems as well as the 
betterment in infrastructure, result of governments’ 
intervention, had as a corollary an increase in labour 
qualifications in many developing countries thus making 
possible such moves. The world slump of the early 1970s came 
to accelerate the pace of industrial relocation because of the 
need of many firms to minimise their production costs. For 
many of them the relocation of complete production system or 
part of it was the only way to survive in the world market.
During the 1980s, a new wave in the shift of manufacturing 
activities to developing countries has been in progress. The
18
recession of the early 1980s, along with the arrival of new 
world-class competitors (Japan and, more recently, South Korea 
and Taiwan) have sharpened international competition and have 
pressed firms to look for new low cost production sites for 
sectors restricted only to developed countries in the past. In 
addition, trade restrictions and fluctuations in the exchange 
rate of particular countries have also pushed some firms to 
change their locations of production facilities or locate 
their new investment in an advantageous region.
The process of integrating more and more areas into the world 
market has not worked without changes or in an uni-directional 
way, both in sectorial and geographical terms. In the first 
phase, the sectors involved were those with simple technical 
processes and mainly labour-intensive operations, such as in 
textiles and electronic components. In the latest phase, 
sectors that require more sophisticated production processes 
and capital-intensive operations were included. On the other 
hand, the geographical distribution of such sectors has been 
changing too. Some countries were integrated in a first wave, 
some others later. Those which were included in the first 
phase have changed their initial production base by moving on 
to other manufacturing sectors. For instance, Mexico is now 
attracting more firms involved in capital-intensive 
operations, while industries such as textiles are moving to 
areas where labour is even cheaper, as the Caribbean region. 
The same pattern happened in Hong Kong, which is losing its 
labour-intensive operations to other LDCs of the East Asian 
region, including the Peoples’s Republic of China. The so- 
called ’’comparative advantages" in the production of goods are 
constantly changing among countries.
This process can be seen as the result of a change in the 
structure of world production capacity and its subsequent 
geographical redistribution. As competition increased with 
waves of expansion of world trade and periodical crises, firms 
sought to maintain their profitability through several 
strategies, such as innovations in production processes,
19
products and in organisations which supported the great 
dynamism of some industrial sectors in terms of location. 
However, this process or relocation offshore would not have 
taken place had the potential locations not undergone a 
process of structural change in their economies which enabled 
the firms to successfully perform production processes at 
current levels of productivity.
The purpose of this research lies in analyzing the pattern of 
location of the in-bond electronics industry in Mexico in what 
we have called a new pattern of location in its Northern 
Border in order to answer a question rarely addressed in 
"Grand Theories" such as the world-systems and globalisation 
theories: what are the inducements for foreign corporations to 
locate production facilities offshore in particular parts of 
the LDCs rather than elsewhere? We are talking here not of an 
undifferentiated "Third World" as opposed to the "First World" 
as any centre-periphery theorist would argue but to 
particular geographical areas. The relevant factors would 
include a series of external and internal factors. As external 
we find process of competition (inherent to the essence of 
capitalism) as well as the policies of the government, in the 
home countries (like military purchases, etc). The internal 
factors include not only the policies directly concerned with 
making the host country attractive for the industry - tax 
conditions, repatriation of profits and labour legislation- 
and the economic policies of industrial deconcentration, 
provision of industrial facilities, upgrading of labour 
productivity, export-led growth, and the like -but also the 
social policies and adequate investment necessary to guarantee 
the availability and continued reproduction of both unskilled 
and skilled labour force able to perform the labour process at 
current levels of productivity. These would include the 
provision of scientific and technological institutions for 
high-skill engineers and technicians and centres for the 
education and training of lower lever technicians and workers, 
also the provision of health and public services, 
transportation and infrastructure and housing are included.
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These factors are a result of the governments* initiative to 
attract foreign investment. Thus, and opposing all those 
arguments which link the redistribution of production capacity 
within a given country to the more generalised, as a direct 
outcome, process at the world level (the^  "Grand External 
Forces") in my analysis "government policy remains, therefore, 
an independent, local variable" [the stress is mine] 
(Henderson, 1989:xvii), and not only a "permissive" factor, as 
N. Harris points out, just facilitating the integration of the 
economy with the international arena (1986:36).
Here the in-bond electronics industry is used as an empirical 
vehicle to analyse the dynamics of industrial location. Also 
I am interested in the electronics industry because I consider 
it as a prime example of the current process of redistribution 
of world industrial capacity for the following reasons.
a) Since the mid-1960s the sector has become highly 
internationalised with the NICs (and lately the so-called 
New-NICs) as important offshore locations for leading 
transnational corporations (TNCs).
b) The widespread use of its products for many activities 
(as end-products or crucial inputs) in home, office and 
industry for processing information to such an extent 
that for many "life without electronics is almost 
unthinkable".
c) The characteristics of the production processes and 
the products themselves: relative labour-intensive phases 
and the high value/low weight products facilitate the 
location offshore. So a technical division of labour is 
found in which each country specialises in certain part 
of the production process with different requirements in 
the skill of the labour force.
d) As a result of (b) and due to the impacts of (c) in 
the host countries * governments in many developing
21
countries give great importance to this sector in terms 
of the development and expansion of an export-oriented 
electronics industry or (as in the case of some of the 
Asian NICs) the development of an indigenous one with 
world standards able to compete with the big American or 
Japanese producers.
Therefore my main argument is that redistribution of world 
production capacity has had as a corollary, the emergence of 
a new pattern of location of the industry in the host 
countries, away from the old industrial cores which dominated 
the global economy. As the new locational pattern consolidates 
and spreads into the country the labour processes upgrade and 
result in changes in the structure of the labour force in 
response to the need for more skilled labour. Taken as an 
alternative for industrialisation and development, in a 
country which up to some few years ago was one of the most 
protected countries, the production processes thus located 
offer ample opportunities for the qualification of the labour 
force in processes which require productivity at world levels 
and for the making of a more competitive environment which 
will force the improvement in efficiency and quality of 
production at world standards of those local industrialists 
willing to provide inputs to the in-bond electronics industry.
The analysis begins with an exposition of some ~,r developments 
which attempt to explain the current process of 
internationalisation of capital and its implications in both 
developed and developing countries. There i ,s no pretension 
of giving a conclusive verdict on the theories, but to show 
some of their flaws in such a complex problem. In Chapter II, 
the redistribution of electronics production capacity is 
examined highlighting what above I identified as external 
factors [to the host countries], competition, technology, 
governments* policies in the home countries, etc. which acted 
as a "push" factor for the TNCs and led them to relocate
facilities in LDCs. Chapter III deals with the "pull" factors 
which induced the location of some electronics firms in the 
Mexican Northern Border, the economy and host government’s 
policies and finishes with a brief outlook of Mexico’s 
international trade and its performance in the trade of 
electronic products. In Chapter IV I start with an exposition 
of the creation of the Border Industrialisation Programme in 
the late 1960 s and the in-bond industry legal regime and then 
proceed to examine the general characteristics of the in-bond 
electronics industry and its consolidation as a new locational 
pattern. In Chapter V is examined the empirical data drawn 
from m y survey on the Mexican Northern Border in order to 
corroborate the findings in chapter IV and, ultimately the 
assumptions given in my argument, that the new locational 
pattern is consolidating and spreading into the country and 
bringing about important changes in the structure of the 
labour force. Finally, in chapter VI, some conclusions are 
drawn about the viability of the new locational pattern for 
the further industrialisation and development of the country, 
also some policy suggestions are given in order to consolidate 
the in-bond electronics industry by forging durable links with 
the rest of the economy.
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I. THE ELECTRONICS IN-BOND INDUSTRY IN MEXICO:
A review of the literature.
INTRODUCTION.
The economic, social, political and spatial implications of 
the process of internationalisation of capital are far- 
reaching, for both "developed" and "developing" countries, and 
are the object of a heated debate and research in both the 
academic and governmental institutions (Henderson and 
Castells, 1987). As a result there is an extensive literature 
which examines the impact of this redistribution of world 
production capacity of specific industrial branches in 
particular territorial units (e.g. Hall and Markusen, 1985; 
Hansen, 1981; Harris, 1986; Jenkins, 1986; Langlois et. al. , 
1988; Massey, 1984; Perlo, 1987; Salih, Young and Rasiah, 
1988; Saxenian, 1985; Scott, 1988; etc). Also there is some 
work which tries to explain this worldwide redistribution in 
several industries at global scale (see, for example, Dicken, 
1986; Grunwald and Flamm, 1985; Scott and Storper; 1986). 
However, there has been relatively little research on how the 
changes in the structure of world production capacity has led 
to an increasingly more elaborate territorial pattern of 
specialisations (see Scott, 1987).
Before analysing the in-bond electronics industry in Mexico, 
it is necessary to examine the theoretical attempts to explain 
the process of internationalisation of capital since there is 
no single view about its emergence, expansion and impact in 
both the developed and developing countries. In many cases, 
these attempts fail due to their one sided explanations of 
the process, giving a lot of weight to the labour-force 
factor, or to the technological change, or to the role of the 
TNCs and its decisions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
developing countries and neglecting all the other factors 
which are also involved in the location offshore of production 
facilities.
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I will start with one of the earlier attempts at 
interpretation of the process of internationalisation, the 
product-cycle approach applied to the electronics industry by 
Hirsch (1967). In the second part a brief examination and 
critique of the New International Division of Labour Theory of 
Frobel (NIDL) et.al. (1980). is given. The works of Hymer 
(1979) and Jenkins on the internationalisation of capital and 
its spatial implications are dealt with in part 3. In part 4 
I examine what I have called other neo-marxists developments, 
Massey (1984) and Sayer (1986). The analysis of Schoenberger 
(1986, 1988) about flexible technologies and its implication 
in the production of semiconductors (the change to semi-custom 
and custom) together with the work of Scott (1987, 1988) and
Scott and Angel (1987, 1988) on transactional relations of the 
firms is grouped in what is called approaches on the 
strategies of the firms. Finally in part 6 there is a group of 
works which see the current process of internationalisation of 
capital as a restructuring of capital in order to overcome 
the ever-deepening crises (Henderson, 1989; Salih et.al, 1988 
and Sklair, 1989).
1. PRODUCT-CYCLE APPROACH.
In one of the earlier attempts dt explaining the location of 
electronics industry, Hirsch (1967) uses the product cycle 
approach first introduced by Vernon (1966)*. To start with, 
Hirsch proposes that:
"the comparative advantage a country has in 
particular industries is determined by the degree of 
development attained by that country and the 
maturity of the industries concerned, less developed 
countries having an advantage in mature industries, 
industrial leaders in growth products, and small 
developed countries in new products with a high 
engineering and scientific content. One relevant 
factor given special consideration is the effect of 
marketing costs in industries of differing maturity" 
(1967:v-vi).
* Another Interesting atteapt based on Vernon's approach is that of the profit-product 
cycle proposed by Markusen (1985). An interesting critique can be found in Henderson 
(1989:23-4).
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To determine the maturity of the industries he uses the 
definition of Kuznets of new product as one being manufactured 
by methods which were not previously used by the industry or 
if it is based on a recent invention or unfamiliar 
developments.
In the introductory phase of a new product, the model asserts, 
the manufacturers try to keep their fixed assets and overheads 
down as much as possible so they refrain in installing 
machinery and rely on subcontractors and independent 
specialist firms. Since the introduction of a new product 
requires the cooperation and availability of highly skilled 
personnel (engineers, managerial staff, etc) and specialised 
services, the production is generally confined to the firm’s 
home country where all these external economies are available.
The second phase of the product-cycle is characterised by the 
emergence of sufficient demand in other core states so that 
local production for these markets begins. By this time the 
product has been refined and its production technology 
standardised so that routine manufacturing operations can be 
safely conducted in locations remote from the corporate core 
(Wallace,1990:127).
The opportunity for the developing countries -as Hirsch 
affirms- comes with the mature phase of the product due to the 
production process is well established, the machinery 
standardised, easily obtainable and maintainable. Likewise 
§ince the skill-requirements of the labour-force are low it is 
easier to train it. The few people needed with specialised 
skills and experience can be hired from the local elite or 
even from abroad (1967:25).
Wallace (1990:127) suggests that 1 interpretations of changing 
spatial distributions of manufacturing activity must be 
sensitive to their cowji/flctural (historically and 
geographically specific) origins". In this way, he affirms, 
the product cycle model was developed when the US economy was
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the world’s largest, richest with the most technologically 
advanced market to the advantage of the US TNCs. Apparently 
the model proved to be right for the analysis of, to say, the 
textiles industry and the electronics industry of the early 
1960s (See Hirsch, 1967:63-82).
However, recent developments in the industry have proved the 
model’s inaccuracy, for example, the increasing importance of 
the Asian NICs as locations of phases of the production 
processes with greater skill requirements for the production 
of relatively new products and even the emergence of 
indigenous production in those "new products" proper of 
developed countries in the model. In addition, some 
technologically- mature products -like televisions- 
experienced some technological rejuvenation and reversing of 
the cycle and are now successfully manufactured by firms from 
the NICs. For example, the South Korean companies Samsung and 
Gold Star are moving into more sophisticated colour television 
production and into the manufacture of video cassete recorders 
(VCRs) and they have also built colour television plants in 
the US. Tatung, the major television manufacturer in Taiwan, 
has plants in Japan, Singapore, the US and UK and acquired a 
manufacturing plant in the latter (Dicken, 1986:348).
In addition Hirsch asserts the dynamism of the model upon the 
proposition that:
"comparative advantage is not a static phenomenon 
which remains constant overtime. One of the model’s 
major premises is that a country which has a strong 
competitive position in a particular industry at a 
given point in time may well lose this position when 
the industry enters into a new phase" (1967:129).
However, this proposition gives a lot of weight to the 
characteristics of the product and of the industry itself in 
the locational pattern of the industry and, to a certain
See Henderson. 1989; Salih, Young and Kaslah, 1988 and Scott, 1987 In the case of 
semiconductors production and Evans, 1986 and Evans and Bastos Tigre, 1989 for computers.
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extent, neglects the dynamic of the economies of the countries 
themselves and the existence of specialisation of production. 
Thus the components of a given product are increasingly 
produced in different countries and each one specialises in 
certain components independently of the "maturity" of the 
product or the "degree of development" of the country. This is 
so just because that country had -in the proper time- the 
required resources (skill of the labour force, capital, 
external economies) to perform that particular phase of the 
production process. Once the production is established, the 
dynamic of growth of the country may allow the upgrading of 
the production process, as in the case of the Asian NICs and 
to lesser extent the Latin American NICs -a process which is 
utterly neglected in the product-cycle approach.
2. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR THEORY.
As noted earlier, the failure of some attempts to explain the 
offshore location of the industry in general -and electronics 
in particular- is due to the one-sided view they have of the 
problem. This is the case in the neo-marxist j ha-f/ctis like
that of the New International Division of Labour (NIDL) theory 
of Frobel et.al. (1980) which examines the dynamics of 
production developed in the 1970s when firms moved offshore 
and formed a global network of production establishments 
(often through subcontracting rather than foreign direct 
investment, FDI) "located to exploit comparative advantages 
within a functional division of labour" (Wallace, 1990:126). 
These comparative advantages are: the existence of cheap
labour force in the developing countries*, the provision of 
equipment and infrastructure, the removal of trade and 
currency restrictions and the granting of investment 
incentives by the host countries (Frobel et.al. 1980).
 ^ A small proportion established production facilities in Free Production Zones (FPZs).
* "... this is the chief determining factor of the structure of production in free 
production zones in the context of the transnational organisation of capitalist 
production" (Frobel, et.al., 1980:322).
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The critiques to the NIDL theory can be centred around the 
following factors:
a) It is said that the NIDL is based on the existence of cheap 
labour force and although the high female participation rates 
are mentioned, no account is given of the working conditions 
as long hours, short holidays, intensity of labour, causes of 
accidents in the work place, etc (Corbridge, 1986; Sklair, 
1990). This point is developed in other attempts, yet they 
overestimate the role of female participation in export-led 
development (Fuentes, et.al., 1987; Lin, 1987; Porpora. 
et.al., 1989; Sassen, 1987) and in the valorisation of capital 
(Duncan, 1981).
b) The location in FPZ and the super-exploitation of the 
labour force is seen from the perspective that the function of 
labour in the valorisation process of capital is guaranteed by 
the compliant governments. They (Frobel, et.al) devalue the 
role of the nation-state to the simple provider of the 
optimum conditions (whatever the means, even repression of 
unions) for the successful performance of the production 
process. This view is not necessarily wrong but it is too 
simplistic to leave no place for the governments in the 
promotion of industrialisation. As we will see later this view 
is similar to that of Hymer (1979) about the role of the TNCs.
c) Following the previous point, Frobel*s account is not 
dynamic in the sense that if; sees industrial location in FPZ 
as "enclave” development (that is, few linkages are forged 
with the rest of the economy); thus despite of the NICs success, 
it cannot be considered as "real", "developmental" or 
"independent" (Corbridge, 1986:148). Consequently, it misses 
the importance of changes in the production processes and in 
the locations subsequent to the establishment of the plants, 
for instance, the upgrading of the skill of the labour-force 
and the rise in wage-levels that led electronics companies to 
relocate some labour intensive phases with low skill 
requirements from Hong Kong and Singapore to Malaysia,
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Thailand and Philippines, leaving in the former those labour- 
intensive phases with higher skill requirements. In this way 
we witness the emergence of a regional division of labour in 
which each location specialises in a specific part of the 
production process. Ernst suggests that,
”... the availability of a low-priced, highly 
subsidised infrastructure with a minimum of 
environmental regulations and labour standards is 
becoming increasingly important for wafer 
fabrication and silicon foundries. In fact, 
governments in developing countries are likely to 
continue, if not to expand, their programs to 
promote foreign investments in so-called *high 
technology industries*, through a variety of tax 
incentives and policies to reduce overhead costs" 
(1985:346).
d) The NIDL is said to be a main factor of the crisis now 
afflicting the core economies in the 1980s, provoking a 
substantial job-loss, unemployment, deindustrialisation and 
fiscal crisis due to the decline of the domestic investment. 
According to Harris (1986), the NICs are still too small to 
lift or lower the world profit rate: rather it was the slump 
that caused all these problems and the way of lessening the 
impact was the integration of a multitude of countries into 
the world economy. An example is the in-bond industry in 
Mexico, much criticised in some circles in the US for the 
supposed job loss it means there. Nonetheless, the American 
Chamber of Commerce defends in-bond activities under the 
considerations that a great amount of direct employment in US 
depends on in-bond assembly plants. They use around an average 
of 65 per cent materials and components produced in US and, 
furthermore, from 1984 to 1985, 165 000 high skilled jobs were 
created in US because of the activities o ► in-bond plants in 
Mexico (El Financiero, Dec 3, 1987). As a matter of fact, "the 
export of capital is still predominantly between the countries 
of the core rather than from the high-wage countries to the 
low-wage countries" (Grahl, 1983, quoted in Corbridge, 
1986:152).
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e) Finally, the NIDL centres on the production and supply 
sides, neglecting the impacts demand conditions might have in 
the redistribution of world production. For example, the shift 
in US semiconductors demand from military and government uses 
to industrial and consumer applications influenced the 
relocation to the periphery. Also, market access or the 
avoidance of trade sanctions or tariff and non-tariff 
restrictions on imports in the host countries (specially those 
of the OECD) influences the relocation as well as other 
factors in the home countries like inflation in wages or land 
prices, currency exchange rates, etc. (Dicken, 1988; 
Corbridge, 1986; Hamilton, 1986; Sayer and Morgan, 1987).
It is important to stress that without the considerations 
included in points (a) to (e) it is not easy to understand the 
whole dynamic of the redistribution to some countries as the 
NICs and the New-NICs of certain segments of the production 
process. The important thing in analyzing the process is not 
just to examine one or another factor but how all these "push” 
and "pull" factors interrelate which each other and lead to 
the relocation decision.
3. THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CAPITAL APPROACH.
Another block of neo-marxist approaches, to be found in the 
works of Hymer (1979), Palloix (1975, 1978, quoted in Jenkins, 
1984), Amin and Smith (1986) and Jenkins (1978, 1984 and 1987) 
among others, characterise the current phase of capitalism - 
internationalisation of capital as they refer to the NIDL- as 
a large scale global expansion of all three circuits of 
capital (financial, commodity and productive). This process 
"is seen as a tendency of the capitalist system towards an 
ever more integrated world economy" (Jenkins, 1984:17).
The driving force in the internationalisation of capital 
AS seen to be both the contradiction between capital and 
labour and the competition between capitals. To survive and 
expand, capital must maintain the rate of profit which
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requires increases in labour productivity (Jenkins, 1984;
Hymer, 1979, ch 2 and 3). Since direct foreign investment 
(DFI) by the TNCs is considered an important expression of the 
internationalisation of capital, these approaches are devoted 
to examine the TNCs and the spatial implications of this 
investment. However, they differ in the weight they give to 
the TNCs in their analysis.
For example Hymer (1979, ch 2.) underestimates the role of the 
state in industrial policy-making, pointing out (as do also 
Amin and Smith) that TNCs play a prominent role in laying down 
the terms of international trade and national economic 
development and in reducing the options for development. In 
fact, they (the TNCs) reproduce or even aggravate the uneven 
development problem between DCs and LDCs. According to Hymer, 
the NIDL is moulded in the image of the TNCs* own vertical 
division of labour.
"The application of location theory to the Chandler- 
Redlich scheme suggests a correspondence principle 
relating centralisation of control within the 
corporation to centralisation of control within the 
international economy" (1979;64).
In this way, he suggests a "pyramidical" structure of 
corporate power where Level III activities (production) spread 
all over the world according to the existence of manpower, 
markets and raw materials. Because this level spreads more 
evenly, the TNCs may be a force for industrialisation in LDCs 
through the creation of new centres of production in the 
periphery.
Level II activities (lower level of administration) locate in 
large cities where white-collar workers, communication systems 
and information are available. TNCs in different industries 
tend to locate these kind of activities in the same city 
leading to a greater geographical concentration than the 
localisation of Level III activities. The activities of R & D 
and strategic planning development are even more concentrated 
in a few Level I cities: New York, London, Paris, Bonn and
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Tokyo. This arrangement gives place to a geographical 
specialisation where the characteristics of the labour-supply 
of the host countries depend upon its function in the 
international economic system (1979:64).
This analysis oversimplifies the complexity of the current 
distribution of world economic activity. As some critics 
assert (Morgan and Sayer, 1983), it seems cities in each level 
can have only the activities corresponding to their 
level. Obviously, this is not the case, Level I cities contain 
not only Level I activities but also Level II and Level III 
activities; Level II cities contain also Level III activities. 
Likewise, these stratifications do^ , not take into account the 
contemporary trends in the redistribution of world production 
capacity as, the movement of some segments of US industry from 
the old industrial areas to the "Sunbelt" areas in the West; 
the movement to backward areas within the DCs (e.g. Ireland, 
some areas of the UK and Spain); the upgrading of some NICs 
(notably the Asian Gang of Four, Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan) which, thanks to either government policy or 
business activities, are locations of more sophisticated 
labour-intensive processes and regional headquarters of 
important TNCs in the electronics industry. Also there are the 
New-NICs and some academics are concerning nowadays with the 
emergence of TNCs in the NICs.
It is necessary to keep in perspective that the redistribution 
of production capacity is not simply the consequence of TNCs 
operations alone (as the dependence and development theories 
also argue). Nation-states, world slump and the policies of 
international institutions (like the World Bank or IMF) have 
played an important role.
In this context, the contribution of Jenkins (1984) to the 
study of the internationalisation of capital is more objective 
in terms of the factors involved in the process. He stresses 
the need to avoid an exclusive focus on the TNCs in isolation 
from those broader contextual tendencies of which they
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constitute a part. Furthermore, it is important to point out 
that "despite the concentration and centralisation of capital 
the TNCs remain subject to the compulsion of competition" 
(1984:178). Consequently, Jenkins suggests that the analysis 
of the internationalisation of capital must be done through 
the study of individual branches of industry, since 
international competition takes place at the level of 
individual branches and the internationalisation of products 
and processes occurs at this level.
"The specific ways in which the dynamic of capital 
accumulation require the internationalisation of 
capital can be spelt out in some detail through 
historical analysis of individual branches" 
(1984;20).
Jenkins points out that the relocation of production to cheap 
labour countries has been of little importance, considering 
the size of the market and investment in the OECD countries. 
Also it has been concentrated in particular branches (as 
clothing and electronics). In addition, he suggests that some 
of the conditions for relocation in those countries W/.ere 
result of developments in the other circuits of capital, money 
(for instance, the financial support to export-credits and 
loans for some Third World countries) and commodity capital 
(in some cases the relocation in Third World countries is not 
because of- cheap labour but because o^ the market or the 
platform to access other markets they offer) (Corbridge, 
1986:153).
In the case of the electronics industry, the pace of 
technological change in the products makes uneconomical the 
investment in fixed capital for assembly operations which 
would be obsolete after a while. This peculiarity and the 
intense competition in the industry (in spite of being highly 
concentrated with 20 firms accounting for almost 95% of world 
production of semiconductors in the mid-1970s) has led the 
firms to seek strategies for cutting the cost per unit of 
output through the relocation of the labour-intensive phases 
of production in countries with cheap labour-force with the
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required levels of productivity and skill. The existence of 
special tariff regimes, like items 806.30 and 807.00 of the 
Tariff Schedule of the US® in the home countries and the 
establishment of infrastructural facilities and incentives in 
the host countries made the rest (Jenkins, 1984).
4. OTHER NEO-MARXISTS DEVELOPMENTS.
This block of Neo-marxist approaches emphasises, as Hamilton 
points out, "the capital deepening process with capital/labour 
substitution and restructuring in places of rising wages (or 
real labour costs) and the displacement of more labour- 
intensive functions to lower labour-cost areas (1986:4). The 
attempts to explain the redistribution of world production 
capacity in this line are many, as Sayer (1986) points out, 
the French Regulationist School (c.f. Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 
1986; Lipietz, 1986, quoted in Sayer, 1986), studies about 
imperialism (Mandel, 1975; Radice, 1975, quoted in Sayer,
1986) and many more. Here I shall deal with some of them from 
the perspective of the electronics industry.
From a geographical point of view, Massey (1984) argues that 
behind major shifts between dominant divisions of labour 
within a country lie changes in the spatial organisation of 
capitalist relations of production, whose development and 
reorganisation she calls "spatial structures". In the most 
classical Marxist tradition she identifies the changes in 
class relations as the cause of this process, "the geography 
of industry is an object of struggle (ibid. p. 7). In her view 
the world is not the linear result of the capital requirements 
but the result of the struggle which, with the characteristics 
of the industry itself, give place to a wide range of spatial 
structures.
5
These iteas allow the reiaport of articles whose Manufacturing process began in the US 
and were processed abroad and duty was to be paid only on the value added.
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In analyzing the location of electronics industry in UK, 
Massey differentiates the spatial structures of large firms 
from small firms. The former resembles Hymer*s pyramidical 
structure and the latter*s spatial structure is characterised 
by high concentration. She explains that the spatial 
structures of the large firms are characterised by the 
locational separation of research from production according to 
the availability of labour-force.
"Each of these parts of the labour force -different 
social groups- operates in different ways as a 
* location factor *; the way it affects the location 
of industry is different in each case. Each social 
group, moreover, is unevenly distributed across the 
country -indeed if they were not they would not be 
operative locational considerations" (1984:141).
The "best staff" (R&D) tend to cluster in places with high
c
quality of the environment and the firms locate accordingly. 
Work follows this staff which has the power to influence 
industrial location. Conversely, the activities at the bottom- 
end of the production process locate in those places with 
reserves of new workers coming for the first time to the 
capitalist labour market (particularly the female labour 
force). Because of the dynamic of competition, firms need to 
cut costs so, instead of clustering, they tend to disperse to 
monopolise labour markets, though this is not always the case. 
Firms indeed cluster together to take advantage of 
infrastructure available in some places without which labour 
could not be exploited.
On the contrary, as we mentioned above, small firms, 
characterised by small batches of high-tech products requiring 
a highly-skilled labour-force, are geographically 
concentrated. These firms are less prone to competition-based 
costs but more to competition based on technological
e
In what Massey defines as a Mutually reinforcing relation between location and social 
status.
7
Suitable for the asseably job and their lack of organisation and union Militancy 
(1984).
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characteristics since their production is mostly for
specialised markets (1984:150).
Both types of spatial structures -Massey asserts- reinforce 
the pattern of spatial differentiation, that is the 
concentration of particular kinds of labour-force and the
concentration of ownership in the same area. Although she
points out that location factors should not be taken for
granted but it is necessary to know why and how certain 
factors become geographical attractions for industry, the 
apparent dynamism of her proposed spatial structures is lost. 
The self-reinforcing pattern of geographical distribution of 
firms neglects, as in the case of Frobel et. al., the 
developments which can occur a posteriori in the locations as 
a result of the interaction of firms and inner developments in 
those areas.
Rather than having different spatial structures for different
sizes of plants, this thesis suggests that it is the
concurrence of several firms of different sizes as one of the
factors which structure the space due to the presence of
interlinkages which are continually evolving. For example, in
the electronics industry in the Asian countries, big firms,
subcontractors, even the carrier services to bring the
products, materials and components to and fro have a say in
0
the "spatial structure" of the locations .
Sayer criticises this kind of "radical views" which wrongly 
treat the patterns of uneven development as a linear result of 
the tendencies of capital accumulation in the abstract. These 
tendencies: "work through specific mediating technical and
social forms, such as particular technologies, types of labour 
and management systems (i.e. ways of combining labour, 
materials and machinery)" (1986:107-8).
o
As a aatter of fact this example is extensive in any kind of industry, the complexity 
in the analysis arises from the overlapping of the patterns of the different industries 
and other economic activities in the Bame city (Harris, 1983).
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Thus, in his analysis of the internationalisation of the 
semiconductor industry emphasises a series of factors which 
drive the internationalisation rather than the sole interplay 
of capital/labour relations. These factors are:
a) Innovations are causes and consequences of competition 
among capitals and responses to the actions of labour. That 
is, they are responses to the operation of the law of value 
and involve the search for time economies in the circulation 
of capital; new ways of extracting surplus value; or new 
products to compete effectively (Sayer, 1985).
b) Home markets. To continue accumulation, firms cannot expect 
to survive within the narrow limits of the domestic markets 
(even in the massive American market). Internationalisation 
through exports or FDI becomes necessary to amortise the 
burgeoning R&D.
c) Characteristics of the industry. Offshore production is an 
option open only to "certain kinds of production: mass 
produced high-value per unit weight, and involving a 
substantial element of low skilled manual labour and lacking 
a need for intensive technical management or proximity to 
customers" (Sayer and Morgan, 1987:23).
d) Social and institutional characteristics of capital and 
labour, for instance the differences between Japanese and 
British capital. Such differences have spatial implications, 
not only directly through their differential consequences for 
the competitive strength of capitals and hence for global 
patterns of uneven development.
e) The role of the nation-state which, through tariff import 
quotas, technical standards, policies on investment and 
transfer of technology, support for domestic producers and 
R&D, regional policy, etc. can influence the 
internationalisation of capital.
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After analyzing how these factors influenced the 
internationalisation of the semiconductors industry and 
finally determine the location in the NICs, Sayer asserts that 
some developments in the industry may lessen the influence of 
the "pool of cheap labour-force". Because of the slump -he 
argues- firms are facing the need to automate in order to 
remain competitive. Innovations in microelectronics offer the 
possibility of accessing cheap production technology which may 
favour developed country locations.
Likewise, technological developments give place to the growing 
importance of customised products with the resulting need of 
a closer seller-user proximity. This trend is observed also in 
the investment in consumer electronics in the developed 
countries where automated facilities and changes in product 
design shifted cost advantages back toward production in those 
markets. Moreover, in some products as computers, after-sales 
services favour the location in the developed countries.
However, Sayer points out that those these trends do not 
constitute a reversal of the attraction of the pool of labour- 
force. "The diversity of cost structures for different types 
of firms means that automation and use of cheap labour will 
have different advantages and disadvantages for each one" 
(1986:121). The so-called "exodus to the DCs" is still far 
away of the reality. Ernst (1985, 1988) suggests that
developments in automation technologies in electronics 
manufacture have not yet led to the redeployment back to the 
DCs. (specifically in the case of semiconductors), but is 
likely to penetrate into a very select group of Third World 
countries, in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Based 
on Malaysia's and Hong Kong's experiences, Salih, Young and 
Rasiah (1988) and Henderson (1989) assert that this scenario 
is likely to be the case. The chief drawback to automated 
assembly is not the operating cost but the problems of 
adapting machines to changes in semiconductor package designs. 
The machines must be flexible and reprogramming is costly 
(Langlois, et.al, 19888:55).
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With regard to the pull of market access for customised
c
devices (in the case of semiconductors) and after sales 
services (in the case of consumer electronics) we shall 
suggest that, though they may constitute important segments of 
the industry, . they are different markets from those
standardised products assembled in the NICs and the New-NICs.
In this respect we have three possible scenarios: growing
standardisation of products and production processes joined to 
the cheapening of materials (characteristic of the capitalist 
production) may lead even the high specialised customised
products to mass production. Technological developments in 
telecommunications networks can make some face-to-face design 
phases or after-sales services unnecessary*®. The upgrading 
of the skilled labour-force in some NICs and the growTing 
importance of their markets may lead to the production of 
customised products in those countries. However, it is 
possible that these three scenarios coexist increasing the 
complexity of the set of interrelations among the several 
factors influencing the location of electronics industry.
5. APPROACHES ON THE STRATEGIES OF THE FIRMS.
Here an attempt is made to examine some developments in the 
field which focus on other factors to explain the 
internationalisation of the electronics industry. Particularly 
interesting are the works of Schoenberger (1986, 1988), Scott 
(1987, 1988) and Scott and Angel (1987, 1988) for the case of 
semiconductors industry. They stress the need to search beyond 
the view of the Marxist approach to the NIDL which divides the 
world into two simple blocks of economic activity*** Without
Q
Which made up 11X of world Barket for integrated circuits in 1986 
(Henderson, 1989: table 7.1)
*® See for example the case of Dell Coaputers in US which sells its products by telephone 
and keeps a hot-line to offer technical assistance to customers and, in the case of Binor 
repairaents, spare parts are delivered by an express parcel service within 24hrs! (The 
Economist, various issues).
** The core as centers of managerial control, BID and technology intensive production 
with large n ushers of highly skilled labour force and the periphery with an
undifferentiated mass of cheap labour force (Scott and Angel, 1988:1064).
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disputing the importance of the labour process and employment, 
their objective, rather, is to suggest that the nature of 
competition (Schoenberger) and the "transactional structure of 
production" (Scott and Scott and Angel) also influence the 
evolution of production and its spatial patterning. Their 
analysis is done in the light of the current change in the 
regime of accumulation from Fordism to flexible accumulation.
Schoenberger argues that in the context of crisis of the 
Fordist regime1 firms have responded with a series of 
strategies:
"rationalisation of existing capacity, mergers and 
acquisitions, plant 'shutdowns, location of 
facilities offshore, the adoption of new 
manufacturing technologies and new ways of 
organizing production, the restructuring of supplier 
and subcontracting relationships, and all manner of 
formal and informal cooperative and joint ventures 
on a national and international scale: (1988:245).
In the midst of this crisis and the transition to what is 
called regime of flexible accumulation, the advent of new 
flexible automation technologies in production is believed to 
have a major impact in employment, the use of labour and 
ultimately the way production is spatially distributed.
The main issue in Schoenberger * s work is how the new 
technologies of production need to be used by firms to restore 
their competitiveness and profitability. Since the crisis of 
Fordism is linked to rigidities in the sphere of production 
and in the way competition takes place, then flexible 
technologies have to be used in a way that supports both the 
reorganisation of production and the restructuring of 
competitive strategies. Thus a change in the spatial 
distribution of production arises.
12 The Fordist regiae of accuaulation was fully elaborated in the decades after the World 
War 2, encoapasses both a characteristic technology and organization of production. The 
labour process is structured around the seaiautoaatic asseably line (the faailiar 
standardised aass-production operation based on costly aachinery) which gives yirse. to 
huge productivity gains (Shoenberger, 1968)
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Under Fordism the nature of competition is constrained by the 
mass production techniques (which require considerable 
standardisation of output in order to capture economies of
scale) and the wage bargain with labour. Crisis and the
expansion and intensification of international competition 
without the concomitant expansion of the domestic markets gave 
~Tise. to two responses. One, to erode the position of labour 
in the core and search for low-cost and non-militant labour in 
the periphery. The second is the extracting of competitive 
advantage from greater differentiation and destandardisation 
in the market. This latter strategy, incompatible with the 
Fordist regime, was facilitated by parallel changes in the 
techniques and organisation of production.
In the case of semiconductors industry, standardisation is 
becoming a less viable strategy. Consequently, over the course 
of the last years, a number of major IC producers have 
announced their intention of shifting to semi-customised and
customised chips (with the result of a proliferation of
products and markets). Although to offer a wide and changing 
range of customised chips at low volume with the conventional 
technology could be done at very high cost, Schoenberger*s key 
point is that custom and semi-custom markets can be expected 
to strengthen vis-a-vis commodity chips as costs of design 
and fabrication decline due to new technologies as, for 
instance, standardised and automated design (1988:269).
These changes in the competitive strategy of the industry have 
significant implications for the location of production 
facilities, since the move into custom and semi-custom markets 
increases the need for customer-supplier interaction as the 
customer needs to be involved in the design process 
(1986:326). However, she notes three countervailing pressures:
a) the cost of moving or dismantling production facilities 
offshore; b) the major offshore production region, the Far 
East, has evolved into a significant market; c) the region has 
also expanded as a supplier of equipment, materials, and 
technically qualified labour at relatively low-cost thus some
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firms are moving other phases of production processes (e.g. 
design and engineering) to integrate with the already existent 
facilities in order to serve the regional market. The likely 
scenario Schoenberger suggests on the international level is 
intensified investment -and cross-investment- among major 
market areas, much more complex set of relations than the pure 
model of the NIDL, in a kind of concentrated deconcentration: 
US, Europe (EC) and Asia (1986:327).
In his analysis, Scott asserts that the regime of flexible 
production focuses above of all on the flexibility of 
production processes and labour markets and on the search for 
external economies of scale in the organisation of the 
industrial apparatus (1988:10). The shift to this regime of 
accumulation involved a set of "locational transformations" 
which consist of the twofold tendency to a) definite spatial 
reagglomeration of production in selected areas; combined with
b) active evasion of labour dominated now or in the recent 
past by Fordist industry.
Thus, "new industrial spaces" have come into being typified by 
a resurgence of the phenomena of the social division of labour 
and agglomeration, combined with rapid rates of local growth 
(1988:1307). In an attempt to explain the emergence of these 
new industrial spaces beyond the mere listing of so-called 
location factors (specially in the case of high-tech growth 
centres), Scott argues that they can most effectively be 
comprehended as transactions-intensive agglomerations of human 
labour and social activity. These places experience a "self- 
reinforcing spiral of growth" sustained by the endogenous 
creation of external economies of scale. That is, as markets 
for final products expand, the whole system evolves internally 
by means of a deepening social division of labour and 
increasing elaboration of local-labour structures (1988:109).
"In this context, technological innovation, 
entrepreneurial activity and genealogical structures 
of horizontal and vertical spin-off become the 
proximate expressions of the underlying logic and 
pattern of growth. In particular, a process of
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territorial reproduction is set in motion in which 
the production system and the social system come 
simultaneously to depend upon and yet to sustain one 
another’s existence. Additionally, individual 
producers in different growth centers develop 
multiple transactional relations with one another, 
so that these centers eventually form a mesh of 
interlocking local economies evolving 
interdependently through time" (1988:109).
These transactional relations are of two types, intrafirm, in 
which the production of activities are coordinated by 
managerial hierarchy; and interfirm governed by price signals 
in market and quasi markest institutions. The interface between 
both is constantly in change depending upon factors st/ch as 
technology, labour relations, wages, prices, location, etc. If 
the firm’s internal transactional activities increase (either 
upstream or downstream) vertical integration is taking place; 
when transactions are being externalised, then vertical 
disintegration takes place. The latter is the fragmentation of 
production apparatuses into larger numbers of separate 
specialised production activities performed in different 
firms. This situation corresponds to a production system 
involving different operations tied together by intrafirm 
linkage relations (Scott and Angel, 1987:887).
The nature of transactional activity gives place to two 
different patterns of location, geographical dispersal 
associated to vertical integration and geographical clustering 
associated to vertical disintegration. The inducement to 
converge spatially depends on the cost of transactions per 
unit of output and per unit of distance. Reduction on cost of 
external transactions encourages vertical disintegration and 
spatial convergence lying the foundation of an incipient 
growth center. Increases in these costs (rising land-prices, 
inflation, increasing wages, organisation of labour, and some 
external diseconomies) lead producers to adopt alternative 
strategies. One of the commonest is vertical integration 
associated with the spatial dispersion of production in large 
routinised branch plants that can be profitably relocated in 
peripheral areas where land and labour are cheap and unions
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weak or absent. However, Scott’s main analytical issue is not 
how these areas (in the core or periphery) started but how 
they subsequently grew systematically as a function of their 
own internal dynamic of disintegration, externalisation, 
transactional proliferation, diversification and job creation 
(1988:878). This is by no means, a smooth process of 
organisational-locational change going from agglomeration to 
dispersal but both phenomena may overlap in different segments 
of the same sector.
In the case of semiconductors production, the major centers of 
discrete devices are Massachusetts, the Mid-Atlantic States, 
Silicon Valley and Southern California; for integrated circuit 
production Silicon Valley is the undisputed center. From 
Scott’s statistical analysis it is suggested that this pattern 
of location merged as manufacturers for discrete devices can 
survive on the basis of a very generalised sorts of 
agglomeration economies, whereas manufacturers of integrated 
circuits (ICs) are more dependent on highly specialised kinds 
of agglomeration economies available at a relatively small set 
of locations as Silicon Valley (Scott, 1988; Scott and Angel,
1987).
The growth of this central complex (Silicon Valley) has been 
accompanied by a steady locational diffusion of the industry 
throughout the rest of US and the world. One of the 
manifestations of this diffusion is the spatial and lately 
vertical disintegration of wafer fabrication and assembly 
operations, and the assignment of the latter to various 
locations, mainly offshore. This phenomena can be interpreted 
as a search for various "location-specific advantages", among 
them cheap labour, under circumstances specific to the firm 
which inhibit externalisation, such firms are vertically 
integrated but geographically separated.
However, there have been growth and development at some 
favoured areas in the periphery and semiperiphery (e.g. Hong 
Kong and Singapore) where semiconductor plants have engendered
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significant upstream economic linkages and created demands for 
new kinds of labour skills. This being true for the computer 
industry in South Korea and Taiwan, as well. Although it is 
acknowledged that the advent of automation assembly may prompt 
some repatriation back to US, the widening and deepening of 
external economies available at offshore locations are likely 
to delay that trend13. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a 
regional division of labour is merging in that area interwined 
with the broader division of labour at the world scale. This 
intraregional division of labour can be identified in terms of 
a "core" of high wage countries (Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan) and a "periphery" of low-wage countries, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. According to 
Scott (1987), this phenomenon is mainly due to four factors.
a) Increasing wage rates and other production costs in the 
intra-Asian core have given place to a decentralisation to the 
New-NICS (mainly Malaysia and Philippines).
b ) The emergence of a secondary flow of assembly work inside 
the Southeast Asian region in a both intra-firm and inter-firm 
basis, from plants in the core to plants in the periphery 
(specially for assembly simpler devices).
c) The emergence of Hong Kong and Singapore as centres of 
testing for the international semiconductor industry in the 
whole region. These two centres have a special abundance of 
the kind of scientific labour and consulting services that 
facilitate efficient production in this relatively high 
technology activity at cheaper rates than in  OS- e/c?>rj^ /e .
d) The grow-th of local markets over the last decade'1 has 
encouraged several major producers to establish marketing,
"National Semiconductor has indicated that its new fully automated Odyssey chip 
-assembly system is now being installed in its offshore assembly plants" (Scott and 
Angel, 1986:1061).
11 "Some 16X-18X of all shipments of semiconductor devices from US-owned plants in the 
region now go directly to consumers in the same region (including Japan)(Scott, 
1988:154).
46
sales and after-sales services facilities in Southeast Asia. 
Again, Hong Kong and Singapore merged as important locations 
for regional headquarters. Thus they function as localised 
centres of management and control within the global structure 
of the industry as in Hymer*s model. The clustering of 
producers, services, etc. around these two major centres is 
done in order to minimise the costs of their transactional 
interrelations. The internal dynamic of these complexes gives 
place to a new industrial spaces -as argued above- which can 
be considered as "incipient small-scale Silicon Valleys" 
(Scott, 1987:154).
We consider that the analysis of location under the 
transactional relations framework helps to understand the 
locational decision of the firm at the micro-level. However, 
the factors which compel the firms to move are much more 
complex than the existence of agglomeration economies or 
diseconomies. Likewise, the analysis is devoid of an 
explanation about how the role of the nation-state, or 
competition, affect the locational decision or the dynamic of 
growth in the "new industrial spaces". Nonetheless it has the 
advantage (over other rather simplistic approaches, like the 
NIDL of Hymer* s) of clearly demonstrating that the new 
international division of labour no longer consists of core­
periphery relations. Rather, it has evolved into a complex 
spatial system with many different hierarchical levels and 
sub-regional articulations. In this context, it does recognise 
the possibility of further development in those places - 
eroding the enclave economy view of the NIDL or the so-called 
repatriation back home argument.
6. THE RESTRUCTURING OF CAPITAL APPROACH.
In the same line of analysis, the works of Henderson (1989), 
Salih, Young and Rasiah (1988) and Sklair (1989), offer a rich 
account of the emergence and growth of key locations for 
electronics industry in Third World countries, particularly 
some of the NICs (Hong Kong, Malaysia and Mexico,
4 ?
respectively) in the context of global restructuring of 
capitalism (or reformation of capitalism as Sklair proposes) 
brought about by the ever-deepening crises tendencies. The 
response of the firms has been the initiation of major 
processes of organisational and technical restructuring. It is 
argued that, at the global level, restructuring -as in 
previous crises- is predicated on the search for new bases for 
capital accumulation.
Henderson attempts to examine the relation between economic, 
social and spatial change in particular territorial units and 
the dynamics of global restructuring. He argues that in 
previous crises, restructuring was usually confined to the 
given territorial unit.
"In this contemporary crises restructuring 
"internal" to the territorial unit has been combined 
with spatial (both intra- and inter-national) shifts 
in investment and a massive expansion of the radii 
of organisational control associated with the growth 
of transnational corporations, it is precisely this 
combination of the increased use of space together 
with the expanded transnationalisation of corporate 
structures that has given the current restructuring 
process its global character and dynamic" (1989:3).
To confront fierce competition and generate new accumulation 
possibilities capital turned to the "global option" which was 
made possible thanks to the emergence of new technologies, 
particularly telecommunications. These technologies enabled 
phases of production processes or entire production facilities 
to scatter across the globe whereas managerial control 
remained centralised in the major cities of the core. So 
important are these new technologies (especially 
microelectronics) in a number of activities that Henderson 
argues that industrialisation based on them takes a different 
form from previous rounds of industrialisation: "we can begin 
to specify what is about the manufacture of semiconductors and 
electronic products more generally, that may have brought into 
being this new mode of industrialisation" (ibid p. 4)
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The characteristics of this new mode of industrialisation are 
given by the distinguishing elements of the electronics 
industry:
a) Knowledge, that is, continuing technological innovation as 
a primary basis to keep competitive. Knowledge embodied in 
labour power is a factor of production unevenly distributed 
which influences the spatial distribution of production 
facilities.
b) Processing of information. Since social relations are based 
on communication, electronics production is important for the 
entire realm of human activity in contemporary societies.
c) Electronics production has generated social and technical 
divisions of labour different from most other manufacturing 
industries. This has led to the emergence of socially and 
spatially segregated labour markets based on skill and gender 
relations.
d) Electronics production is organised in terms of technically 
disarticulated labour processes which can be dispersed to 
selected locations onshore or offshore to take advantage of 
production factors."With modern telecommunications and 
transport systems linking dispersed production units to the 
centralised control function, the ’world factory* phenomenon 
merges (1989:5).
These elements -Henderson asserts- in articulation vrith 
historically specific factors such as state development 
strategies internal to the given territorial units themselves, 
have produced economic, social and spatial transformations in 
Silicon Valley, M4 corridor and Scotland in UK, Toulose and 
other parts of Southwest France and,in addition, in some 
peripheral societies such as those of East and Southeast Asia.
To understand this new mode of production and its impact on 
the dynamic of the international division of labour, Henderson
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suggests a methodology to explain the globalisation of 
semiconductor production (or any other branch) and why some 
territorial units, rather than others, have been upgraded in 
terms of their technological basis and control functions and 
why regional divisions of labour have merged. His methodology 
pays attention to the following elements:
"(a) the structure of capitalist commodity 
production at large; (b) the central dynamics of 
labour processes in the context of the contradictory 
capital-labour relation; (c) the internal and 
external organisation of industrial production; (d) 
the influence of state and development strategies; 
(e) the socio-spatial consequences of these 
phenomena, and (f) the way this ensemble of 
relations changes over time” (1987:6).
In relation with the capitalist commodity production, 
Henderson points out that in relation with the valorisation 
process, we should look to the nature of labour processes and 
associated phenomena, capital-labour ratios, technological 
change, wage rates and actual or potential labour conflict. 
With regard to the commodity circulation, the structure of the 
market influences the spatial dispersal of the industry and 
its subsequent evolution.
As noted earlier, in the case of the internationalisation of 
the semiconductor industry, fierce competition between the 
major producers, the emergence of some external diseconomies 
in Silicon Valley, the decline of military markets and the 
relative growth in civilian markets (which brought about an 
increase in standard commercial markets), induced stringent 
cost-cutting measures. Also the characteristics of the 
production process made possible the spatial disarticulation 
of the different phases of production. So US firms invested in 
production facilities in order to reduce costs taking 
advantage of the huge supplies of cheap labour offshore.
However, Henderson points out that subsequent development of 
the industry cannot be understood in terms of such narrow 
unicausal explanation. The emergence of regional division of
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labour in South-east Asia with core-periphery relations is 
associated with the increasing ability of those areas to 
provide good quality engineering and technical labour, the 
development of an indigenous electronics industry (including 
semiconductors) and particular forms of state intervention.
Specifically, Hong Kong (the case he examines) had additional 
advantages to the pool of cheap labour force1®. These 
advantages were as follows: a) political stability; b) an open
financial system with no limits on the repatriation of
profits, and c) excellent telecommunications and air transport 
facilities. Moreover, since Hong Kong had previously developed 
an important textile industry and later radio assembly and 
production of cheaper varieties of consumer electronics, the 
work force was habituated to the kind of labour process
characteristic of the semiconductor industry (1989:51). In the
came.
case of Scotland, US firms and later Japanese/to locate there 
to avoid tariff and non-tariff barriers. Additional factors 
were the existence of cheap and qualified engineering and 
technical labour and the existence of a substantial and
grovring market there (Henderson, 1987 ).
The characteristics of the labour process implanted in both
locations are rather different. Starting from the manual
assembly of transistors, diodes and integrated circuits, Hong
Kong upgraded, so, by the mid-1980s, US companies had
restructured their operations and engaged in a process of
capital deepening and had begun to specialise in more
technologically advanced processes such as final testing,
circuit design and automated assembly. Hong Kong’s education
system could provide the qualified engineers and technicians
more more.
for the testing and design activities/cheaply and in/reliable
quantities than in US or Scotland./^Wther important reason as
Scott (1987) noted is the emergence of a electronics
production complex in the region.
As in the ca&e of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore which also developed flourishing 
seniconductor industries.
/
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ln c o n t r a s t -  f the initial investment in Scotland was in 
warehousing, testing and, occasionally, assembly (for ‘testing 
the water* in Henderson’s words). After a while US firms 
invested in the more capital-intensive, technologically 
sophisticated process wafer fabrication. As in the case of 
the Asian NICs it has merged a string semiconductor production 
there (sub-contractors, suppliers, services, etc.) which
represents an additional inducement for investment^. From his 
detailed analysis of- - Hong Kong’s and Scotland’s 
semiconductor industr , Henderson concludes that since
Scotland has received more advanced phases of production 
processes than those implanted in Southeast Asia, it is
clearly in a more favourable position, that is, more 
autonomous, within the new international division of labour 
than the latter area (Henderson and Scott 1987:71)^.
However, it seems that the q-uesi/o* in this case is not
addressed in the proper terms. At this respect there are three
in 7»» a Ke. •
points/ First, Hong Kong (as Singapore, Taiwan and South 
Korea) do^have indigenously-owned production facilities
(although at present capable of producing only low-grade 
semiconductors) which Scotland lacks. Second ly, many firms make 
the masks (production of celluloid filaments that contain the 
microscopic electronic circuits) in the core centres (e.g. 
US), fabricate the wafers (process by which the circuits on 
the mask are transferred to the silicon wafer and etched into 
its surface) in Scotland; then, the assembly of transistors 
diodes and integrated circuits is made in some New-NICs 
(Malaysia, Indonesia, etc) and from there the ICs are sent to 
Hong Kong or Singapore to be tested and then they are 
distributed directly to the markets. In this context, it is
^  "The growth of this complex has been underpinned by the development of local and 
foreign firas supplying a wide variety of components and subcontracting services to the 
industry. Most significant technologically has been the emergence of the Scottish mask- 
aaking firm, Coapugraphics and the recent decision of the Japanese silicon wafer 
producer, Shin-Etsu Handotal, to set up a plant in the country" (Henderson, 1987:70).
1? In relative teras, since both Scotland and Southeast Asia remain subordinated to the 
US in teras of organisational and managerial control and in terms of scientific and 
technological inputs. The most technologically sophisticated parts of the production 
process remain in US.
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difficult to say which country has a stronger electronics
1 0
industry since they specialise in different activities . 
Finally, 1 ... The importance of the
growing market in East and South East Asia which is an 
inducement for new investment and for upgrading the industry 
there, s h o o /J  -n o t  bz
Salih, Young and Rasiah (1988) examine empirically the growth 
of the semiconductor production in Malaysia. In theoretical 
terms they focus on the exchange-productionist debate*' on the 
role of TNCs in Third World industrialisation. They assert 
that the debate is particularly relevant because changes in 
the structure of the industry, in terms of technology, 
production and markets, transform the nature of the 
international division of labour itself, as in the case of the 
regional division of labour in Southeast Asia and the Pacific 
Rim. The analysis focuses o n the changes in the patterns of 
growth and stagnation of the "local" semiconductor industry in 
terms of cycles and rhythms in the internationalisation of 
capital and the competition amongst capitals in peripheral 
industrialisation (1988;376).
Malaysia in the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s the largest single concentration 
of offshore semiconductors assembly in the Third World. As 
with the other locations, its development was affected by the 
crises of 1974-1975, 1982 and the crash of 1984.
"According to McFarlane (1986) crises are periods 
when outmoded technology gives way to new and more 
productive technologies. Increasing the organic 
composition of capital was meant to raise the 
productivity of labour and in that way help the 
firms to eliminate the obstacles impeding increased 
valorisation. The response to conjunctural shifts, 
of which retrenchment of labour is the most drastic,
In the computers industry can be observed the same trend, Taiwan and South Korea are 
leading terminal exporters, Singapore a major supplier of disk drives and Taiwan, South 
Korea and Hong Kong could expect to play a considerable role in the expanding world 
market for personal computers (Ernst, 1985:339).
19w  See Corbridge, 1986.
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also includes job enlargement and rationalisation 
and the recomposition of some labour processes. This 
recomposition of tasks is an effort by management to 
readjust the labour process in order to realise 
increased relative surplus appropiation" (1988:380).
However, structural and cyclical transformations do not take 
place alone. They are conditioned, as noted earlier, by 
competition between capitals, by the role of the home and host 
countries, etc. In the case of semiconductor industry, 
declining costs of production have led to a growing demand for 
end-use markets for semiconductors. This in turn has 
stimulated product innovation and growth in semiconductors 
applications, expanded volume of production and reduced costs 
further, giving place to intense competition between producers 
in terms of product innovation, production technology and 
markets. This developments, the state policy directed towards 
the maintaining of semiconductors production facilities in
Malaysia and the inducement of new investments and the
20availability of skill labour force and suppliers have 
induced the increasing automation in assembly and testing 
facilities in Malaysia and the decision of National 
Semiconductor to establish a new wafer fabrication unit there 
(although of a lower-end, wafer plant technology is an 
important step towards upstream activity).
Under this condition, the so-called repatriation of 
investments back to the home countries and reintegration of 
the industry around some cores seems to be Unltfely'' as 
far as Malaysia is concerned. However, since the economy is 
heavily dependent on the semiconductors industry, i 
consequence is more vulnerable to the periodical crises of the 
industry than the Asian NICs which have developed indigenous 
electronics industry. The aim of the state policy is to 
attract end-use producers to consolidate the industry there.
20 "So specialized and advanced are the Penang engineers in the areas of asseably and 
testing that they are often sent back to the US to train Americans -an interesting case 
of reverse technology transfer" (1988:383-4).
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With a similar argument, Sklair (1989) emphasises that the 
export-led industrialisation fuelled by foreign investment 
(ELIFFIT, as he calls it) strategy represents a "fundamental 
coming together of the interests of the TNCs and some key 
elites in the countries of the Third World: (1989:1), This
coincidence of interests is a result of the globalisation of 
production since the 1950s, the growth in world trade of 
manufactured products and the changing nature of the 
relationships between TNCs and Third World countries. These 
changes -Sklair argues- constitute a new phase in the history 
of capitalism and a new ideology. This new phase is a 
"reformation of capitalism", the latest readjustment 
capitalism is making to overcome the continuous crises it 
faces. He analyses how the TNCs started to locate offshore the 
labour intensive phases of production y .  at a time of
rapid growth in some Third World countries, the NICs. Some as 
a result of a successful export-led industrialisation policies 
(the Asian NICs) became internationally competitive and had 
the labour-force and infrastructural facilities (FPZs) 
required to attract foreign investment, specially in 
electronics industry. Others (the Latinoamericans)
pursued an import substitution strategy which proved costly 
for those governments. We rather argue that this import 
substitution strategy laid the foundations in terms of 
infrastructure and labour productivity for a later and 
successful production for the world market. In Mexico’s case 
an export-oriented assembly industry program was introduced in 
1965 to encourage firms to build factories along the US-Mexico 
border. It was not the Taiwan or South Korean model, but in 
a more regional context, that is, a development and 
industrialisation strategy in which the in-bond assembly 
plants could play a catalytic role in the/ take-off of the 
whole border region (1989:10).
21 They are better known by their Spanish nue, the Maquiladoras or the abbreviated fora, 
aaquilas.
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The interest of TNCs on this border region comes from some 
problems, Sklair argues, they had operating in Asia. The main 
one is logistical. It is expensive to ship equipment and 
components and tiresome for personnel to commute to the Far 
East. Moreover, in the 1960s, many US companies began to buy 
their materials and components in Asia (Japan and the Asian 
NICs). This meant that the advantages of items 806.30 and 
807.00 were lost since US firms assembled goods with materials 
and components that were not manufactured in US. The wage 
differentials between Asia and the US for assembly were so 
substantial that the loss o/ unc/er 806.30 and 807.00
was outweighed by the savings in production costs.
In this context, the connection between maquilas and the 
reformation of capitalism is that some US based TNCs saw the 
advantage offered by the maquila industry • as typical a 
of "the global embryonic reformation of capitalism" 
(like the FPZ in Asia) and in terms of logistical advantages 
of the US-Mexico border region.
"The embryonic reformation of capitalism can be
perceived in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms. Technological changes in process of 
production in the advanced industrial countries and 
changes in the political economy of foreign trade 
and investment in both First and Third World
countries are beginning to alter the vrays in which 
global capitalism works, albeit in as yet quite 
limited fashion" (1989:10-1).
This impact can be a "dependency reversal" which means that 
the progressive development of the host country will take 
place when the needs and interests of the populations of the 
LDCs begin to displace the needs and interests of the TNCs and 
their local allies. The issue for the reformation of 
capitalism is whether foreign investments strengthen or weaken 
global capitalism in its struggle to maintain its hegemony
over competing forces, that is, if dependency reversal
displaces dependent development. To approach this question 
Sklair chose four countries, one of them Mexico, specifically 
the maquila industry which, established in the northern
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border, did not seem to constitute a threat to the Mexican 
national industry. However, when it was extended to the rest 
of the country as a strategy of industrialisation and 
development, it raised serious questions about its real
2 5  v
contribution to national development . *'n response, Sklair
offers a methodology to evaluate the developmental effects of 
foreign investment in those "maquila like" zones. The 
methodology is based on a set of criteria -he points out- 
both logically and sociologically related to a general theory 
of development and underdevelopment.
"The ’maquila effect’ originates from the Mexican 
experience, but the phenomena it conceptualises are 
universal effects of the global reformation of 
capitalism in its relations with the countries of 
the Third World. This methodology is intended to 
give the capacity to decide concretely where an 
export oriented assembly zone is in the process of 
transformation to a ’development zone’" (1989:19).
Sklair identifies six elements to assess the developmental
success or failure of a zone: linkages, retention of foreign
exchange, upgrading of personnel, technology transfer,
conditions of labour and distribution of costs and benefits
between TNC and the local population. In Mexico’s case, it was
found the existence of few linkages with the local industry
. ,dnU r*J
(there are more linkages in the Asian countries); retention/of 
foreign exchange is decreasing (in terms of value added and 
because population in the border tends to buy their goods in 
the US border cities). t here have been an upgrading of 
personnel, professional, supervisory and production workers 
thanks to the demand of the maquilas. Since this kind of 
labour force is cheaper than the personnel in the home 
country, the growing demand induces the universities and
technical colleges to provide it. Regarding technology
transfer, though the location of phases of production of high- 
tech as semiconductors and computers presents the possibility 
of some technology transfer as the transmission of skill and 
the transfer of workable technology from its controllers to
22
“  See Sklair, 1988.
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those employed to work with the products and processes,. Sklair 
argues that the reformation of capitalism does not permit the 
transfer of the technological monopolies.
The question of the conditions of labour has yenera.J/J.a. long 
debate on the literature, long journeys, job security, 
hazardous processes endangering the health and safety of the 
worker ; the fast pace of production, are some of the 
problems encountered.
With regard to the distribution of benefits, the devaluation 
of the currency and inflation rates of the country means a 
decline of the standards of living of the workers, specially 
maquila workers wTho purchase their household goods in
US. On the other side of the spectrum, there are the Mexican 
professionals and comprador bourgeoisie along the border who 
have done very well because of the maquilas. Industrial park
, /r\c/iS j
developments,/legal and commercial services for the maquila 
have created a new class of wealthy Mexican maquila 
facilitators and a strong middle class. Although most 
commentators argue that maquila industry has been responsible 
for considerable multiplier effects along the border, it is 
extremely difficult to asses the distribution of costs and 
benef its.
Sklair ends his analysis affirming that the reformation of 
capitalism is a series of process within the global system as 
it tries to regulate the relations between the countries of 
the core and those of the Third World. In this context, TNCs 
depend on the continual increase international trade for
their accumulation purposes, Xo this end Third World countries 
are of importance for two reasons. Firsts, as locations (or 
potential locations) since the globalisation of production is 
increasingly taking place in those countries with the 
proliferation of in-bond assembly plants or production sharing
23 The strict US codes on health and safety at work and environmental protection laws and 
the inadequacy of Mexican industrial health and safety legislation encourages some US 
firms to establish in Mexico (Sklair, 1989).
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and the like, analysed under the rubric of NIDL. Second, as 
markets (or potential markets) in so far as these countries 
integrate to the world economy, the TNCs will be seeking to 
satisfy not only demands of mass consumer markets but the 
demands for materials, components, capital goods and services 
as well.
The analysis of Sklair, however full of facts about the 
establishment of in-bond assembly plants along the border and 
its consequences in the cities concerned, is rather linear in 
the sense that ? he. identifies two poles, First and Third 
World, and emphasizes thef r .V>w dependence
( uSinj the argument of "dependency reversal"). By focusing 
on the Mexican case without reference to developments
the emergence of a regional division of labour in the 
production of electronics in South-east Asia, the impacts 
(which not necessarily mean a dependence reversal) in terms of 
development and subsequent dynamics of this kind of industry 
are not stressed enough.
7. CONCLUSIONS.
From this review of the literature it can be concluded that 
the analysis of the locat'o> \ of electronics industry is
not an easy one given the complexity of interrelations between 
the different actors involved. It is clear that we cannot 
approach the analysis7locational patterns of the electronics 
industry/isolation. from the '
growing internationalisation of capital in a 
context of recession in one of the main cores (USA) and the 
rising importance of Japan and some of the NICs as 
competitors.
T h e role of the nation-states in policy making (at 
the country, regional and local level) is often 
underestimated. Governments in the home and host country 
influence the location and subsequent development and
59
upgrading of the industry. In this context we consider that 
the view of the TNCs as an evil ikying the conditions for any 
development at the country or even world level is somewhat 
exaggerated. Since TNCs are subject to the market forces, they 
will look for strategies to minimise costs and, hence, 
increase profitability (or keep their market shares). 
Strategies / new technologies in / j production
processes, new systems of organisation, opening of new markets
and new locations for production facilities bring about 
changes in the structure and geographical distribution of 
world production capacity.
Therefore, to analyse the geographical distribution of the
electronics industry worldwide and the resulting emergence of 
new patterns of location in the host countries
is necessary then to look at ' * ,
external and internal^ External J-dcicrs /nc/ucte , the
competition among firms  ^:• ' ' : ^
r *  d"ncL the role of the nation-states in the home
countries (government and military purchases, industrial 
policy, trade legislation, etc)* " P rnv/ta internal
o/"fhe j v
factor^ /, first and foremost social and
economic policies, the role of the local industry in those 
places integrated to the world production of electronic goods ,
j /*<&the/labour-force organisation. * , c ?-•- '
' j
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II. PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE ELECTRONICS
INDUSTRY. 1970 - 1985
INTRODUCTION.
After the long boom of the post-war period, the worldwide 
economic crises in the early 1970s intensified the 
competition in some industrial sectors, hastening the trend of 
redistribution of world production capacity that was observed 
in the early 1960*s. To maintain the rate of profit, capital 
needed to increase labour productivity by different means: 
increased mechanisation, new technology, relocation of some 
phases of production processes or the adoption of new 
organisational systems which were more suitable to the new 
conditions of production and competition on a worldwide scale.
To understand how the process of internationalisation of 
capital has occurred I shall deal with the electronic 
industry, which is characterised by intense competition, which 
led to a redistribution of the world production capacity from 
the developed countries to the more developed of the 
developing countries (the so-called New-NICs) in a first wave, 
and in a second wave to the next tier, the New-NICs. Nowadays, 
the process continues, not only from developed to developing 
countries, but from the most developed NICs to the less 
developed.
be
Therefore, it can ^ observed the emergence of an international 
division of labour in the electronics industry and lately the 
emergence of a regional division of labour between the NICs 
and the New-NICs. The logic of this process of redistribution 
of production capacity was to increase labour productivity 
through the relocation of the labour-intensive phases of the 
production process to those countries which offer a cheaper 
labour-force (skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled) than in 
the main production sites, with the same levels of 
productivity per unit of output, or even higher levels in some 
branches of the industry. The process took place at the same 
time that the strategies of the governments in these countries
changed to reinforce the export-led policies, offering 
facilities to the establishment of plants (in some cases in 
the FPZs), stressing the advantages of such locations for the 
industry.
Hence, in discussing the internationalisation of the 
electronics industry, attention will be focused on the 
patterns of international trade in some of the most important 
branches of the industry, from 1971 to 1985. It should be
noted that the electronics industry, as a whole, has more than
/■/**-
25 categories of products (at 4 digits level of the Standard 
International Trade Statistics, rev. 2 UNIDO)* Some of these 
,<lj .are completely new ^ y i d  fo r some there is a lack of
information for some years or some categories appear 
aggregated in the first years of the period, making the 
analysis of all the categories for the period difficult. 
Consequently, in this attempt I choose just some of the 
branches without denying the importance of expanding the 
analysis to the other branches in further stages of research.
1. ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY:
a) Classification. o l . c b tn . i j
The starting point of the/industry was the radio
jk , followed in the 1930’s
by the television set. Communication equipment, entertainment 
and information systems are an important part of the industry 
and they are being transformed by the electronic computer. In 
this way the telephone system today increasingly uses 
electronic exchanges and switching computers, and is 
increasingly used for data transmission and for communication 
between computers. Domestic television and video-cassette- 
recorders (VCRs) can be linked through telephone networks to 
provide a wide range of information services, both for 
households and for businesses. Likewise, office activities are 
transformed by the use of electronic equipment (Freeman, 
1982:78). All these developments within the electronics 
industry constitute a wide range of different products which 
are classified within four divisions of the Standard
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International Trade Statistics Rev. 2 (UNIDO), as can be seen 
in table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1 ELECTBONICS 1KDUSTET: Classification.
DIVISION 75: Office 
lachines and data- 
processing equipient
DIVISION 76: Telecoxxunications 
and sound recording and 
reproducing apparatus and 
equipient
Group 776; Electronic 
tubes, valves, transistors
DIVISION 87: Professional, 
and instruients, etc.
DIVISION 88: Photographic 
apparatus and supplies;
Typewriters; calculating and cheque 
writing lachines; other autoiatic 
data-processing lachines and periphe­
rals; cash registers, incorporating 
a calculating device; postage, franking 
and ticket issuing lachines, incorpo­
rating calculating devices; duplicating 
lachines; photo copying and thenacopy 
parts for this type of equipient not 
elsewhere classified.
Television and radio broadcast 
receiving equipient; graxophones 
dictating lachines an all other sound 
recorder and reproducers, including 
record players and tape decks and 
systeis; licrophones and loudspeakers 
etc.; telephonic and telegraphic 
apparatus; radio and television 
transxitters; other telecoixuni- 
cations equipient; television 
catenas; radar and radio navigational 
aid apparatus; parts for these not 
elsewhere classified.
Electronic valves and tubes;piezo- 
electric crystals; diodes; 
transistors; and other seiiconductors 
and siiilar seiiconductor devices; 
electronic licrocircuits; parts of 
these coiponents.
A wide range of optical, scientific 
controlling instruients, including 
telescopes and licroscopes; ledical 
instruients, leters and counters; 
surveying and navigational 
instruients; drawing, lathenatical 
and iarking-out instruients and 
lachines; electronic, electrical and 
other autoiatic control and 
analytical instruients; parts for 
these products not elsewhere 
classified.
Photographic and cinexatographic 
caieras projectors, optical goods; 
watches and clocks, sound recorders, 
etc.{photographic fill, plates and 
paper; optical goods including 
lenses, spectacles, etc.; watches, 
clocks and other tiie recording 
equipient, tiie switches, etc.
Source: P. Hall and P. Preston, 1988:Table 11.5.
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In terras of the end-use demand of the electronic products the 
industry is conventionally divided into four main sectors, as 
Freeman (1982b:58) pointed out. These are:
(1) Consumer electronics (radio, T.V., record-players * 
tape recorders, etc.)
(2) Electronic capital goods (radar, computers, process 
control equipment, communication equipment, telephone 
exchanges, instruments, etc.)
(3) Electronic components (valves, semiconductors, 
integrated circuits, Large Scale Integration (LSI), Very 
Large Scale Integration (VLSI), chips, resistors 
rectifiers, capacitors, etc.)
(4) Military equipment (radar, missile control systems, 
electronic battlefield equipment; etc.)
The author has found that the fourth group is sometimes 
classified separately, but more usually with the second. It 
is important to mention that the products of the third sector 
are intermediate goods which are incorporated in the final 
products of the other three sectors. Lately, with the advent 
of the microprocessor, electronic components are increasingly 
incorporated in a wide range of products from other industries 
(eg. toys and missiles) which are not classified as 
’electronic* (Freeman, 1982b:58).
Such a variety of products makes it difficult to analyse the 
location pattern of each one over a long period of time. For 
none of these products existed at the beginning of the 
century, and most of them did not exist in their present form, 
even ten years ago, due to the high rate of innovation. As in 
some other sectors of industry (e.g. chemicals), electronics 
is one of the most research-intensive. Therefore, in as much 
as the available data allows I shall try in the next sections 
to identify the pattern of international trade related with 
the location of some of the main subsectors of the industry.
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b ) International Trade in the Electronics Industry.
As mentioned above, the electronic industry is characterised 
by intense competition and rapid technological change in its 
products. Therefore, it is "uneconomical to invest heavily in 
fixed capital for assembly operations (to increase labour 
productivity) because of the short time period within which 
such equipment would be rendered obsolete" (Jenkins, 1984: 
129). This element has brought the industry to its leading 
role in the internationalisation of capital from the 1960s 
through the relocation of the labour-intensive phases of the 
production process (assembly) in Asia (Southeast and East) and 
Latin America.
Although it can be observed a general pattern of
redistribution of the electronic production capacity, each 
branch has its own specific characteristics and ' - locate
accordingly. In this way, some high-skilled phases as well as 
research and development activities remain in the core 
countries. The most sophisticated phases of the assembly 
process, which require a skilled labour-force, are sent to the 
most developed NICs, whereas the less sophisticated phases are 
sent to the New-NICs, due to the fact that they require a 
labour-force with lesser levels of skill to perform the 
assembly activities. This process gives place to the
emergence of specialisations of production related to specific 
geographical locations.
Before starting to examine specific branches a broad outline 
of the international trade of electronics products at the most 
aggregated level wTill be given. Table 2.2 presents the 
proportion of each category of products in some countries*
,/A / ifZ,
exports of electronics^. These give some idea of the
specialisation patterns in the international trade of great 
importance in this study. In the American exports of 
electronics, office machinery (including computers) dominates, 
at 43% of the total. In the UK exports its share is 38%; 28%
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in FRG; about one-fifth of Japanese exports; one-third of the 
EC total and just 11% of the NICs total.
TABLE 2.2: Electronics Industry Exports: percentage 
coaposition by sector, 1982
UK USA JAPAN ERG EC NICs
TOTAL
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nations
Office machinery 
ADP equipment 38 43 20 28 33 11 29
Telecommunications 
and sound 
recording 11 9 46 22 16 41 26
Transistors, 
valves, etc. 13 19 13 10 11 35 16
Professional and 
scientific 24 21 5 25 21 3 15
Optical goods, etc. 14 8 16 15 19 10 14
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: P. Hall and P. Preston, 1988:Table 11,7.
Consumer electronics (including telecommunications) has a big 
share in the Japanese total (46%) and in the NICs total (41%), 
highlighting the export performance of both NICs and Japan 
compared with, for example, British exports (11%) and American 
(9%). With regard to transistors, valves, etc. (electronic 
components) the core sector of electronics, the export 
performance of the NICs is remarkable, being 35% of their 
total exports, followed by 0 5 # (19%). In professional and
scientific equipment, a subsector which requires high levels 
of skill, it is hardly surprising to find that the developed 
countries dominate; FRG 25%; UK 24%; and both ‘ USA . and EC 
21% each. Optical goods is a subsector which has little 
importance in the countries concerned, the EC being an 
exception with a share of about one-fifth of its total 
exports, followed by FRG with 15%. This means that the core 
centre of production for these kind of goods is located a v i y  from 
the main producers of electronics.
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With regard to the world total exports of electronic products 
it can be seen that , office machinery is the
dominating subsector, with 29% of the world total, followed by 
consumer electronics (26%) and electronic components (16%). 
However, it should be noted that the above-mentioned shares 
can underestimate the electronic components sub-sector due to 
the existence of intra-firm trade. Japanese firms, for 
example, are characterised by their vertical integration; this 
means that part of their electronic components production is 
incorporated in the final goods (e.g. consumer electronics) 
without being accounted for as exports. The same happens with 
reference to an inter-firm trade in some countries, the final 
result being that they have a large bulk of exports in, for 
example, consumer electronics, which incorporates 
home-assembled devices. Unfortunately, this kind of trade is 
difficult to measure with the data available.
To summarise, the above percentages indicate the existence of 
patterns of specialisation in the international trade of 
electronic products. The NICs in consumer
electronics and electronic components, subsectors which makes 
up more than three-thirds of their exports of electronic 
products. Japan performs better in consumer electronics than 
in the other sectors and America in office machinery, 
including computers. In the next sections attention will be 
focused on some of the most important branches of each 
subsector.
2. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SEMICONDUCTORS.
Before examining the trends in the international trade of 
electronic components, a broad outline is presented of the 
characteristics of this subsector. This is particularly 
relevant due to changes in the structure of the industry, k! 
afeeo-f iy m technology, production and markets have influence
in the nature of the international division of labour. The 
process gives place, for instance, to a regional division of 
labour in Southeast Asia (Scott, 1985; Henderson, 1989), which
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is reflected in the emergence of "new exporters” J 0 Y the 
period of study.
a ) Characteristics of the Industry
The predecessor of modern semiconductors is the vacuum tube, 
invented in England at the beginning of this century. It 
consisted of from two to five electrodes surrounded by a glass 
tube. The tube was sealed to a metallic base and a vacuum was 
induced inside it to improve conductivity. This device became 
central for the development of all electronics, but it was 
fragile, bulky and relatively slow in transmitting electronic 
signals, though it could be easily and cheaply produced
(Henderson and Scott, 1987:38). World War II k / W e j A i  
new developments. The corner stone of the modern electronics 
industry, the transistor, was developed by the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in the United States (1948). The transistor
displaced the vacuum tube and made possible the 
technological development of electronics and microelectronics 
through the progressive sophistication and miniaturisation of 
the electronic components. The wide range of implications of 
such technological change are not only in the characteristics 
of products but in the type of labour processes needed in the 
production (Dicken, 1988).
The transistor is made with materials such as silicon, which 
acts as a semiconductor of electrical current. Later 
developments allowed the semiconductor to be manufactured 
commercially. In the late 1950’s the integrated circuit (ICs) 
the second major innovation. Integrated circuits consume 
) ' f k  power, have high reliability and are cheap to produce.
Moreover, they are tiny devices which can perform the
functions more quickly than their predecessors (Henderson and 
Scott, 1987:40).
As Henderson and Scott pointed out, since its commercial 
development, integrated circuit technology has become 
increasingly sophisticated in two senses. First, the number
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of circuits embodied in a piece or ’chip* of silicon, of less 
than 1/4 inch square in size, and the number of functions that 
can be performed have increased enormously^. Secondly, the 
number of functions that the integrated circuit can perform 
has advanced in such a way that nowadays there are five forms 
of semiconductor technology 7 . *discrete* devices used, for 
instance, in telephone systems to the most sophisticated 
microprocessor. The microprocessors are able to manipulate 
data and hence can perform the functions of computers 
( 1987:40) .
In essence, the production of semiconductors involves five 
stages, or different labour processes, which can be 
technically disarticulated: R&D, mask making, wafer
fabrication, assembly and testing. The continued development 
of integrated circuit technology has had implications for the 
first three stages. Assembly and testing manual
processes, which can be performed offshore, owing to several 
aspects, as pointed out by Langlois, et al:
’First, scale economies are minor, capital 
requirements are modest and few learning economies 
attach to assembly beyond the worker-training 
period. Second, although package designs are 
continually changing, the manual assembly process 
itself is a relatively stable technology. Third, in 
view of the high growth rate of the industry, 
decisions about the establishment of offshore 
assembly were generally confronted as 
capacity-expansion decisions. Without sunk costs, 
the lower average total cost of offshore assembly 
was often the deciding factor” (1988:53).
However, in the last few years, as a result of the evolution 
of VLSI technology, the assembly processes have begun to be 
automated and final testing controlled
lasers and computers. Nonetheless, this process can hardly 
spread out and jeopardise the advantages of offshore locations 
in the short-term. High fixed costs, rapid technological
 ^ "With first ’large scale* (LSI) and then ’very large scale’, (VLSI) in the 1970’s, each 
chip in the latest generation of integrated circuits now contains in excess of 100,000 
■icroscopic transistors" (Henderson, and Scott, 1987:40).
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change and expansion of market niches for customised designs 
are the main factors preventing the full adoption of automated 
assembly. The machines, once they overcome the high-cost of 
establishment, must be flexible and reprogramming is costly 
(Langlois, et al, 1988:55).
In view of this brief introduction to the characteristics of 
the industry, I will now turn to some aspects of offshore 
assembly and competition of the main firms and countries 
involved in the international trade of semiconductors.
b) Development of Offshore Assembly
The US semiconductor industry, as has already been indicated, 
dates back to the early 1950s as a strategic sector for 
military purposes. The federal government via the Department 
of Defence and NASA spent great amounts in supporting R&D 
programmes and extending the production capacity. Moreover, 
as the main purchaser, the federal government^ encouraged the 
production capability and the technological development of 
the industry.
At the same time, Silicon Valley in Santa Clara County, 
California consolidated as an important location for the 
industry. Several electronic and military related enterprises 
located there and, with Stanford University nearby, it made
possible the development of technology as a result of the
• 3interaction between firms and scientists . This does not mean
that the mere existence of the university *J,‘ . - ■ to the
emergence and shape of the semiconductor industry as some 
literature affirms. Without neglecting the importance of 
them, I believe that to understand the dynamic of this 
subsector (and of the electronics industry as a whole) it must 
be seen as a sector of production in capitalism and subject to
2
"...100 percent of sales in integrated circuits in 1962" (Sayer, and Morgan, 1987). 
And M...a half of sales in the semiconductors" (Flama, 1985).
3
For further information on the genesis of Silicon Valley see Saxenian, 1985.
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the pressures of the capital-labour relation and the 
competition between capitals. Only in the light of a 
clarification of this issue is it possible to understand how 
the redistribution of world production capacity has taken 
place in the semiconductor industry and in the electronic 
industry.
In the early 1960s, the standardisation of production lines 
emerged as a consequence of improvements in r 
technology, the decline of military demand and the grow’th of 
a civilian market (with less sophisticated needs) (Flamm, 
1985:41). The reduction of military demand had two important 
effects on the industry^:
i. the emergence of strong price-competition and 
cost-cutting strategies;
ii. the internationalisation of production, restricting 
domestic manufacturing to military purchases by federal 
law (Henderson, and Scott, 1987: 59).
The intensity of competition and the entry of new firms 
pressed location shifts on the industry to reduce production 
costs. So the firms began to seek out low labour-cost 
locations. The first ‘runaway* firm, in the strict sense meant 
by Frobel (1981:331-8) was Fairchild, which established a 
plant in Hong Kong in 1962. Therefore, in the first location 
wave the first beneficiaries were the NICs since they had the 
best cost-cutting conditions, that is, a cheap labour force 
with the required levels of productivity per unit of output. 
They also constituted a favourable investment environment, the 
host governments offered tax holidays, few restrictions on 
repatriation of profits and 4 and lax enforcement of
labour legislation, important for this kind of industry. 
Likewise, the policies of government in fomenting economic
"...froa 39X in seaiconductors and 100X in ICs in 1962, to 27 and 53 respectively in 
1966" (Flaaa, 1985: 43).
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growth had resulted in improvements in infrastructure and 
public services adding to the incentives.
In 1964, General Instruments set up some of its assembly 
activities in Taiwan. In 1966, Fairchild located a plant in 
South Korea. Also, several US semiconductor plants were 
established in Latin America, particularly Mexico and the 
Caribbean region. In the later 1960s, they were established 
in Singapore and Malaysia (Dicken, 1988; Sayer and Morgan, 
1987) .
The reimport of assembled devices into the US was possible 
under items 806.30 and 807.00 of the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States. As mentioned in chapter I, only the duties on 
the foreign value-added had to be paid ,r<W/u?r'on the total value 
of the devices. These items were added to the tariff code in 
1963 and the semiconductor industry became a major user of 
them. The duties added only 1 or 2 percent to the total cost 
of the reimported devices in the late 1970s, in April 1985
the tariff rate on semiconductors was reduced to zero,lk*j 
eliminating this cost (Langlois, 1988:54).
Nonetheless, the outstanding position of the US firms was 
challenged by Japanese newcomers. They did not receive 
stimulus from the military sector and lacked a rich 
technically- sophisticated domestic market such as the US 
firms . After great efforts at imitation and a long term
strategy (which includes restrictions on imports and foreign 
investment, licensing of foreign technology) encouraged by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) the 
Japanese firms became a major force in the world
semi-conductor market in a range of chips which took advantage 
of high quality volume productions.
The second location wave was the result of the strong 
competition of Japanese firms, which grew at a rapid rate; the 
world crisis which brought about the first overproduction 
crises in the industry (1974-1975) and the increasing cost of
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labour in some NICs. Therefore, the firms searched for 
locations with still cheaper labour-cost in some New-NICs such 
as the Philippines and Indonesia in addition to Malaysia. 
Moreover, the ’old* locations in South East and East Asia and 
Latin American were consolidated and upgraded in terms of the 
characteristic of the assembly process performed there as a 
result of improvements in skilled and semi-skilled 
labour-force, infrastructure, government incentives, etc. 
(Duncan, 1981; Dicken, 1988).
A standard pattern of internationalisation can be identified 
for the industry in general. Firms employ mostly young 
unmarried female workers (see Sklair, 1989 among others) 
Wafers fabricated in Silicon Valley are air-freighted to 
South-East Asia for assembly. Once assembled the discrete 
devices or integrated circuits are air freighted back to 
Silicon Valley for final testing and marketing. Since 
transport costs per unit of output amount to less than 1% of 
the total production costs in the international semiconductor 
business, ' . distance is not an obstacle to
offshore assembly, provided that the air service is reliable 
and rapid from the host country (Scott, 1987:145). Lately, the 
assembly of more sophisticated devices and final testing has 
been performed successfully by the more advanced Asian NICs - 
Hong Kong and Singapore - giving rist to the emergence of a 
sub-regional division of labour. Less sophisticated devices 
are assembled in the New-NICs mentioned above and then sent to 
Hong Kong and Singapore for final testing (Scott, 1987; 
Henderson and Scott, 1987).
The third major producing region, Western Europe, shows some 
backwardness in terms of production of semiconductors. Since 
the late 1960s several US companies have started operations in 
the UK; General Instruments set up . J>1 ~ . 1968
and was followed by National Semiconductors, Motorola and 
Hughes (Financial Times, September 8, 1981). However, the
labour processes implanted in the UK (Scotland) are rather 
different from those in Third World locations. Initial
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investment was in warehousing, test facilities and 
occasionally assembly, as a manner of "testing” the advantages 
of the location. After a while, all the American firms had 
invested in the more capital intensive, technologically 
sophisticated process, wafer fabrication.
"No American firm has yet invested in offshore wafer 
fabrication facilities other than in Europe or Japan 
and thus their Southeast Asian plants, for instance, 
are totally dependent on assembly processes or in 
certain locations (Hong Kong and Singapore in 
particular) on final testing” (Henderson, 1987:11).
Moreover, there are well-established companies from the 
Netherlands, (.Philips) and from West Germany ^Siemens and 
Telefunken) „ among the world’s leading semiconductor 
companies. However, the development of the European industry 
has to confront several problems to increase its share in the 
world market and to reduce the importance of US firms in 
Europe. First, the market fragmentation in several small 
national markets, each with its own technical standards, 
strategies, government policies and low level of 
sophistication. Second, with such a fragmentation, it is 
difficult to achieve economies of scale and efficiency. Also
■ d>\ y
there is^absence of linkages between sectors in the US and
Japan * c . Moreover, the failure to develop a long term 
strategy instead of responding to customer’s individual needs 
and the development of defence markets has had major 
consequences in the wide penetration by foreign investment. 
Specially, US firms began to produce and sell in Europe
, to penetrate EC tariff barriers and hence to 
compete effectively with European suppliers (Morgan and Sayer, 
1987; Sayer, 1986).
"The fact that the 17% EC tariff was levied on the 
value-added during the production process, meant 
that semi-conductor firms could produce most of the 
values-added in their European plants - namely at 
the wafer fabrication stage - and cheaply assembly 
and test the semiconductors in their South East 
Asian facilities, and subsequently import the 
completed product back into EC" (Henderson, 
1987:17).
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After the crisis of 1973-1974, the performance of the industry 
was spectacular; the average annual rate of increase from 1974 
to 1980 was around 15 percent (Financial Times, April 30, 
1980). Intense utilisation of semiconductors in a wide range 
of completed products, from the most sophisticated electronic 
equipment for telecommunications to the most simple watch, and 
the fierce competition were some of the factors for the 
development of techniques to cut down production costs®.
Therefore the prices of individual devices decreased by as 
much as 30 percent per year (Financial Times April 30, 1980). 
This tendency was increased by the crash of 1984. But what 
happened to such a successful industry? First, extra capacity 
was installed by both US and Japanese firms to respond to the 
great shortage of semiconductors between 1976 and 1980. 
Second, the industry was hit by world recession (Europe) and 
high interest rates (US). There seem to be problems of 
adjusting output: cyclical problems of oversupply and the high 
inventory levels maintained by customers (Financial Times June 
17, 1981).
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the introduction of 
automation in production is the current focus of the debate. 
Some people have suggested that semiconductor offshore plants 
may be repatriated to the home countries in view of the need 
to assemble the more technically advanced devices (Sayer and 
Morgan, 1987). Also, there appears to be a tendency to locate 
the industry in the developed economies. For example, Britain 
remained the first choice for overseas investment by US 
electronics companies (Financial Times February 2, 1983). The 
core idea of the ’exodus* from the NICs to advanced economies 
is that of demand for high levels of skill from the 
labour-force; wage differentials have narrowed between NICs 
and the West; worker resistance (in the case of Philippines* 
illegal strikes in 1985); and political instability in some 
countries.
5
"Perhaps the most significant structural shift within the labour process was the 
accelerated introduction of automation" (Salih, et.al., 1988:380).
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But the above debate seems to neglect the emergence of 
important changes in the structure and organisation of 
production. As Jenkins points out, the TNCs remain subject to 
the compulsion of competition, despite concentration and 
centralisation of capital (1984; 17). So, they create more 
intricate production networks which may lead to a rapid 
vertical integration and increase in the division of labour, 
for example, the subregional division of labour in South East 
and East Asia.
Likewise, the high costs of establishing a plant (to carry out 
any phase of the process) seems to be not only a great barrier 
to entry, but also to promote the need to maintain offshore 
plants in the NICs and New-NICs (Duncan, 1981:183). In this 
way, as Ernst points out, to maintain a low level of unit cost 
for the expensive equipment, it is only possible if "the 
effective annual utilisation of this machinery can be 
increased considerably by means of uninterrupted work" 
(1985:346). Therefore, NICs and New- NICs locations have an 
advantage, because they have soft labour regulations and, in 
some cases, no effective existing unions, as in the developed 
countries. In the case of places like Scotland, the location 
is a result of the EC tariff barriers. As Dicken mentions:
"...the type of international production located by 
electronics firms in these developed countries is 
substantially different from that located in the 
Third World. Whereas offshore production in most 
developed countries is aimed at cost-minimisation, 
the dominant motivation for overseas location 
within developed countries is market access" 
(Dicken, 1988:343).
Besides, as seen in chapter I, Scotland specialises in 
different production processes than those performed in the 
Asian NICs. Additionally, there are two other factors which 
have to be considered in the analysis. First, the expansion of 
the market in the NICs, though not considerable now, could be 
important in the next decade. Second, the specialisation of 
labour processes in the different locations, given the 
differences in sophistication and complexity of the devices
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roust be taken into account. Since each location has its own 
advantages in performing different phases of the production 
process, it would be expensive to move the plants from one 
already specialised location to another.
c ) The Nature of Competition.
The production of semiconductors is dominated by a handful of 
companies. All of them have a variety of backgrounds, but the 
most evident is the division between the Old School and the 
New Comers. The former consist of firms like Siemens, firms 
which come from the older electrical industry, and Motorola 
and Fairchild which were in electronics before the ’chip* was 
conceived. Most of them are already diversified but have had 
failures in the mass markets. Texas Instruments and National 
Semiconductor were founded in the 1950*s to take advantage of 
the transistor technology (Duncan, 1981:178).
The leader, Texas Instruments is almost the only strictly 
semiconductor company meeting the Japanese competition there. 
The others, in their quest for further vertical integration, 
are concentrating on other areas like communication. Others, 
like IBM were already in the computer industry and make their 
own semiconductors (The Guardian, June 18, 1979).
There is another block, the ’New Comers*, which came in with 
the chip. The successful ones have expanded rapidly and tend 
to lead the technology more often than the ’elders*. Intel, 
for instance, from a small beginning in 1969, achieved a great 
turnover in 1979. Mostek, even younger, is questing for 
diversification beyond the chip itself and tends to be 
restricted to building working blocks for customers (Duncan, 
1981; The Guardian June 18, 1979). Likewise, there are the 
Japanese firms, which were aiming to become a force in the 
worldwide market for silicon chips (Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, 
Toshiba, Mitsubishi). With only a tiny fraction of the 
semiconductor market they have an aggressive campaign 
(particularly NEC) for increasing their market share by means
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of establishing plants in some of the European countries (UK) 
and in the US. The five companies are also vertically 
integrated, controlling their business from chip design and 
manufacturing to the assembly and marketing of finished 
products (Financial Times, September 9, 1980).
The data for semiconductor sales in 1979 and 1988 show the 
increasing importance of Japanese firms (figures 2.1 and 2.2). 
In 1979 NEC and Hitachi were the only two Japanese firms in 
the top ten worldwide integrated circuit producers (8th and 
10th place). By 1988, there were six Japanese companies the 
among the ten top producers of semiconductors, the three top 
places were for Japanese companies, NEC (1st), Toshiba (2nd) 
and Hitachi (3rd). However, nowadays the American firm Intel 
is firmly established as the world’s top chip maker. Finally, 
there is another block of newcomers from Asian NICs, 
especially from South Korea (also some firms from Taiwan are 
incursioning in the production of semiconductors); Samsung, 
Gold Star and Daewoo are large producers of electrical and 
electronic system products already, while one - Hyundai - has 
no previous experience in this area (Langlois, 1988:45). 
Since the late 1980*s, the semiconductor industry is going 
into a gradual slow down, due, again, to the high levels of 
inventory maintained by most of the purchasers. For example 
Advanced Microdevices (AMD), National Semiconductor and Texas 
Instruments reported a significant worsening in market 
conditions which led to lay plans for restructuring their 
businesses and cut their labour forces (Financial Times, 
November 12, 1988; Financial Times, November 22, 1989).
Thus the slump joined to the competition of Japanese firms® 
will have definite implications in the international division 
of labour .
For example, Japan has overtaken the U.S. as the largest source of components for 
electronics companies in Scotland (Financial Times, November 11, 1988). Likewise Japanese 
semiconductor sales in the U.S. have increased by over 70 percent in the past three years 
(Financial Times, Hay 12, 1989).
7
In October, AMD announced 1 400 workers were going to be laid off in its plants in the 
Philippines (Financial Times, November 11, 1988).
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FIGURE 2.2
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Another dimension of competition in the semiconductor industry 
is that of the national shares achieved in the worldwide 
markets for various IC products. In a broad outline the 
specialisation of different types of semiconductors can be 
seen in Table 2.3. US based firms have undoubtedly great 
strength in most of the different types of semiconductors but, 
particularly in bipolar digital ICs, whose end-use is 
basically in computers.
TABLE 2.3. National Shares of the World IC Market: 
by Product Type, 1982, as percentage
PRODUCT UNITED STATES JAPAN OTHERS*
IC Total 62 31 7
MOS IC 60 35 5
Microprocessors 64 33 3
Meaory 65 33 2
Logic 49 40 11
BIPOLAR 62 27 11
Linear 51 35 14
Digital 74 19 7
Note: Excludes captive production 
* Mostly Western Europe 
SOURCE: R N Langlois, et al, 1988:Table 12.
Japanese and European firms have relative strengths in bipolar 
linear ICs, whose use is in consumer electronics. Despite 
their leading position, US firms are at present being 
challenged by Japanese firms, which are showing relative 
strength in some areas as MOS (Metal-oxid semiconductors) 
products. Langlois et.al. pointed out that
"Japanese firms had no share in the IK DRAM (Dynamic 
Random Access Memory) market in the early 1970s and 
achieved only a 12 percent share of the 4K DRAM 
merchant market in the mid-1970s, they captured 
about 40 percent of the world merchant market for 
16K DRAMs in the late 1970s, and about 60 percent of 
the world merchant market for 64 DRAMS in the first 
half of the 1980s.” (Langlois et.al., 1988:35).
The most important application for the 64K DRAM is computers. 
Memory chips store data and, if they are combined with 
data-processing logic chips like microprocessors, DRAMs become 
the "brains" of computers, missiles, robots and other 
microelectronic products (Rogers and Larson, 1984: 208).
Likewise the Japanese have successfully 256K
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DRAMs market (about 80 to 90 percent of the world market). 
The introduction of 256K DRAM suggests that the Japanese and 
South Korean firms are becoming technological leaders, with 
the resulting efforts of US firms to stop them through several 
means.
d ) International Trade in Semiconductors.
It is necessary for an attempt to analyse the new 
redistribution of world production capacity taking place in 
the semiconductor industry, to look at the exports from the 
main producer countries in a defined period of time. Having 
in mind the nature of the industry in its main aspects - 
production process, types of products and competition and how 
these phenomena take place in the geographical sphere - makes 
it easier to understand the redistribution of production 
capacity from the DCs countries to the NICs, New-NICs, within 
the DCs countries and from the NICs to the DCs (e.g. South 
Korean firms). Due to problems of data aggregation for the 
first year of the period of analysis (1970), I will only 
examine the main trends in the selected years of 1975, 1979 
and 1985. Table 2.4 (see next page) shows exports of 
transistors, valves, semiconductors, etc. as a percentage of 
world exports (from market economies) by main geographical 
area and country. In 1975, the main exporter area was Asia 
with almost fifty percent of world exports, followed by 
Western Europe (38.6 percent) and America with 11.0 percent.
The main exporter country was Japan with about 32 percent 
share of world exports. The US, West Germany and Netherlands 
shares are almost the same, about 10 percent each. The US 
share has to be carefully considered due to the fact that 
US-based firms had already started offshore assembly 
operations in the NICs. Since the products assembled are not 
always re-impor'ted into US markets, but go directly to third 
markets or are included in final products it is possible that 
US production is underestimated in terms of exports.
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TABLE 2.4: Exports of Transistors, Valves, etc. (Valves as 
percentage of world Market economies, rate of 
growth in brackets) 1975 - 1985.
COUNTRIES 1975 1979 r75/79 1985 r79/85
WORLD MKT EC 100.0 100.0 (16.7) 100.0 (10.2)
ASIA 47.0 38.0 46.0 _
Japan 31.8 18.0 (6.6) 21.0 (12.3)
Hong Kong 2.4 4.1 (24.2) 4.0 (10.0)
Singapore 7.3 10.7 (22.7) 6.2 (2.9)
South Korea 4.9 4.6 (15.9) 5.0 (11.3)
Malaysia 0.2 n.a. n.a. 8.3 (38.2)*
Philippines 0.0 n.a. n.a. 1.1 (56.9)*
Thailand 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. -
Indonesia 0.0 0.6 (74.9) 0.3 -
AMERICA 11.0 16.3 _ 24.8 _
USA 10.5 15.9 (23.4) 23.6 (15.2)
Brazil 0.3 0.4 (17.7) 0.4 (12.3)
Mexico 0.2 n.a. n.a. 0.8 (25.1)*
EUROPE 38.6 30.5 _ 24.1 _
France 7.2 6.3 (14.4) 4.4 (5.6)
Italy 3.0 2.7 (14.7) 2.4 (8.7)
UK 4.7 4.3 (15.2) 5.8 (13.9)
West Germany 10.2 9.7 (15.8) 6.4 (4.8)
Netherlands 9.7 5.1 (5.2) 2.9 (2.6)
Australia 1.2 n.a. n.a. 1.0 (13.0)
Belgium-Lux. 1.6 1.2 (12.1) 0.2 (-12.6)
Ireland 0.4 0.5 (22.3) 0.7 (14.0)
Switzerland 0.6 0.7 (19.8) 0.3 (1.2)
REST OF THE WORLD 3.4 15.2 - 5.1 -
Notes: n.a.= not available 
• r - 75/85 
SOUBCZ: United Nations 1976, 1980 and 1988.
The next important exporters are Singapore and France, about 
7 percent each one; and South Korea and UK (offshore location 
of US-based firms) with about 5 percent each one. In 1979, the 
distribution of world exports changed; Western Europe’s share 
declined to 30 percent and that of Asia to 38 percent, while 
America’s share increased to 16.3 percent due to a growth in 
US exports. In view of these percentages I shall suggest that 
after the slump in the industry in 1974-1975, which affected 
mainly US production, the industry recovery (at a growth rate 
of 16.7% per year between 1975 and 1979) had an impact on US 
production (which grew at a rate of 23.4 %). Also, the growth 
of re-imports of devices into US from offshore assembly plants 
under items 806/807 must be taken into account (Scott, 
1987:146).
82
Japanese exports share decreased to 18.0 percent which could 
be due to the expansion of assembly operations offshore^ , 
especially in the Asian NICs (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Malaysia). Langlois has suggested that a large part of the 
devices assembled offshore are sold in foreign markets rather 
than re-imported into Japan (1988:56).
The expansion of offshore assembly (either US or Japanese 
firms) and subcontracting firms is reflected in the grovring 
importance of some of the host countries. Singapore increased 
its share to about 11 percent (at a growth rate of 22.7 
percent per year). Hong Kong increased its share to 4.7 
percent (at a growth rate of about 25 percent). Meanwhile, 
European countries slightly reduced their shares in world 
exports, especially the Netherlands, their shares decreasing 
to 5.1 percent. All of them had a growth rate lower than that 
of the world total exports, with the exceptions of Ireland 
(22.3) and Switzerland (19.8).
During the period 1979-1985, the growth of world exports 
decreased to 10.2 percent per year due to the * crash* 
originated in 1984 (Salih, et. al. , 1988:380). Considering the 
major geographical areas, Asia consolidated as a major 
exporter with a share of 46 percent. America increased to 24.8 
percent while Western Europe decreased from 30.5 percent in 
1979 to 24.1 percent in 1985.
By country, table 2.4 shows the outstanding performance of the 
Asian countries, with Japan as a leading exporter (21.1 
percent share), and the consolidation of the Asian NICs (Hong 
Kong, Singapore and South Korea) as important exporters. 
Malaysian success as an offshore location is impressive, from 
a small beginning in 1975 world exports, to becoming the third 
major exporter of semiconductors in 1985 with 8.3 percent 
share. In this respect, Salih et. al. point out that:
0
"Japan has a provision in the tariff code siailar to the American 806/807 items. 
Japanese components of certain designated manufactured imports, including various types 
of semiconductors, can be granted relief from duty upon reimport..." (Langlois 1988:56).
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"The growth of Japanese exports after 1975 was due 
to increased capacity beyond domestic demand, and 
experience gained from providing for domestic 
end-users. At the same time, the 1974-75 recession 
had affected US capacity owing to a lack of capital 
investment and reduced workforce. When the US 
semiconductor demand later accelerated, Japanese 
firms were able to increase their import 
penetration. However, Japan became a net exporter of 
semiconductor, particularly memory ICs, only after 
1980-81. The cost-effectiveness and high quality of 
Japanese semiconductor products in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s enabled them to compete effectively 
with American producers not only in the US market 
but also in other markets. Japanese offshore 
production facilities, as found in Malaysia, were 
important in this process" (1988:389-90).
On ^he contrary, all the European countries decreased their 
shar-es in world exports, with the exception of the UK (the 
favourite location of US-based and Japan-based firms), which 
increased from 4.3 percent in 1975, to about 6 in 1985. This 
reflects the poor performance of European countries in the 
industry as compared with the leading exporters such as the 
US, vhich increased its share to about .24 percent, or Japan.
Table 2.4 clearly shows a redistribution of world production 
capacity of semiconductors from the core countries (US, Japan 
and some Europeans) to the NICs and New-NICs, with particular 
strength in the Asian countries. The advantages they have in 
the performance of assembly operations and the upgrading of 
the processes performed by some of them make difficult the 
an-irunced ’exodus* of offshore operations to the core 
countries. In view of the current overproduction crises and 
the intensification of competition, increased by competitors 
frcr the NICs, it can be foreseen in the immediate future a 
consolidation and intensification of the above mentioned 
trends. That is, a greater articulation of the geographical 
are.s.s involved in world production of semiconductors 
reinforcing the specialisations that already exist.
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3.- INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN PERSONAL COMPUTERS.
a ) Characteristics of the Industry*
The development of semiconductors and increased 
miniaturisation has been the most important development of
the last three decades of the century. It made possible the
incorporation of a great number of electronic components in a 
wide range of products. One of these, the computer, has had an 
enormous impact on almost all activities. The computer has 
both decreased its size and cost and increased its functions, 
speed applications and efficiency.
After the semiconductor subsector, the computer subsector is
one of the most technology-intensive in the electronics
industry as a whole. In 1982, for example, the share of sales
revenue devoted to research and development expenditures was
7.7 percent in the semiconductors industry and about 6 percent
in the computers industry (O’Connor, 1985:312). The innovation
in design and manufacture of semiconductors is the driving
force in computer design. Likewise, the computer industry’s
huge demand for semiconductors enables the firms to realise
the learning economies that have resulted over the last decade
g
in the dramatic decline in per unit costs of computing power . 
The result of this articulation has been the appearance on 
the market of successive generations of computers, each one 
with smaller machines, more powerful and versatile and cheaper 
than their predecessor.
Apart from the microprocessor, the ’brain* of the computer, 
there are other elements of the hardware called peripheral 
equipment. Such peripherals include keyboards, terminals and 
monitors, memory storage units (tape and disk drives), 
printers, x-y plotters and modems. All this peripheral 
equipment can be assembled without having to manufacture a 
complete computer system. Actually, the major producers of
In 1985, the computers share of world desand for integrated circuits was 36 percent 
(Langlois et. si., 1988: table 8).
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computers contract specialised outside suppliers to 
manufacture their requirements of this equipment. That means, 
a complete computer is the result of different labour 
processes which can be geographically separated, performed 
all over the world. This allows for the internationalisation 
of production, which will be dealt with in the next section.
b ) Development of Offshore Assembly.
The internationalisation of the computer subsector dates back 
to the early 1960s, from the traditional location in the 
developed countries to some production sites in the Third 
World, such as the NICs in Southeast Asia and Latin America 
(Mexico and few countries in the Caribbean). Locations (some 
of them FPZs) have provided numerous benefits, as in the case 
of semiconductors, a cheap and docile female labour force, the 
availability of infrastructure, government incentives, lack of 
restrictions on foreign investments, etc. (Ernst, 1985; 
Frobel, et. al., 1981).
The increasing worldwide demand for computers (personal 
computers, telecommunications, defence, security, and medical 
systems, etc.) has produced strong competition among firms for 
market shares. The obvious consequences were improvements in 
R & D and the search for locations for the labour-intensive 
phases of production to cut production costs, increase the 
overall productivity and reduce the prices. For instance, in 
1978, IBM made 10 times as many computers as in 1970.
"The prices for microprocessor memory was about half 
the price of ordinary (mainframe) computers memory; 
in 1977 it was one third of the price and in 1978 
came down to one tenth the price" (The Economist 
March 4, 1978).
The main US firm for computers, IBM, has a undisputed 
leadership in the mainframe market, but such is not the case 
in smaller scale systems. Although, I ! i, , Apple,
was the pioneer, launching the first personal computer Lisa in 
the early 1980s, and later the first Macintosh, IBM rapidly
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caught up and achieved first place, dominating the direction 
and shape of the PC industry. Competitors started to make 
computers which closely resembled IBM machines, but with 
higher performance at lower cost. Such computers are known as 
’plug compatibles* because they can be plugged into an IBM 
system (Financial Times September 9, 1980).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s firms preferred West 
European locations (mainly UK and Ireland), to access that 
market (due to the tariff barriers imposed by EC on imports) 
and effectively competing with the European firms. Nonetheless 
despite the efforts for automation in production lines, the 
NICs locations remained important for computer production for 
several reasons:
i. Computers are characterised by rapid technological 
change and short product-cycles, both disincentives in 
the short run to invest in expensive automated equipment 
for computer production/assembly. Rather than undertake 
such investment, manufacturers prefer to keep their 
relatively labour-intensive processes in offshore 
locations, especially in the case of peripheral equipment 
and subassemblies (O’Connor, 1985:316).
ii. The availability of local suppliers of cheap 
components has had, as a result, the emergence of 
imitators of the main brands of personal computers in 
practically all major Southeast Asian countries.
iii. The emergence of markets in South East Asia and 
Latin America. Therefore, US, Japan and West European 
firms are looking for a share in this market (Ernst, 
1985).
As in the case of semiconductors, an important element to be 
considered in the analysis is the emergence of a regional 
division of labour in the Asian NICs.
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"Already, there are first signs of how various 
activities are likely to be divided between 
different locations in the region: Taiwan and South 
Korea are expected to become two of the world’s 
leading terminal exporters. Singapore, a major 
supplier of disk drives and Taiwan, South Korea and 
Hong Kong could expect to play a considerable role 
in the expanding world market for personal 
computers’1 (Ernst, 1985:339).
The emergence of specialisations in these countries and the 
upgrading of the skill of a cheaper labour-force and, in some 
cases, a more productive labour-force than that of developed 
countries, all reinforce the difficulty for the full 
implementation of automation. Also, the consolidation of the 
Asian NICs as important locations for the industry is implied.
c) Nature of Competition.
The production of computers, as in the case of semiconductors, 
is dominated by a handful of firms, mainly US-based. The 
pioneer, IBM - a manufacturer of office equipment
sjarhJ u/ / /A
. . . .  in the early 1950s / the development of computers 
(mainframes), taking a large share in the world market. With 
the advent of the micro and the personal computer, innovative 
competitors emerged, due to the ... J. low barriers to
entry. O’Connor argues that as the industry matures, a 
considerable reduction in the number of firms continuing to 
manufacture personal computers is likely (1985:316). By 
contrast . . ' quotation I suggest that,
according to the trend of diffusion of electronics to all 
activities and the reduction in the price of semiconductors, 
it is possible that the number of competitors/ increase in 
this subsector, as in the case of semiconductors.
Moreover, as a result of the technological developments in 
semiconductors, "the latest PCs are offering performance 
levels comparable with engineering workstations, but at a 
fraction of the price" (Financial Times September 29, 1989), 
thus increasing their demand by a wide range of users. The
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expanding demand in the main markets stimulates the 
proliferation of competitors.
In terms of world market shares, in 1986 Europe was the 
biggest importer of automatic data processing, equipment 
(ADPE), about 60 percent of world imports, and 60.5 of 
computers. America’s (mainly the US) share was 25.1 percent in 
ADPE and 9.9 in personal computers. Asia’s (mainly Japan) 
share was 9.8 percent in ADPE and 9.9 in personal computers 
(UN, 1988). Although the US market is quite important as a 
single country, Europe as a whole constitutes the biggest 
market for this kind of product. Consequently, US and Japanese 
firms locate there to avpid trade barriers and to confront 
competition from European firms.
With regard to market shares by firm, tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 
show that the US based firms are the main producers of 
personal computers with IBM as a leader in the world, US and 
European market (11.5, 20.9 and 26.6 percent respectively).
Commodore has a share of 10.7 percent in the world market; 
Apple has a good share in the three markets and Compaq only 
in the US and European markets. European firms have not 
penetrated the US market, Amstrad’s (UK) share in the world 
market is 4.5 percent and Olivetti’s (Italy) is 8.6 in the 
European market. However, it is important to note that 
Japanese firms are present in the three markets. Despite their 
small shares Japanese firms (Toshiba, NEC and Fujitsu) are 
effectively competing with US and European firms*® to produce 
for their markets and, not far behind Japan, Korean and 
Taiwanese manufacturers (Financial Times December 27, 1989)**.
*® "There are clear signs that the Japanese computer industry is gaining ground. Five 
Japanese companies now rank among the top 20 in the world, up froa three a year ago, 
according to a recent report..." (Financial Times, December 27, 1989). Also South Korea 
and Taiwan combined share of PCs Bold worldwide soared froa 2 percent in 1984 to 10 
percent in 1988 (The Econoaist, August 19, 1989).
** Channel International, a Taiwan-based consortium acquired Kyse-Technology, a U.S. 
coaputer aaker (Financial Tiaes, December 12, 1989).
TABLE 2.5: Worldwide PC Unit Shipments, 1988.
FIRM %
IBM 11.5
Commodore 10. 7
Apple 6.4
NEC 4.7
Amstrad 4.5
Zenith 3.0
Compaq 2.7
Tandy 2.7
Hewlett-Packard 0.6
Others 53.2
SOURCE: Financial Times, September 27, 1989
TABLE 2.6: U.S. Personal Computer Market, 1988.
FIRM %
IBM 20.9
Apple 9.2
Compaq 7.7
Zenith 6.1
Hewlett-Packard 4.0
Sun Microsystems 3.7
Tandy 3.2
Toshiba 2.2
DEC 1.8
NEC 1.5
Others 39.7
SOURCE: Financial Times, November 6, 1989
TABLE 2.7: European Personal Computer Market, 1989
FIRM %
IBM 26.6
Olivetti 8.6
Apple 7.4
Compaq 7.1
Hewlett-Packard 3.2
Tandon 3.0
Toshiba 2.6
Victor 2.6
Zenith 2.3
Bull 2.1
Nokia Data 2.1
Others 32.4
SOURCE: Financial Times, September, 1989.
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As competition increases in this subsector, it seems to me 
that to cut production costs and therefore price's, firms will 
continue offshore assembly to increase productivity. Moreover, 
as innovations spread (as portable computers) and products* 
life-cycles get shorter, automation still will be difficult to 
implement.
Likewise, the emergence of specialisations makes it hard to 
think of the feasibility of the ’exodus* to core countries. 
Since each location has a place in the ’chain of production*, 
the cost-effectiveness of ending activities in one location 
could be higher than the benefits. Also there are market 
considerations; US market growth is gradually slowing, 
becoming one of replacement, firms confront strong 
competition, to maintain their market shares they have to cut 
production cost to keep prices attractive in Europe and to 
enter new markets, which are growing in Asia and Latin 
America, by exploiting the locational advantages of these 
areas.
d ) International Trade of Computers.
As has already been indicated, competition in the computer 
industry led firms to look for strategies to increase 
productivity and to lower costs per unit of output. 
Consequently, a redistribution of world production capacity 
has taken place. In so far as competition increases this 
redistribution will be hastened. Hence, the need to look at 
the international trade in personal computers to appreciate 
the changes pointed out in the last sections. Since personal 
computers are a relatively new subsector of the industry, the 
available data covers just the period between 1980 and 1985.
Table 2.8 shows that in 1980 the biggest exporting area was 
Western Europe with 44 percent of world exports, followed by 
America, 42 percent, and finally Asia with only 6.3 percent 
share. Looking by country, undoubtedly the US was the main 
exporter (42 percent), West Germany was the second exporter
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with a 14.8 percent share, followed by the UK, Ireland and 
Japan (12.7, 9.5 and 6.2 percent respectively). The high
shares in the UK and Ireland should be attributed to their 
role as important locations for US-based firms for access to 
European markets.
TABLE 2.8: Exports of Digital Computers (Value as 
percentage of World Market Economies, 
rate of growth in brackets),
1980 - 1985
COUNTRIES 1980 1985 r/85/80
WORLD MKT EC. 100 100 (10.5)
ASIA 6.3 14.4
Japan 6.2 9.1 (16.0)
Hong Kong - 1.9 -
Singapore 0.1 1.5 (24.1)
South Korea 0.0 1.7 (62.3)
Malaysia - 0.02 -
AMERICA 42.2 36.4
USA 42.0 35.7 (8.03)
Brazil 0.12 0.44 (27.7)
Mexico 0.1 0.25 (23.3)
EUROPE 44.19 48.4
France 1.9 2.6 (15.1)
Italy 0.7 0.06 (-35.4)
UK 12.7 2.6 (-16.4)
West Geraany 14.8 13.0 (8.5)
Netherlands 3.6 5.1 (15.4)
Begiua-Lux. 0.54 0.4 (5.8)
Denmark 0.24 0.22 (9.0)
Finland 0.21 0.22 (11.4)
Ireland 9.5 24.2 (23.4)
BEST OF THE WORLD 7.3 0.8
SOUBCE: United Nations 1976, 1980 and 1988.
In 1985, important changes in the composition of world exports 
can be observed. Asia increases its share to 14.4 percent, as 
well as Europe (48.4 percent) while that of America decreases 
to 36.4 percent. With regard to the countries* shares, Japan 
increase its share to 9 percent (at a rate of growth of 16 
percent per year). US share declined to about 36 percent 
possibly due to three factors: expansion of overseas
investment (included offshore assembly), the emergence of 
competition from other countries (as Japan) and the world 
economic crises which could affect the exports of personal 
computers.
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In Europe, the UK share decreased a significant amount, to 2.6 
percent (rate of growth of -16.4 percent per year). The West 
German share remains almost the same and that of Ireland 
increased to 24.2 percent (at a growth rate of 23.4 percent 
per year), consolidating its place as an important location 
for overseas investment.
The Asian NICs merge as exporters of personal computers, 
despite their small share, Hong Kong, 1.9 percent; Singapore,
1.5 percent and South Korea, 1.7 percent. These shares, 
according to the industry trend, can increase in the 
short-run. With regard to the other NICs (Brazil, Mexico and 
Malaysia), their shares are negligible in this respect. 
However, it is possible that they can increase their shares in 
the future. Malaysia, for example, has a strong position as an 
exporter of semiconductors and its performance in electronics 
can be improved due to the government policy of fomenting 
backward and forward linkages in the industry. In addition, 
the two Latin Americans are performing quite well in the 
assembly of peripheral equipment:
"In absolute terms, data processing equipment 
exports from Latin America still exceeded those from 
Asian developing countries in 1981, with Brazil 
accounting for the bulk of those exports. It is 
probable, however, that Mexico will increase its 
share of Latin American computer exports in the 
future, as a growing number of computer 
transnational corporations (TNCs) are investing in 
production facilities there to serve the Latin 
American region as well as the US market" (O’Connor, 
1985:317).
The expected importance of Mexico is due to the restrictions 
on investment for mini and personal computers, as well as 
peripheral equipment imposed by the Brazilian government. 
Lately, Hewlett-Packard and Apple Computer have invested in 
Mexico. The former has a wholly owned subsidiary there, which 
manufactures minicomputers and a joint venture to make 
personal computers. The latter established a joint venture to 
manufacture personal computers for local and regional markets 
(O’Connor, 1985:330).
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In so far as competition increases in the already established 
markets and with the upsurge of Third World market, firms will 
look for price-cutting strategies and innovations in software. 
Both strategies will spread out the computer applications even 
more. Consequently, it can be expected a growth in the demand 
for personal and portable computers. Thus the above mentioned 
trends in the redistribution of world production capacity will 
be reinforced. That is, offshore locations will be 
consolidated, as well as the patterns of specialisation in 
production.
4. INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF CONSUMER ELECTRONICS.
a) Characteristics of the Industry.
The introduction of integrated circuits made possible the
launching of new products in the great markets, like the US
and Western Europe. Old products were not ousted - TV and
radio - but chips were incorporated in them and in many other
goods to improve their performance or to cut their costs
19(watches, calculators, audio equipment, etc.) . There was a 
great number of newcomers in the entertainment, communications 
and consumer durables (The Economist March 24, 1979).
The varying pace of acceptance of some products in the 1970s 
reflects the success of new electronic products (figure 2.3). 
Especially in terms of consumer electronics, attention has 
been focused on television sets and audio equipment (sound 
recorders and phonographs). As a result of improvements in 
R&D, television sets, for example, are increasing their 
functions and new related products such as video tape 
recorders (VTR) and teletext systems have emerged.
12 This is exemplified by the fact that in the early 1970s a typical colour TV set 
contained 1,100 to 1,200 separate components. Today, a British set contains less than 600 
components and Japanese designs have only 420. In such products the increasing use of 
integrated circuits leads to a reduction in overall component demand (Financial Times, 
November 19, 1979).
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"These are part of a broader developments in 
communications systems in which the domestic 
television receiver is seen, potentially, as the 
centre of a sophisticated entertainment, 
educational, commercial and general information 
system" (Dicken, 1988:331).
In general terms, the manufacture of consumer electronic 
products is less technologically sophisticated than the 
production of semiconductors or computers. Therefore, these 
branches of the industry were the earliest to be 
internationalised and were less geographically concentrated 
in the developed countries. Despite the great rate of 
technological innovation, it is still largely an assembly 
production process which requires a high proportion of low or 
unskilled labour force.
In the 1960s, there was a great labour cost differential
between the US and developing countries (Dicken, 1988). So,
to cut cost per unit of output it was necessary to transfer 
labour-intensive phases of production process to those 
countries to increase productivity levels.
Admiral came to make both colour and black-and- 
white sets in Taiwan.
General Electric moved the manufacture of
circuit boards and other colour components to 
Singapore.
- Magnavox (A Philips subsidiary) imported from a 
Taiwanese plant owned by its parent.
- RCA used Taiwan and, in 1975, began moving
colour-chassis operations to Mexico.
- GTE Sylvania opened operations in Mexico in 1973 
and bought a plant in Taiwan in 1975 for 
production of both kinds of televisions.
- Zenith built up subsidiary plants in Taiwan and 
Mexico, and, in late 1977, announced a major shift 
of jobs to them" (Turner, 1982).
However, Asian competitors caught up and rapidly merged as 
strong competitors to the alarm of US and Europe producers
96
which concerned for a coining flood of cheap Asian sets started
13to restrict imports .
For example, Japan was originally many years behind the US 
with colour television, but it not only closed the gap in the 
1960s and 1970s but went ahead to undisputed leadership in 
this industry until the advent of electronic producers from 
the Asian NICs. By 1977 Japan accounted for over half of world 
production in colour television and three quarters of world 
exports including a large share of the US market. Later in the 
1970s, Japanese investment in the US and Europe, together with 
trade restrictions, has diminished its share of direct 
exports, but not its leadership domination in the industry at 
world level which however is becoming seriously contested by 
producers from the other Asian NICs. The explanation of 
Japan's success can be found in the high levels of 
productivity, high quality and the more rapid and efficient 
introduction of advanced electronic technology than either the 
US or European producers (Freeman, 1982b:80).
Japan's success is not restricted to TV sets, in 1978 exports 
from Japan were about $4.8 bn (mostly tape recorders); the 
principal purchaser was North America (45 percent) and Western 
Europe (25.5 percent). Also between 1967 and 1977, the output 
of Japanese consumer electronics increased five times, from 
$2bn to $10 bn (The Economist April 22, 1978).
Both fierce competition and an increasing demand from 
high-income countries accentuated the preference for low 
labour cost locations such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Latin America. The great advantage of this low 
labour cost locations for television assembly, for instance, 
is evident:
13 "In 1977, the Federal Government imposed restrictions - the euphemism was ’Orderly 
Marketing Agreements' - that cut the sales of Japanese companies from two and a half to 
one and three quarter million for three years. The following year. South Korea and 
Taiwan were brought into the Agreement. The restrictions prompted Japanese companies to 
build production facilities in the United States to escape import controls (Dicken, 1988: 
331).
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"In the late 1970s, the direct labour costs per set 
produced in South Korea were £1.50 compared with 
£5.70 in Japan, £10.60 in UK and £15.00 in West 
Germany" (Dicken, 1988:331).
Therefore the production in the NIC locations rapidly grew in 
the 1970s. "The share of Taiwan electronic products in exports 
increased from 1 percent to 18 by the early eighties... 
Electronic product exports increased from Hong Kong which had 
the highest growth rates between 1973-1981, 302 percent... In 
Mexico, the electronic equipment subsector grew from 1970 to 
1978 in 126 percent" (Harris, 1986:31 and 73).
However, in the early 1980s, world economic crisis and the 
’saturation* in the developed market economies had, as a 
result, a decline in the demand for TV sets. The ’replacement* 
market is slower and more volatile (Dicken, 1988:327), 
Nonetheless, the demand for other consumer electronic products 
grew, see for example, sales by products of the most important 
companies (figures 2.4 and 2.5). Production in Japan of VTR 
went from 280,000 in 1976 to 700,000 in 1977 (The Economist 
April 22, 1978). By the early 1980s, the most important
Japanese TNCs reported a spectacular growth in sales and it 
was expected that consumer electronics sales would continue 
growing (Financial Times, July 1, 1981). Although Japanese
firms are the biggest producers within Asia, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore have emerged as producers as well. As 
mentioned above, these shifts in the worldwide distribution of 
production in consumer electronics has led to trading 
frictions and the implementation of protectionist measures 
(especially in Western Europe) against Asian imports. High 
productivity levels allow the firms to keep low prices in 
products.
In the late 1980s, increasing competition between companies, 
as well as the rising labour cost in the Asian and Latin 
American NICs are the main factors for a new redistribution of 
world production capacity in this subsector, for instance:
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i. Japanese firms are shifting their assembly plants from 
the Asian NICs to the New-NICs -China, Thailand 
Philippines, Indonesia - which offers the labour force 
that is required to perform the less sophisticated phases 
of assembly process at low cost per unit of output^.
ii. The South Korean companies (Gold Star, Samsung and 
Daewoo) are increasingly "planning to open plants abroad, 
especially in Europe, to manufacture household appliances 
such as TV sets and microwave ovens, so as to avoid 
protectionist threats" (Financial Times, November 22, 
1988). In this way, the French electronics association is 
asking for the implementation of tariff and non-tariff 
protective measures because they say the European 
electronics industry would disappear! (Financial Times 
November 18, 1988).
As markets for consumer electronics expand not only in high 
income countries but also in middle-income countries it is 
possible that the trends above indicated will continue. That 
means, the process of geographical concentration of the 
industry in the Asian NICs and New-NICs as a labour-cost 
saving strategy and the penetration of markets in developed 
countries through foreign direct investment to avoid 
protectionist measures.
In view of this broad outline of the main characteristics of 
the industry, I will now turn to examine the pattern of 
international trade in three branches of the industry to 
better understand the changes in the distribution of world 
capacity during the period 1971-1985 of consumer electronics.
"Wages in South Korea rose by an annual average of 12X in real terms between 1977 and 
1986 and though the rise slowed last year, the New-NICs have a big labour advantage. It 
is a similar tale in Bong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan" (The Economist, November 5, 1988).
101
b) International Trade in Consumer Electronics,
Since the consumer electronics industry includes a wide range 
of different products, most of which hardly existed in the 
early 1980s, I will only look through the pattern of 
international trade of only three branches, television 
receivers, radio broadcast receivers and sound recorders and 
phonographs. The consumption of these products is widely 
spread in developed and developing countries so they can be 
seen as representatives of mass-production in electronics. 
Despite the diffusion of other products like VCRs or 
microwave ovens, for instance, their market share is still 
small and restricted to a buyers of a certain income-level and 
their share in world exports, though increasing, is not quite 
important yet.
Table 2.9 shows exports of television receivers during the 
period 1971-1985. In 1971, exports from Asia accounted for 
about 51 percent of world exports; Europe’s share was of 26.2 
percent, while that of America was 10.7.
TABLE 2.9: Exports of Television Beceivers (Value as percentage 
of World Market Econony, rate of growth in brackets) 
1975 - 1985
COUNTRIES 1971 1975 r71/75 1980 r75/80 1985 r80/85
WORLD MKT EC 100 100 (16.6) 100 (10.8) 100 (3.4)
ASIA 51.34 35.12 50.14 _ 66.11 _
Japan 49.4 31.1 (8.6) 34.5 (12.3) 45.7 (7.8)
Hong Kong 1.4 0.5 (-2.8) 1.8 (27.6) 4.0 (15.7)
Singapore 0.2 2.2 (49.5) 5.3 (23.0) 5.0 (2.5)
South Korea 0.3 1.2 (37.5) 8.4 (35.1) 9.6 (5.5)
Malaysia 0.04 0.1 (32.0) 0.02 (-22.8) 1.8 (55.3)
AMERICA 10.7 7.51 - 6.6 5.5
US 7.2 7.3 (17.0) 6.5 (8.8)a 4.0 (-2.5)b
Argentina 0.02 0.01 (1.7) - - - -
Brazil 0.05 0.2 (36.2) - - 0.1 -
Mexico 2.8 n.a. - n.a. - 1.4 (7.3)c
EUROPE 26.2 37.78 _ 36.2 _ 19.03 _
Belgiun-Lux. 3.8 6.8 (26.0) 6.1 (9.0) 3.3 (-7.1)
France 0.7 1.1 (24.4) 1.0 (6.9) 0.6 (-1.5)
Ireland 0.4 0.08 (-17.4) 0.1 (12.6) 0.03 (-13.9)
Italy 6.3 6.5 (17.1) 3.5 (1.0) 2.1 (-5.4)
UK 1.7 6.0 (35.4) 3.4 (2.0) 2.6 (-1.0)
W.Geraany 13.3 17.3 (21.0) 22.1 (14.3) 10.4 (-9.5)
Notes: a. Data of 1979
b. rate of growth 1979 - 1985
c. rate of growth 1971 - 1985 
SOUBCE: United Nations 1976, 1980 and 1988.
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The undisputed exporter country was Japan with loosely half of 
world exports, followed by West Germany (13.3 percent), US and 
Italy (7.2 and 6.3 percent respectively). It is important to 
note the share of some of the first NIC locations such as 
Mexico with a 2.8 percent share and Hong Kong, 1.4 percent. 
The former constitutes an important location of US foreign 
investment in assembly plants not only for better labour cost 
conditions but due to its closeness to the US market. However, 
problems like high wages, inflation and overvaluation of the 
currency during the 1970s made the spread of the assembly 
operations difficult for more sophisticated products such as 
semiconductors and computers as in the Asian NICs case. 
Although this kind of product is assembled in Mexico, its 
share is still small as compared to that of consumer 
electronics.
In 1971, due to the world economic crises and the import 
restrictions in some countries (as in Europe), a change in the 
distribution of world production capacity took place. Asia’s 
share decreased to 35 percent as well as that of America (7.5 
percent); obversely, Western Europe’s share increased to 
roughly 38 percent.
With regard to each country, it can be seen that the share of 
Japan decreased to 31 percent (at lower growth rate than world 
exports, 8.6 percent per year). US share remained almost the 
same (7 percent)while European countries increased their 
share, West Germany to 17.3 percent; Belgium-Luxembourg to 6.8 
and UK to 6 percent. Asian NICs, except Hong Kong, increased 
their shares at fast rates of growth, Singapore 2.2 percent 
share (49.5 percent per year) and South Korea, 1.2 percent 
share at 37.5 percent per year.
In 1980, world export growth decreased from 16.6 percent per 
year between 1971-1975, to 10.8 per year during the period 
1975-1980. Asia recovered its leadership as a main exporter 
area with about half of world exports. European and American 
shares declined to 36.2 and 6.6 percent respectively. Japan
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and West Germany remained the most important exporters (34.5 
and 22.1) with rates of yearly growth higher than world 
exports. It is interesting to observe that the share of all 
the other European decreased while that of the Asian NICs 
increased at a high rate of growth. Hong Kong * s share 
increased to 1.8 percent; Singapore, 5.3 percent. The 
outstanding performance of South Korea in the industry is 
confirmed by a remarkable 8.4 percent share in world exports.
The trends noted in 1980, accentuated in 1985, the core of 
world exports of TV sets is in Asia, whose share increased to 
66 percent. The other two major geographical areas decreased 
their shares, America to 5.5 percent and Western Europe to 
19.0 percent. Although West Germany remained as an important 
exporter with 10.4 percent share, its growth as compared to 
that of other European countries became negative as a result 
of the strong competition from Asian producers, characterised 
by high productivity levels which allowed them to effectively 
compete with lower prices and high quality.
Japan remains as an undisputed leader in the industry with 
about a 46 percent share. The Asian NICs are consolidated as 
important exporters, South Korea with a 9.6 percent share, 
Singapore with 5.0 percent and Hong Kong, 4.0 percent. On the 
contrary, Latin American NICs decreased their already low 
share, for instance, Mexico’s share decreased from 2.8 in 1971 
to 1.4 in 1985.
As to radio broadcast receivers, table 2.10 shows almost the 
same trends mentioned above throughout the whole period. The 
core of production is strongly concentrated in Asia with Japan 
at the head, with about half of the world exports during the 
whole period. The Asian NICs performance in this industry is 
self-evident. However, it is important to note the decline of 
Hong Kong and Singapore’s share during the period of analysis. 
It is possible that, as a result of the upgrading in the skill 
of their labour force and increasing labour costs, the 
assembly of less sophisticated products were lost to other
3 04
countries, such as the New-NICs as in the case of 
semiconductors.
TABLE 2.10: Exports of Radio Broadcast Receivers (Value as 
percentage of Korld Market Economy, 
rate of growth in brackets), 1971 - 1985.
COUNTRIES 1971 1975 r71/75 1980 r75/80 1985 r80/85
WORLD MKT EC. 100 100 (13.7) 100 (12.0) 100 (0.6)
ASIA 73.2 66.57 _ 82.93 _ 72.35 _
Japan 61.3 49.1 (9.8) 51.6 (12.8) 43.7 (-2.1)
Hong Kong 10.0 11.4 (16.0) 14.5 (15.5) 8.9 (-7.8)
Singapore 1.4 3.5 (27.8) 11.0 (27.2) 8.2 (-4.4)
South Korea 0.5 2.0 (33.0) 4.9 (25.5) 6.2 (8.9)
Malaysia 0.01 0.5 (52.2) 0.8 (18.2) 3.3 (21.8)
AMERICA 2.93 3.51 _ 0.6 13.1 _
US 2.6 1.9 (8.2) n.a. - 3.6 (7.6)a
Brazil 0.03 1.6 (59.0) n.a. - 3.7 (9.6)a
Mexico 0.3 0.01 (-66.6) 0.0 (2.3) 5.8 (69.0)
EUROPE 17.96 23.5 _ 12.8 _ 8.9 _
Belgium-Lux. 2.4 3.7 (21.0) 3.0 (8.6) 1.6 (-10.0)
France 1.1 1.7 (20.7) 1.4 (9.4) 1.6 (2.2)
Ireland 0.06 0.2 (29.3) 0.3 (18.1) 0.2 (3.8)
Italy 1.3 1.0 (9.9) 0.5 (2.0) 0.2 (-18.3)
Netherlands 4.3 7.3 (22.3) 1.6 (-136.6) 0.8 (-U.7)
UK 1.0 1.0 (17.0) 1.1 (13.3) 0.7 (-8.2)
K . Germany 7.8 8.6 (15.6) 4.9 (3.2) 3.8 (-3.8)
Notes: E - estimate
a - rate of growth 1979 - 1985 
SOURCE: United Nations 1976, 1980 and 1988.
With regard to America, there was an increase in its share of 
world exports through all the period from 2.93 percent in 1971 
to 13 percent in 1985, with an important contribution from the 
Latin American NICs, Mexico (from 0.3 percent in 1971 to about 
6 percent in 1985) and Brazil (from 0.03 to 3.7 percent). On 
the contrary, all the European countries decreased their 
shares in world exports with lower rates of growth than those 
of the NICs and even had negative rates in the last part of 
the period (1980-1985).
Finally, in the exports of sound recorders and phonographs it 
is clear the strong predominance of Japan throughout the whole 
period. In 1971, Japan’s share was about a half of the world 
exports, bigger than that of the European countries, here 
considered, which altogether made up about 32 percent share 
with West Germany and UK as the biggest exporters (11.3 and
7.6 percent respectively) (table 2.11). In 1975, the share of 
all the others remains roughly the same.
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TABLE 2.11: Exports of Sound Records and Phonographs (Value as 
percentage of World Market Economy, 
rate of growth in brackets),
1971 - 1985.
COUNTRIES 1971 1975 r71/75 1980 r75/80 1985 r60/65
WORLD MKT EC. 100 100 (9.3) 100 (17.3) 100 (11.S)
ASIA 48.91 47.3 76.15 _ 83.45 • _
Japan 48.0 40.8 (6.3) 69.5 (24.3) 76.7 (13.2)
Hong Kong 0.4 1.1 (26.7) 2.1 (26.0) 2.15 (12.0)
Singapore 0.2 1.6 (60.5) 2.0 (20.3) 1.5 (7.6)
South Korea 0.3 3.6 (43.0) 2.5 (11.7) 3.0 (14.8)
AMERICA 6.15 7.83 • 6.2 3.4
USA 6.1 7.6 (13.3) 5.9 (13.5) 3.0 (1.6)
Brazil 0.01 0.2 (51.7) - - 0.4 -
Mexico 0.04 0.03 (3.1) 0.3 (44.3) 0.06(-16.1)
EUROPE 31.9 33.5 • 13.0 10.3
Austria 4.3 4.9 (11.6) - - 1.2 (4.3)a
Belgium-Lux. 4.4 4.9 (11.4) 2.7 (8.9) 1.1 (-3.2)
France 2.5 2.7 (10.0) 1.1 (4.8) 0.4 (-5.6)
Italy 1.8 2.1 (12.4) 0.8 (3.8) 0.1 (-29.2)
UK 7.6 7.8 (9.8) 3.5 (5.3) 2.0 (3.6)
W .Germany 11.3 11.1 (8.9) 4.9 (5.3) 5.5 (13.4)
Kote: a = rate of growth, 1975 - 1985 
SOURCE: United Nations 1976, 1980 and 1988.
However, by 1980-1985, the trend accentuating Europe’s share 
drastically decreased, as well as that of America, while 
Japan’s share increased enormously to about 83 percent of 
world exports in 1985. Asian NICs performed quite well during 
the periods as compared to European countries or Latin 
American NICs, but still their contribution to world exports 
is small.
To summarise, it can be observed a redistribution of world 
production capacity of consumer electronics from US and Europe 
to Asia, constituting a heavily concentrated geographical 
pattern of production focused in Japan and in the Asian NICs, 
which merged as important producers as well. However, as 
Japan’s performance was upgraded in other areas of the 
industry (computers, robotics, tool-machines, optoelectrics) 
it might be expected in the years to come an increase in Asian 
NICs* share in consumer electronics and, to a lesser extent in 
the Latin American NICs.
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5. CONCLUSIONS.
We have shown in the above account how a redistribution of 
world production capacity of electronics has emerged since the 
early 1960s. The most important factors in the 
internationalisation of production of some of the subsectors 
of the industry are two; the internal characteristics of the 
production processes, strong competition between capitals in 
the industry and the role of the nation-states in the home and 
host countries. The former allows the spatial separation of 
labour processes in such a way that they can be performed 
elsewhere in the world. Competition leads the firms to look 
for strategies to increase productivity levels, cut down cost 
per unit of output and offer low prices of products in the 
market. The role of the nation-states is unquestionable, as in 
the case of US semiconductor production, the rise and decline 
of military purchases was one of the factors which led to the 
technological development and later internationalisation in 
semiconductor; in Japan, the industrial policy of the MITI 
fostered the emergence of a strong group of firms which are 
among the best in semiconductors and consumer electronics, the 
same can be said about the Asian NICs. With regard to the host 
countries, the social and economic policies implemented by 
their governments undoubtedly affected the decisions of 
location of the TNCs.
, firms have looked for the best locations to perform 
the several phases of production process. In this way, the R&D 
and design activities which required high levels of skill in 
the labour force and a great amount of fixed capital and other 
facilities remained in the developed countries while the 
assembly phases of production with lower skill-requirements 
were sent to the most developed of the developing countries, 
the so-called NICs in a first stage and later, the New-NICs. 
These countries offered a pool of cheap labour force with the 
required levels of productivity per unit of output to perform 
the assembly activities at lower cost than in the developed 
countries. This process gave place to the emergence of
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specialisations in the worldwide production of electronics and 
regional divisions of labour as in the case of South East 
Asia.
In the first case, it was observed the predominance of US and 
Western Europe in the production of office machinery (mainly 
computers) and professional and scientific equipment. 
Meanwhile, Japan and the NICs perform better in consumer 
electronics and electronics components with the exceptional 
case of Malaysia which in less than ten years became the third 
producer of semiconductors in the world.
In the second case, a diffusion of more advanced phases of 
production from developed countries to selected NIC locations 
took place as a result of their upgrading and improvements in 
the performance of assembly activities and the increase of 
labour costs for less-sophisticated phases. At the same time, 
a process of diffusion of labour intensive phases of 
production took place from the Asian NICs to the New NICs 
(Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, etc.).
foresee for the immediate future a consolidation and 
intensification of the trends above described in contrast to 
the what some analysts foresee, it is hardly probable that the 
diffusion of automation in assembly-1ines and the ’exodus* 
from the NICs to the DCs^due to several factors:
i. Increased competition between the already established 
f irms.
ii. The upsurge of competitors from the Asian NICs 
characterised by high productivity and quality at lower 
prices than US or European competitors.
iii. The high cost involved in ’automation* investment.
iv. The high rate of innovation which makes the life­
cycle of products shorter, so it is necessary great
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flexibility in assembly-1ines possible with the 
utilisation of labour force.
v. The growing importance of the NICs and New-NICs 
(specially in South-east Asia) as markets.
Furthermore, as protectionism increases in US and Western 
Europe it can be foreseen a growth in the movement of 
production capacity from Asia to US and Latin America, 
especially Mexico (to avoid tariff barriers) and Western 
Europe. However, this process does not affect for the 
immediate future the current geographical distribution of the 
industry.
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HI. MEXICO: FROM JNWARD TO OUTWARD DEVELOPMENT 
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE.
INTRODUCTION.
As pointed out in previous chapters, the long boom of the 
postwar brought about important shifts in the worldwide 
economic structure. The tendency of manufacturing system 
-)-£> employ ’ far greater quantities of equipment and 
changing technically/much faster. Manufacturing consolidated 
as the dominant sector in industry with metal-working 
(engineering) and chemicals as leading subsectors of the 
postwar growth of international trade. Furthermore, world 
trade increased mostly between industrialized economies,
One of the consequences of these structural shifts was the 
transformation of the labour force in some industrial sectors 
of the DCs* from unskilled and semi-skilled to high-skill 
levels.^Composition of/labour force also changed, there was an 
increasing. employment of women. Likewise, the economic boom 
stimulated the movement of labour to those places where
there were jobs (Harris N, 1983).
The change in the industrial geography was not only in the old 
core region. Japan revived its devastated postwar economy to 
become a part of the core region. Moreover, in the sixties, a 
group of LDCs acquired the status of Newly Industrializing 
Countries (NICs). These countries through different strategies 
(outward or inward development) achWd a sustained growth of 
their industrial capacity for exports or domestic consumption 
and provided an outlet for much investment capital during the 
early 1970s (Storper and Scott, 1986:4).
In chapter two, it was examined the electronics industry in 
which increased world competition, internal developments of 
the industry and the role of the governments, led firms in
the early sixties to search for cheap-labour locations for the 
labour intensive stages of the production process. The purpose
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of this chapter is to give, first a brief outline of emergence
of Mexico as newly industrializing country, that is the social
and economic conditions (or factors internal to the country)
which made possible the emergence of a new pattern of location
of the industry and the consequent change in the structure of
the labour force. In the second part I shall deal with
Mexico’s international trade with particular reference to its
,»v
trade in electronic products since the changes/structure of 
exports relate to changes in the geographical distribution of 
industry. In part 3 some conclusions will be dravrn about the 
role of the governments in economic growth, industrial 
location and in the integration of the economies to the world 
market.
1. ANTECEDENTS: THE MEXICAN ECONOMY UP TO 1989.
a ) From Imnort-Substitution to the Oil Bonanza.
In the post-war period the development strategy pursued by 
successive Mexican governments was that of import-substitution 
(as in other Latin American countries and in some South Asian 
as India) unlike the South and East Asian countries of Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan which were more 
export-oriented. The Mexico’s government strategy sought the 
expansion of the domestic market through the protection
(through import controls, subsidies and other incentives) of
oLo-masWc , , . , _ ,the nat-io-nal production of non-durable consumer goods in a
first stage and intermediate goods and producer and consumer
durables in a second one (Jenkins, 1978).
As a result, Mexico experienced two decades of annual growth 
of 6-7 per cent in the 1950s, almost 8 in the 1960s, 6-7 in 
the first half of the seventies, and 8 per cent from 1977 to 
1981. In the seventies, when much of the world stagnated, 
Mexico doubled the volume of its industrial output. There were 
other impressive achievements during the import-substitution
Ill
industrialisation (ISI), the capacity to generate electricity 
grew from 6 to 16 million kw; the length of paved highway from 
68 000 to 208 000; the number of registered vehicles, from 1.8 
to 4.5 million (Harris, 1986).
The ISI was further supported by the direct intervention of 
the state in the form of public investment. The government and 
state holdings accounted for around 40% of the country gross 
fixed capital formation by 1975. It should be noted that the
jniJe >*-
' public investment «/ds/ key areas in terms 
of the needs of the industrial sector energy, transport
and communications which between them have accounted for about 
three.fifths of public investment. However, most of the state 
spending was financed by increasing public indebtness, both 
internal and external (Jenkins, 1978:16).
In geographical terms, this strategy reinforced the market-
oriented locational pattern of the industry and the great
concentration of population, labour-force, infrastructure,
amenities, services, etc., in the biggest industrial cities of
o/■
Mexico, > the main markets/ Mexico City, Monterrey and
Guadalajara (see figure 3.1)*.
Later, the policy of d e s a r r o l l o  e s t a b i l i z a d o r  (’stabilising 
development”), initiated in 1955, combined price and exchange 
rate stability with sustained economic and industrial growth. 
Again, this policy stressed the tendency of great spatial 
concentration as a result of the dynamic of the industry 
oriented to serve the growing domestic market for consumer 
durables. As shown in table 3.1, in 1965 the Central Region 
(constituted by Mexico City and the states of Hidalgo, Mexico, 
Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro and Tlaxcala, see figure 3.1) 
concentrated 46.3% of the industrial establishments, nearly 
56% of the labour force, nearly 64% of the wages and about 60% 
of the Gross Industrial Product. During the period, the growth
For an exhaustive account of public expenditure in the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico 
City and its inpact in the profitability of manufacturing industry as well as in the 
great urban concentration in there since the past century up to the 19S0s see Carza, 
1985.
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rate of Gross National Product (GNP) was high, 7.1 per cent 
from 1960 to 1970.
TABLE 3.1: MEXICO: Share of the Central Region in the 
Manufacturing Industry, 1965-1975.
CENTRAL REGION(a)
NO. or 
PLANTS EMPLOYEES WAGES
GROSS
PRODUCT
VALUE
ADDED
1965 62 626 746 928 11523467 69021157 n.d.
X National Tot 46.32 55.81 63.61 59.3 -
1970 52 543 236 315 19811066 122033980 48553534
X National Tot 44.16 54.99 62.35 59.9 61.32
1975 52 675 912 955 47044192 276630213 106436357
X National Tot 44.39 55.18 61.46 60.0 60.49
(a) Central Region: Mexico City and the Btates of Mexico, Hidalgo, 
Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro and Tlaxcala.
SOURCE: G. Garza and E. Aguilar, 1988:Table 6.
In view of the problems of unemployment and lower living 
standards resulting from this accentuated regional imbalance 
the government implemented a series of regional and urban 
policies, as the new towns and industrial estates programme 
and the provisions for the in-bond industry (which shall be 
deal with in chapter IV). Created in 1967 under the name of 
Border Industrialisation Programme (BIP) to attenuate the 
regional disparity and unemployment in the Northern Border, 
the in-bond plants are either subsidiaries of American firms 
(mainly) or subcontractors who assemble imported American 
materials into finished goods for re-export to the United 
States, paying duty on the value-added in the plants located 
along the 2,000 mile border, thus taking advantage of lower 
costs in Mexico. The successful performance of in-bond plants 
in the Northern Border gave place to the emergence and 
consolidation of what I call a new pattern of industrial 
location.
One of the main consequences of the policies of the government 
was a change in the structure of employment, in 1960, 55 per 
cent of Mexican workers were recorded as employed in 
agriculture, 20 per cent in industry; in 1980, the figures 
were 36 and 26 per cent respectively.
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Nonetheless, a series of imbalances merged since the protected 
manufacturing industry needed progressively more capital and 
intermediate goods imports to maintain the sustained growth.
"Indiscriminate protection of local businesses 
resulted in inefficient, l o w-quality production, 
while excessive public and private industrial 
investment left agriculture so severely neglected 
that many of these nations began to import food. 
Further, the advancement of industry required more 
imports of capital goods and technology and 
therefore greater capacity to accumulate foreign 
exchange. This capacity, however, was limited both 
by the anti-export bias of ISI and by the limited 
availability of foreign credit. External sector 
deficits mounted, hindering economic growth. At the 
same time, swelling urban p o p u l a t i o n  and improved 
social and political organization brought government 
under increasing demands wh i c h  they often were 
unable to fulfill. Policy changes were needed if 
economic prosperity and political stability were to 
continue" (Szekely, 1989:1779).
un'nj the Echeverria Administration (1970-1976) the policy 
strategies shifted in response to social unrest and the 
slowdown in economic growth that resulted from the world 
economic crisis. The new policy of d e s a r r o l lo  compartido 
("shared development") stressed the export promotion of 
manufactures as well as job creation, income distribution and 
a more balanced geographical dis t r i b u t i o n  of industry to 
achieve sustained economic growth. To this end more emphasis 
was put on all those policies directed to alleviate regional 
imbalances. Specially, and in view of its success in terms of 
employment and foreign exchange, the g overnment r e f o r m e d
the in-bond industry regulations allowing it to locate in 
the interior of the country and sell limited quantities of 
their output <?n ■//?£ doryitjht vnlrlUf . Likewise, more
funds were allocated to education, health care and the social
j
infrastructure in general .
2
"...the Mexican government has made extraordinary efforts to expand educational 
opportunities. During the decade following 1970, the proportion of the gross domestic 
product devoted to education almost doubled from 2.9 to 3.9 per cent according to data 
provided by the education ministry. Between 1972 and 1980, the real per capita 
expenditure on education more than doubled. A notable expansion of secondary schools and 
universities made it possible to accommodate an Increasing proportion of the school-age 
population. In 1980, almost 40 per cent of the population of secondary school age was
~ 30®
-25°
-20°
-15*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CHIHUAHUA
COAHUILA
NUEVO‘S  
S LE6N  J
SAN 
' - O  LUIS Gulf o f  Mexico
q u e r Et a r o
HIDALGO
POTOSl
n a y a r it : YUCATANG U A N A JU A T O-7
X V  QUINTANA ROOJALISCO FEDERAL DISTRICT 
TLAXCALA  
MORELOS A Caribbean Sea
C O LIM A PUEBLA*'
TABASi
GUERRERO
CHIAPAS
Ocean
HONDURASGUATEMALA  
90° )
M E X IC O
P O L I T I C A L  M A P  O F  M E X I C O
® National Capital 
  State Boundaries
—  International Boundaries
250 500 750 Miles
400 800 1200 Kilometers
114
115
/At
Lo offset the world slump in 1974 , /government
by
attempted to force growth/expanding public spending. However, 
higher government spending was not met by higher revenues so 
the budget deficit soared. Likewise, external debt grew 
substantially and infiation accelerated (from 5 per cent in 
1970 to 23 in 1974 ) and the currency, the peso, became 
overvalued «s>S the inflationary gap with its trading 
partners widened. In 1976, after 22 years/pegged to the US 
dollar the peso was devalued by about 80 per cent.
The Lopez Portillo Administration (1976-1982) embarked on a 
post-devaluation stabilisation programme that had as its main 
goals reduction /*• the current account and budget deficits. 
Public expenditure was cut and income from state enterprises 
increased. A year after devaluation the current account
deficit had narrowed to 3 per cent of GDP and the budget 
deficit to 5.7 per cent • GDP grew at 3 per cent.
However this brief recovery of stability was ended when the 
discovery of huge oil reserves and their availability for 
export reduced the foreign exchange constraint. Thus, the 
government expanded overseas borrowing to finance a public 
heavy-industry programme in oil power, steel and capital. As 
a result of domestic expansionary policies the economy 
expanded swiftly but Mexico lost export market shares in both 
traditional and nontraditional exports. Although the discovery 
of large oil deposits benefitted Mexico’s balance of payments, 
it increased the overvaluation of the currency that 
discriminated against agricultural and manufacturing 
activities.
enrolled, and 15 per cent of the group aged 20-24 was enrolled in institutions of higher 
learning, in 1969, the corresponding proportions were 11 and 3 per cent, respectively. 
Furthermore, as rapid expansion of vocational schools was affected, the 1970s saw am 
increasing diversification in the types of available opportunities [mainly in technical 
areas]. From 281 vocational schools in 1970, the number increased to 1573 by the 1979-80 
academic year, and enrollment had increased fourtfould... The continuing trend in school 
enrollment is clearly in evidence in the findings of the labour force surveys of the past 
decade. By 1979, the proportion of the population of labour force age that was enrolled 
in school had risen to 18.3 per cent. Particularly notable has been the sharp increase 
in the enrollment of females" (Gregory, 1986:23-14).
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b) The Manufacturing Industry up to 1980.
Following three decades of 6 per cent annual growth Mexico’s 
manufacturing sector contributed 19.2 per cent to GDP by 1960. 
In the 1960s the sector grew by 8.4 per cent but slowed down 
to 6.3 per cent in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the performance of 
Mexican manufacturing output in the early seventies was 
remarkable. It expanded on "average by over 7 per cent per 
year with higher rates of growth in the heavy and chemical 
products sectors1'; 9 per cent in metal products, machinery and 
equipment, and in basic metals. These four have increased 
their share of the value of manufacturing since 1950 from 25 
to 49 percent, while ’traditional’ industries decreased from 
73 to 49 percent" (Harris, 1986:73). Electronic equipment was 
one of the subsectors with high growth. While much of the 
world stagnated, overall manufacturing industry output doubled 
in volume of capacity (Harris, 1986).
i The growth (was less
impressive, from 1 343 510 workers in 1965 to 1 654 381 in 
1975 with a growth rate of 2.08 per cent per year (tables 3.2 
and 3.3), proving the increasing incapacity of the industry of 
generating employment since, due to the ISI, became more 
intensive in capital. This impressive growth of the industry 
remained concentrated in the old industrial cores of the 
country, the share of Mexico City in manufacturing remained 
important though employment slightly decreased from 46 per 
cent in 1960 to 41 percent in 1970 (Garza G and Aguilar E,
1988).
The only industrial activity able to make an important 
contribution to employment was the in-bond industry or maquila 
industry as it is better known. Between 1965-1975, the 
employment in electronics and electrical products subsector, 
constituted mostly of in-bond firms, grew to 106 016 employees 
(6.4 percent of the total manufacturing). The annual rate of 
growth was 3.18 per year, above most of the traditional 
subsectors such as food, beverages, clothes among others, but
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below the dynamic chemical products subsector (tables 3.2 and 
3.3).
TABLE 3.2: Mexico: Distribution of Employment in Manufacturing by
Industry, 1965, 1975 and 1985 (and percentage shares).
CONCEPT 1965 X 1975 X 1985
TOTAL 1343510 100 1654381 100 2568846 100
SUBTOTAL 762744 56.6 789444 47.7 1064185 41.4
Pood 273186 20.3 309651 18.7 406722 15.8
Beverages 53650 4 69392 4.2 109477 4.3
Tobacco 8636 0.6 8645 0.5 9758 0.4
Textiles 168229 12.5 144444 8.7 181344 7.1
Garments/Footwear 108408 8.1 90606 5.5 150330 5.9
Furniture 45193 3.4 43113 2.6 18678 0.7
Printing and Publishing 30822 2.3 39164 2.4 61216 2.4
Leather 49463 3.7 50316 3 77334 3
Other 25157 1.9 34113 2.1 49326 1.9
SUBTOTAL 283146 21.1 444403 26.9 759622 29.6
Wood 10461 0.8 48108 2.9 93958 3.7
Paper and Paper products 18576 1.4 32002 1.9 79162 3.1
Bubber and rubber prod. 106734 7.9 125934 7.6 162474 6.3
Chemical products 2508 0.2 5247 0.3 47504 l.S
Petroleum 17556 1.3 53363 3.2 122001 4.7
Non-metallic minerals 76994 5.7 100714 6.1 133445 5.2
Metallic minerals 50317 3.7 79035 4.8 121078 4.7
SUBTOTAL 297620 22.2 420534 25.4 745039 29
Metallic products 104388 7.8 127474 7.7 186418 7.3
Machinery 35343 2.6 76375 4.6 129388 5
Electrical and electronics 77174 5.7 106016 6.4 197466 7.7
Transport Equipment 80715 6 110669 6.7 231767 9
SOUBCE: Sria de Industria y Coaercio, 1965 and 1975, Mexico. 
Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto, 1985 
(preliainar data, noT published), Mexico.
TABLE 3.3: Mexico: Employment in Manufacturing, rate of growth, 
1965-1975, 1975-1985.
CONCEPT 1965-1975 1975-1985 1945-1985
TOTAL 2.08 4.4 3.2
SUBTOTAL 0.34 2.99 1.7
Food 1.25 2.73 2
Beverages 2.57 4.56 3.5
Tobacco 0.01 1.21 0.6
Textiles -1.52 2.28 0.4
Garments/Footwear -1.79 5.06 1.6
Furniture -0.47 -8.36 -4.5
Printing and Publishing 2.4 4.47 3.4
Leather 0.17 4.3 2.2
Other 3.05 3.69 3.3
SUBTOTAL 4.51 5.36 4.8
Wood 15.26 6.69 10.4
Paper and Paper product 5.44 9.06 7
Bubber and rubber prod. 1.65 2.55 2.1
Chemical products 7.38 22.03 13.7
Petroleum 11.12 8.27 9.2
Non-metallic minerals 2.69 2.81 2.7
Metallic minerals 4.52 4.27 4.3
SUBTOTAL 3.46 5.72 4.5
Metallic products 2 3.8 2.9
Machinery 7.71 5.27 6.3
Electrical and electronics 3.18 6.22 4.6
Transport Equipment 3.16 7.39 5.1
SOURCE: Table 3.2.
118
Nonetheless its impact in employment, the in-bond industry 
developed few linkages with the domestic industry (over 95 per 
cent of inputs re imported).Its contribution to export 
earnings is significant, accounting for one-third of all 
manufactured exports in 1979 as a result of their dynamism and 
the low export propensity of the manufacturing industry.
Despite all the criticisms that the import-substitution 
strategy of government received (as opposed to the export-led 
growth of the Asian NICs) it is my belief that apart from 
fostering the industrialisation of the country, increased in 
employment, expansion' j’v the domestic market
risesin income and living standards, it laid the conditions 
for the establishment of production for the world market once 
the country was ready for the opening of the economy: 
construction of infrastructure and public services, educative 
and health institutions, a skilled labour force among others.
c ) From Boom to Bust. Economic Crisis in the 1980s.
Mexico entered the 1980s on a wave of prosperity after the 
stabilisation period (1976-1980) and the discovery of huge new’ 
oil reserves. Daily output of petroleum more
than doubled between 1978 and 1981 to over 1 200 000 barrels. 
Apparently undisturbed by the world recession and stagnation 
which started in 1979 and affected most other developing 
countries, the main variables of the economy expanded at high 
rates (output, employment and foreign trade). Thanks to the 
dynamism of private and, specially, public investment, the 
economy grew at between 8 and 9 per cent each year between 
1978 and 1981. Unemployment in Mexico City dropped to 3.6 per 
cent in 1981.
Oil apart, only the in-bond industry was important in that 
period, it accounted by one third of all manufacturing exports 
in 1979 (mainly due to the decrease in other manufactured 
exports), but the growing overvaluation of the Mexican 
currency before 1982 contributed to decrease its great
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dynamism. The situation changed drastically in 1982 with the 
worldwide glut of petroleum and the subsequent fall in its 
price which had a great impact on economic development. To the 
fall in exports revenues followed a severe balance of payments 
disequilibrium and the rise of the cost of the debt service. 
Extension of foreign credits and the renegotiation of existing 
debt was made conditional on the adoption of policies designed 
to restrain domestic inflation, curtail the fiscal deficit and 
control the disequilibrium in the balance of payments. 
National output declined during the second half of 1982, 
canceling the entire peak growth of the first half. Over the 
entire year, GDP declined by 0.5 per cent from the level of 
1981, and there was further contraction in 1983 as GDP fell by
4.7 per cent. Industry was hit in many aspects, recession and 
restrictive policies reduced the domestic market. 
Manufacturing output fell, mainly in the production of capital 
and consumer durable goods. It is estimated that industrial 
output fell by 2.7 per cent in 1982 and by further 8.3 per 
cent in 1983 (Gregory, 1986:271).
The government’s efforts to reduce the current account deficit 
made it impossible to import materials and intermediate goods 
needed by non-in-bond industry. The firms heavily dependent on 
imports had to reduce production or even close (Liemt G van, 
1988:93). However, the devaluation of the currency resulted in 
a boom in in-bond plants where imports were not a constraint.
In 1982, the selection of Miguel de la Madrid as candidate of 
the official party, the PRI, by former President Jose Lopez 
Portillo, seemed to be a political victory for the supporters 
of a more export-oriented development strategy which implies 
greater integration into the world economy.
In 1984, a 32 per cent growth of manufactured exports (mostly 
to United States) allowed GDP growth of 3.5 per cent and 
another trade surplus of US$14 000 million, however, the boom 
in the United States not only increased the Mexico’s exports 
but also lifted the value of the dollar and sustained high
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interest rates, to Mexico’s loss in terms of the burden of the 
debt. The ending of the boom in the late 1984 lowered interest
c u r + d i  \e <k
rates and the value of the dollar, but sharply contracted the 
demand for Mexico’s exports, particularly oil. Once again the 
economy was threatened with severe pressures, rapidly
inert AJg /A (ojf &F
increasing / deficit on external -trade and a*. h4g-h /debt 
servicing. The earthquake in 1985 added disaster to the 
economic problems of 1986 (when the spot price of oil touched 
US$10 a barrel against a budget Mexican forecasted figure of 
US$22 ) .
Amid all these economic problems employment in the 
manufacturing reached 1 654 381 employees with a rate of
growth of 4.4 per cent per year between 1975 and 1985 above 
that of 1965-1975 and attributable to the expansion of the 
domestic market that the oil boom brought about. Employment in 
electrical and electronics production grew from 106 016 in 
1975 to 197 466 in 1985 with a rate of growth of 6.2 per cent 
per year! above that of the overall industry. Also its share 
in the manufacturing industry rose, accounting for about 7.7 
per cent (see tables 3.2 and 3.3). It should be noted that 
Mexico City decreased its share in the employment of the 
manufacturing industry in this period, from 41.2 per cent in 
1970 to 36.6 in 1985 (Garza G and Aguilar E, 1988).
One of the most important effects of the crisis was that 
forced the government to increase its efforts in encouraging 
production of manufactures for export. Nonetheless, during his 
first three years as president, de la Madrid jus-t introduced 
measures to bring public deficit under control 
refrained from pursuing radical reforms on foreign trade 
policy. T-heref-o-re, Import licenses and exchange controls 
remained practically intact, rendering his constant 
adjustments of the peso-dollar exchange rate insufficient to 
encourage growth of non-oil exports.
Upon taking office, in 1988, the new President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari declared his firm commitment to continue the
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policies of his predecessor, reduce inflation, shrinking the 
budget deficit, privatise most of the holdings of the state' 
and liberalise trade. Added a successful rescheduling of the 
external debt and, according to some estimations, by "'198 9 the 
economy grew at 3 per cent, stronger than the projected 1.5 
per cent with inflation down to 19 per cent (Financial Times 
January 30, 1990). In 1990 GDP grew by 3.9 per cent, the
fastest growth since 1981 (Financial Times May 29, 1991).
Nowadays it seems there is a growing confidence among 
businessmen in Mexico, the continued lack of domestic credit 
in Mexico had led many of them recently to repatriate several 
billion dollars suggesting their interest in continuing their 
operations in Mexico^. According to Mexico’s central bank, 
around US$1.5 billion of footloose capital has returned in the 
past six weeks (The Economist August 12, 1989)
Some academics argue that the main result of the crisis was 
the renewed importance of exports of manufactured goods to 
maintain industrial production and employment, and to service 
the external debt (Harris, 1986; Liemt G van, 1988:94). Thus 
Mexico became stil-l more integrated in the world economy. On 
the contrary, it seems to me that the government was playing 
all the time "the two cards”, production for the domestic 
market while preparing the ground for the opening of the 
economy. After all, the in-bond industry regime was 
established as early as 1967 when the economy was still robust 
and there was no foreign constraints as low oil prices and 
external debt at the time.
 ^ "...Mr Salinas aake it clear that nothing was out of bounds from privatisation except
that prohibited by the constitution. He specified as "irreversible" the state-run 
Petroleos Mexicanos, basic petrochemicals, the federal Electricity Commission, 
radioactive materials and nuclear-related activities, the railways the mail service and 
satellite communications. He added to the list important social institutions like 
Conasupo, the giant food production and distribution company" (Financial Times, April 25,
1990). - the Mexican government is on the route of a successful privatisation of
Telmex, the giant telephone company and the re-privatisation of the banks (nationalised 
in 1982) (Financial Times July 2, 1990 and May 17, 1991).
 ^ In the early 1980’b capital flight to foreign banks intensified as Mexican businesses 
faced a severe domestic recession and limited credit. Geographical proximity to the US, 
the overvalued dollar, and high interest rates attracted most of these funds -it is 
estimated that Mexican citizens still hold about US$50 billion abroad (The Economist 
April 27, 1991).
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In the light of the later economic events in Mexico it is 
believed that the new locational pattern will not only 
consolidate in the Northern Border and interior of the country 
but will constitute one of the corner-stones of the export-led 
growth strategy to be implemented by the Mexican government. 
Recently with regard to the opening up of the economy, the 
regulations on foreign investment have been still more relaxed 
to attract more foreign capital®. It is estimated that about 
60 per cent of the Mexican economy would be open to foreign 
participation as a result of the broad revision of 
: ~ 4 ' ; Mexico’s foreign investment law of 1973
(Financial Times, May 17, 1989).
In this way, Mexico will be more integrated in the world 
production and it can take advantage of this fact by means of 
an appropriate industrial policy. For example, as Grunwald 
suggests (1985) a system of incentives for establishing in- 
bond plants (which mainly locate in the Northern Border) in 
the interior of the country could benefit the national 
integration of this kind of industry. Plant location in the 
interior could increase the content of domestic materials and 
consequently the participation of national firms with the 
resulting impact in the regional economy.
The negotiation, between United States, Mexico and
Canada to form a North American Free Trade Area
By 1984 Mexico still had extensive restrictions on foreign investment (including the 
maximum of 49 per cent of foreign equity). Industries such as petroleum, basic 
petrochemicals, electricity, and railroads, are run exclusively by the state; others such 
as radio and television, urban transport, air and maritime transport, and gas 
distribution are reserved for Mexicans and Mexican companies. Some other sectors like 
electronics (considered strategic) were also reserved for Mexicans which led the public 
opinion, in the early 1980s, to great controversy about the IBM's plans of setting up a 
computer plant in the country. However, the importance of the electronics industry and 
the possibility of taking advantage of the new technologies led the government to the 
decision of allow, after protracted negotiations, IBM to establish a wholly owned 
personal computer plant despite the general bar on full foreign ownership in this branch 
(OECD, 1988:60). Thus exemptions were made to let IBM, Xerox and Ericsson industries to 
set up plants as well as other leading companies as Hewlett-Packard and Apple Computer, 
all US-based companies. For example, Hewlett-Packard has a wholly owned subsidiary which 
manufactures minicomputers as well as a joint venture to Bake personal computers. Apple 
established a joint venture to manufacture personal computers for the local and regional 
market and has contracted with an independent institute to write Spanish-language 
software programmes for its machines (O’Connor, 1985). These authorizations are normally 
granted for mainframe and mini-computer production, conditional on the use of minimum 
levels of domestically made components.
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NAFTA) represent a positive prospect for the Mexican 
economy. However, the opinions in the United States are 
split : *!. The west is for free trade, the east not. Some 
influential western Democrats like Bruce Babit, once governor 
of Arizona, and Roy Romer, the governor of Colorado are 
decisive advocates of free trade. They and the Californians 
know that they have no choice but to work closely with Mexico 
because -as President Salinas says- if Mexico cannot export 
its goods it will export its people. That is a good argument 
to convince the skeptics of the advantages of a revitalisation 
of the Mexican economy through a free trade agreement. 
Moreover, a report from the Business Roundtable released in 
1990 by the two hundred top American Business leaders urges 
the US and Mexican government to negotiate a comprehensive 
free trade and investment agreement which would embrace all 
sectors of the economy and include agreements on tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, services, intellectual property, 
agriculture, investment and dispute settlement procedures. The 
prospect of a market of 100m Mexican consumers before the year 
2000 constitutes an incentive for the US industrialists now 
that US exports have been rising sharply as the Mexican 
economy recovers (Financial Times, June 11, 1990). Quite apart 
from the market opportunities for the US in Mexico, free trade 
could further shift labour intensive production south of the 
border. This would give US greater flexibility in competing 
against Japan and the Asian NICs. From the Mexican 
perspective, in spite of the so-called danger of being exposed 
to US competition and lost of sovereignty, the agreement would 
provide an stimuli for the economy which will bring about 
stability for economic, monetary and fiscal policy, apart from 
the flow of investment, creation of employment, etc.
However, as one commentator says, these changes in policy 
imply the need to modernise Mexican industrial firms, which 
traditionally have been only oriented to satisfy the domestic 
market, growing increasingly inefficient; they have lacked a 
export orientation and the capacity to modify their products 
to compete in different types of markets. That is why the
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country must look for a greater degree of cooperation and 
trade with modern firms from the developed countries (Trejo 
Reyes, 1987:95).
3. MEXICO * S INTERNATIONAL TRADE.
s mentioned before, due to the anti-export bias of the 
ubstitirtTbTr-^teatcg^y, exports of manufa^tjjx^^were neg 
or long in Mexico. In f acJII^ thtr^ m^pLQrtj^ subst i tut ion i 
elied in th£__—dercreasing foreign exchange proviclerb
s titu
f  
r
tural sector which tended to stagnation.
ligible 
sub efforts
Until the oil boom Mexico’s participation in international 
trade was modest: imports and exports together represented the 
equivalent of 13 per cent of GDP in 1965, by 19-70 thi-s—w£ls
st i 1-1 no more than 14 per cent/ , After the oil boom the 
percentage increased to 18 in 1980. In the 1960s and 1970s 
Mexico exported little of its manufacturing production. In 
1974, for example, when manufactured exports registered a 
record high, exports were no more than 5 per cent of 
production. Only for some products like sugar, basic 
chemicals, fertilisers and insecticides was exported more than 
10 per cent of production. Manufactured exports experienced a 
short boom between 1970 and 1974 when they made up 50 per cent 
of total exports - up from 10 per cent in the early 1960s. 
However the growing overvaluation of the peso contributed to 
an absolute decline in their level thereafter. The boom in the 
late 1970s with the consequent growth in domestic demand left 
little surplus to export (van Liemt, 1988). In his survey 
about trends of exports from developing countries Cline (1984) 
indicates that Mexico experienced major increases in the share 
of non-traditional goods in its exports from 31.6 per cent in 
1969-1970 to 54.1 per cent in 1976-1978. The author suggests 
that perhaps, "Mexican assembly plants reexporting processed 
components to the United States were important (Cline W R, 
1984:21). However, it is necessary to confirm the above 
statement through careful analysis of composition of exports 
from Mexico. Although the exports to United States grew as a
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percentage of total manufactured exports from 61.1 in 1969 to 
81.6 in 1978, certainly not all of the exports could be from 
in-bond industry, the automotive and chemical industries were 
also a great exporter at the time. In the next sections it 
will be examined Mexico's main trading partners, its export 
profile and its performance in the international trade of 
electronic products and components to be able to evaluate the 
role the in-bond assembly industry has played in the growth of 
exports in general and electronic products and components in 
particular.
a ) Main trading partners.
In the 1970's Mexico embarked in a diversification programme
to reduce its political and economic dependence on its main
trade partner, and lately its economic dependence on the oil
revenues (Weintraub, 1984). This dependence on one market and
one product made Mexico clearly exposed to externally induced
fluctuations in demand and prices of their exports.
The US administration applauded the efforts of Mexico to
diversify on the grounds that it was dangerous to depend on
£
oil imports from a single source . Likewise, Mexico's move to 
establish sound relations with : mother industrial countries 
could mean reduced demands on US financial resources.
However, as shown in table 3.4, US is still Mexico's main 
trade partner though reduced its share from 70.3 per cent in 
1970 to 58.1 in 1984 j - ' 5 the Latin
American countries accounted for a small share of Mexico's 
exports throughout the period 1970-1984. In 1970, Argentina, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela accounted for 
more than 1 per cent each one of Mexico's exports but by 1984 
just Brazil and Canada took a significant share (more than 2 
per cent each).
Eegarding the policy of diversification of oil exports, out of the scope of thiB part, 
see the work of Szekely (1989) which deals widely on the subject.
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TABLE 3.4: Mexico: Trade by Principal Countries of Consignment 
(Value in thousand of U.S. dollars)
COUNTEY 1970 1975 1980 1984
WORLD 1205409 100 2993134 100 15307480 100 24053566 100
AMERICA 1954900 81.2 2278133 76.2 11128679 72.8 15973167 66.5
USA-PR. 846821 70.3 1844765 61.6 10072067 65.8 13971721 58.1
Argentina 14056 1.2 35037 1.2 44301 0.3 44760 0.2
Bahamas 2114 0.2 3125 0.1 1485 0 24469 0.1
Brazil 14675 1.2 91176 3 405411 2.6 561426 2.3
Canada 12026 1 43755 1.5 116874 0.8 494488 2.1
Chile 15741 1.3 16751 0.6 27153 0.2 15832 0.1
Colombia 12993 1.1 23520 0.8 47714 0.3 69175 0.3
Costa Rica 5043 0.4 26559 0.9 96353 0.6 60351 0.3
Cuba 66 0 30025 1 26757 0.2 81076 0.3
Dominican Rep 1209 0.1 6643 0.2 10212 0.1 162575 0.7
Ecuador 1812 0.2 9598 0.3 38905 0.3 39384 0.2
El Salvador 3184 0.3 13760 0.5 18583 0.1 76991 0.3
Guatemala 8807 0.7 24478 0.8 59201 0.4 102632 0.4
Nicaragua 2439 0.2 8145 0.3 53749 0.4 68618 0.3
Panama Ex.CZ 6513 0.5 14202 0.5 21948 0.1 150873 0.6
Peru 8093 0.7 29299 1 26194 0.2 14087 0.1
Venezuela 21858 1.8 57295 1.9 61772 0.4 34689 0.1
EUROPE 129510 10.6 363138 12.1 2144892 14.1 4112846 17
Belgium-Lux 3008 0.2 35389 1.2 77277 0.5 82368 0.3
France 8770 0.7 38599 1.3 566781 3.7 928171 3.9
Germany FR 27819 2.3 87346 2.9 0 0
Italy 19734 1.6 43290 1.4 100586 0.7 304988 1.3
Netherlands 18667 1.5 48338 1.6 76295 0.5 34622 0.1
Spain 14161 1.2 20504 0.7 1238123 8.1 1702554 7.1
Sweden 1187 0.1 10950 0.4 19221 0.1 7952 0
Switzerland 25553 2.1 42597 1.4 23106 0.2 32749 0.1
Unit Kingdom 10611 0.9 36125 1.2 43503 0.3 1019442 4.2
ASIA 69544 5.8 233621 7.8 1411658 9.2 2455981 10.2
China 0 0 33679 1.1 93415 0.6 91907 0.4
India 657 0.1 12139 0.4 6107 0 10035 0
Israel 0 0 43634 1.5 640989 4.2 486021 2
Japan 68887 5.7 144169 4.8 671147 4.4 1868018 7.8
Australia 2867 0.2 3827 0.1 8268 0.1 9467 0
SOUBCE: United Nations, 1976, 1980, 1988.
On the other hand, European and Asian countries increased 
steadily their shares during the period, mainly due to their 
increasing demand for oil. Since the outbreak of hostilities 
between Iran and Iraq, Mexico has been a major source for 
Japan and Israel (supplying over two-thirds of the latter in 
the 1980s). Likewise, Spain, France and Britain are Mexico’s 
main customers in Europe. Specially the governments of the 
first two countries, which lack oil have been more concerned 
with secure oil sources, and have therefore actively 
encouraged business deals with Mexico (Szekely:1989:1790).
As it is shown in table 3.5, Mexico has held a positive trade 
balance with its main trade partners, US, Japan and the EC 
(with the exception of its trade balance with US in 1988 and
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1989), mainly due to the oil exports. It is estimated that 85 
per cent of Mexico’s exports to the EC are oil, so that if 
this is not taken into account in the total, it would mean 
that the country's exports are minimal. Moreover, apart from 
oil exports, Mexico’s positive trade balance is due to the 
strict adjustment process imposed by the government throughout 
the 1980's in response to the economic crisis with a 
consequent reduction in imports (De Mateo, 1987).
TABLE 3.5: Mexico’s main trade partners, 
1985-1989 (USSbn).
MEXICO-US TRADE! BALANCE
EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE
1985 13.3 9.8 3.5
1986 10.4 8.3 2.2
1987 12.6 8.5 4.1
1988 12.5 13.1 -0.5
1989 15.7 17.8 -2.2
HEXICO-EC
EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE
1985 4 1.9 2.1
1986 0.6 1.9 0.4
1987 3.8 1.7 2.2
1988 3.8 2.5 1.2
1989 3.9 3.5 0.5
MEXICO-JAPAN
EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE
1985 1.7 0.8 0.9
1986 1.1 0.8 0.3
1987 1.6 0.7 0.9
1988 1.6 1.1 0.6
1989 1.8 1.4 0.3
SOURCE: Financial Times June 11, 1990.
The inability of Mexico to increase the volume of non-US 
exports is due basically to two factors. On the one hand, 
there has been little interest on the part of the EC to 
increase its trade links with Mexico in spite of the economic 
progress Mexico has made since 1985 and the campaign to
promote closer ties, President Salinas de Gortari undertook in 
early 1990. The democratisation of Eastern Europe and the 
preparations for 1992 made the Europeans uninterested in
a closer integration with Mexico (Financial Times June 11, 
1990; The Economist, June 16, 1990).
On the other hand, for the major part of the last decade the 
US dollar was overvalued in relation to other European 
currencies. Since the peso slides according to the dollar, it
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became overvalued i( in relation to the EC currencies. Thus, 
Mexico’s exports of some products to this market were reduced 
(De Mateo, 1987).
These factors made Mexico reverse the diversification
policy and engage in negotiations for closer links with the 
United States and Canada and, eventually, the formation of a 
free-trade area which will make a market of close 400 million 
people. In any case, 'spite of the diversification efforts of 
the Mexican government, the US accounts for about 88 per cent 
(US$23bn) of Mexico’s annual trade (see figure 3.2) and Mexico 
is the US’s third biggest trading partner. Likewise, US 
accounts for two thirds of total foreign direct investment in 
Mexico of US$23 bn.
b) Export profile.
As can be seen in tables 3.6 and 3.7, in 1976 manufacturing 
was the biggest earner of foreign exchange constituting almost 
fifty per cent of Mexico’s exports (with food products, 
machinery and parts and chemicals in the lead) followed by 
agricultural products and cattle (32.1 per cent of total 
exports). Oil represented only 15 per cent of total exports.
By 1980 the panorama had completely changed, oil exports 
accounted almost 67 per cent of the total, manufactured 
products declined to 17 per cent and agriculture and cattle to
9.8 per cent. The decline in non-oil exports is explained not 
only by the increase in oil exports but the government’s 
neglect of the agriculture and also by the expansion in the 
domestic demand which left little surplus to export as 
mentioned earlier.
This pattern continued up to 1985 when due to the decline in 
the international prices of oil, the government ... 
undert^X a policy of export diversification to boost non-oil 
exports and obtain the foreign currency necessary to service 
the debt.
FIGURE 2.3
NAFTA
VALUE OF INTRA-NORTH AMERICAN EXPORTS, 1989 US$ bn
(FIGURES IN BRACKETS SHOW EXPORTS AS % OF EACH COUNTRY'S TOTAL)
CANAQA
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SOURCE: The Economist, June 16, 1990
TABLE 3.6: Mexico: Exports, 1976, 1980-87 (million US dollars)
1976 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
TOTAL EXPORTS 3655 15570 19646 21214 21819 24407 22108 16031 20656
NON-OIL 3092 5168 5072 4736 5654 7941 7341 10082 12250
Manufactures* 1708 2651 2688 3018 4582 5595 5267 7110 9894
Food Products 531 772 679 702 725 822 747 934 n.a
Textiles 182 185 181 150 191 275 207 354 558
Chemicals 236 395 457 442 628 756 676 831 1095
Steel Products 54 70 64 112 319 378 246 455 620
Machinery fc parts 399 785 894 888 1663 2217 2336 3597 4000
Auto engines 56 33 61 214 603 983 1040 1155 1291
Auto parts 76 208 165 131 180 270 241 374 444
Electronics 60 109 110 91 180 227 285 363 n.a
Agriculture & Cattle 1175 1528 1481 1233 1189 1641 1323 2100 1549
Mining 209 512 677 502 524 539 510 510 807
OIL 563 10402 14574 16478 16165 16466 14767 5949 8406
Crude 540 9449 13305 15623 14821 14967 13309 5572 7870
Refined Products 16 384 589 261 866 1138 1351 532 412
Petrochemicals 7 120 153 116 123 128 107 29 124
Natural Gas 447 526 478 353 231 -- -— --
* Manufactures: dlnnngragnt.ftd f inures include only the most significant. export.
categories. The oil industry's manufactured exports are shown 
separately below.
SOURCE: G. Szekely, 1989:Table 3.
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TABLE 3.7: Mexico: Exports, 1976, 1980-67 (percentages)
1976 1960 1961 1962 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
TOTAL EXPORTS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
NON-OIL 64.6 33.2 25.8 22.3 25.9 32.5 33.2 62.9 59.3
Manufactures* 46.7 17 13.7 14.2 21 22.9 23.8 44.4 47.9
Food Prod. 14.5 5 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 5.8 0
Textiles 5 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.9 2.2 2.7
Chemicals 6.5 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 5.2 5.3
Steel Prod. 1.5 ' 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 2.8 3
Mach. & parts 10,9 5 4.6 4.2 7.6 9.1 10.6 22.4 19.4
Auto eng. 1.5 0.2 0.3 1 2.8 4 4.7 7.2 6.3
Auto parts 2.1 1.3 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 2.3 2.1
Electronics 1.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.3 2.3
Agric. A Cattle 32.1 9.6 7.5
CO 5.4 6.7 6 13.1 7.5
Mining 5.7 3.3 3.4 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.3 3.2 3.9
OIL 15.4 66.8 74.2 77.7 74.1 67.5 66.8 37.1 40.7
Crude 14.8 60.7 67.7 73.6 67.9 61.3 60.2 34.8 38.1
Refined Prod. 0.4 2.5 3 1.2 4 4.7 6.1 3.3 2
Petrochemicals 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.6
Natural Gas 0 2.9 2.7 2.3 1.6 0.9 0 0 0
SOURCE: Table 3.6.
As shown in the table 3.7, the policy of diversification 
succeeded in increastAj the share of non-oil exports . to 
almost 63 per cent in 1986, with manufacturing taking the lead 
with 44 per cent share of total exports (machinery and parts 
exports were bigger than agricultural products and cattle 
exports). Again in 1987, manufactured products had the biggest 
share in total exports above of oil exports. Regarding the 
export of electronic products, though rising, they have not 
been significant in terms of exports throughout the period. 
However, it is my belief that given the geographical position 
of Mexico (strategic for Japan) and the prospects of the free- 
trade area, it will become an important sector in the years to 
come.
c) Exports of electronic products and components.
As mentioned in chapter II, the share of Mexico in the 
international trade of electronics products is not very 
significant. The main bulk of electronic products exports 
comes from the in-bond assembly plants located mainly in the 
Northern Border (though lately it can be observed a trend in 
locating these plants in the interior of the country) which
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will be dealt with more extensively in the next chapter. Apart 
from the in-bond industry the Mexican electronics industry has 
been geared towards the domestic market which boomed before 
the economic crisis of the early 1980s.
"This industry suffers, however, from its heavy 
concentration on consumer electronics and its 
dependence on imports since it consists in 
assembling imported components. Moreover, certain 
products (such as medium-sized and large computers) 
are traditionally imported. The electronics industry 
carries a heavy deficit, which amounted in 1984, 
despite the recession-induced fall in imports, to 
329 million (this figure includes also electrical 
engineering). The strategy of the authorities is to 
expand this industry but to ensure that firms 
increase their purchases from domestic supplies and 
thus help to reduce the shortage of foreign 
exchange. The microcomputer market is likely to 
develop rapidly and several American companies have 
set up in Mexico since the crisis..." (OECD, 
1988:60).
The minor role played by the Mexican electronics in-bond 
industry in the world trade is due, among others, to the 
economic effects of the expansionary policies followed by the 
government. Although economic growth accelerated, domestic 
inflation and overvaluation of the currency made exports more 
expensive and offset the labour cost advantage for setting up 
in-bond plants. As shown in tables 3.8 and 3.9, from 1980 to 
1985 Mexico performed poorly in the international trade of 
computers compared with Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore 
which increased their shares. In the case of TV sets, as 
mentioned in chapter II, from 1975 to 1985 the DCs lost their 
TV sets production to Japan and the Asian NICs, South Korea, 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Mexico increased its share from 
nothing to 1.4 per cent in this period.
Radio sets is the only product in which Mexico seems to have 
and advantage but, again, in a lesser degree than the Asian 
NICs but greater than some of the European countries. 
Regarding sound recorders, phonographs, semiconductors 
(transistors, valves and etc), again Mexico performs badly in 
comparison with the Asian NICs.
TABLR 3.8: Rxports of *ain electronic products by country, 1975 and 1985,
(thousand US dollars)
TV RADIO SOUND RECORDERS TV IMAGB, SOUND TRANSISTORS
COMPUTERS SETS SBTS i PHONOGRAPHS RECORDERS, ETC VALVES, ETC
COUNTRIES 1980 1985 1975 1985 1975 1985 1975 1985 1980 1985 1975 1985
WORLD MKT EC 2188393 4260629 2517999 6534817 2697965 6050941 1717705 11342508 2367194 8204377 4242658 22514799
OECD COUNTRIES 2014123 3948251 2144706 4487727 2056170 3512485 1464997 10162949 2299970 7678852 3441502 15918201
Prance 40951 109719 27984 39317 45514 94125 45706 168226 18190 23557 304491 995543
Japan 136493 387472 783685 2815339 1325391 2654439 700227 8704137 1981376 6622119 1351012 4753395
G e n a n y  Fed Rep 324641 553032 436512 641323 232701 229857 190330 230885 99072 532562 434121 1451341
Ireland 207151 1030487 1942 1992 4523 11957 547 1215 15395 156379
Italy 15875 2576 164066 127738 27472 11341 36699 45840 3688 2591 127734 532785
Netherlands 79332 216840 136437 94844 197560 47253 102406 345458 33752 79770 412309 650014
United Kingdoi 278814 111713 152078 160146 27873 41099 133708 136384 54756 183610 199350 1298791
USA-Puerto Rico 918972 1519395 185165 245288 51054 218323 130998 135221 83313 176224 443344 5318983
NICS 7173 248907 107681 1349313 510477 2310754 112420 274766 49253 481684 668207 5896792
Brasil 2668 18742 4674 6730 41950 223752 2668 289 14321 95572
Hong Kong n.a. 79777 12654 244722 306706 537443 18664 6589 18581 167239 101446 904350
Korea Rep 76 74442 31363 591090 50374 499905 62471 9979 197 206562 206614 1136908
Malaysia 96 1010 2969 108749 13655 199739 46 6096 9328 1868343
Mexico 2183 10701 0 88611 270 349220 525 385 380 366 7773 187337
Singapore 1957 64001 55140 308347 95447 497484 26847 244186 29864 101402 310658 1385788
SOURCE: Tables 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and UNIDO, 1976, 1986, 1988.
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TABLE 3.9: Bxports of fain electronic products by country, 1975 and 1985.
(percentages)
TV RADIO SOUND 1IBCORDERS TV IMAGE, SOUND TRANSISTORS
COMPUTERS SETS SETS & PHONOGRAPHS RECORDERS, ETC VALVES, ETC
COUNTRIES 1980 1985 1975 1985 1975 1985 1975 1985 1980 1985 1975 1985
WORLD MKT EC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TOTAL 92 92.7 85.2 68.7 76.2 58 85.3 89.6 97.2 93.6 81.1 70.7
Prance 1.9 2.6 1.1 0.6 1.7 1.6 2.7 1.5 0.8 0.3 7.2 4.4
Japan 6.2 9.1 31.1 43.1 49.1 43.9 40.8 76.7 83.7 80.7 31.8 21.1
Gerfany Fed Rep 14.8 13 17.3 9.8 8.6 3.8 11.1 2 4.2 6.5 10.2 6.4
Ireland 9.5 24.2 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.7
Italy 0.7 0.1 6.5 2 1 0.2 2.1 0.4 0.2 0 3 2.4
Netherlands 3.6 5.1 5.4 1.5 7.3 0.8 6 3 1.4 1 9.7 2.9
United Kingdon 12.7 2.6 6 2.5 1 0,7 7.8 1.2 2.3 2.2 4.7 5.8
USA-Puerto Rico 42 35.7 7.4 3.8 1.9 3.6 7.6 1.2 3.5 2.1 10.4 23.6
TOTAL 0.3 5.8 4.3 20.6 18.9 38.2 6.5 2.4 2.1 5.9 15.7 26.2
Brasil 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.6 3.7 0.2 0 0 0 0.3 0.4
Hong Kong 0 1.9 0.5 3.7 11.4 8.9 1.1 0.1 0.8 2 2.4 4
Korea Rep 0 1.7 1.2 9 1.9 8,3 3.6 0.1 0 2.5 4.9 5
Malaysia 0 0 0.1 1.7 0.5 3.3 0 0 0 0,1 0.2 8.3
Mexico 0.1 0.3 0 1.4 0 5.8 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.8
Singapore 0.1 1.5 2.2 4.7 3.5 8.2 1.6 2.2 1.3 1.2 7.3 6.2
SOURCB: Table 3.8.
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Regarding the geographical distribution of Mexico’s exports of 
electronic products and components, in 1985, the main bulk 
went to America (mainly the United States) and Asia ( m a i n l y  
Japan). Considering by product, all the exports go mainly to 
United States with the exception of accounting machines and 
computers which went to Argentina, Brazil, Belgium-Lux, France 
and Germany. In this case, it may be that the US-based firms 
are assembling these products in Mexico to send them directly 
to those markets.
In the case of products like TV and radio sets, sound
tit
recorders, US- and Japan'- firms assemble in Mexico to send the 
final products to the main consumer market, in this case 
United States (see tables 3.10 and 3.11). Kith respect to 
telecom equipment and semiconductors it is known that 
once assembled this devices are re-exported back to United 
States in some cases to belater assembled in products in some 
of the New-NICs which have advantage over Mexico in terms of 
labour costs in less-sophisticated products.
Grunwald (1985) affirms that the rank of Mexico in 
television and radio receivers imported into the U.S. under 
items 806/807 (these items allowed the reimport of articles 
whose manufacturing process began in the U.S., and were 
processed abroad and duty was to be paid only on the value- 
added abroad) increased from 2nd place to 1st between
1970 and 1980. In semiconductors, Mexico lost its advantage 
in comparison with other countries such as Malaysia, for 
instance. He also argues that between 1970 and 1980, Mexico 
decreased in importance from the 1st place to the 7th in 
exports of semiconductors and parts into U.S. under items 
806/807 as a result of the increase in labour costs and unions 
activities within the in-bond assembly plants (Grunwald J, 
1985) but as Sklair ( 1989) affirms it is also necessary to 
take in account the impact of the world slump (1974-1975).
TABLE 3.10. Mexico: Exports of electronic products by country, 1985
(thousand US dollars)
COUNTRY
TOTAL
OFFICE MACHINES 
Accting. 
Type- Machs. 
Writers Conputers
Office 
Statist. Machines 
Machs. NES
TOTAL
TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
Sound Tele- 
TV Radio Recorders Conn. 
Sets Sets etc. Eq. nes
TRANSIST.
VALVES
ETC.
VORLD 271733 28551 2939 74739 165113 665883 56962 215642 43742 349537 264632
ASIA 23128 5320 0 17304 113 0 0 0 0 0 951
Japan 9307 1912 0 7282 113 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong 2929 1022 0 1907 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 1903 0 0 1903 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea 740 0 0 740 0 0 0 0 0 0 329
Malaysia 1198 0 0 1198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore 2424 449 0 1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand 2616 1337 0 1279 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China 1354 482 0 872 0 0 0 0 0 0 587
Other Asia 266 118 0 148 0 0 0 0 0 0 35
AMERICA 221553 13125 1192 43135 164101 665380 56962 215642 43531 349245 258255
Canada 3126 0 0 2211 915 154 0 0 0 154 179
USA 193774 3881 134 26948 162811 654608 56756 215640 43296 338916 254753
Argentina 7636 1854 441 5341 0 118 0 0 118 0 450
Brasil 1427 975 293 159 0 1076 206 0 0 870 477
Chile 1902 636 0 1266 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colonbia 1900 1142 0 758 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Peru 2189 1219 0 970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Venezuela 3867 940 324 2603 0 0 0 0 0 0 2202
Other Anerica 5732 2478 0 2879 375 9424 0 2 117 9305 194
Continues next page.
TABLE 3.10 (Continued),..
EUROPE 13271 7051 1747 3744 729
Belffiuii-Lux 580 140 440 0 0
Prance 1572 166 552 743 111
Geriany 8854 5449 727 2449 229
Italy 417 417 0 0 0
Netherlands 416 243 0 0 173
Spain 420 241 0 0 179
UK 639 235 0 404 0
Austria 106 106 0 0 0
Other Europe 267 54 28 148 37
OCBANIA 13781 3055 0 10556 170
Australia 11116 2502 0 8458 156
New Zeland 2652 553 0 2099 0
SOURCE: United Nations, 1988.
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TABLR 3.1t. Mexico: Exporta of electronic products by country
1985, (percentages)
OFFICE MACHINES TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
COUNTRY Accting. Office Sound Tele- TRANSIST.
TOTAL Type- Machs. Statist. Machines TOTAL TV Radio Recorders Co«n. VALVES
Writers Coiputers Machs. NES Sets Sets etc. Eq. nes ETC.
WORLD 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ASIA 8.5 18.6 0 23.6 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
Japan 3.A 6.7 0 9.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong 1.1 3.6 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 0.7 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Korea 0.3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
Malaysia 0.4 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Singapore 0.9 1.6 0 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand 1 A.7 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China 0.5 1.7 0 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
Other Asia 0.1 0.A 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AMERICA 81.5 A6 A0.6 57,A 99.A 99.9 100 100 99.5 99.9 97.A
Canada 1.2 0 0 2.9 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
USA 71.3 13.6 A.6 35.9 98.6 98.3 99.6 100 99 97 96.1
Argentina 2.8 6.5 15 7.1 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.2
BrAr.ll 0.5 3.A 10 0.2 0 0.2 0.A 0 0 0.2 0.2
Chile 0.7 2.2 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Colonbia 0.7 A 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Peru 0.8 A.3 0 1.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Venezuela 1.4 3.3 11 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8
Other Aserica 2.1 8.7 0 3.8 0.2 l.A 0 0 0.2 2.7 0
Continues next page.
TABLE 3,10 (Continues
EUROPE <.9 24.7 59.4 5 0.4
Belgiua-Lux 0.2 0.5 15 0 0
France 0.6 0.6 18.8 1 0.1
Geriany 3.3 19.1 24.7 3.3 0.1
Italy 0.2 1.5 0 0 0
Netherlands 0.2 0.9 0 0 0.1
UR 0.2 0.8 0 0.5 0
Other Europe 0.2 1.3 0.9 0.2 0.1
OCEANIA 5.1 10.7 0 14.1 0.1
Australia 4.1 8.8 0 11.3 0.1
New Zeland 1 1.9 0 2.8 0
SOURCE: Table 3.10.
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Table 3.12 shows that, by 1976 Mexico was in the fifth place 
in exports of semiconductors behind the Asian NICs with 9.6 
per cent of the total of US$1064.2 million exports from these 
countries.
TABLE 3.12: Semiconductor Exports from the NICs, 1976.
COUNTRY US$MILLION %
Singapore 339.5 31.9
South Korea 298.6 28
Taiwan 197.7 18.6
Hong Kong 126.2 11.9
Mexico 102.5 9.6
TOTAL 1064.2 100
SOURCE: P Dicken, 1988:Table 10.1.
Loosely 40 per cent of the total number of in-bond plants were 
in electronic production in the late sixties. Television 
receivers and parts, the most important single group in in- 
bond operations, in the mid-eighties made up about a quarter 
of the total in-bond plants. Likewise, semiconductors and 
parts, which, with more than 16 per cent of the total, were 
almost as important as the television group in 1969, accounted 
for less than 6 per cent in 1980 (Grunwald J, 1985:146).
As world competition increased in the electronics industry, 
firms were pushed to look for still more cheaper labour-force 
while productivity levels remained the same. In the Mexico’s 
case the overvaluation of the currency (peso) and high 
inflation levels made it too expensive to perform the assembly 
operations in the semiconductors production. Therefore, firms 
moved to South-East Asia. Nonetheless, this movement of 
industrial capacity did not mean a reduction of in-bond 
operations in Mexico but, it seems, a shift from traditional 
assembly operations to more skill-intensive operations with 
higher value-added.
As can be seen in table 3.13, in 1983, Mexico was the biggest 
exporter to United States under items 806.3 and 807, ahead of
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the Asian NICs and New-NICs, with an amount of US$1908.7 
million in exports. Today, many in-bond plants incorporate the 
most modern equipment and sophisticated technology. 
Electronics and electrical machinery (as well as autoparts) 
remain the growing sectors.
TABLE 3.13: Value of electronic component products exported to 
US under iteas 806/807 by Country, 1969 and 1983.
(US Billion dollars)
1969 1983
1. Malaysia 0.1 1. Colombia 20
2. Dominican Bep. 0.1 2. Brazil 27.4
3. Colombia 0.2 3. El Salvador 45.3
4. Haiti 2.4 4. Germany 58.9
5. Brazil 2.5 5. Hong Kong 72.2
6. Philippines 3.5 6. Taiwan 100.7
7. Singapore 3.8 7. Dominican Bep. 111.6
8. Germany 11.6 8. Haiti 139.4
9. South Korea 15.9 9. Japan 175.5
10. Taiwan 23.8 10. Singapore 275.9
11. Japan 25.4 11. South Korea 340.4
12. Hong Kong 51.3 12. Philippines 455.6
13. Mexico 97.9 13. Canada 467
14. Canada 118.7 14. Malaysia 695.7
15* Mexico 1908.7
SOUBCE: N Clement and S B Jenner, 1987.
Despite the great size of employment in the Mexican in-bond 
assembly industry in its Northern Border , Mexico has not 
achieved high levels of competitiveness in electronics 
production as in the Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore cases. These countries have had a superior 
performance in terms of exports:
"The electronics field is dominated by the Asian 
suppliers who specialise in the production of sound 
recorders, television and radio sets; in 1978 Asian 
LDCs respectively accounted for 18.55 and 13 per 
cent of world production in each of these 
categories... Foremost among the exporters are Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan" (Ballance 
R and Sinclair S, 1985:140).
In this respect, Mexico still has to make many improvements in 
terms of productivity of labour to be able to catch up with 
the Asian NICs and also to take advantage of the free-trade
 ^ On some estimates, 500 000 Mexicans now work in the in-bond assembly industry (The 
Economist April 20, 1991).
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agreement with the United States. The initial advantage Mexico 
would enjoy in a movement to free trade with the United States 
would result from Mexico*s lower wages, compensating many 
industries for lower Mexican productivity. This initial 
advantage can be overshadowed if measures are no taken in 
advance to avoid bottlenecks in public services and housing in 
border cities (already the fastest in urban growth in Mexico) 
and to improve and expand educational establishments suitable 
for the expected demand of a diversity of qualifications.
d) Conclusions.
From the brief examination of the performance of Mexico in 
international trade some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. 
Mexico became an exporter of industrial products on the NIC 
scale in part because it had become a successful producer of 
manufactures for its own market, but also because of the 
existence of special arrangements with the United States as in 
the case of the in-bond assembly industry.
The policy of import substitution inhibited the exports of 
manufactures in first instance. Later, an overvalued currency, 
the expansion of domestic demand and the oil boom further 
inhibited the export of manufactures. These developments 
discouraged the inefficient industry to modernise and adapt to 
circumstances of strong competition unlike the Asian NICs.
... „ shanks to the drastic reduction in the 
international prices of petroleum the Mexican government 
realised the need of taking steps avray from the one-product 
export profile and engage in an export diversification 
strategy. In consequence exports of manufactured goods 
increased steadily throughout the 1980s with food products, 
chemicals and machinery parts (mainly automotive parts) in the 
lead. However, in the case of market diversification external 
factors as the democratisation of Eastern Europe, the plans 
for 1992 of the EEC and the overvaluation of the US dollar 
overshadowed the efforts of the Mexican government in that
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respect. Moreover, there exists already an integration with 
the economy of the United States in terms of finance, trade 
and foreign direct investment in manufacturing activities like 
the in-bond assembly industry.
Regarding the international trade of electronic products and 
components it can be seen that Mexico has an advantage in 
consumer electronics. Unfortunately due to the overvaluation 
of the currency many labour processes were located and re­
located in the New-NICs losing, then, the opportunity to catch 
up with the Asian NICs, spite of its strategic geographical 
position.
5. CONCLUSIONS.
From this analysis on the performance of Mexico in the last 
two decades in economic terms and international trade and more 
specifically in terms of electronics industry some conclusions 
can be suggested. Contrary to the widely held view that the 
role of the nation-states is that of simple providers of the 
optimum conditions for the successful performance of the TNCs, 
it is suggested that the nation-states actively influence the 
geographical distribution of the industry (whether local or 
foreign) and the emergence of new patterns of location. The 
series of factors frequently adduced as influencing the growth 
of exports from the NICs and the New-NICs, (infrastructure, 
labour productivity, educative and health services,
incentives, tax reliefs, cheap raw material, repressive
0
political regime, etc) are result of active interventionism 
in fostering economic growth from the part of goverments. 
Thus, those companies in the DCs compelled by strong 
competition seek to cut unit cost of production locate some or 
all the phases of the production process in those countries 
which offer advantageous incentives.
8 Soae of the less democratic of the regimes in the Asian KICs and New-KICs are the most 
successful in achieve sustained rates of growth of GDP and exports. Por example, China 
which between 1981 and 1990 achieved 10.0 per cent growth of GDP and 13.1 growth of 
exports between 1981 and 1990; Singapore (6.3 and 7.3, respectively); South Korea (9.9 
and 11.6); Taiwan (8.5 and 12.1) and Thailand (7.8 and 12.7) (The Economist June 29,
1991).
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In the case of Mexico, due to its market size, natural and 
resources, etc, the opening of the economy was delayed a bit 
longer than in the Asian NICs which, with exception perhaps of 
South Korea, had no other alternative than export. Although it 
is argued that the oil-boom and the expansion of the domestic 
market further delayed the integration to the world economy. 
However, the establishment in 19 *, of the BIP and the in-bond 
industry regulations (and later, in 1972, reforms to th^j^ 
regulations) proves that the Mexican government was already 
envisaging an strategy alternative to the ISI.
The debt and foreign currency constraints
constituted further incentives for the Mexican government to
take measures for a full opening of the economy thus exposing
the inefficient and protected local industry to foreign
competition. The measures (reduction of budget deficit and
inflation, privatisation of the government holdings,
liberalisation of the economy, among others) implemented under
the advise of the IMF first, during the De la Madrid
Administration (1982-1988) and in the Salinas de
Gortari Administration (1988-1994) had, as a result, positive
consequences for the economy, about 4 per cent growth of GDP
in 1990 and «3.,k per cent in the first half of 1991 (this is
dy,J 'lit
the highest figure for a decade)/, reduction of inflation, 
increase in DFI, increase in exports , above of all a major 
integration of Mexico to the world economy.
'■’i v. he negotiations of a free trade
agreement with United States and Canada * bring
further advantages to all the parties^,/spite/criticisms, and 
specially to Mexico in terms of an increase in investment 
(foreign and domestic) and employment.
"In the first half of 1990, manufacturing exports grew by just 0.6 per cent compared 
to the same period in 1989; in the second half they were up by 20.9 per cent, to give a 
growth rate for the year of 10.9 per cent" (Financial Times March 12, 1991).
^  "Indeed, as Rudiger Dornbusch from MIT points out, the United States’non-oi1 trade 
with Mexico swung from a deficit of US$1.2 billion in 1986 to a surplus of US$2.1 billion 
in 1989. Using the latest rule of thumb -US$1 m-worth of net exports equals 30 jobs- that 
means that the swing in the bilateral-trade balance has already created more than 100,000 
jobs in the United States" (The Economist April 20th 1991).
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A / o - /  a // manufacturing industry
was inefficient and unable to compete at the world level.
Indeed, there were some few sectors that performed
outstandingly well throughout all the period considered, /
machinery and parts, specially automotive parts and the in-
bond assembly industry located, mainly in the Northern Border.
In particular, the in-bond industry has become s e c o n d  o A/ -/-o
-o e <?r inc r
the petroleum sector/ of foreign 
currency. Likewise, it is a big generator of employment,
. /?. it provide an estimated of 500 000 jobs for
Mexicans.
Although it .jo e  r  J-vhrn.r in the international trade, the
most important sector within these border industries is the
assembly of electronic products and components.In 1985, for
example, the electronics production share 36
per cent in number of plants, 47 per cent in employment and
the most important generator of value-added with 44.6 per
cent. Likewise it provided 40.3% of the total foreign exchange
/fey in-bond industry (INEGI, 1989). The low labour costs at
cu/T) to t'n e A.
given levels of productivity, f with devaluation, were 
responsible for such dynamic growth.
Mexico is now seeking new credits to implement a five-year 
programme aimed at satisfying development requirements in 
border towns -h> ease bottlenecks in the expansion of
in-bond industries. Likewise, it is going to change the tax 
regime of in-bond industry to incentive this kind of industry 
which is estimated to have grown 13-15 per cent in 1990 with 
a 10 per cent rise in foreign exchange earnings to US$3.lbn 
(Financial Times March 29, 1990).
It can be concluded that changes in policy /ourj rt j more 
export-oriented g ' k a J e j / e s . .  hav'e ) qcL -ho the
emergence of a new locational pattern/different to that of the 
heavy industrial concentrations in the three metropolitan 
areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. This new 
locational pattern merged in the way of
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in-bond plants mentioned above. The assembly of electronic 
products and components is a good example of this shift in 
Mexican industry, It is heavily concentrated in the Northern 
Border Region though the interior region is gaining importance 
in terms of the location of in-bond industry due to wage
differentials, labour shortages and bottlenecks in the supply 
of public services and infrastructure in the Northern Border 
plants.
It is undeniable that the incentives provided by the Border 
Industrialisation Programme had influenced the location of 
the in-bond plants. But it is also the case that this area 
designated by the government provided the kind of low-cost
labour suitable for routine and assembly-line tasks required 
by the firms and with the required levels of productivity. 
Also the geographical proximity to United States provided an 
additional stimuli. These can be considered as factors
internal to the country as opposed to those external factors 
examinated in the previous chapter, competition between
capitals, technological developments in the industry, the role 
of the governments in the home countries as well as some other 
more specific factors as rise in the cost of land (in Silicon 
Valley, for example) and labour unions (in some parts of the 
East-US).
The amount and extension of the foreign direct investment 
(mainly from U.S.) in electronic production is very important 
in Mexico unlike other NICs as South Korea and Taiwan where 
a major part of the industry is locally owned (e.g. Samsung, 
Gold Star and Hyunday from South Korea and Tatung from 
Taiwan). However, Mexican local capital involved in 
subcontracting operations could be important though it is 
possible underrepresented. It is necessary to deepen
the analysis of available data in further stages of the 
research before to draw any conclusion in this aspect. As a 
result of the foreign investment from US firms the main market 
for Mexican electronics exports is US but as foreign
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investment diversify (from Japan, for example) other markets 
could gain importance.
Mexico seems to have advantages in the assembly of consumer 
electronics rather than components as semiconductors. But 
negative factors in the Mexican economy, mainly inflation, and 
overvaluation of the currency offset the advantages for 
setting up certain kind of in-bond plants in Mexico. That 
means some assembly operations were lost to poorer countries. 
For instance, ’less-sophisticated labour-intensive phases of 
production processes are being performed in the so-called New- 
NICs as Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, etc.
148
IV. THE IN-BOND ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY. 3 965 - 1990. 
INTRODUCTION.
As indicated in chapter III, the establishment of in-bond^ 
assembly plants in Mexico as a result of the implementation of 
the Border Industrialisation Progamme in Mexico led to the 
emergence of a new locational pattern of the industry away 
from the old industrial concentrations. The cities located 
along the Mexican Northern Border (see figure 4.1) have 
boomed due to the number of in-bond plants devoted to the 
assembly of several types of products for export has been 
increasing there since the middle 1960s. Also, there are some 
other establishments located in the interior of the country.
There are . few studies of the locational pattern of both the 
electronics industry and in-bond plants in Mexico. In 
particular, the bulk of research on in-bond plants emphasizes 
the type of labour force employed, the impact on the regional 
economy, as well as the social and family consequences. Other 
main concerns are on unionism and the working class and so on 
(Carrillo, 1986)*.
 ^ These plants were first identified as "in-bond" plants due to the fact that they should 
operate under Mexican law (or in-bond) as long as they are inside the Mexican territory. 
As mentioned in chapter 1 (footnote 20) they have become better known by their Spanish 
naae maquiladoras or in the abbreviated fora maquilas.
"In colonial times, the maquila was the portion of flour that the ailler kept 
after grinding the corn. The U.S. coapanles provide the corn (for example, cut 
cloth or electronic components), Mexico keeps its portion (U.S. dollars changed 
into pesos for wages and production costs), and the assembled goods (garments or 
TVs or auto parts) return to the U.S..." (Sklair, 1989:10).
2
The border region is aade up of thirty-five aunicipalities located in the six states 
bordering the United States (Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sonora and 
Taaaulipas, since Baja California Sur is free zone is also included in the statistics). 
Almost a third of the border population is concentrated in Tijuana and Mexicali -on the 
Californian border- and almost a quarter in the largest border city Cd. Juarez, the twin 
city of El Paso Texas according to the 1980 population census.
3
"...from 428 publications and documents about maquiladoras in the Mexican Northern 
Border, written between 1969 and 1981, 357 dealt with the Border Industrialisation 
Programme and development in the border; 17 dealt with the general characteristics of the 
labour force; 15 dealt with gender relations; 7 were about the social impact in the 
female workers families; 20 about working conditions; 4 on unionism and 8 case studies 
on workers' struggles..." (Carrillo, 1986:46).
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However, on the verge of an important realignment in the world 
market due to the formation of several trade blocks as the EC, 
the NAFTA and other trade blocks in Latinamerica, the 
incorporation of the Eastern Europe and the republics of the 
former Soviet Union as market economies and the growing 
importance of the Asian NICs as investors and the New-NICs as 
locations, it is of great importance to study the location of 
this kind of plants and its impact in the host economies.
There have been a number of studies on the subject which 
highlight the relevance of this kind of industry for the 
economies involved (see chapter I). Apart -frcr^ their somewhat 
one-sided view, they are in general, devoted to comparisons 
either between countries or between industrial branches; some 
other country-specific studies tend to examine the whole 
industrial sector or the role of the economic actors involved 
in the current process of redistribution of world industrial 
capacity as the state, the TNCs, etc. Without denying their 
important contribution to the subject it is considered that 
the study of particular industrial subsectors on particular 
locations yields fruitful results, as the analysis of 
Henderson (1989) and Salih et.al. among others, demonstrate.
Thus, the purpose of the present chapter is T'z* examine 
the electronics in-bond industry . -X/j. well defined location 
in the Mexican Northern Border constitutes a new locational 
pattern of industry which, as mentioned earlier, is spreading 
inside the country overlapping with the dominant pattern of 
location of great concentration in the three main cities, 
Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadalajara. It is important to 
mention that, with the exception of the in-bond industry 
regime (the BIP), the trend towards great concentration 
continued (though it should be recognised that at lower pace 
in the last years) after several plans and costly projects^
 ^ Like the heavy-industry complex Lazaro Cardenas-Las Truchas in the Pacific coast (see 
figure 3.1), the costly programme of new towns and industrial estates (Garza, et.al., 
1988), or middle-size cities among others.
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m ad e  by the Me x i c a n  government to d e c o n c e n t r a t e  the industrial 
se c t o r  and, ergo, the urban popu l a t i o n  out of the main cities.
I will examine in part 1 the antecedents of the Border
Industrialisation Programme (BIP) and the BIP in its
first phase from its creation in 1965, up to 1974. The second 
part is concerned with the growth and main characteristics of 
the in-bond assembly plants with special reference to the 
electronics subsector, economic crisis and its impact in the 
in-bond industry in the 1980s patterns of specialisation. Part 
3 gives the pros and cons adduced by politicians, academics 
and businessmen in US and Mexico and the prospects for the 
industry whereas in part 4 some preliminary conclusions are 
drawn.
1. THE BORDER INDUSTRIALISATION PROGRAMME. 1965-1970.
a ) A n t e c e d e n t s .
The relations between Mexico and US have been often 
by suspicion and distrust by the Mexicans^, who hardly forget 
the annexation of half the country/the last century and see 
their Northern neighbour as a powerful giant always looking 
i z> take- advantage of its small and weak neighbour which 
sees as its backyard. On the other side the US have seen with 
rs'trujf the nationalist policies of Mexico like the 
nationalisation and distribution to peasants of large 
landholdings after the Mexican Revolution and during the 
administration of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) as well as the 
nationalisation of natural resources and strategic foreign 
owned sectors as electric energy distribution, oil®, 
railroads, mining, sugar refining, etc.
After the outbreak of World War II, economic and political 
relations improved considerably. Mexico joined the US in the 
war. Moreover both countries signed a commercial agreement by
5
The oil industry was mainly in hands of American companies until 1938 when President 
Lazaro Cardenas nationalised the industry. As a result the U.S. imposed an embargo on 
Mexican oil until 1942 when the American oil companies and the Mexican government reached 
an agreement on compensation (Perlo Cohen, 1987:144).
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which trade barriers were lowered and Mexico was soon 
exporting oil, cattle, beer, ore and agricultural.products to 
the US (Perlo Cohen, 1987).
In addition to expanding foreign trade, investment and credit, 
the two governments agreed on the creation of a migrant labour 
programme, the Bracero programme to alleviate the labour 
shortages in agricultural and other activities that the war 
caused in the US. Mexicans have always come across the border, 
legally or illegally, to seek work. The Bracero programme gave 
legal basis to this migration. In short, the programme 
provided for shared control over the hiring, transportation 
and protection of Mexican workers in jobs in US agriculture 
and railroads involving over four million Mexican workers 
until it was unilaterally canceled by US in 1964 (Sklair, 
1989:28).
Due to the proximity to the US, border population has 
generally grown at a faster pace than the Mexican population 
as a whole (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). The fast urban growth was 
in many cases not matched with a proper economic base in the 
cities which could have facilitated the local supply of those 
products too expensive to "import" from the interior of 
Mexico. Thus the Mexican government implemented a serious 
regional development strategy in the late 1930s establishing 
a Free Zone along the border. The zone permitted the duty-free 
import of raw materials and other industrial inputs from the 
US for further processing in Mexico. However, instead of 
stimulating local production the zone stimulated the import of 
great quantities of US finished goods.
In terms of population, the Northern Border had the highest 
rate of urban growth in the country between 1940 and 1960. 
The great demand for raw materials and labour to the US during 
the World War II and the Bracero programme triggered the 
growth inthe cities which improved their positions as 
commercial centers due to increasing flow of products and 
workers.
TABLE 4.1. Mexico: Population of the Border States and the Most Important Cities along the Border,
1900-1980
1900 1910 1921 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
MEXICO 13607259 15160369 14334096 16552644 19649162 25779254 34923129 48381547 66846833
BORDER STATES 1400872 1657733 1717082 2054345 2617721 3762963 5541100 7848169 10691887
BORDER CITIES 36563 42108 87644 140723 178861 468459 1017306 1702517 2233102
Tijuana 242 733 1028 8384 16486 59952 152473 341067 429500
Mexicali - 462 6782 14842 18775 65749 179539 276167 341559
San Luis Rio Col. - 175 910 558 4079 28545 51118 76684
Nogales 2738 3177 13475 14061 13866 24478 37657 53119 65603
Agua Prieta - 656 3236 4674 4106 10471 15339 21017 28862
Ciudad Juarez 8218 10621 19457 39669 48881 122566 262119 414908 544496
Villa Acuna 667 933 2423 5350 5607 11372 20048 30838 38898
Piedras Negros 7888 8518 14233 15878 15663 27581 44992 40885(a) 67455
Nuevo Laredo 6548 8143 14993 21636 28872 57668 92627 152325 201371
Reynosa 1915 1475 2107 4840 9412 34087 74140 140480 194693
Rio Bravo 515 746 936 4610 17500 39933 55236
Matamoros 8347 7390 9215 9733 15699 45846 92327 140660 188745
(a) A data mistake
SOURCE: M Perlo Cohen, 1987:Table 3.
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TABLE 4.2. Mexico: Population growth of the border states and the most 
important cities along the border (Annual rate of grovth)(a).
1900/30 1930/50 1950/60 1960/70 1970/80
MEXICO 0.7 2.2 3 3.2 3.2
BORDER STATES 1.3 3 3.8 3.4 3
BORDER CITIES 4.4 5.8 7.5 5 2.7
Tijuana 11.1 9.4 8.9 7.7 2.3
Mexicali 100 7.2 9.6 4.2 2.1
San Luis Rio Colorado 100 7.2 17.7 5.7 4
Nogales 5.3 2.7 4.2 3.4 2.1
Agua Prieta 100 4 3.7 3.1 3.1
Ciudad Juarez 5.1 5.5 7.3 4.5 2.7
Villa Acuna 6.7 3.7 5.5 4.2 2.3
Piedras Negras 2.3 2.7 4.8 -1 4.9
Nuevo Laredo 3.9 4.8 4.6 4.9 2.8
Reynosa 3 9.3 7.5 6.2 3.2
Rio Bravo 100 8.7 12.5 7.9 3.2
Matamoros 0.5 7.5 6.8 4.1 2.9
(a) Annual rate of growth was calculated using the following expression: 
r = 1 - (Po/Pf) 'n where Po and Pf are the population at the 
beginning and the end of the period considered, respectively, and n 
is the number of years.
SOURCE: Own calculations from Table 4.1.
Between 1940 and 1950, Matamoros, Ciudad Juarez, Mexicali and
Tijuana tripled in size and Reynosa quadrupled. In the period
between 1950 and 1960 the average annual increase in
population in the border cities was 7.5 percent. High growth
rates were found in Tijuana (8.9 percent), Mexicali (9.6),
Ciudad Juarez (7.3) and Reynosa (7.5) (see table 4.2 and 
£
figure 4.1) . In the next decades the pace of urban growth 
lowered and even experienced a drastic fall in their growth 
(though Tijuana, San Luis Rio Colorado and Reynosa doubled in 
size) due, it is argued, to a fall in migration to the region 
particularly in the 1970s (Perlo Cohen, 1987:156).
Later, realising that the bracero programme could stop at any 
time and under the combined stress of demographic explosion 
and economic deterioration the government initiated another 
attempt to develop local industry in the Northern Border. The 
National Border Programme (PRONAF), precursor of the BIP, 
which began in 1961 with the political aim of tying the 
Northern Border to the Central Valley. Some improvements in 
infrastructure, building roads, industrial parks with 
electricity and water were introduced. This infrastructure was
® We bypassed San Luis Bio Colorado (17.7 per cent) and Bio Bravo (12.5 per cent) because 
of the lower base-population they had in 1950.
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designed to be a platform for the development of import- 
substitution manufacture and tourism in the Norther Border. 
The programme met with some success at the beginning but it 
soon became apparent that it was not enough to solve the 
regional problems. In 1964, when US closed the bracero 
programme 200 000 farm workers were suddenly jobless. It is 
estimated that unemployment reached 50 per cent among manual 
laborers in border cities like Mexicali and Ciudad Juarez.
"The Mexican government, anxious for a solution 
reacted enthusiastically when the Mexican secretary 
of industry and commerce was invited to visit United
States assembly plants in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
United States industrialists proposed the creation 
of a free trade zone on the United State/Mexican 
Border that would both fulfill United States 
manufacturer’s need for cheap labour and create jobs 
for Mexico’s unemployed..." (Fuentes A and 
Ehrenreich B, 1987:210).
Thus in 1965, the Mexican government implemented the Border
Industrialization Programme (BIP) as an effort to integrate
the unevenly developed Northern region with the rest of the 
country and which came into full operation in 1967 . The main 
goals of the BIP were officially to generate employment for 
the unemployed and underemployed. The advantages of the 
programme were seen as the following: a) creation of jobs with 
the resulting larger incomes and increased living standards; 
b) the transference of technology as modern methods of 
manufacturing were introduced; c) impact in Mexican economy as 
backward linkages merged. The mechanisms for achieving these 
goals were:
"To allow duty-free imports of machinery, equipment, 
raw materials, and components into plants located 
inside a 20 kilometre strip (plus free zones) of the 
border region. The commitment was that the entire 
output was exported" (Clement and Jenner, 1987:8).
See the works of Fernandez, 1973; Cleaent and Jenner, 1987; Kong, 1988; Crunwald, 
1983, 1985; Harris, 1986.
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The firms could enjoy exemption from the law which laid down 
foreign companies must be 49 per cent maximum equity.
Moreover, unprecedented financial incentives were granted to 
foreign companies by the Mexican government; low taxes on 
profits and sales with some Mexican states giving full tax 
exemption; land could be purchased or leased on favourable 
terms and -unofficially- corporations were given carte blanche 
to conduct their business and labour affairs without
government interference. Additionally, the in-bond plants were 
exempted from a prohibition on land ownership by foreigners in 
border and coastal zones, that is they were allowed to
establish anywhere in the country, subject to approval by the 
authorities. The main cities, Mexico City, Monterrey and 
Guadalajara were intended to be off the limits because of 
pollution problems and the often-sought goals of deconcentrate 
the industrial activity out of these areas. However, special 
permission was granted for the establishments of several 
plants there. Also some incentives were offered for the
establishment of plants in other locations. Likewise, to 
further attract the in-bond industry industrial states have 
been promoted along the border and in the interior (see Garza, 
Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988).
As can be seen in-bond plants constitute a variation on the 
concept of FPZs (Goldsmith, 1984). In Taiwan, Thailand, South 
Korea, Singapore and Malaysia the FPZs were sited near 
airports and seaports where there were low-wage, semi-skilled 
labour surplus zones. Thesezones were meant for production of 
cheap, labour-intensive, manufacturing goods for export to 
developed countries.
The bulk of exports could be imported into the US the 
regulations of the Tariff Schedule of the United States, items 
806.30 and 807.00. As noted in the previous chapters, these 
items allowed the reimport of articles whose manufacturing 
process began in the US, and were processed abroad and duty 
was to be paid only on the value-added abroad. Item 807.00 
accounts for over 90 per cent of US offshore assembly
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provisions (OAPs) and provides for duty-free re-entry only of 
those components which do not lose their physical identity in 
the assembled article. Likewise the provision is available to 
foreign firms (which, as will be seen in the case of Japanese 
companies constitutes a great advantage ) who buy US components 
for assembly into products for sale in the US, that is it is 
not limited to domestic firms as in the case of the European 
countries OAPs (Finger, 1975:365)®.
b) Importance of In-bond Plants.
The importance of the in-bond plants is not restricted to 
Mexico. American firms rapidly realised the advantage that in- 
bond plants constituted. As mentioned in chapter I, Sklair 
argues that/is expensive to . to ship equipment and
components To Asia. Moreover, in the 1960s, wage differentials 
were so substantial that US firms began to buy their materials 
and components in Asia (Japan and NICs), given that the 
savings outweighed the advantages of items 806.30 and 807.00 
(1989:11). Mexican proximity to the US meant considerable 
savings in transport costs due to the transport network 
existent between both countries which added to items 806.30 
and 807.00 and the facilities offered by the BIP represented 
an attraction hard to ignore. For example, Fairchild one of 
the first plants to go offshore (in 1962 it established an 
assembly facility for semiconductors in Hong Kong) opened a 
component assembly facility in Tijuana in 1966 although it 
already had in Hong Kong, South Korea and other low-wage 
locations. Sklair reports that a Fairchild official said that 
wages in the Far East were lower than in Tijuana but on 
heavier components where freight cost is important Mexico 
outweighs the low-cost advantage of the Asian countries 
(1989:79).
0
By 1972 the Bain items imported under OAPs by US from all the countries were electronic 
products and components, 18 per cent; machinery, 27 per cent; and, motor vehicles 
(Including aircraft), 39 per cent. From developing countries in particular the shares 
were electronic products and components, 56 per cent; machinery, 13 per cent; and, misc. 
metal products, 11 per cent (Finger, 1975:Table II).
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"During the mid 1960s, when data on 806/807 trade 
first became available, Hong Kong was more than five 
tiroes as important and Taiwan as important as Mexico 
in the processing and assembling of US components 
for reexport to the United States. By the end of 
that decade, Mexican operations were nearly twice as 
large as those of Hong Kong and about four times as 
large as those of Taiwan. This shift took place 
despite the fact that wages were higher in Mexico" 
(Grunwald, 1985:137).
The original conception of the in-bond plants vras the concept 
of "twin plants" (or "production sharing" as Sklair defines 
it). US firms would establish two plants under a single 
management one on each side of the border, in this way US 
plants would perform the capital-intensive phases of the 
production processes supplying its Mexican counterpart with 
the necessary components to carry on with the labour-intensive 
phases returning the finished products to the US side for 
further processing, testing packaging or whatever and sale. 
The savings in terms of administration, transport, 
inventories, repair and maintenance, technical support and 
etc. are thought to be substantial. However, the number of 
real twin plants is considered insignificant, since most of 
the plants in the US side are mainly warehouses. The great 
majority of the US suppliers of the in-bond plants are distant 
from the border (Midwest, East and far West) (Grunwald, 1985; 
Sklair, 1989 ).
Since 1967, when the BIP came into full operation the number 
of plants and employees have been growing each year, that year 
73 plants (with 4 000 workers) were established generating 
value-added of 925 millions of pesos (table 4.3)^ .
q
"The administration of the BIP was in the hands of several different ministries so 
startups and closures were deficiently recorded. Moreover, since Baja California was 
already a free zone many plants did not register under the in-bond scheme until 1972 when 
in-bond plants were obliged to register under in-bond legislation. In consequence the 
data available for the period up to 1974 is scarce and insecure in many cases. It was 
until the 1980s that Institute Nacional de fstadistica Geografia e Informatics (INEGI), 
got the responsibility for recording in-bond industry data that uniformity has been 
introduced" (Sklair, 1989:75). Table 4.3 is taken from the estimations made by Sklair 
(1989).
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TABLE 4.3. Mexico: In-bond Industry by Plants, 
Employees, Labour Costs and 
Value-added, 1967-1973
YEAR
NUMBER OF 
PLANTS EMPLOYEES
LABOUR
COSTS
VALUE
ADDED
1967 72 4000 n. a 925
1968 112 10927 n. a 975
1969 149 15900 n. a 973
1970 160 20327 n. a 1035
1971 205 28483 16460 1227
1972 339 48060 17388 1820
1973 400 64330 17808 2415
NOTE: Labour costs are average annual costs 
per employee in pesos; value-added is 
annual total in millions of pesos.
SOURCE: L Sklair, 1989:Table 3.1.
In 1973, there were 400 plants employing about 64 330 people 
and value-added of 2415 millions of pesos. That means an 
average annual rate of 25 per cent in number of plants, 37 per 
cent in number of workers and almost 15 per cent in value - 
added for the period between 1967 and 1973. Soon the in-bond 
assembly industry became the most important employer in the 
border region and an important earner of foreign exchange. 
Since 1973 the exports of in-bond products have earned for 
Mexico between 30 and 45 per cent as much as total Mexican 
manufacturing exports (Grunwald, 1985:144). Big corporations 
like RCA, Zenith, General Motors and General Electric came to 
establish in-bond plants in the Northern border.
"Of 147 plants authorized in mid-1969, 103 were in 
actual operation. The heaviest concentration was 
Baja California, where over 70 plants were 
assembling US-made components. Of these, 68 were in 
Tijuana and Mexicali. The remainder were mainly in 
Cd. Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, and Matamoros. Presently, 
the concentration is heaviest in electronic products 
and textiles, but there are many other lines 
including dismantling of scrap railroad cars, food 
processing and packaging and assembly of medical 
instruments, boats and caskets. In terms of 
employment however, fully 80 percent of the workers 
are in the electronics and textile plants" 
(Fernandez, 1973:44).
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Although the early performance of the in-bond plants is 
impressive, ; / ^ A J j o e * realised that it hardly get at the main 
problem, the growing unemployment in border cities. So the BIP 
came under attack from several sources, mainly academics 
pointed out that the major cause of unemployment in the 
border was the heavy migration into the area. The main 
argument was that the attraction of high wages (relative to 
wages in the interior) was further stimulating this migration 
so employment situation was going to get worse (Fernandez, 
1973). Surveys of in-bond plants in Mexico show that under 
normal circumstances they offer wage rates from 5 to 30 per 
cent above the official minimum wages (which are already high 
in the border region as Sklair, 1989, and Perlo, 1987, show) 
wThich would give place to internal migration to Northern 
Mexico and international migration to US (Rivera-Batiz, 
1987:263) .
The Mexican government, whtlA had considered the BIP as a 
temporary response to the critical situation of the ending of 
the Bracero programme and • rising unemployment, soon 
realised the advantages of the programme so, in 1972, made a 
reform in the in-bond plant regulations. They were allowed to 
locate in the interior of Mexico (but not in the major 
industrial cities). Also they were allowed to sell limited 
quantities of assembled goods domestically if they did not 
compete with those domestically produced (Clement and Jenner, 
1987).
The lack of information about electronics production in in- 
bond plants makes it too difficult to evaluate its importance 
between 1967 and 1974 in both the worldwide and national 
electronics production in order to identify if patterns of 
specialization wereemerging. W. Cline ( 1984:145 ) shows that in 
the early seventies Mexico, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Malaysia were important in radio, T.V. and 
communication equipment into US but, its study does not tell 
anything about the existence of specializations among these 
countries.
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In Mexico, ^40 per cent of the total number of in-bond
plants were in electronic production in the late sixties. 
Television receivers and parts was the most important single 
group in in-bond operations. Likewise, semiconductors and 
parts, with more than 16 per cent of the total, w€r€ almost as 
important as the television group in 1969 (Grunwald J, 
1985:146 ). It should be recalled from tables 3.12 and 3.13 
that in 1969 Mexico exported components and parts to US (under 
items 807.00) with a value of US$97.9 million dollars -well 
ahead of the Asian NICs- but by 1976 the total exported was 
US$102.5 lagging behind the Asian NICs.
As world competition increased in the electronics industry, 
firms were pushed to look for still cheaper labour
while productivity levels remained the same. In the 1970s the 
overvaluation of the peso and high
inflation levels made it so expensive to perform the assembly 
operations in some branches as semiconductors production. 
Therefore, firms moved to South-East Asia. Nonetheless, this 
movement of industrial capacity did not mean a reduction of 
in-bond operations in Mexico but a shift
t to more skill-intensive
operations with higher value-added in the Northern Border and 
a relocation towards the interior of the country, were the 
wages are lower for those less sophisticated processes. Table
4.4 shows that in 1975 the average wage in the border was 79 
cents per hour whereas in the interior of the country
ce.n4-$
was 63x-and the national average, 78 cents- with Tijuana and 
Ciudad Juarez with the highest wage levels (94 and 80 cents 
respectively).
By 1980, with the overvalued currency, the average wage in the 
border increased to US$1.03 per hour and 85 cents in the 
interior. After the 1982 devaluation, the wages diminished to 
levels bo-louJ oF , 1975 increasing the competitiveness of
the industry.
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TABLE 4.4. Mexico: In-bond Industry Border and 
Interior Average Operative Wages, 
1975, 1980, 1985.
CITY/AREA
1975 1980
(U.S CENTS PER HOUR)
1985
Tijuana 94 1.12 79
Ciudad Juarez 80 1.00 75
Reynosa 66 96 67
Matamoros 71 1.03 84
Border 79 1.03 76
Interior 63 85 60
National Average 78 1.01 74
SOURCE: L Sklair, 1989 .‘Table 7.1.
Likewise, assembly plants costs diminished to levels even 
smaller than those in the Asian NICs and New-NICs. As can be 
seen in table 4.5, land and buildings, electric energy costs 
were higher in Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong. Malaysia 
retained its labour-cost advantage over Mexico by almost half 
the cost.
TABLE 4.5. Assembly Plants Costs, International Comparison, 1983
CATEGOBY OF COST MEXICO SINGAPORE MALAYSIA HONG KONG USA
Land and buildings 
(dollars per ftZ)
25-30 35-45 36-46 50-60 30-40
Electric energy 
(cents per kw/hr.)
4-5 10-12 7.5 n.d. 4.1
Labour costs 
(dollars per hour) 0.91 1.75 0.49 1.45 8-13
SOURCE: M Luna, 1984:Table 1.
According to Carrillo (1986), from the statements of high 
level officers within the government it is clear that in-bond 
assembly activities are considered not only an stable activity 
but one which could be a key-factor in the Northern border 
industrial development. In 1980, in-bond industry was the most 
important generator of employment in the border, occupying
88.3 per cent of manufacturing labour force in Ciudad Juarez,
99.4 per cent in Matamoros and 45.6 in Tijuana (p. 48). Also 
is the sector with highest growth in employment in the country 
as a whole. It is estimated that between 1975 and 1985
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employment in the manufacturing industry grew at a yearly 
average rate of 4.4 per cent (see table 3.3), in the in-bond 
industry the rate of growth was 8.7 between 1975-1982 and 16.1 
between 1982-1987 (see table 4.8.B in Appendix II).
The impact in employment and income in the border cities has 
led the local governments to establish industrial parks and 
offer incentives to the location of the industry. Moreover, 
there are what Sklair calls "the private facilitators", a very 
important group of people who appeared with the first in-bond 
plants, and realising the great profits which could be 
obtained, operate within the industry without actually owning 
in-bond plants in the normal way. "They typically offer a 
variety of subcontracting or legal services to those 
manufacturers who wish to use a maquila but do not which to 
own one directly" (1989:14). These group of people organised 
as either Mexican or US firms and with important connections 
on both sides of the border, are not only an important part of 
the of the in-bond industry in terms of their subcontracting 
operations but also in terms of their promotion activities in 
the US side. One example is "Assemble in Mexico" (AIM) founded 
in 1980.
"AIM is organised as a California corporation in 
association with a wholly owned Mexican subsidiary 
which owns several corporations in Mexico, and these 
are the companies that are legally responsible in 
Mexico for the shelter and subcontract operations. 
AIM takes out long leases on industrial buildings in 
and around Tijuana, mostly as the contracts are won, 
but sometimes speculatively in anticipation of
prospective business. Factories suitable for 
maquilas have been in short supply in Tijuana since 
the flood of new maquilas began in 1985, so
facilitators now have to take rather more risks than 
was once the case to ensure that they are not caught 
without facilities when lucrative contracts appear 
on the horizon" (1989:88).
Two of the AIM’s post-1985 boom clients, for example, are an
in-bond plant which started operations in 1986 on contract for
a New York based electronics company, (a Fortune 500 one) 
which fabricates an electronic training device for the US
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* army. The other is a small high-tech company at the leading 
edge of dot matrix printer technology, with no plants in the 
US. This firm relocated its headquarters from Silicon Valley 
to San Diego and its production facilities from Puerto Rico to 
Mexico (Tijuana) due to the lower labour costs.
Since many corporations require very rapid startups, the 
experience of the facilitators can more or less guarantee 
this. Although the costs are relatively high the certainty 
which gives to operate through a facilitator is worthy the 
cost allowing the client to concentrate on production problems 
rather than in administrative, legal and bureaucratic matters. 
The excellent services offered by the facilitators have 
attracted big companies as Honeywell and General Electric to 
start in shelter plants (subcontracting) and after ’graduate^ 
in the in-bond operations have/wholly owned in-bond plants on 
their own (Sklair, 1989:89).
In August 1983, the Mexican government issued a new decree 
regarding in-bond industry which confirms its importance for 
the economic well-being of the country. The decree states the 
need of surveillance, regulation and control of the in-bond 
industry without disturbing its performance. Also, it 
highlights its importance in employment generation, training, 
income distribution and strengthening of the domestic market. 
One of the most important features of the decree is that 
allows in-bond plants, specially those with idle capacity, to 
sell their products in the domestic market up to 20 per cent 
of their annual output (or even more in some cases) as long as 
they do not harm the domestic industry. That is, it is
possible to sell those products which are not supplied by
domestic industry, if on-bond plants satisfy local content 
requirements (very lax, certainly), maintain a positive 
balance of foreign exchange and provide technical assistance 
to local suppliers. The main goal of these regulations is to
generate advantages and incentives for the establishment of
high-tech industries like electronics in the country (Luna, 
1984:41-44 ) .
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It is still too early to understand the impacts of the changes in regulations on the geographical 
distribution of the in-bond electronics industry in Mexico. Yet Table 5.1 (please see chapter V, 
pages 222-223) shows the distribution by States of the number of plants and of employment 
both in manufacturing as a whole and in the electronics industry. According to the data, in 
1989 the centrally-located Distrito Federal and the States of Mexico, Nuevo Leon and Jalisco 
together concentrated 36.1 percent of all plants and 49.8 percent of all employment in Mexico’s 
entire manufacturing system, thus highlighting the locational importance of nodal access to the 
domestic market for industry as a whole. However, as will be elaborated in detail in chapter V, 
a new industrial location pattern is taking hold in the Northern Border region where the States 
of Baja California Norte, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas, which adjoin the 
U.S.A., localized a significant 9.1 percent of the number of plants and 20 percent of 
employment in all manufacturing in 1989.
In that year the electronics industry (including in-bond activities) accounted for only 0.4 
percent of all manufacturing plants and approximately 4 percent of all manufacturing 
employment in Mexico (Table 5.1 p.222). The Table shows, however, that the electronics 
industry is much more highly concentrated in the northern border states as the States of Baja 
California Norte, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas localized 200 plants or 33 
percent of the electronics industry, employing 76,274 workers. If we also include the adjacent 
State of Nuevo Leon, the northern region accounted for 270 plants (40.3 percent) with 78,065 
workers (77 percent) in electronics production (calculations from Table 5.1). Although the 
importance of the Distrito Federal and the State of Mexico appears to be overwhelming in terms 
of electronics plants, 280 or 42 percent of the total, these only employ some 18,870 workers 
(or 18.7 percent of the employment in electronics).This is because the average plant size in that 
central region is only about 53 workers per plant whereas the average plant in the entire 
electronics industry (Table 5.2, page 225) employs 151 workers. This may be due to the fact 
that the industrial census includes also small repairing workshops employing few workers on
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contracts while the in-bond electronics industry located in the North comprises some plants 
engaging as many as 1,500 workers (see Table 5.15A, page 248).
A closer look at electronics sub-sectors indicates that the most important subsector in Mexico 
is the Telecommunications and Sound Recording and Reproducing Apparatus Equipment 
industry which accounts for 80 percent of the number of plants and 85 percent of the 
employment in the electronics industry. This particular sub-sector is very heavily concentrated 
in Baja California Norte, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas where 58,117 workers or 67.5 of the 
employment in that sector or 57.5 percent of the employment in the electronics industry are 
localized. Therefore Table 5.1 confirms that the growth of electronics industries is creating a 
new industrial location pattern in Mexico as a result of its expansion in the Northern Border 
region and hence away from the traditional industrial concentrations in the central regions of the 
Distrito Federal and the States of Mexico, Jalisco and Nuevo Leon.
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2. GROWTH AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IN-BOND ELECTRONICS 
INDUSTRY, 1970-1990.
a) Number of Plants, Employment and Value-added.
By the early 1970 s it became clear the success of the BIP, as 
more labour-intensive phases of production processes were 
located in Mexican Northern Border as in-bond plants, a new 
locational pattern was emerging in the North. Moreover, some 
firms preferred locations in the interior of the country.
In terms of products assembled table 4.6 shows that in 
1970/71, Mexico ranked the highest in the exports, under items 
806/807, of semiconductors and parts (1), textile products (1) 
and equipment for electronic circuits (1); the second for 
television receivers and parts and the third in motor vehicle 
parts and office machines. By 1980 it had diversified the 
product mix but lost the production of semiconductors to other 
countries.
TABLE 4.6. Rank of Meiico axong Countries frox which the United 
Sates Ixports Asseibled X&nuf&ctured Products under 
Tariff Itexs 807.00/806.30, by Selected 1TC Categcry,
1970-71 and 1980.
PRODUCT CATEGORY 1970/71 1980
Television receivers and parts 2 1
Seiiconductors and parts 1 7
Textile products 1 1
Office sachines 3 3
Kotor vehicle parts 3 2
Equipxents for electric circuits 1 1
Electric xotors and generators (a) 1
Electrical conductors (a) 1
Capacitors (a) 1
Kiscellaneous other electrical products (a) 1
Radio apparatus and parts (a) 3
Recording nedia (a) 1
Luggage and kandbags (a) 1
Toys and dolls (a) 1
Luiber and paper products (a) 1
Scientific coxponents (a) 1
(a) Less than third place 
SOURCE: J Grunwald, 1985:Table 4.4.
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Between 1974 and 1980 value-added grew from 3945.5 to 17 728.8 
million pesos (+449.0 per cent increase); the employment from 
75 974 to 119 546 (+157. 3 per cent). The number of plants grew 
from 455 to 620 ( + 136.2 per cent) (see graphs 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 
after page 167). That means a yearly rate of growth of 22.2 
per cent in value-added^, 13.6 per cent in employment and 
10.6 in number of plants for the period under consideration 
(see tables 4.7.A, 4.8.A and 4.9.A for absolutes and tables 
4.7.B, 4.8.B and 4.9.B for rates of growth in Appendix II).
Electronics has been the single most important sector since 
the beginning of the BIP though its share in the total has 
decreased. Tables 4.7, 4.8. and 4.9. show that in 1974,
electronics production accounted by 70 per cent of the value- 
added, 67 per cent of employment and about 45 per cent of 
number of plants. By 1988, these shares had diminished to 41 
per cent, 39 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively.
TABLE 4.7: Mexico: Value-Added in the In-Bond Industry, 1974-19S9.
(percentages)
YEAR
Border
States
(a)
SHABE OF NATIONAL TOTAL
Interior Electronic Electr. 
States Subsector in Border 
(b)
Electr. 
in Int.
SHABE: 
BECION 
Elec.in 
Border
ELECTB.
= 100 
Elec.in 
Interior
SHABE: 
SECTOR 
Elec.in 
Border 
X of Tot 
Electr.
ELECTR.
= 100 
Elec.in 
Interior 
X of Tot 
Electr.
1974 91.6 8.4 69 62.1 6.9 67.8 82.9 89.9 10.1
1975 90.3 9.7 64.8 58.2 6.6 64.4 68.3 89.8 10.2
1976 89.3 10.7 63.3 57.1 6.2 64 57.4 90.3 9.7
1977 87.8 12.3 62.6 54.9 7.6 62.6 62.3 87.8 12.2
1978 88.1 11.9 61.4 54.4 7 61.7 59.4 88.5 11.5
1979 84.6 15.4 62 53.3 8.7 63 56.5 86 14
1980 85.8 14.2 56.8 48.6 8.2 56.7 57.4 85.6 14.4
1981 86.6 13.4 55.5 48 7.6 55.4 56.2 86.4 13.6
1982 86.7 13.3 54.4 46.1 8.3 53.2 61.9 84.8 15.2
1983 87.1 12.9 50 41.4 8.7 47.5 67.4 82.6 17.4
1984 86.5 13.5 49.8 42.1 7.7 48.6 57 84.6 15.4
1985 87 13 44.7 37.5 7.2 43.1 54.9 84 16
1986 84.6 15.4 45 38 7 44.9 45.7 84.4 15.6
1987 80.7 19.3 42.4 34.8 7.6 43.2 39.2 82.1 17.9
1988 79.9 20.1 41.4 33.2 8.2 41.5 41 80.1 19.9
1989(c) 88.7 11.3 40.9 ' 7 — ; '
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja 
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuhua, Sonora and Taaaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to electrical and electronic aachinery, 
equipaent, apparatus, parts and accessories.
(c) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989.
SOURCE: Table 4.7.A.
^  This high rate is due to the fact that value-added is in current prices.
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TABLE 4.S: Mexico: Employment in the In-Bond Industry, 1974-19S9.
(percentages)
YEAR
SHARE OF NATIONAL TOTAL
Border Interior Electronic Electr. Electr. 
States States Subsector in Border in Int. 
(a) (b)
SHARE: 
REGION 
Elec.in 
Border
ELECTR.
= 100 
Elec.in 
Interior
SHARE: 
SECTOR 
Elec.in 
Border 
X of Tot 
Electr.
ELECTR.
= 100 
Elec.in 
Interior 
X of Tot 
Electr.
1974 93.6 6.4 67.1 62.1 5 66.3 78.3 92.5 7.5
1975 92.5 7.5 63 58 5.1 62.7 67.1 92 8
1976 90.7 9.3 63.1 57.4 5.7 63.3 61.1 90.9 9.1
1977 90.1 9.9 61.6 55.7 5.9 61.9 59.6 90.4 9.6
1978 90.8 9.2 62 56.4 5.5 62.1 60.4 91.1 8.9
1979 90.3 9.7 62.7 57.1 5.6 63.3 57.7 91.1 8.9
1980 89.2 10.8 58.1 52 6.1 58.3 56.2 89.5 10.5
1981 88.9 11.1 58.2 52.5 5.7 59 51.3 90.2 9.8
1982 89.1 10.9 58.3 52.3 6 58.7 55.6 89.6 10.4
1983 89.4 10.6 54.8 48.6 6.3 54.3 59.1 88.6 11.4
1984 88.6 11.4 54.3 47.6 6.8 53.7 59.3 87.5 12.5
1985 83.4 12.3 47.6 41.5 6.1 49.7 49.8 87.2 12.8
1986 85 15 45.3 38.6 6.6 45.5 44.2 85.3 14.7
1987 82.4 17.6 44.1 36 8.1 43.7 45.9 81.6 18.4
1988 80.9 19.1 43.6 34.5 9.1 42.6 47.7 79.1 20.9
1989 80 20 38.6 - — ~ ■— - —  ’
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja 
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuhua, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to electrical and electronic machinery, 
equipment, apparatus, parts and accessories.
(c) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989.
SOUBCE: Table 4.8.A.
TABLE 4.9: Mexico: Number of Plants in the 
(percentages)
In-Bond Industry,, 1974-1989.
YEAR
Border
States
(a)
SHARE OF NATIONAL TOTAL
Interior Electronic Electr. 
States Subsector in Border 
(b)
Electr. 
in Int.
SHARE: 
REGION 
Elec.in 
Border
ELECTR.
= 100 
Elec.in 
Interior
SHARE: 
SECTOR 
Elec.in 
Border 
X of Tot 
Electr.
ELECTR.
= 100 
Elec.in 
Interior 
X of Tot 
Electr.
1974 94.3 5.7 44.8 41.5 3.3 44.1 57.7 92.6 7.4
1975 92.1 7.9 43.4 39.4 4 42.8 50 90.9 9.1
1976 90.6 9.4 40 35.9 4 39.7 42.9 89.9 10.1
1977 89.8 10.2 38.4 34.5 3.8 38.4 37.8 90 10
1978 91.9 8.1 38.1 35 3.1 38.1 37.8 92 8
1979 88.9 11.1 36.9 33.7 3.1 37.9 28.3 91.5 8.5
1980 88.9 11.1 36 32.3 3.7 36.3 33.3 89.7 10.3
1981 88.1 11.9 38 33.9 4.1 38.5 34.7 89.1 10.9
1982 87.9 12.1 38.1 33.8 4.3 38.5 35.2 88.8 11.2
1983 88.8 11.2 37.3 33.5 3.8 37.7 34.3 89.7 10.3
1984 88.5 11.5 36.3 32.6 3.7 36.8 32.5 89.8 10.2
1985 88.4 11.6 36.1 32.9 3.2 37.2 27.3 91.2 8.8
1986 92.7 7.3 30.5 27.2 3.3 29.3 45.8 89 11
1987 90.4 9.6 29.7 26.4 3.3 29.2 34.3 88.9 11.1
1988 89.5 10.5 27.6 24 3.6 26.8 34.6 86.9 13.1
1989 87.8 12.2 27.8 — - - - \ - —  '
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja 
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuhua, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to electrical and electronic machinery, 
equipment, apparatus, parts and accessories.
(c) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989.
SOUBCE: Table 4.9.A.
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The growth of electronics production has been impressive by 
any standards though slightly below of that of the in-bond 
industry as a whole. Between 1974 and 1988 it recorded a 
yearly average growth rate of 38 per cent in value-added, 7.9 
per cent in employment and 4.8 per cent in number of plants^. 
This rosy scene was soon threatened by one of the worst 
crisis of the in-bond industry in 1974-1975 when, it is 
argued, more than 34000 workers were laid off (Carrillo, 
1986:48). Official data records a loss of about 9000 jobs and 
a reduction in /number of plants in that year (table 4.7 and 
4.8). By 1975 the number of plants totaled 454 and the job 
total declined to around 67000. In 1976, employment recovered 
to 74496 and/number/plants decreased to 448 and 443 in 
1977.Although employment increased during these years, the 
number of plants hardly increased. Sklair argues that average 
in-bond plant was employing more labour and the crisis had 
just shaken out many small and unstable firms gaining for the 
in-bond industry the fame of "runaway" or ’'footloose” 
industry.
During the oil boom, high inflation and overvaluation of the 
currency offset the advantages of Mexico as a location. Unlike 
the Far Eastern NICs (with the exemption of Singapore) which 
have by-and large followed the Japanese pattern relying on 
indigenous entrepreneurship, the Mexican in-bond industry 
rel/Vj on foreign direct investment (mainly from US). As 
foreign exchange/offsex the labour-cost advantage, firms found 
it too expensive to perform labour- intensive phases either 
with high skill or low-skill requirements. Likewise, world 
competition increased with the emergence of competitors from 
other NICs which have taken great advantage in the production 
of sophisticated devices such as semiconductors (South Korean 
firms) or the manufacturing of consumer electronics (as the 
local firms from Singapore and Taiwan) at lower cost than 
Mexican in-bond industry. Thereby, the firms were pushed to 
look for still lower -cost locations. It is the case of the 
so-called New-NICs, Thailand, Philippines, China, Indonesia
^  Own calculations froa tables 4.7.A, 4.8.A and 4.9.A.
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which became better locations for low-skill processes and
Malaysia for high-skill processes because they offered low
1 ?labour-costs at given productivity levels . Nonetheless, in- 
bond electronics industry remains as important subsector 
within Mexican in-bond industry with over one-third share in 
the total of all the variables considered.
Certainly, part of the reason for the plant closures are the 
fluctuations in the US economy which affect the performance of 
the in-bond industry. During the US recession years of 1975- 
1977 and 1981-1982, the number of plants decreased as well as 
the number of employees. Likewise, the increasing militancy of 
the labour force, mainly in the Northern Border affected the 
performance of the industry. However, the argument needs to be 
further clarified, Sklair points out that increasing militancy 
was, possibly, a response to the economic slump in the US 
market rather than being a cause of the crisis in the 
industry.
Between 1980 and 1982, the net receipts (to US $1 400 million)
doubled despite the decrease in number of plants and
employment (Liemt van, 1988:93). The most dramatic increase 
was after the devaluation of 1982. The number of plants grew 
from 585 in 1982 to 672 in 1984; employment from 127048
workers to 199684 in the same years. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to analyze the changes in terms of value-added due 
to the absence of data in dollars.
From 1983 onwards the in-bond industry entered a dynamic phase 
of growth due to the devaluation of the currency. By the end 
of 1989, table 4.9 indicates that there were 1699 in-bond 
plants in operation. The annual growth of number of plants 
remained above 10 per cent (12.3 per cent between 1982-1987 
and 18.6 between 1987-1989). Employment had almost the same 
behaviour. Also the plant size increased from around 192
12 See Ballance and Sinclair, 1985; McMullen, 1982; Salih, et.al., 1988.
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workers per plant in 1980 to 271 in 1986 at the national 
level. The same happened at the regional level.
The in-bond industry’s share of total national industrial 
employment went from 5 per cent in 1975 to 10.5 in 1986. "The 
last three years showed the most dynamic increase in 
employment in the in-bond industry vis-a-vis total national 
industrial employment” (Banamex, RESM, Vol LXI, No. 721, Dec 
1985:460).
With regard to the market, the in-bond industry’s output is, 
mostly sent to US. In 1983 and 1984, Mexico was the most 
important supplier of items 806.30 and 807.00 of US tariff 
regulations. According to US Department of Commerce 
Statistics, total dutiable value imports under 806.30 and 
807.00 were US$4.89 billion in 1983 and US$6.21 in 1984. 
Dutiable value imports from Mexico were US$1.79 billion (36.6 
per cent) and US$2.26 billion (36.4 per cent) respectively. In 
1984, Singapore was the closest competitor of Mexico (for the 
second year) with US$957 million in dutiable value imports 
into US and, in 1985 Mexico was, once again, in the top of the 
list (Business Mexico, February, 1986:92)^.
b) Location and Size.
Regarding the location of the in-bond industry, most of the 
plants are located in the main border cities of the six 
states, above mentioned (Baja California Norte, Chihuahua, 
Coahuila, Sonora and Tamaulipas, and the free zone of Baja 
California Sur). These cities are Tijuana, Mexicali, Nogales, 
Agua Prieta, Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and 
Reynosa (see figure 4.1).
13 "Maquila (in-bond industry) exports are Included in the service category rather than 
the merchandise export category in Mexican balance-of-payments statistics. They therefore 
do not correspond to U.S. isports under tariff items 806 and 807. The former include U.S. 
and other non-Mexican components as well as the Mexican value-added. The dutiable value 
of 806/807 imports should reflect Mexican value-added plus the value of non-Mexican and 
non-U.S. components. Data concerning Mexican maquila [in-bond industry] exports include 
Mexican assembly exports to all distributions, not only to the United States" (Crunwald 
J, 1985:144 footnote 16).
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In 1974, the Northern Border accounted for 94.2 per cent of 
the total of plants, whereas the interior accounted for only 
5.7 per cent (tables 4.7, 4.8. and 4.9.). However, the number 
of plants in the border has been slightly decreasing in 
relative terms to about 89 per cent in 1980 that means in the 
interior they accounted for 11 per cent. In terms of the 
employment the interior’s share has been increasing from 6.4 
per cent in 1974 to about 11 per cent in 1980. Value-added in 
the interior plants has a little bit more importance, it grew 
from 8.4 per cent in 1974 to 14.2 in 198Q (tables 4.7, 4.8. 
and 4.9).
In terms of growth, in the three variables considered, the 
interior grew at a faster pace than the border region and the 
in-bond industry as a whole. Value-added increased at 28.7 per 
cent per year between 1974 and 1980 (which compares with 21.3 
of the border region and 22.2 of the whole in-bond industry); 
employment at 15.1 (against 6.5 and 7.3) and number of plants 
at 15.0 per cent per year (against 4.1 of the border and 5.0 
of the industry) (see tables 4.7.B, 4.8.B and 4.9.B in
Appendix II).
With regard to the location of electronics and electrical 
production, the border zone accounted for more than a half of 
the total value-added and total employment of in-bond industry 
between 1974 and 1980 diminishing to about one third by 1988. 
In the case of electronics and electrical production located 
in the interior, it can be seen its increasing importance in 
value-added and employment. But it still has a small share of 
the overall in-bond industry. The number of plants shows more 
instability through the whole period (tables 4.7. and 4.8. and 
4.9., fourth and fifth columns).
It should be noted that in-bond industry became more 
diversified within each region and at the national level. 
Despite increasing in absolute terms, electronics and 
electrical production decreased its share in the number of 
plants, employees and value-added in each region through the
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whole period. Employment, for instance, decreased its share in 
the border region from 66.3 per cent in 1974 to 42.6 per cent 
in 1989. In the interior plants, employment in electronics 
decreased from 78.3 per cent to 47.7 per cent in the same 
years (tables 4.7, 4.8. and 4.9, columns 6 and 7). The same
happens in the other variables concerned. The surveys of 
Grunwald (1985) and Clement and Jenner (1987) note the same 
trend during the decade.
Although the Northern border is still the location per 
excellence of in-bond assembly plants, as the absolute figures 
show, it is clear that the new locational pattern has been 
slowly spreading into the country. The possible explanation of 
this fact must be focused not only in the relaxation in the 
regulations concerning in-bond plants. Because "the wage 
differentials are important for foreign assembly operations, 
the lower wages in the interior of Mexico provide a stronger 
attraction" (Grunwald, 1985:161). Given the labour 
characteristics of the industry, mostly female, single young, 
aged 24-26 with basic primary education and holding their 
first job, for performing such delicate assembly activities 
with the necessary attention and dexterity, it is not 
impossible that this kind of labour-force with the required 
levels of productivity exists in the interior. Thus, the new 
locational pattern would consolidate in the interior in the 
mid-term^. Additionally, there are other factors such as the 
high value/low weight of some products, transport costs 
decreasing, and so on. Anyway, it is necessary to determine if 
the characteristics of the labour force (skill/literate), use 
of local inputs, etc. are substantially different between the 
border plants and the interior plants before drawing any 
conclusion.
Apart from lower wage levels, there were . .other advantages 
for the foreign investor to locate in the interior. The
^  With regard to feaale education, the World Development Report of 1988 indicates that 
in Mexico 114 per cent of age group is enrolled in primary (basic education and 54 per 
cent in secondary (World Bank, 1988:table 30).
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infrastructural capacity to service both in-bond plants and 
workers in the border was declining creating serious 
bottlenecks in public services, housing and education (though 
the government with the cooperation of some in-bond plants has 
tried to expand the supply of technical education schools 
according to the in-bond industry needs). Likewise, union 
activities in the early 1970s constituted a serious problem to 
the activities of in-bond plants. In the late 1970s, there 
appeared a serious shortage of labour force particularly in 
the biggest locations, Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez which 
reinforced the attractiveness of the interior. However, the 
main attraction of the interior is the lower wages, though the 
difference has been declining -Grunwald argues that as a 
result of deliberate government policy and weak labor unions 
at the border (1985:161).
We shall note that, as Grunwald (1985) argues, during the 
period 1974-1980 the size of the in-bond assembly plants was 
larger in the plants located in the border than in the 
interior. The largest plants tend to be located in modern 
industrial parks like those in Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana. As 
table 4.10 shows.
TABLE 4.10: Mexico: Plant Size in the In-Bond Industry,
1974-1989.
PLANT SIZE
National Border Interior Electr. Electr. Electr.in 
YEAH States(a) States Ind. (b) in border interior
1974 167 166 187 250 250 253
1975 148 149 141 215 218 189
1976 166 166 166 263 266 237
1977 177 178 172 284 286 272
1978 198 196 225 323 320 359
1979 206 209 180 351 350 368
1980 193 193 188 311 311 317
1981 216 218 202 331 335 298
1982 217 220 195 332 335 307
1983 251 253 238 369 364 410
1984 297 297 296 445 434 541
1985 279 263 295 368 352 538
1986 253 232 521 376 360 503
1987 271 247 499 403 370 668
1988 248 224 453 392 357 624
1989 261 238 427 363 - -
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuhua, Sonora and Taaaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to electrical and electronic machinery, 
equipment, apparatus, parts and accessories.
(c) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989.
SOUBCE: Tables 4.8.A and 4.9.A.
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In 1974 the average size of the in-bond industry as a whole 
was 167 workers per establishment, 166 in the border states 
and 187 in the interior of the country.By 1980 the size had 
increased in the in-bond industry and in the border to 193 and 
had decreased to 180 in the interior after a peak of 225 
workers per establishment in 1978. It can be pointed out that 
although the crisis of 1974-1975 had effects in the interior 
in terms of slow pace of startups, the data suggests that 
after the recovery of the US economy a few larger plants were 
attracted by the lower wages in the interior (see graph 4.4). 
These trend continued throughout the 1980s, as shown in table 
4.10 plant size enormously increased in the interior states 
almost doubling that in the border by 1989. Plant size also 
varies with type of product, furniture assembly is generally 
done in small plants whereas garments and assembly of 
electrical and electronic machinery and equipment is done in 
large plants. Table 4.10 also shows that the number of workers 
per establishment in the electronics industry is larger than 
the national average for the industry.
c) Ownership.
The majority of the in-bond industry output is produced by 
foreign subsidiaries operating in the country. Since about 90 
per cent of the assembly is for the US market, most of these 
subsidiaries are US-owned or controlled. Mexican capital,
however, has been inroads in the assembly operations.
15Table 4.11 indicates that in 1982, 351 plants were foreign 
majority-owned or foreign owned, that is 58 per cent of the 
total, 606 (96.5 per cent of that came from US). That means 
that there was substantial Mexican capital in almost half the 
in-bond plants in 1982, however, the proportion of capital 
invested in in-bond plants is smaller in Mexican in-bond 
plants. As can be seen in table 4.11, the capital invested by 
foreign firms amounted to 1899.7 million pesos or 63.2 per 
cent of the total invested.
15 Data say be slightly different froa that in table 4.9 due to the different sources.
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According to the studies of Grunwald (1985) and Sklair (1989) 
the kind of enterprise has changed as well. At the beginning 
most of the US-controlled in-bond plants were subsidiaries of 
medium-sized TNCs. Later, some Fortune 500
corporations have established assembly operations in Mexico.
TABLB 4.11: Share of Foreign Capital in the Social Capital of the In-bond Industry, 1982.
(lillion pesos)
. . _  . _ _  _  OTHERS (a) TOTAL
CONCEPT Plants Aiount Plants Aiount Plants Aiount Plants Aiount Plants Aiount
TOTAL 339 1752.4 255 1104.5 4 97.8 8 49.5 606 3004.2
Nat. Ownership 0 0 211 811 0 0 0 0 221 811
K a j . National 0. 0 76.8 34 141.7 0 0 0 25.5 34 244
Naj. Foreign 0. 90 544 .6 0 151.8 1 51 4 16.8 95 764 .2
Foreign 0. 249 1131 0 0 3 46.8 4 7.2 256 1185
NOTE: Includes Geriany (16.SX), Finland (8.8X), Bahatas (7.4X), Spain (6.8X),
England (4.4X), Chile (1.0X), Panaia (0.6X), Argentina (0.6X), Canada (0.5X),
Italy (0.5X), Beriudas (0.55), Holland (0.2X) and others (1.7X).
SOURCE: K Luna, 1 9 8 4 :TabIe 3.
It is interesting to note that also foreign control and amount 
invested varies in the different industrial branches. In 1982, 
199 out of 339 US in-bond plants concentrated in the assembly 
of transport equipment, electrical and electronics machinery 
and equipments and electrical and electronic parts and 
accessories. With regard to the Mexican plants 171 out of 255 
were in the assembly of garments, footwear and leather, 
furniture and miscellaneous, though it is important to note 
that there were 39 plants in the assembly of electrical and 
electronic parts and accessories. The heaviest investment were 
made in electrical and electronics machinery and equipment 
and electrical and electronic parts and accessories which 
accounted for almost half the total invested capital (1467.4 
million pesos or 49 per cent, see table 4.12).
Nowadays one of the biggest issues regarding the ownership of 
in-bond assembly plants, is the great attractiveness of the 
Mexican Northern border for Japanese investors.
TABLE 4.12. Share of Foreign Capital in the In-bond Industry by Sector, 1982.
(million pesos)
USA
SECTOR Plants Amount
MEXICO
Plants Amount
JAPAN
Plants Amount
OTHERS(a) 
Plants Amount
TOTAL
Plants Amount
TOTAL 339 1752.3 255 1104.6 4 97.8 8 49.5 606 3004,2
Food 6 107.7 4 37.9 - - - 8.6 10 154.2
Garments 23 51.5 64 168.7 - - 1 0.6 88 220.8
Footwear and leather 13 6.1 24 147 - - - - 37 153.1
Furniture 13 124 49 190.5 - - 2 2 64 316.5
Chemical products 1 1 3 30.2 - - 1 5 5 36.2
Transport Equipment 36 112.6 13 37.8 2 14.3 2 5.7 53 170.4
Machinery (non-electrical) 8 23.1 3 2.4 1 51 1 0.7 13 77.2
Electr. and electronic mach.,
equipment and parts 46 365.3 7 76.3 - - 1 0.6 54 442.2
Electr.and electronic apparatus
articles and accessories 117 820.9 39 194.7 - - - 9.6 156 1025.2
Toys and sport articles 18 17.9 8 2.4 - - - 26 20.3
Others 45 103.2 34 211.6 1 32.5 - 16.7 80 364
Services 13 19 7 5.1 - - - - 20 24.1
SOURCE: M Luna, 1984:Table 4.
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Among intense criticisms and debate from the part of US 
businessmen and congressmen, who see Japanese investment in 
Mexico as a way to circumvent protectionist barriers^, cause 
of deindustrialisation and to economically invade their 
country, Japanese investment in in-bond plants has 
impressively grown in the last five years. Some sources 
estimate that before 1985 there were 5 Japanese in-bond plants 
in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez and by 1987 there were 21 (Kerber 
and Ocaranza, 1989:836-838).
However, the criticisms from the part of US result rather 
exaggerated, the number of Japanese plants is still too small 
to represent a serious threat. In 1987 the 21 plants above 
mentioned constituted 1.8 per cent of the total number of in- 
bond plants; 1.9 per cent of employment; less than 1 per cent 
of social capital invested in the in-bond industry (which 
compares with 69.2 and 29 per cent invested by US and Mexican 
firms respectively); and 1.5 per cent of value-added. It is 
estimated that about half the Japanese plants are in the 
assembly of electronic products representing 3.6 per cent of 
employment in that branch. Among the firms located in the 
Northern border are, Hitachi, Matsushita, Sanyo, Sony, 
Toshiba, Video-tec and Kuron (Kerber and Ocaranza, 
1989:838)17.
The main reason to locate in Mexico is the closeness to 
California, one of the major receptors of Japanese investment 
in US. Likewise the increasing foreign exchange value of the 
yen motivated the investment in Mexico. It is estimated that 
Japanese investment in Mexico will increase in the coming 
years since some medium- and small- size Japanese suppliers of 
the big companies are being attracted by their customers since
1 c
I teas 806.3 and 807 of the US Tariff Schedule are available to foreign fins thus 
constituting a great advantage for Japanese companies who import components from their 
US-based subsidiaries to be assembled in Mexico and then exported to US for further 
processing, testing, packaging and sale in the US market.
17 "Sony set up, in Tijuana, in-bond plants which produce refrigerators, televisions and 
other electrical house appliances. A twin plant in the US side gives the final touches 
to these products before sale. Also, Sanyo is planning to set up an assembly plant, US$40 
millions to produce TV sets (El Imparcial, newspaper, June 16,1987).
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the latter find it too difficult to rely on local suppliers 
given the high-quality standards and reliability of supplies 
they require. Also, companies from the Asian NICs -facing 
intensive protectionism from the part of the US- have showed 
great interest in establish assembly facilities in Mexico (El 
Imparcial, newspaper, June 7, 1987).
d) Use of Local Inputs.
Besides employment and ownership, one of the most 
controversial issues about in-bond assembly plants is that of 
local content. The share of materials and supplies provided is 
an important indicator of the linkages that in-bond activities 
have for the Mexican economy.
In the case of the in-bond assembly plants in Mexico, few 
linkages have developed with the rest of the economy, so the 
local content is almost negligible at the national level and 
varies according to geographical location and ownership of the 
plants. As table 4.13 shows, from the total value of output in 
the in-bond plants in the country 18 per cent corresponded to 
value-added, 80 per cent to foreign inputs and 2.2 to foreign 
packing. In the in-bond plants with national capital the 
shares are, 26.1 per cent for value-added and 72.7 per cent 
for foreign inputs.
TABLE 4.13. Share of National Value-added a n d 'Total Output in the 
Social Capital of the In-bond Industry, 1982.
(lillion pesos)
NATIONAL FOREIGN FOREIGN FOREIGN TOTAL
SHARE VALUE INPUTS PACKAGING ELECTR. ENERGY VALUE
ADDED (Nat. A Corp.) MATERIALS AND FUELS
Aiount X Aiount X Aiount X Aiount X Aiount X
TOTAL 29915.9 18 133031 79.9 3602.5 2.2 25.4 0 166574.8 100
Nat. Ownership 5399.7 26.1 15059.8 72.7 255 1.2 2.1 0 20716.6 100
Naj. National 0. 1034 22.9 2412 53.4 52.5 1.2 17.7 0.4 4516.2 100
Naj. Foreign 0. 5759.2 13.1 37808.1 86.1 366.9 0.8 0.6 0 43934.8 100
Foreign Ownership 17723 18.2 76751.1 78.8 2928.1 3 5 0 97407.2 100
SOURCE: N Luna, 1984:Table 13.
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In the plants with foreign capital, 18.2 per cent of the total 
value was for value-added, 79 per cent foreign inputs and 3 
per cent foreign packaging.lt should be noted than in the case 
of national majority-owned plants the share of foreign inputs 
diminishes to 53.4 per cent and in the case of foreign 
majority-owned goes up to 86.1 per cent.
Regarding the geographical distribution of the in-bond plants 
table 4.14. (see table 4.14.A for absolutes in Appendix II) 
shows that the share of local inputs has been exceedingly 
small. With the exception of 1976, when the peso was devalued 
and the share of local inputs rose to 3 per cent, it has 
generally remained around 1.5 per cent in the in-bond industry 
as a whole. However, in the plants in the interior the use of 
local inputs has been considerably greater than in the border 
and the whole industry, ranging from 4 to 15 per cent of total 
inputs used (table 4.14).
TABLE 4.14. I n - bond’s Industry Inputs by Source and Geographical Location 
of Plants, 1975-1989 (percentages)
NATIONAL TOTAL BORDER STATES(a) INTERIOR STATES
TEAR TOTAL Foreign National TOTAL Foreign National TOTAL Foreign National
1975 100 98.6 1.4 100 99.2 0.8 100 90.7 9.3
1976 100 97 3 100 97.9 2.1 100 85.5 14.5
1977 100 98.5 1.5 100 98.9 1.1 100 94.1 5.9
1978 100 98.2 1.5 100 98.6 1 100 93.4 6.6
1979 100 98.6 1.4 100 99.1 0.9 100 92.3 7.7
1980 100 98.3 1.7 100 99.2 0.8 100 90.3 9.7
1981 100 98.7 1.3 100 99.2 0.8 100 93.9 6.1
1982 100 98.7 1.3 100 99.2 0.8 100 93.6 6.4
1983 100 98.7 1.3 100 99 1 100 95.8 4.2
1984 100 98.7 1.3 100 98.9 1.1 100 96.5 3.5
1985 100 99.1 0.9 100 99.3 0.7 100 97 3
1986 100 98.8 0.8 100 99.2 0.4 100 96 4
1987 100 98.5 1.5 100 99.1 0.9 100 93.2 6.8
1988 100 98.3 1.7 100 99 1 100 93.9 6.1
1989(b) 100 98.5 1.5 100 99.1 0.9 10C 86.5 13.5
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, 
B&ja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and 
Taiaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989. 
SOURCE: Table 4.14.A.
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Grunwald warns that "given the differences in inflation rates 
between Mexico and the United States, it is difficult to 
interpret a change in proportion with the passage of time.If 
prices of Mexican materials rise more than the prices of 
materials imported from the United States and the rate of 
exchange remains fixed, then the proportion of local material 
used may go up in value without increasing in physical volume. 
The converse is true when a sharp devaluation takes place" 
(1985:161-162). This being illustrated in table 4.14 which 
shows the declines in the use of local inputs in the interior 
in the years following the devaluations of 1976 and 1982.
Since the majority of electronic assembly plants are foreign-
1 sowned (or foreign-majority owned) , the local content of 
inputs and materials is even lower than that of the in-bond 
industry taken as a whole (Table 4.15).
TABLE 4.15. In-bond Electronics Industry Inputs by Source end Geographical Location of Plants,
1979-1988 (percentages)(a)
NATIONAL TOTAL ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
YEAR TOTAL Foreign National TOTAL Foreign National
1979 100 98.6 1.4 n.d n.d n.d
1980 100 98.3 1.7 100 99.4 0.6
1981 100 98.7 1.3 100 99.5 0.5
1982 100 98.7 1.3 100 99.5 0.5
1983 100 98.7 1.3 100 99.4 0.7
1984 100 98.7 1.3 100 99.7 0.3
1985 100 99.1 0.9 100 99.7 0.3
1986 100 98.8 0.8 100 99.4 0.6
1987 100 98.5 1.5 100 99.2 0.8
1988 100 98.3 1.7 100 99.1 0.9
BORDER STATES(a) INTERIOR STATES 
TAL F o reign National TOTAL Foreign National
n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d
100 99.8 0.2 100 95.2 4.8
100 99.8 0.2 100 96.9 3.1
100 99.9 0.1 100 96.1 3.9
100 99.8 0.3 100 96.5 3.5
100 99.8 0.2 100 99.2 0.8
100 99.8 0.2 100 99 1
100 99.6 0.4 100 98 2
100 99.6 0.4 100 96.3 3.7
100 99.5 0.5 100 96.6 3.3
(a) Corresponds to the sectors Electrical and electronic lachinery, equipient and parts, 
and Electrical and electronic apparatus, articles and accessories.
(b) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja Cali f o r n i a  Sur, Coahuila, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Taiaulipas.
SOURCE: Table 4.15.A.
18 According to table 4.12, 163 of the 210 plants engaged in the assembly of electrical 
and electronic oachinery and apparatus and electrical and electronics parts and 
accessories, were US-owned or majority-owned in 1982, that id 77.6 per cent.
185
So, whereas the local content in-bond industry as a whole was 
in average 1.3 per cent from 1979 to 1989, that one in the 
electronics in-bond industry was in average 0.5 per cent. 
Likewise, the share of local inputs varies according to the 
geographical location, being lower in the border states (below 
1 per cent for all the period considered) than in the interior 
states (which ranged from 1 per cent to almost 5 per cent). 
Actually, the share for the electronics in-bond plants in 
border and interior states is lower than that for the whole 
industry located in those regions.
Among the.main reasons argued for this low local content of 
the industry are from the Mexican side, the low productive 
capacity, failure to meet rigorous specifications and lack of 
interest in doing business with the in-bond plants (since they 
are considered ’runaway*) on the part of Mexican businessmen. 
On the US side, the use of Mexican components wTould force 
firms to pay higher duties which would increase the cost of 
assembly products in Mexico thus losing the advantage of 
cheaper labour-costs. Likewise, since in-bond plants are so 
close to the US, it is cheaper to use US inputs. Also, the 
restrictions on selling in the domestic market discouraged the 
assembly firms to use local inputs (Perlo, 1987:162). As noted 
before, one of the goals of the 1983 decree was increase the 
local content by allowing the in-bond plants to sell in the 
Mexican market.
Also, the kind of processes involved in electronics production 
is in many cases technically more sophisticated than the 
traditional assembly "sweatshops" of the late 1970s (as the 
increasing number of technicians seems to show). Thus it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, for the local businessmen 
to engage in the production of inputs (out of packaging 
materials) with the quality and price-competitiveness required 
to supply the assembly plants.
The high levels of quality (zero-error) required in an 
intensely competitive world market under the leadership of
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Japanese companies suggests that such development is not 
I r M i  to occur in Mexico in the short term. For example, 
Singapore’s efforts to achieve an integrated production 
structure in the field of semiconductors led to a limited 
degree of forward integration (testing, packaging, direct 
shipping to the customer). The highly-sophisticated 
manufacture of wafers and masks did not take place in 
Singapore until 1986 when Hewlett-Packard established its 
wafer fabrication plant. Malaysia, the third largest 
semiconductors exporter, has also faced the same problems 
though in 1987 National Semiconductor announced a new wafer 
fabrication unit for Penang (lower-end wafer plant technology) 
and Intel and Hitachi planned to do the same, there is no 
local entrepreneurship which can forge the backward-forward 
linkages with the quality and price-competitiveness required, 
(Frobel, et.al., 1981; Salih, et.al., 1988). The size of
Malaysian-owned electronic companies is still too small, 
estimated in about 9 per cent of the total fixed assets 
(Singh, 1988:81).
The Asian NICs are a longer way ahead in the field of consumer 
electronics, computers and semiconductors than Mexico. Crucial 
inputs to the manufacturing computer hardware and peripheral 
equipments are much cheaper in Asia. Particularly, the cost of 
assembly ' ' . labour and
engineers l.s lower if high*. ' levels of productivity (Ernst, 
1985:339). More important, the Asian NICs count with local 
firms which already compete in the world market of consumer 
electronics and computers. As it was pointed out in chapter 
II, Taiwan and South Korea are leading exporters of terminals, 
Singapore is a major supplier of disk drives and Taiwan, South 
Korea and Hong Kong are expanding their shares in the world 
market for personal computers. In the field of semiconductors, 
according to Scott’s (1987) study on South-East Asia, in 1985 
there were 124 plants in the region, 63 US-owned and 61
locally-owned from which 17 were engaged in diffusion and 
assembly and 44 only in assembly. These diffusion facilities
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(i.e. wafer fabrication) were found only in Hong Kong, South
19Korea and Taiwan) .
This is not to deny the upgrading in the in-bond operations in
Mexico. It is estimated that one third are involved in
microelectronics production or component processing, and most 
of these are subsidiaries of big TNCs like General Instrument,
General Electric, GTE-Sylvanna, RCA, Honeywell and Motorola.
As noted above, and contrary to public belief, these plants 
are not traditional sweatshops. There are technologically 
advanced operations even in the context of intracorporate 
division of labour. Automated component insertion, soldering, 
and quality control technologies are common in the plants 
(Brown and Dominguez, 1989; Palomares and Mertens, 1987, 1988; 
Pena and Cardenas, 1988; Sklair, 1989).
e ) Labour force: gender relations and skill.
As in the case of other FPZs in the world, one of the striking 
aspects of in-bond activities is the high proportion of 
females in the labour-force. In the case of Mexico as in East 
Asia, low wages are not the only reason to prefer women. There 
has been a good deal of research on this kind of industry,
which, from an anti-TNC view perspective, analise the role of
20
women in the NIDL . These analyses generally focus their 
critics to assembly activities in a set of factors.
First, the hiring practices of assembly plant managers. Social 
and cultural stereotypes of docile and uncomplaining women 
apply here (see Frobel et.al, 1981; Fuentes and
Ehrenreich, 1987; Kelly, 1986; Pena and Cardenas, 1988; 
Porpora et.al., 1989; Robert, 1983; Sassen, 1988; among others 
and the bibliography compiled by Sklair, 1988). These plants
Japanese and European semiconductor plants were excluded fro* the study by the author, 
but is is estimated that there were about 25-30 in 1985.
20 See for example the works of frobel et.al., 1981; fuentes and Ehrenreich, 1987; Lim, 
1987; Porpora, et.al., 1989; Robert, 1983; Sassen-Kobb, 1987; among others and the 
commentated bibliography elaborated by Sklair, 1988.
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tend to select their women workers from the younger age 
groups, for the following reasons:
"Women’s economic weakness and social subordination 
make them easier to control than men. Female labour 
is considered to be more docile and subdued than 
male and better able to perform monotonous, 
repetitious and badly-paid activities. They are also 
less inclined to join trade unions. The criteria 
used in the selection of workers are quite 
unambiguous: ’the labour which is employed is that
which demands the least remuneration, provides the 
maximum amount of energy (i.e. fresh labour which 
can be expected to work at high intensity) and which 
is predominantly unskilled or semiskilled" (Robert, 
1983:28-29).
In the words of a electronics plant manager "the man in Mexico 
is still the man. This kind of job is not doing much for his 
macho image. It’s just a little quirk of a different culture, 
They’d rather run a factory.." (quoted in Fuentes and 
Ehrenreich, 1987:211). This routinary, repetitive and delicate 
tasks which require great concentration and manual dexterity 
it is thought to be unsuitable for men’s capabilities. 
Specifically, line speed up, characteristic of the Neo-Fordist 
organizational form, increases worker health problems and 
turnover rates. So, for the plant it is easier to control 
women through various mechanisms as the exploitation of 
traditionally defined attributes of femininity, passivity, 
submissiveness, sentimentality, and sexual desirability. On 
the one hand it is reported a pattern of sexual harassment to 
hire or maintain a worker in the job (see for example Kelly, 
1986 and Pena and Cardenas, 1988). On the other hand, to 
increase company loyalty, productivity and avoid unified 
strength among female workers, plants seek to increase 
competitiveness through the organisation of beauty 
competitions and a wide range of social activities which in 
some cases include families (Sklair, 1989).
Second, the pronounced gender division of labour within 
plant5\ >i leaves no place for an upgrading of the skill of 
the labour force, rather assembly productions causes the
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’deskilling* of the workers. That is, there is a polarisation 
of the skill structure of the industry. Pena and Cardenas
(1988) quote several studies on assembly activities. Regarding 
in-bond plants in Mexico, one of the studies identifies 13 
basic job positions in the typical plant. The top eight 
positions (from mechanic to plant manager) are found to be 
dominated by male workers. On the contrary, women predominate 
in the two lowest job positions: "80-95 per cent of assembly 
line operator and 100 per cent of the soldering operator 
positions are occupied by women. These job positions are 
subject to the highest levels of speed up, continuous process 
supervision, and hazardous toxic and environmental stress 
exposure in the entire industry" (p. 95). With the low-wages, 
in many cases insufficient to cover the costs of basic 
subsistence; low contributions of employers to social security 
provisions; and the inadequate safety standards, the in-bond 
activities guarantee low production costs at high productivity 
levels at the expense of the female worker whose capabilities 
and energies become prematurely exhausted without the 
acquisition of relevant skills which may enable her to upgrade 
or maintain her position in the labour market (Robert, 
1983:33).
Third, the in-bond industry workers (and workers in other FPZs 
in general) are not drawn from the traditionally unemployed 
and underemployed but from a new pool of labour 
generated by the industry itself, that is the female workers. 
So the contribution of the industry to the generation of 
employment and lessening of internal and international 
migration, one of the main goals of the BIP has not been met 
with the establishment of in-bond plants. Sklair points out 
that "evidence around the world strongly leads to the 
conclusion that most of the young women who work in the 
assembly industries do so as their first experience of paid 
employment, and that there are practically no other jobs in 
manufacturing industry open to them" (1989:168). However, 
Sklair warns against the sophisticated image of the in-bond 
industry worker given by the propagandists, of young women
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spending their salaries in fashionable clothes and cosmetics 
in the US border cities. Actually, there is also evidence that 
many assembly workers in Mexico and other locations in the 
world are the sole wage earners in their families and have, in 
consequence, little or not remaining income for such 
expenditures (see for example, Kelly, 1986; Porpora et.al., 
1989).
From table 4.16 can be seen that female operatives have 
accounted for almost two thirds of the employment in the in- 
bond industry as a whole and in the border and interior 
plants. However, as Grunwald (1985) and others affirm there is 
no basis for the assertion that women workers have greater 
manual dexterity than men for delicate assembly operations or 
that they are less combative than male workers. Sklair quotes 
some studies on the ’docility’ image of the in-bond industry 
female workers which suggest that "they are prepared to take 
their complaints in substantial numbers, and presumably at 
some risk to themselves, to the authorities” (p. 173).
Likewise, the steady increase in the number of male operatives 
within the industry shows that company managers are willing to 
employ male workers as well, as it is clear that they are as 
able as women to perform assembly activities (see graph 4.5).
With regard to the participation of women in the in-bond 
electronics industry, table 4.17 shows that is higher than in 
the in-bond industry as a whole though is also decreasing. In 
1980 almost 70 per cent of work-force were females but by 1988 
this share had decreased to 55 per cent (against 67 and 51 per 
cent for the in-bond industry as a whole for the same years, 
see table 4.16).
In the in-bond electronics industry located in the border 
states the share of females in the labour force is the same as 
in the electronics industry, 69 per cent in 1980 and 55 per 
cent in 1988, again higher than the in-bond industry located 
in the border.
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GRAPH 4.5
FEMALE LABOUR IN THE IN-BOND INDUSTRY
Rataa of growth, saloctod years.
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SOURCE: Table 4.16.B (see Appendix II)
TABLE 4.16. Enployiient in the In-bond Industry by Geographical Location of Plants and Category, 1975-1988.
(percentages)
NATIONAL TOTAL BORDER STATES(a) INTERIOR STATES
OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAPP OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAPP OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF
YEAR TOTAL Subtotal Male Penale TOTAL Subtotal Kale Penale TOTAL Subtotal Male Penale
1975 100 86.1 18.7 67.4 8.8 5.1 100 86.5 18.7 67.8 8.4 5.1 100 80.7 18.4 62.4 13.7
l ***>
l ^
1976 100 86.8 18.4 68.4 8.3 4.9 100 87.1 18.7 68.3 8.1 4.8 100 84.4 14.9 69.6 9.7 5.9
1977 100 86.9 19.1 67.8 8.1 5 100 87.3 19.7 67.6 8 4.7 100 83.4 13.9 69.5 9.3 7.3
1978 100 86.6 20.1 66.6 8.3 5.1 100 87 20.7 66.3 8.2 4.8 100 83.1 14.5 68.6 9.4 7.5
1979 100 86 19.7 66.3 8.6 5.4 100 86.5 20.1 66.3 8.5 5 100 82.3 16.1 66.2 9.3 8.5
1980 100 85,3 19.4 66 9.1 5.6 100 85.7 20.1 65.6 9 5.3 100 82.4 13.6 68.9 9.5 8.1
1981 100 84.5 19.1 65.4 9.6 5.9 100 85 19.7 65.2 9.5 5.6 100 80.9 13.9 67.1 10.5 8.6
1982 100 82.9 18.9 64.1 10.5 6.5 100 83.4 19.6 63.8 10.6 6 100 79.2 13.1 66.1 10.3 10.5
1983 100 83 21.2 61.8 10.8 6.1 100 83.4 22 61.4 11 5.7 100 80.4 15 65.5 9.7 9,9
1984 100 82.9 24.1 58.7 11.2 5.9 100 83 25.3 57.7 11.4 5.6 100 82.1 15.4 66.7 9.4 8.5
1985 100 82 25.4 56.6 . 11.8 6.2 100 82.1 26.7 55.4 12 5.9 100 81.7 16.7 64.9 10.3 8.1
1986 100 81.6 25.9 55.7 12.2 6.2 100 81.9 27.7 54.2 12.2 5.9 100 80.3 16.5 63.8 11.9 7.9
1987 100 81.5 27.7 53.8 12 6.5 100 81.7 29.7 52 12.1 6.2 100 80.5 18.6 61.9 11.7 7.9
1988 100 81.6 30 51.5 12 6.4 100 81.6 32.3 49.3 12.2 6.2 100 81.6 20.6 60.9 11.1 7.3
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Tanaulipas.
SOURCE: Table 4.16.A.
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TABLB 4,17. Enploynent in the In-bond Electronics Industry by Geographical Location of Plants and Category, 1975-1988( a ) .
(percentages)
ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
IN BORDER STATES(a) IN INTERIOR STATES
OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF
YEAR TOTAL Subtotal Nale Female TOTAL Subtotal Nale Fenale TOTAL Subtotal Nale Fenale
1979 n.d. n.d. n.d n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d n.d. n.d. n.d.
1980 100 83.8 14.8 69 10.2 6 100 84.4 15.1 69.3 10.1 5.5 100 79 12 67 11.3 9.7
1981 100 82.9 14.8 68 10.8 6.4 100 83.5 15 68.5 10.6 5.9 100 77.1 13.2 63.8 11.9 11
1982 100 80.7 14.4 66.3 12.2 7.1 100 81,3 14.8 66.4 12.3 6.4 100 76.1 11.2 64.8 11.2 12.7
1983 100 80.4 15.9 64.5 12.7 6,8 100 80.7 16.3 64.3 13.1 6.2 100 78.3 12.9 65.4 10.1 11.5
1984 100 82.9 18.7 64.3 13.4 6.5 100 80.7 19.2 61.4 13.6 5.8 100 103.5 13.6 89.9 12.4 12.6
1985 100 78.7 18.4 60.3 14.6 6.7 100 78.9 19.4 59.5 14.9 6.2 100 77.7 12.2 65.4 12.5 9.9
1986 100 78.7 19.4 59.2 14.7 6.6 100 78.9 20.2 58.7 14.9 6.2 100 77.3 15.2 62.1 13.4 9.2
1987 100 78.8 21.4 57.4 14.3 6.9 100 79.1 22.3 56.8 14.3 6.6 100 77 16.5 60.5 14.2 8.8
1988 100 79 23.5 55.4 14.1 6.9 100 79.4 24.4 55 14.1 6.5 100 76.7 19.3 57.4 14.1 9.2
(a) Corresponds to the sectors Electrical and electronic lachinery, equipment and parts, 
and Electrical and electronic apparatus, articles and accessories.
(b) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Tanaulipas.
SOURCE: Table 4.17.A.
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However it is interesting to note that the utilisation of 
female labour force in the electronics in-bond industry 
located in the interior is lower than the in-bond industry 
located in the interior, in 1980 67 per cent of the work force 
in electronics was female and by 1988 decreased to 57.4 per 
cent (against 62 and 60 per cent for the same years in all the 
in-bond plants located in the interior).
The decrease in female participation in electronics industry 
responds to the same trends noted with regard to the in-bond 
industry as a whole, an increase in male participation and 
increase in the number of technicians and staff (see graphs 
4.6, 4.7 and 4.8). However, in terms of the dynamic of growth, 
the number of males and technicians in the electronics in-bond 
industry is increasing at a lower pace than in their 
counterparts in the industry as a whole.
For example, between 1982-1987 male participation in the in- 
bond industry grew at a yearly average rate of 22.3 per cent 
whereas in the electronics in-bond industry did it at 17.4 per 
cent (see tables 4.15.B and 4.17.B in Appendix II). Likewise, 
for the same years, number of technicians grew at a yearly 
average rate of 18.3 per cent in the in-bond industry as whole 
and 13.4 in the electronics subsector (see tables 4.15.C and 
4.17.C in Appendix II).
Among the reasons argued regarding the increase in male 
workers is that the pool of female labour is drying up (so in- 
bond plants are forced to employ men) and that the expansion 
of metal products industries has increased the opportunities 
for male workers (Sklair, 1989:176). Thus the higher rate of 
growth in the in-bond industry than in the electronics sector.
It is interesting to note that Rivera-Batiz (1987) holds the 
view that the higher male-female labor ratios in the border 
plants means that assembly plants are supplying jobs with some 
advancement opportunities and with non-menial tasks, different 
from the kind of jobs provided by traditional plants, thus
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increasing internal migration and discouraging international 
migration to US (p. 264 ). I cast a doubt on this aspect, since 
surveys on migration to the US show that the majority of the 
migrant workers are coming from rural areas, are unskilled and 
generally employed in agricultural seasonal jobs, service 
(maids, cleaners, etc) and other menial activities (see 
Sklair, 1989, chapter 8 ).
Another trend which is becoming apparent in the in-bond 
industry (apart from the rise in male workers) is the 
increasing participation of the technical and staff workers 
which implies that the industry is performing labour-intensive 
processes which require greater skill from the workers and 
more technical support. Table 4.16 above shows that from 1975 
to 1989 technicians and staff have steadily increased in 
numbers and proportion (see also table 4.16.C in Appendix II 
for rates of growth). This growth being greater in the plants 
located in the interior (graph 4.6 above).
There is a great incentive to employ Mexican staff and 
technicians since they are much cheaper than the equivalent 
personnel in the home countries, they speak Spanish and are 
also more familiar with the environment. In the border cities, 
in-bond assembly plants ha>/fi been responsible for a good deal 
in the upgrading of personnel through ' supporting and, in 
some cases, organising training courses in technical colleges. 
Also universities and other educational establishments have 
expanded their supply of technical and professional education 
according to the in-bond industry requirements. However, it is 
a fact that the booming border cities face, since the late 
1970s, bottlenecks in infrastructure, public services and 
educational establishments which threaten the smooth growth of 
the industry in that region.
Regarding the electronics subsector, the participation of 
technicians is lower than in the in-bond industry as whole. It 
is possible that the type of labour processes involved in 
electronics production as well as the high requirements in
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terms of quality of inputs and products is preventing the 
f irms upgrading the production processes located in Mexico
due to an unnumber of circumstances, specially shortage of 
technicians and engineers with the required skill and lack of 
specialised services (e.g. maintenance and repairment of 
sophisticated machinery and equipment) which itself requires 
qualified personnel. However, this is not to say that the 
production processes in the electronics in-bond industry are 
just mere assembly of devices and components. It is true that 
they not involve the sophistication levels found in the Asian 
NICS but they are upgrading. The study of Brown and Dominguez
(1989) about new technologies in the in-bond industry reveals 
that, in a sample of 20 plants (half of it electronic plants), 
there were 286 units of microelectronic machinery; 37.5 
percent were computerised numeric control units for soldering, 
moulding or injection of plastic materials; 40.2 per cent were 
robot for assembly and insertion and the rest robots for 
testing and handling of materials (p. 219).
d) Patterns of Specialization.
One important aspect in any study on industrial location is 
the existence of patterns of specialisation. As studies on 
the semiconductor industry in particular (Henderson, 1989; 
Scott, 1987) and on the electronics industry in general 
(Dicken, 1988a; Sawyer and Morgan, 1987; Todd, 1990) show:
"the NIDL no longer consists of a simple bipartite 
division between the economies of the capitalist 
core and those of the world periphery. Rather, it 
has evolved into a complex spatial system with many 
different hierarchical levels and sub-regional 
articulations" (Scott, 1987:156).
In these analyses it can be found that the NICS and NewT-NICs 
have a combination of natural resource endowments, lower cost 
skilled labour and, in most of the cases, a widespread 
institutional support which places them at competitive 
advantage if specialised in given labour processes. 
Specialisation, in time, leads to upgrading of the production
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processes there performed. Therefore, the process of
industrialisation is one of historical spread and emergence of 
specialisations inter- and intra-countries.
Moreover, despite all the arguments given by some analysts 
(Kaplinsky, 1984; Sanderson, et.al., 1987; among others), 
there is no evidence that automation of production processes 
in the electronics is resulting in the repatriation of 
production back home. As discussed in chapter II,
manufacturing of electronic products will continue to expand
in the NICs and the New-NICs and the use of computerized
automation technologies is penetrating into a very select 
group of NICs (see Ernst, 1985 and 1987; Duncan, 1981 for 
semiconductors; the works of Scott, 1987 and Henderson, 1989 
for the Asian NICs and Brown and Dominguez, 1989; Palomares 
and Mertens 1988 and Sklair, 1989 for Mexico).
Regarding the subject here, the existence of specialisations, 
it can be observed for instance that, "Hong Kong and Mexico 
have significant capacity for the assembly of discrete 
devices, whereas Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand 
concentrate heavily on the assembly of integrated circuits, 
especially advanced memory and microprocessor products" (Scott 
and Angel, 1988:1063). The analysis of Sanderson et. al., in 
which a model is developed, shows that "for the range of 
generally less-sophisticated products currently assembled 
there, Mexico retains its cost advantage for all volumes 
considered. However, for volumes exceeding 310 000 units per 
year, US flexible assembly begins to show lower unit costs 
than manual assembly in Singapore" (1987:140).
Unfortunately there is a lack of disaggregated data by product 
and cities in the official statistics of in-bond activities. 
Therefore I will have to rely on the analysis of Puebla (1988) 
who, according to data of 1986 obtained from the Flagstaff 
Institute in Arizona, affirms that from the 133 products 
assembled by the in-bond industry and imported by US under 
items 806/806, the electrical and electronic subsector had the
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highest share, with 58 products imported with a value-added of 
US$713.1 million dollars or 56.5 per cent (see tables 4.18 and 
4.19).
TABLE <.16: Mexico: In-Bond industry's tost corpetitive products 
by custois district (USA) in 1986.
(Value-Added in Iters 806/807, i i 1 lions of dollars)
PRODUCT
NO. OP 
COKPETIT. 
PRODUCTS
MEXICO
TOTAL
CUSTOMS DISTRICT IN US-MEXICO BORDER 
SAN
DIEGO NOGALES EL PASO LAREDO
C l o t h i n g 20 15.3 7.6 1.7 5.5 0.5
Footwear 10 0.2 0.2
Non-electrical »ach. 3 6.4 0.2 3 1.6 1.6
Office equipient 24 63 17 28.3 5.1 12.6
Electrical and electronic 58 713.1 93.7 95.1 286.5 237.8
Transportation equiprent 10 458.5 47.2 411.3
Others 8 4.7 3.9 0.8
TOTAL 133 1261.2 122.4 128.3 345 .9 664 .6
SOURCE: L F Puebla, 1988: Table 3.
TABLE 4.19: Mexico: In-Bond industry’s lost coipetitive products 
by custois district (USA) in 1986.
(Value-Added in Iteis 806/807, percentages)
PRODUCT
NO. OF 
COMPETIT. 
PRODUCTS
MEXICO
TOTAL
CUSTOMS DISTRICT IN US-MEXICO BORDER 
SAN
DIEGO NOGALES EL PASO LAREDO
Clothing 20 1.2 6.2 1.3 1.6 0.1
Footwear 10 0 0 0.2 0 0
Non-electrical aach. 3 0.5 0.2 2.3 0.5 0.2
Office equipient 24 5 13.9 22.1 1.5 1.9
Electrical and electronic 58 56.5 76.6 74.1 82.8 35.8
Transportation equipient 10 36.4 0 0 13.6 61.9
Others 8 0.4 3.2 0 0 0.1
TOTAL 133 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: L F Puebla, 1988: Table 4.
Each of the four US customs district along the Mexican 
Northern border, through which the products of in-bond go into 
US, is associated with one or more Mexican border city so it 
can be drawn an idea of the presence of specialisations in 
production along the border. However, the analysis should be 
taken with care since some products coming from locations in
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the interior (specially heavy, bulky ones) are exported to US 
through one of these border cities, specially Ciudad Juarez 
terminal point in Mexico of the Panamerican
motorway.
San Diego customs district •
registers the value-added generated in Tijuana and Mexicali
jt/cA
and other minor localities /as Tecate and Ensenada in Baja 
California state. Nogales district in Arizona mainly accounts 
for the value-added generated in Nogales and Agua Prieta in 
Sonora state. El Paso, Texas is associated with Ciudad Juarez 
in Chihuahua state (but also registers exports coming from 
Chihuahua City). Finally Laredo accounts for the value-added 
of Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Matamoros and other 
minor locations (see figure 4.1).
As can be seen in table 4.19, electrical and electronics 
products accounted for more than three quarters of value-added 
in the exports to US through San Diego, Nogales and El Paso 
customs districts, 76.6, 74.1 and 82.8 per cent respectively. 
However, considering the geographical distribution of value- 
added in the electrical and electronics subsector, El Paso and 
Laredo accounted for the highest shares (40.2 and 33.3 per 
cent respectively, table 4.20).
TABLE 4.20: Heiico: Geographical Distribution of Exports by product 
and custois district (USA) in 1986.
(Value-Added in Iteis 806/807, percentages)
NO. OF CUSTOKS DISTRICT IN US-NEXICO BORDER
PRODUCT CONPETIT. NBXICO SAN
PRODUCTS TOTAL DIEGO NOGALES EL PASO LAEEDO
Clothing 20 100 49.7 11.1 35.9 3.3
Footwear 10 100 0 100 0 0
Non-electrical lacb. 3 100 3.1 46.9 25 25
Office equipient 24 100 27 44.9 8.1 20
Electrical and electronic 58 100 13.1 13.3 40.2 33.3
Transportation equipient 10 100 0 0 10.3 89.7
Others 8 100 83 0 0 17
TOTAL 133 100 9.7 10.2 27.4 52.7
SOURCE: L F Puebla, 1988: Table 4.
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According to Puebla (1988) Mexico has a competitive advantage 
in 133 products of the Tariff Schedule of the United Sates 
shown in table 4.18 in comparison to 30 other developing 
countries (p. 51). Table 4.21 shows (see table 22 in Appendix 
JI for absolutes), within the electrical and electronics 
subsector, the overwhelming share of electrical ignition 
equipment for internal combustion engines, 23.6 per cent of 
the value-added generated by in-bond plants; rectifiers, 8.5 
per cent; electrical insulated conductors, 8.0 per cent; 
radio-broadcasting transmitters-receivers, 8.1 per cent and to 
a lesser degree, TV sets (7.7 per cent) and mainboards for 
personal computers (7.35 per cent).
In San Diego the most important products in terms of value- 
added generated in that area (i.e. Tijuana and Mexicali) were 
electrical generators (10.52 per cent), rectifiers (14.9 per 
cent), telephonic terminals (7.8) and mainboards for PCs 
(7.3). In Nogales, the most important products were TV sets 
(20.5), radio sets (21.5) and electrical insulated conductors 
(25.7). In El Paso the most important single product was 
electrical ignition equipment for internal combustion engines 
(51.4 per cent) followed by rectifiers (9.9 per cent). In 
Laredo the most important products in terms of value-added 
generated in that area were radio-broadcasting transmitters- 
receivers (24.37 per cent) and mainboards for PCs (19 per 
cent) (table 4.21).
Although not quite conclusive the evidence points towards the 
incipient emergence of specialisations in the border cities. 
According to some analysts, the specialisations emerging in 
the electronics in-bond assembly plants along the Mexican 
Northern Border seem to be associated with the place of origin 
of the firms* headquarters in the US., Puebla affirms that
the location of the in-bond plants established in Baja 
California state depends on decisions taken in San Diego and 
los Angeles California. The location of those in Nogales and 
Agua Prieta depends on decisions from Northern California 
whereas those in El Paso depend on decisions taken in the
TABLE <.21: Mexico: In-Bor.d Iridustry, Value-Added in Electronics and Electrical 
Products by Custois District, 1986. (Itecs 806/807,. percentages!
SITC TOTAL SAN
CATEGORY (Rev.2) MEXICO DIEGO NOGALES FI PASO LAREDO
TOTAL
1. Personal coiputers
tainboards (752.4)
2. Television sets (761)
3. Radio-braodcast sets (762)
4. Telephonic terminals- (764.1)
5. Telephonic apparatus (764.1)
6. Microphones (and stands therefor) 
Loudspeakers and audio-frequency 
electric aiplifiers (764.2)
7. TV transiitter-receivers (764.3)
8. Radio-broadcasting transiitters- 
receivers (764.3)
9. Radiotelephonic and radiotele­
graphic transmitters (764.3)
10. Other parts and accessories 
falling within heading 76 (764.9)
11. Tuning parts for TV sets (764.93)
12. Parts and accessories for sound 
recorders (764.99)
13. Parts and acc. elec. (764.9)
14. Cassetes (764.99)
15. Rectifiers (771.21)
16. Inductors (771.22)
17. Lightning arresters (772.1)
18. Control panels (772.1)
19. Switchboards (772.1)
20. Switches (772.1)
21. Other connectors (772.1)
22. Resistors (772.3)
23. Other electrical apparatus (772)
24. Electrical insulated conductors (773.1)
25. Light eiiiting diodes (776.3)
26. Transistors and similar semi­
conductor devices (776.3)
27. Microprocessors, MOS (776.4)
28. Integrated circuits (776.4)
29. Piero-electric crystals (776.8)
30. Parts of semiconductors (776.89)
31. Parts of cathode-ray (776.89)
32. Electrical Engines (778.31)
33. Electrical generators (778.31)
34. Electrical starting eq. (778.31)
35. Electrical ignition eq. for internal 
combustion engines (778.31)
100 100 100 100 100
7.35 7.37 0 0 19.13
7.71 1.19 20.55 8.2 4.54
3.56 1.31 21.58 0.43 1
1.03 7.81 0 0 0
0.39 0 0 0.97 0
0.56 2.06 0.28 0.22 0.48
0.25 0 0 0 0.75
8.13 0 0 0 24.37
0.01 0.06 0.01 0 0
0.93 6.27 0.04 0.24 0
3.15 0 0.16 1.82 7.2
1.39 1.32 0.01 0 3.63
2.55 7.72 0.45 2.25 1.71
0.16 0 1.17 0 0
8.55 14.98 3.52 9.87 6.43
2.84 3.14 3.72 3.12 2.03
0.06 0.41 0 0 0.03
0.12 0.31 0 0.2 0
2.2 0.3 0.13 1.55 4.56
2.29 6.87 0.22 2.75 0.75
1 4.92 0.08 0.81 0.04
1.57 7.81 0.01 1.21 0.17
5.3 7.62 7.12 5.43 3.5
8.07 7.33 25.71 7.19 2.36
0.04 0 0 0.11 0
1.22 0.42 7.47 0.42 0.01
0 0.01 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0.04 0,02 0 0 0.1
0.01 0.03 0 0.02 0
0.69 0 0 0 2.08
0.7 0.1 0 0.41 1.57
2.88 10.52 7.02 1.08 0.37
1.67 0.08 0.2 0.22 4.62
23.62 0.02 0.55 51.48 8.57
SOURCE: L P Puebla, 1988: Table 16.
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North-east states of United States (1988:55). However, the 
analysis of Clement and Jenner (1987) found that in the case 
of Baja California, in 1986, 79.3 per cent of the in-bond
plants had headquarters in Southern California, 12.8 per cent 
from other states in the US and only 1.2 per cent had 
headquarters in Northern California. The latter case rather 
strange considering that half the employment in the 
electronics subsector is located in that area (mainly Silicon 
Valley) (p. 85). Sklair affirms that, according to a study of 
the commerce department of the State of California almost 8 
out 10 US parent corporations of Baja California in-bond 
plants were, in fact, located in Southern California 
(1989:85). Puebla also quotes another analysis on the in-bond 
plants located in Sonora state which at the beginning of the 
BIP had close linkages with firms from Arizona which actually 
were from the North and North-east of US. From 1970 onwards 
the origin of the in-bond plants starts to diversify and 
nowadays there are plants with headquarters in Northern 
California, particularly Silicon Valley (1988:58-59).
3. CRITICISMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE IN-BOND INDUSTRY.
As the in-bond industry consolidated in Mexico as important 
generator of employment and foreign currency,, attention was 
focused on several aspects of its development. Since the early 
seventies, researchers, policy-makers and politicians have 
elaborated a sort of criticisms and forecasts trying to 
prevent or to attract the location of in-bond plants. It seems 
to me that it is unquestionable that the tendency of 
internationalization of capital will accentuate and with it 
the expansion of this kind of activities in Third World 
countries as noted in chapter III. Therefore, in as much as 
competition increases Mexico can take advantage of this 
process by < improving its advantages in terms of
location of in-bond industry and trying to avoid or to control 
the negative side of this kind of industry by an appropriate 
industrial policy.
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Let me give an outline of the main criticisms and prospects 
for the in-bond industry before drawing some conclusions on 
the development of the in-bond electronics industry in Mexico.
a ) • Critici sms .
During the 
cri tici sms 
academics.
i) The absence of significant linkages of assembly 
activities to the Mexican economy;
ii) the effects on the labour force and society;
iii) the vulnerability of in-bond plants to swings in 
the US business cycle and their general dependency o y\ 
decisions made outside of Mexico;
iv) the net loss of jobs in US plants because the 
opening of in-bond plants in Mexico,
In the case of (i) and (ii), it is argued that the in-bond 
industry AS ' j important for the Mexican economy, in
as much as Mexican industrial suppliers, plant managers, 
technicians, supervisory personnel and workers take their 
improved skills and experience to firms in the national 
economy (Clement and Jenner , 1987:11). With regard to the
transfer of technology issue, Sklair points out that
"Each main maquila has its own examples of state-of- 
the- art technology where some genuine technology 
transfer appears to be taking place. The Matsushita 
TV maquila in Tijuana is said to be one of the most 
modern assembly facilities in the world, 
incorporating the most advanced techniques and 
processes. Emermex in Mexicali produces what are 
probably the most sophisticated transformers and 
uninterruptible power supply assemblies in Mexico. 
Elamex printed circuits has "UL" and "MILSPEC" 
approval, and with the introduction of surface mount 
technology, claims to be competitive for quality
whole period, in-bond plants have received a lot of 
from both Mexican and US unions, politicians and 
In general terms the main arguments are:
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with any PC board manufacturer in the world. The 
Allied Bendix maquila, Aerotech Matamoros, assembles 
and fabricates rotating aircraft components to the 
most exacting standards. And in Chihuahua City, the 
Westinghouse maquila, Sistemas Electronicos, works 
to a complete system of military specifications"
( 1989:212 ) .
Although the author does not consider this upgrading in the 
production processes performed by in-bond plants genuine 
transfer of technology, rather a relocation of technology, I 
shall point out that there has been an upgrading of production 
processes and some transfer of technology, if minor, may be 
taking place in the in-bond industry. The increasing number of 
technicians in in-bond plants as well as the number of 
microelectronic machinery (computerised numeric control units 
for soldering, moulding or injection of plastic materials; 
robots for assembly, insertion, testing and handling of 
materials), could, in time, have a positive impact in the 
Mexican industry in terms of the skills learned and 
technology.
However, it is impressive the failure of the Mexican industry, 
which by the late 1980*s was operating at 60 per cent of 
capacity due to the recession, to supply the needs of in-bond 
plants along the US border. The share of domestic materials 
and supplies has been small, around 1.5 per cent of the total 
use of components and materials during the period 1975-1989, 
mainly due to the deficiency of Mexican suppliers (quality 
control, deliveries, production capacity, etc.) (Grunwald, 
1985:161) and because Mexicans have not pursued the business 
opportunities in the exploding in-bond industry (Sklair, 1989; 
Szekely, 1989 ) .
These problems could be solved in the mid-term since the 
prospects for the creation of a free-trade area with US and 
committing of Mexico to free-trade may force the Mexican 
industry to improve its efficiency. In addition, as noted 
before, there is idle industrial capacity which can undertake 
production to supply in-bond plants provided it is given the
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proper financial incentives and technical support. Also there 
were arguments about the advantages of in-bond plants, for 
instance, the amount of foreign currency, the multiplier 
effects on the regional economy (because of the expenditures 
on land, buildings, utilities, services, employees 
expenditures, etc) (Clement and Jenner, 1987:11).
In the case of (iii) and (iv), the arguments abound, for 
example the AFL-CIO, affirms that in-bond plants is a 
"pirating” of US jobs sanctioned by the Mexican government (La 
Jornada, newspaper, January 6, 1987). Some congressmen and the 
AFL-CIO have expressed their hostility to the BIP and to the 
eventual creation of a free-trade area between Mexico and US 
advocating protectionist measures arguing that there is a net 
loss of jobs in US as a result of the actual and potential US 
investment in Mexico’s in-bond plants (El Financiero, 
newspaper, December 3, 1987; Financial Times June 11,1990).
It should be noted that these linear views are misleading. 
There are numerous factors influencing the location of in-bond 
plants. The fluctuations in the worldwide economy and trade, 
the search for increasing competitiveness and the development 
of new technologies in production processes, the Mexican 
exchange rates, and the relative profitability and pricing of 
the assembled products in the world trade, among others. This 
could lead to a redistribution of world production capacity 
with or without affecting jobs either in the US or in Mexico. 
Sklair points out that US defendants of a free-trade agreement 
with Mexico in general and of the in-bond activities in 
particular argue a set of reasons to promote these activities. 
First, those who established production or assembly facilities 
had not real alternative, it is survival, not super profits 
what was in play due to increased competition from low-wage 
areas, mainly from Asia. Second, the proximity of Mexico 
means that it makes a good sense to use US materials, 
equipment, components and services for the in-bond plants. 
Thus, third, far from causing job losses in the US the in-bond 
activities save US jobs that could otherwise be lost in the
209
production of materials, equipment, components and services 
for in-bond plants (1989:47).
b). Prospects.
The prospects for the industry seem to be bright in the years 
to come. Several journalists as well as academics and 
politicians point out positive factors for the further 
development of the in-bond industry. Among the these factors 
are: ,f i ) ■ geographical proximity to the US, ii) entry level
wage, iii) rapidly available American technical support, iv) 
increased Mexican managerial and technical capability, v) 
familiarity with an increasing flexibility of Mexican 
government operating procedures, and vi) continued application 
of US tariff items 806.3 and 807.00 as well as the expansion 
of US markets (Hodak D, 1984:69).
Despite the negative factors of the 1980*s such as inflation, 
labour and infrastructure bottlenecks, in-bond plants steadily 
expanded throughout the period against some analysts forecasts 
which doubted about Mexico*s capacity to attract companies 
Although, the increasing protectionism of US could cut down 
the expansion of in-bond industry in Mexico through 
eliminating all or part of the products under items 806.30 and 
807.00 in the Tariff Schedule of the United States. As noted 
in previous chapters some fractions of U. S. Congress argue 
that in-bond plants mean a net loss of jobs in US. However, 
the American Chamber of Commerce defends in-bond activities 
under the following considerations:
i) A great amount of direct employment in U. S. depends
21on in-bond plants in Mexico .
ii) In-bond plants use around 65 average per cent of
material and components produced in US. From 1984 to 1985
21 See chapter III. footnote 10.
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165 000 high-skilled jobs were created in US because the 
in-bond plants in Mexico (El Financiero, Dec 3, 1987).
iii) Mexico has an advantage in wage levels US$1.30 per 
hour while in US the average wage is from US$5.20 to 
$13.09 per hour and in Asia -Taiwan, South Korea, Hong 
Kong and Singapore- the average wage per hour is about 
US$2.3 (Punto Weekly Magazine, August 31, 1987).
The US defenders of the in-bond industry argue that if it is 
not allowed the expansion of their in-bond activities it would 
mean a net loss of US jobs. Also, US companies would be less 
competitive in comparison with Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong 
and so on (La Jornada, January 6, 1987). The controversy about 
in-bond plants could become even more tangled as a result of 
the proliferation of Japanese and, to a lesser extent, South 
Korean assembly plants on the border. Yet the US 
administration has a great interest in Mexico’s economic 
stability and prosperity so it strongly pressed for the 
creation of the free-trade area (Financial Times, June 11, 
1990).
Nonetheless, the prospects for the industry seem to be more 
positive than negative. Despite the declining of US investment 
in in-bond plants, today there is an increasing interest of 
companies from other countries as Japan, South Korea, United 
Kingdom, France and Finland to invest in-bond industry. For 
instance, Japanese companies want to establish in-bond plants 
in Mexico as a platform for entry to US markets. Among the 
main companies are Sanyo, Matsushita, Sony and Hitachi which 
choose the Pacific Mexican Coast as a best location. There are 
other companies which manufacture photographic equipment, cars 
and motorcycles and components and electronics. Actually, 
Japanese is the second Mexico’s biggest investor, after the US 
and its stake is increasing rapidly. However, US is by large 
the major investor in Mexico in in-bond plants.
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The Japanese interest is due to the great growth in the 
exchange rate of the yen related to the US currency. In 1987, 
there were 1545 in-bond plants, whose capital was 52 percent 
from US, 45 per cent local capital and 3 per cent from other 
countries (El Financiero, July 20, 1987). Likewise, Japanese 
firms want to take advantage of Mexican locations before the 
announced formation of a common market including US, Canada 
and Mexico. As noted earlier, Japanese firms are specially 
interested in the proximity of the State of California which 
has the major share of Japanese investment in the US (El 
Imparcial, newspaper, June 6, 1987).
4. CONCLUSIONS.
The preliminary conclusions of this examination on the Mexican 
electronics industry are the following:
The establishment of the Border Industrialsation Programme, 
with the concomitant implementation of the in-bond industry 
regime, in a time when some industrial branches were going 
through major changes in technology and location brought about 
changes in the composition of industrial output towards a more 
export-oriented production and the emergence of a new 
locational pattern different to that of the heavy industrial 
concentrations in the three metropolitan areas of Mexico City, 
Guadalajara and Monterrey. This new locational pattern merged 
in the Mexican Northern Border in the way of in-bond plants in 
which labour-intensive phases of production processes 
(assembly operations) are performed.
The assembly of electronic products and components is a good 
example of this shift in Mexican industry* it is heavily 
concentrated in the Northern Border. As this new location 
pattern consolidates the labour processes performed upgrade 
thus bringing about changes in the structure of the labour 
force. Data on the labour force in the in-bond industry in 
general and the electronics subsector in particular, shows the 
growing number of males among production workers (assembly
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lines), a post preeminently occupied by women. Labour 
shortages in the border cities are the main reason of this 
change in hiring practices. Also, the growing number of 
technicians (engineers and supervisors) reveals that the 
production processeses no longer consist of simple assembly 
tasks but of more complicated T ds l< £s which require
the handling of sophisticated machinery and technical support
.Suck.
y a s control numeric machinery and robots for insertion of 
devices, bonding and testing, etc.). The w’inner in these 
changes is the interior of the country which is gaining 
/  importance . ^s g the location in-bond industry due to
wage differentials, labour shortages and insufficient 
provision of public services and infrastructure in the 
Northern Border. The interior region offers a vast amount of 
unskilled cheap labour J. to a greater
availability of universities, technical and other educative 
centers; ' a big pool of skilled and high-skilled labour.
It also offers the major possibility o f  increasing 
the local content of the assembled products. :
plants located in the interior showed greater local content 
than those in the northern Border. The changes to the in-bond 
regime give in-bond plants the opportunity of selling a 
greater percentage of their output in the national market thus 
adding attractive to the locations in the interior.
The amount and extension of the foreign direct investment
in electronic production is very important in 
Mexico unlike other NICs as South Korea and Taiwan vrhere a 
major part of the industry is locally owned (e.g. Samsung, 
Gold Star and Hyunday from South Korea and Tatung from 
Taiwan). However, Mexican local capital involved in 
subcontracting operations could be important though it is 
possibly underrepresented in s+o. 4/j j  .
As a result of the foreign investment from US firms the main 
market for Mexican electronics exports is US. However, even if 
foreign investment diversify it is difficult to think in other 
markets gaining importance, since most non-US foreign
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investment in Mexico aims to circumvent US protectionism. The 
eventual creation of the NAFTA is a further stimuli for this 
investment.
Mexico seems to have advantages in the assembly of consumer 
electronics rather then components as semiconductors. But 
negative factors in the Mexican economy, mainly inflation, and 
overvaluation of the currency offset the advantages for 
setting up certain kind of in-bond plants in Mexico. That 
means some assembly operations were lost to poorer countries 
and some others could be gained from richer. For instance,
* less-sophisticated labour-intensive phase of production 
processes are being performed in the so-called New-NICs as 
Malaysia, Thailand Philippines, etc, where patterns of 
specialisations are merging between NICs and New-NICs.
In the light of the later economic events in Mexico the new 
locational pattern will be consolidated. The regulations on 
foreign investment have been made still more relaxed in order 
to attract more foreign capital. It is estimated that about 60 
per cent of the Mexican economy would be open to foreign 
participation as a result of the broad revision of the 
regulation governing Mexico’s foreign investment law of 1973 
(Financial Times, May 17, 1989). Likewise, Mexico is to change 
the tax regime for in-bond plants, including a 4 per cent cut 
in corporation tax from 40 to 36 per cent. Also all Mexican 
sales to in-bond plants will be exempted from value-added tax 
- an incentive to raise local content. These changes follow 
provisions of a new decree, issued in December 1989, by which 
in-bond plants can sell to the domestic market up to 50 per 
cent of the value of their exports. These changes, intended to 
boost in-bond industry, come against a forecast growth of 13- 
15 per cent in the in-bond activities in 1991 and projected 10 
per cent rise in foreign exchange earnings (Financial Times 
March 29,1990).
In this way, Mexico will be more integrated into the world 
production and it can take advantage of this fact by .
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an appropriate industrial policy. For example, as Grunwald 
suggests (1985) a system of incentives for establishing in- 
bond plants in the interior of the country could benefit the 
national integration of this kind of industry. Plant location 
in the interior could increase the content of domestic 
materials and consequently the participation of national firms 
with the resulting impact in the regional economy.
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V. THE SURVEY: IN-BOND ELECTRONIC FIRMS IN MEXICO- 
CHARACTER1STICS AND LOCATION FACTORS.
INTRODUCTION.
As noted in chapter IV, in-bond industry in general, and the 
in-bond electronics industry in particular, have undergone 
several changes since their inception in the Mexican economy. 
Far from being the so-called "enclave” industry much 
criticised by some academics and politicians in Third
World country, this kind of industry can contribute to the 
process of economic development of the host country through 
sound economic policies.
The current dynamics of the world economy, with enormous 
pressures on TNCs to lower costs in the face of increasing y 
international competition, leads to the organisational and 
spatial separation of production facilities from the decision­
making, administrative and R&.D activities of the firms. As 
production facilities move offshore, researchers look for the 
set of . factors which influence the location decisions
of firms. However, as Malecki (1985) points out, wTith 
reference to high-tech industries but in my opinion 
to any other industry, conventional location theory proves to 
be quite limited for understanding the location of firms and 
industries because location theory underemphasizes labour as 
a location factor^. Nowadays, firms are forced to pay greater 
attention to labour which is segmented and each segment may be 
separated from one another. Consequently, need arises to 
analyse the factors contributing to the location of different 
activities in different labour markets and its dynamic.
In chapter I, a review of the main theoretical analyses on the 
current geographical redistribution of world production
IU\C f</ct!» 1
capacity was done with some important points to recall / a“j
It is out of the scope of this work to discuss the analysis of labour and underlying 
as6UBptions made by conventional locational theory. See the works of Alonso, 1964; Isard, 
1956; Lloyd and Dicken, 1977; Salth, 1971 and Weber, 1929.
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the role of technological innovation which allows for the 
spatial separation of the different phases of production 
processes; b) increasing capital-intensiveness of industry 
whilst retaining a considerable degree of labour intensity in 
certain phases of the production processes; c) intense 
competition at world scale with the corollary of the firms’s 
quest for reducing costs per unit of product through several 
strategies, as innovation in processes, organisation, etc; d) 
the labour force as a "pull” factor in the host countries 
where production facilities are intensely relocated and last 
but, by no means least, e) the role of the nation-states in 
the home and host countries, in the former they fostered the 
development of technology and other circumstances which led to 
the internationalisation of production; in the later through 
sound economic and social policies they establish the 
conditions for the successful performance of the labour 
processes there relocated. In chapter II, this process was 
illustrated by the examination of the recent trend in the 
worldwide geographical redistribution of the electronics 
industry in which the most technologically sophisticated and 
capital-intensive phases of the production process are 
retained in DCs whereas the less technologically sophisticated 
and labour-intensive phases are relocated in the NICs and New- 
NICs. However, as shown in chapter III, and in contradiction 
with the NIDL theory, this is not a linear process, nor just 
a search for low-cost, unskilled labour force, it was 
necessary first that there were changes in the economies of 
those host NICs and New-NICs in order to perform those phases 
of production processes with the levels of productivity 
required to maintain or increase the firms’ profitability. In 
the case of Mexico, there was a series of factors which gave 
her an advantage over other developing countries to attract 
production processes, relative abundance of a productive and 
cheap labour force, governments’ industrial policies, 
infrastructure, political stability, etc, as well as the 
existence of special arrangements like the in-bond industry 
regime, etc. Thus, amid a period of relative economic 
instability, inflation, debt, devaluation and falling oil
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prices, those segments of the economy which were export 
oriented as Mexico’s in-bond and car industries proved to be 
the most successful ones in terms of growth, employment and 
foreign exchange generation. The acute debt crises with 
falling oil revenues gave the Mexican government the last push 
towards the full opening of the economy.
In chapter IV, the Mexican in-bond industry was examined, with 
special reference to the electronics in-bond industry. It was 
found not only an impressive growth in terms of plants, 
employment and value-added but some interesting trends which 
reveal a) the consolidation of what I call a new locational 
pattern of industry in the Mexican Northern border; b) its 
slowly spreading into the interior of the country due to 
labour-force and infrastructural constraints in the border; c) 
the upgrading of the assembly processes performed (as the rise 
in the employment of technicians and staff and the presence of 
automated processes) and d) the appearance of specialisations 
among the main in-bond industry locations. To be able to 
confirm the above stated trends a questionnaire and some 
interviews were carried on in several in-bond electronic 
plants along the US-Mexican border during the months of 
September-November, 1990. Therefore the purpose of this
chapter is to present the main findings appearing in the 
survey to draw in chapter VI some conclusions as to the 
viability of the in-bond industry in Mexico in particular, and 
assembly processes spread all over the world in general, to 
become an important contributor to the process of 
industrialisation and development of the host countries.
In part I, some characteristics of the electronics industry in 
each city are presented as well as the main characteristics of 
the plants visited are given as, production, location, size, 
starting of operations, ownership, etc. Part II deals with 
those factors thought to be determinants in the location of 
the industry in traditional location theory, market 
accessibility, inputs, labour and the role of governments, and 
how they truly operate in this kind of industry. The role of
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urbanisation economies is examined in the third part. Finally, 
some conclusions are drawn in part IV.
1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRMS.
a) Selection of Firms.
Figure 4.1 (in chapter IV) identifies the main cities along
the Mexican Northern Border. As it was seen in chapter IV, the
main cities in the Mexican side correspond, in most cases, to
important cities on the US side as San Diego, California or El
Paso, Texas. The entire border comprises around 3200 km (2000
miles) from Tijuana in the extreme West to Matamoros in the
Gulf of Mexico. Since there is no direct motorway all along
the border among some of the cities, just the main cities were
chosen for carry on the questionnaire: Tijuana, Mexicali,
Nogales, Agua Prieta, Cd. Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa and 
*
Matamoros^.
As affirmed in chapter IV, one of the main issues in the in-
bond electronics industry is the location in the interior of
the country, so I found it necessary to collect some
information from in-bond plants located there since official
data was not enough disaggregated. Also for comparison
purposes it was my intention to collect information from
various electronic firms located in Mexico under non-in-bond
regime. In the first place, a wide variety of published
directories was consulted, including both trade directories
and the yellow pages of telephone directories. However, it was
not always possible to obtain a complete inventory of the
locations of all electronics plants or to understand if they
were under in-bond regime. In many cases the firm, otherwise
/$<//
registered as an assembly or manufacturing facility, turned/to 
be distributor, maintenance of equipment shop, software
Once in the fieldwork factors out of our control led us to drop Tijuana, Mexicali and 
Nuevo Laredo fron our list. However, we do not think this fact substantially affects our 
aain findings.
219
facility or just a small family workshop dealing with 
repairments of TV and radio sets (important in an economy 
where not all the people can afford 1st hand sets).
However, it was possible to complete a list of the 70 most 
important firms manufacturers of consumer electronics, 
computers and peripheral equipment and semiconductors, and 30 
in-bond electronic plants in non-border locations. All these 
firms were contacted by telephone and invited to participate 
in the survey. Some 40 plants (see Appendix III) reluctantly 
agreed to participate in the survey, and detailed 
questionnaires (including a stamped-self-addressed envelope) 
were mail-delivered to all of them for later completion and 
return. After three months a total of 5 questionnaires was 
actually returned (3 returned without any answer, 1 turned to 
be a software design facility and the other, distributor of a 
major firm). All the participating plants were telephoned at 
frequent intervals to remind them of their agreement to fill 
out the questionnaire but unfortunately no further responses 
came.
The fieldwork in the Northern Border yielded positive results 
in terms of questionnaires and interviews with managerial 
staff in the in-bond plants (see appendix IV for the list of 
plants). In each city (Nogales, Agua Prieta, Cd. Juarez, 
Reynosa and Matamoros) the "Asociacion de Maquiladoras” (In- 
bond Plants Association) was contacted to obtain some support^ 
and the names and addresses of the most important electronic 
plants as well as general information about the state of 
affairs in the in-bond industry in the locality. Afterwards, 
the firms were contacted by telephone and once explained about 
the survey were asked about the possibility of having an 
interview with the general manager. In most of the cases it 
was obtained an interview with the general manager and in a
3 Since it was out of budget and time to do direct interviews in several cities in 
a country of about 2 million square kilometers.
Unfortunately, the sensationalist work of some left-wing academics in the past has 
made many in-bond plant managers reluctant to give information or visit the facilities.
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few cases with some other managerial staff like production 
manager, personnel manager or acquisitions manager. It was 
sought to make 5-6 interviews per city, but in some cases, 
once there, and despite of having been given an appointment, 
there was no disposition to answer the questions immediately 
but instead they asked to be left the questionnaire (for 
further scrutiny and answering) and either come back to pick 
it up or leave an address for later posting. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to get those questionnaires back. So to fill 
some gaps of information and in order to compare, it is 
included information for the cities of Tijuana, Aguascalientes 
and Queretaro (and one plant of Cd. Juarez) from data from the 
questionnaires of the survey of Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 
"Urban Policy and Technological Development. The Case Study of 
the Industrial Estates Programme, 1952-1986" (Mexico, El 
Colegio de Mexico, Research Report for the International 
Development Research Centre IDRC, 1988). Thus there is a total 
of 20 plants in the basic sample used in the present analysis.
Since much of the information requested in the questionnaire 
is proprietary and confidential in nature (e.g. structure of 
costs), in many cases no answer was given to some questions. 
So in the following analysis the number of observations may 
differ from problem to problem. In spite of the limited number 
of plants (and the possibility of a bias), it is thought that 
the data obtained is quite reliable and presents a truthful 
view of the problem.
b) Some Characteristics of the Electronics Industry per 
City and State.
Before starting with the analysis of the firms surveyed,.it is 
convenient to give a general overview if the ‘electronics 
industry (in-bond and non-in-bond) in the main locations 
(states and cities), thus complementing the analysis in the 
previous chapter. The data was obtained from the industrial 
census of 1989 (preliminary results) and the in-bond industry 
monthly inquiry both carried on by the Instituto Nacional de
2 2 1
Geografia, Estadistica e Informatica, INEGI (National
Institute of Geography, Statistics and Informatic ) .
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, these sources do not 
offer data disaggregated at the city level. Moreover, they are 
not strictly comparable both sources use different
classifications.
Thus, on one hand the industrial census records two divisions 
in electronics industry, "Office Machinery, and Automatic Data 
Processing Machines" and "Telecommunications and Sound
Recording and Reproducing Apparatus and Equipment". On the
other hand, the in-bond industry monthly inquiry classifies 
the electronics in-bond industry as "Electrical and Electronic 
Machinery, Equipment, Apparatus and Appliances" and
"Electrical and Electronic Materials, Components and 
Accessories". Likewise, though in-bond plants are included in 
the industrial census the level of aggregation makes
impossible to know how many industrial plants are under the 
in-bond regime. Another problem is the different ways of
recording the data, the industrial census is carried on every 
five years in a determined month in the year, whereas the data 
for in-bond plants is recorded every month throughout the year 
but the final data represents the yearly average. Nonetheless, 
it is thought that both sources can give a reliable view of 
the kind of production processes located in Mexico.
As to regard the industrial census of 1989, it records a total 
number of plants in the Mexican manufacturing of 162 976 with 
an employment of 2 677 229. The major concentration of
industry is, as mentioned in chapter III, in the Central 
Region, that is the region compounded by the states of 
Hidalgo, Mexico, Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro and Tlaxcala and 
Mexico City (Distrito Federal), 36.3 per cent share in number 
of plants and 44.8 per cent in total employment (see table 
5.1).
TABLE 5.1: Number of Plants and Employment in Manufacturing 
and Electronics by State, 1989.
ELECTRONICS Div. 75. Office Mach. Div. 76 Telecomm, and Sound
NUMBER INDUSTRY and Automatic Data Recording and Reproducing
STATE OP EMPLOYMENT (SITC Rev. 2) Processing Machines. Apparatus and Equipment.
PLANTS
Plants Employment Plants Employment Plants Employment
(1) X (2) X (3) X (4) X (5) X (6) X (7) X (8) X
TOTAL 162976 100 2677229 100 669 100 101230 100 133 100 15075 100 536 100 ~ 8 6 1 5 5 ~ loo'
Aguascalientes 1925 1.2 33208 1.2 4 0.6 193 0.2 - 0 - 0 4 0.7 193 0.2
Baja California 2706 1.7 85328 3.2 75 11.2 13709 13.5 18 13.5 1341 8.9 57 10.6 12368 14.4
Baja Calif. Sur 668 0.4 5872 0.2 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0
Campeche
C
O
o
> 0.6 6320 0.2 - 0 - 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0
Coahuila 3847 2.4 111788 4.2 25 3.7 5088 5 6 4.5 154 1 19 3.5 4934 5.7
Colima 803 0.5 4812 0,2 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0
Chiapas 4384 2.7 15898 0.6 3 0.4 8 0 - 0 - 0 3 0.6 8 0
Chihuahua 4387 2.7 170509 6.4 57 8.5 25196 24.9 15 11.3 5611 37.2 42 7.8 19585 22.7
Distrito Federal 24331 14.9 577612 21.6 200 29.9 10677 10.5 35 26.3 2178 14.4 165 30.8 8499 9.9
Durango 2292 1.4 35545 1.3 4 0.6 122 0 . 1 - 0 - 0 4 0.7 122 0.1
Guanajuato 8789 5.4 112631 4.2 6 0.9 35 0 - 0 - 0 6 1.1 35 0
Guerrero 3813 2.3 14633 0.5 3 0.4 9 0 - 0 - 0 3 0.6 9 0
Hidalgo 2474 1.5 30931 1.2 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0
Jalisco 12607 7.7 168393 6.3 42 6.3 2441 2.4 7 5.3 1210 8 35 6.5 1231 1.4
Mexico 14291 8.8 372492 13.9 80 12 8193 8.1 15 11.3 1268 8.4 65 12.1 6925 8
Michoacan 7522 4.6 53351 2 9 1.3 71 0.1 4 3 53 0.4 5 0.9 18 0
Morelos 2237 1.4 33262 1.2 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0
Nayarit 1821 1.1 11888 0.4 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0
Continues next page...
TABLE 5.1 (Continued)...
Nuevo Leon 7720 4.7
Oaxaca 5404 3.3
Puebla 12366 7.6
Queretaro 1692 1
Quintana Roo 722 0.4
San Luis Polosi 3852 2.4
Sinaloa 2810 1.7
Sonora 2883 1.8
Tabasco 1553 1
Tanaulipas 3735 2.3
Tlaxcala 1714 1.1
V e r a c m 9666 5.9
Yucatan 3896 2.4
Zacatecas 2128 1.3
214016 8 50 7.5 1791
25193 0.9 0 -
116906 4.4 16 2.4 1049
47182 1.8 10 1.5 712
3339 0.1 - 0 -
48083 1.8 6 0.9 183
30611 1.1 5 0.7 223
64726 2.4 29 4.3 5734
9087 0.3 - 0 -
103112 3.9 34 5.1 26547
20028 0.7 5 0.7 727
110827 4.1 8 1.2 60
31915 1.2 3 0.4 59
7751 0.3 3 0.4 15
SOURCE: INEGI, 1989a:Tableg 2 and 4.
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In the electronics industry there were 669 plants and 101 230 
employees with major concentrations in Baja California Norte, 
Coahuila, Chihuahua, Mexico City, Jalisco, Nuevo Leon, Puebla, 
Sonora and Tamaulipas.
Jn the case of Office Mach« and Automatic Data Processing 
Mach* the major concentrations of plants can be found in Baja 
California Norte (13.5 per cent), Chihuahua (11.3 per cent), 
Mexico City (26.3 per cent), and Mexico (11.3 per cent). In 
the case of employment, Chihuahua has the highest share with 
almost 40 per cent of total employment in this subsector.With 
regard to Telecomm. and Sound Recording and Reproducing 
Equip., it can be observed almost the same pattern in number 
of plants, the same states above mentioned had the highest 
shares. In terms of employment, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas 
account for more than fifty per cent of total employment (22.7 
and 30.4 per cent respectively).
Unfortunately, the lack of data about the in-bond plants in 
the census prevent us from identifying those located in the 
interior states. As argued in chapter IV, plants
locating under in-bond regime in the interior locate there to 
avoid labour shortages, bottle-necks in infrastructure and 
public services and in search of more qualified labour force. 
On the other hand, since the highest concentrations of 
electronics industry (apart from Northern Border States) is to 
be found in the main cities of the country, it is thought that 
non-in-bond plants located in the interior, locate there to 
gain access to those markets^.
Plant size throws some light as to which are the main 
locations of the electronics industry in the country. Table 
5.2 shows the plant size in the overall manufacturing industry 
and in the electronics industry. Plant size in the former was 
about 16.4 employees per plant, 151.3 in the overall
It was until very recently (1989) that in-bond plants were allowed to sell up to 50 per 
cent of the value of their exports in the domestic aarket (Financial Tiaes, March 29, 
1990) to have an effect in the location in the interior recorded in the census.
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electronics industry, 150.7 in Office Mach. and Automatic Data 
Processing Equip, and slightly higher in the Telecomm and 
Sound Recording Equip. (160.7). By state, the Northern Border 
states (Baja California Norte, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and 
Tamaulipas) and the most industrialised states (Jalisco, 
Mexico, Nuevo Leon, and Mexico City) have higher plant size 
than the manufacturing industry as a whole®.
TABLE 5.2: Plant Sine in the Manufacturing and Electronics Industry by State, 1989.
STATE
MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY
ELECTRONICS Div. 75. Office Mach. 
INDUSTRY and Automatic Data 
(SITC Rev. 2) Processing Machines.
Div. 76 T e l e c o m ,  
and Sound Rec.and 
Eeprod. App.and Eq.
TOTAL 16.43 151.32 150.75 160.74
Aguascalientes 17.25 48.25 48.25
Baja California 31.53 182.79 99.11 216.98
Baja Calif. Sur 8.79
Canpeche 6.74
Coahuila 29.06 203.52 34.15 259.68
Colita 5.99
Chiapas 3.63 2.67 2.67
Chihuahua 38.87 442.04 497.43 466.31
Distrito Federal 23.74 53.39 82.75 51.51
Durango 15.51 30.5 30.5
Guanajuato 12.81 5.83 5.83
Guerrero 3.84 3 3
Hidalgo 12.5
Jalisco 13.36 58.12 230.04 35.17
Mexico 26.06 102.41 112.41 106.54
Michoacan 7.09 7.89 17.61 3.6
Morelos 14.87
Nayarit 6.53
Nuevo Leon 27.72 35.82 42.86 36.5
Oaxaca 4.66
Puebla 9.45 65.56 145.68 21.5
Queretaro 27.89 71.2 11.95 97.86
Quintana Roo 4.62
San Luis Potosi 12.48 30.5 7.08 55.67
Sinaloa 10.89 44.6 59.31
Sonora 22.45 197.72 241.91 201.87
Tabasco 5.85
Tanaulipas 27.61 780.79 101.86 902.21
Tlaxcala 11.68 145.4 145.4
Veracrus 11.47 7.5 6.64 9
Yucatan 8.19 19.67 19.67
Zacatecas 3.64 5 5
SOURCE: Author's calculations froi table 5.1.
c
The state of Agu&scalientes has higher plant size also because of the textile and 
garments industry there located.
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In the case of the electronics industry, as expected, the 
Northern Border states have a plant size with a
preeminence of Chihuahua and Tamaulipas (442.0 and 780.7, 
respectively). Among the non-border states, Mexico and 
Tlaxcala show high plant sizes compared with the rest of the 
states. By subsector, it is found that the greater plant sizes 
are in the states of Chihuahua, Sonora and Jalisco in Office 
Mach, and Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas in 
Telecomm Equip.
Since the census records every kind of establishment, that is, 
manufacturing, assembly and reparation, it is thought that 
those very small establishments (smaller than the average size 
for the country) located in all the other states may be mere 
workshops . However, this statement should not mislead the 
analysis since some firms locate in states like Puebla, and 
Queretaro, that is in the Central Region, away from the big 
industrial concentrations of the state of Mexico and Mexico 
City but still within the main market, the Central Region 
itself.
In the case of the in-bond industry in general, as table 5.3 
shows, in 1988 the border states* share in number of plants 
was 82 per cent, 80.4 per cent in total employment and 80 per 
cent in value-added.
In number of plants, the state of Baja California Norte had 
the highest share (40 per cent), followed by Chihuahua which 
itself had the highest shares in employment and value added. 
With regard to the distribution per city, Tijuana and Cd. 
Juarez are the most important cities in all the variables 
considered followed by Mexicali, Nogales and Matamoros. The 
non-border states* share in all the variables is about one 
fifth of the total.
7
Further analysis out of the scope of this work sight confirm this statement.
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TABLE 5.3: Characteristics of In-bond Industry by 
State and Locality, 1988.
NUMBER OF 
LOCALITY PLANTS X EMPLOYKENT X
VALUE-ADDED 
(t i11 ion 
of pesos)
X
NATIONAL TOTAL 13 9C 100 369469 100 5263925 100
BOEDER STATES 1146 82.1 297127 80.4 4204376 79.9
FAJA CALIFORNIA 569 40.8 75138 20.3 1098448 20.9
Ensenada 22 1.6 1359 0.4 10569 0.2
Kexicali 135 9.7 19558 5.3 311441 5.9
Tecate 57 4.1 4442 1.2 73128 1.4
Tijuana 355 25.4. <9779 13.5 703310 13.4
BAJA CALIFORNIA S,, 15 1.1 768 0.2 5296 0.1
La Pas 15 1.1 768 0.2 5296 0.1
COAHUILA 67 4.8 17605 4.8 150655 2.9
Cd. Acuna 35 2.5 10655 2.9 96718 1.8
Piedras Negras 32 2.3 6950 1.9 53937 1
CHIHUAHUA 248 17.8 110999 30 1581275 30
Cd. Juarez 248 17.8 110999 30 1581275 30
SONORA 88 6.3 29326 7.9 353999 6.7
Agua Prieta 27 1.9 6462 1.7 78955 1.5
Nogales 61 4.4 22664 6.2 275044 5.2
TAMAULIPAS 159 11.4 63291 17.1 1014703 19.3
Kataioros 72 5.2 32450 8.8 519148 9.9
Nuevo Laredo 44 3.2 11056 3 220433 4.2
Eeynosa 43 3.1 19785 5.4 275122 5.2
NON-BORDER STATES 250 17.9 72362 19.6 1059549 20.1
SOURCE: INBGI, 1989b.
The electronics in-bond industry is more heavily concentrated 
in the Northern Border than the whole in-bond industry in 
terms of number of plants, as table 5.4 shows, in 1988 almost 
87 per cent of the plants were in the Mexico-US border. 
However, in terms of employment and value added, the share of 
the non-border states in the electronics is again about one 
fifth. By industrial subsector, it can be observed that the 
assembly of Electronic Materials, Components and Accessories 
is more important in both locations than the assembly of 
Electronic Equip . , Mach , Apparatus and Appliances.
Looking at the distribution of both subsectors in each 
location, it appears that, in terms of number of plants the 
assembly of Electronic Equip., Mach , Apparatus and Appliances
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is relatively more important in non-border states (with 37 per 
cent share) than in the border states (22.4 per cent).
TABLE 5.4: Characteristics of the In-bond Electronics Industry by 
Industrial Croup and Geographical Location, 19S8.
INDUSTRIAL CB0UP\ 
LOCATION
NUMBER
or
PLANTS X EMPLOYMENT %
VALUE-ADDED 
(million of 
pesos) X
TOTAL 411 100 161130 100 2179729 100
BORDER STATES(a)
- Electrical and Electronic 
Mach., Equip., Apparatus 
and Appliances
357
80
86.9
19.5
127455
47789
79.1
29.7
1745676
690836
80.1 
31.7
- Electrical and Electronic 
Materials, Components 
and Accessories.
277 67.4 79666 49.4 1054840 48.4
NON-BORDER STATES 
- Electrical and Electronic 
Mach. , Equip., Apparatus 
and Appliances
54
20
13.1
4.9
33675
12123
20.9
7.5
434053
169709
19.9
7.8
- Electrical and Electronic 
Materials, Components 
and Accessories.
34 8.3 21552 13.4 264344 12.1
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
SOURCE: INECI, 1989b.
In terms of employment, it seems that the assembly of 
Electronic Materials, Components and Accessories generates 
more employment per plant in the Northern states than in the 
interior of the country. In terms of value- added, in both 
locations Electronic Equip , Mach,, Apparatus and Appliances 
share is about 40 per cent and 60 per cent in Components and 
Materials.
The coefficients of localisation shown in table 5.5 give 
better view of the degree of importance of the electronics 
industry in each state. At the level of the whole electronics 
industry, the border states (Baja California Norte, Coahuila. 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas) show a localisation 
coefficient greater than one, that is, it does exist a degree 
of specialisation in electronics production in those states.
By subsector, in Office Mach., the states of Baja California 
Norte, Chihuahua and Sonora in the border and Jalisco, Puebla, 
Sinaloa in the interior of the country have coefficients
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TABLE 5.5: Localisation Coefficients in the Electronics 
Industry by State.
ELECTRONICS Div. 75. Off. Div. 76 Telecom.
INDUSTRY Mach.i and Aut. and Sound Kec.
STATE SITC Auto., Data and Beprod.
Rev. 2 Process.Mach. App. and Equip.
Aguascalientes 0.154 0 0.181
Baja California 4.249 2.791 4.504
Baja Calif. Sur 0 0 0
Campeche 0 0 0
Coahuila 1.204 0.245 1.372
Colima 0 0 0
Chiapas 0.013 0 0.016
Chihuahua 3.908 5.844 3.569
Distrito Federal 0.489 0.67 0.457
Durango 0.091 0 0.107
Guanajuato 0.008 0 0.01
Guerrero 0.016 0 0.019
Hidalgo 0 0 0
Jalisco 0.3S3 1.276 0.227
Mexico 0.582 0.605 0.578
Michoacan 0.035 0.176 0.01
Morelos 0 0 0
Nayarit 0 0 0
Nuevo Leon 0.221 0.214 0.223
Oaxaca 0 0 0
Puebla 0.237 1.332 0.046
Queretaro 0.399 0.102 0.451
Quintana Roo 0 0 0
San Luis Potosi 0.101 0.059 0.108
Sinaloa 0.193 1.294 0
Sonora 2.343 2.993 2.229
Tabasco 0 0 0
Tamaulipas 6.809 0.66 7.885
Tlaxcala 0.96 0 1.128
Veracruz 0.014 0.024 0.013
Yucatan 0.049 0 0.057
Zacatecas 0.051 0 0.06
(a) The location coefficient (LQ) indicates the importance
of the industrial group in any locality.
By »eans of LQ it is possible to asses the degree 
of specialisation of the locality towards a certain 
industrial activity. The magnitude of LQ in relation 
to the unity indicates the degree of specialisation 
as follows:
LQ > 1, Bigh degree of specialisation;
LQ s 1, No specialisation;
LQ < 1, The locality does not have any incidence 
in the location of the industrial group..
To calculate LQ,
LQ = (ei/et)/(Ei/Et) 
ei = Employment in the industrial group i in the state,
et = Employment in nanufacturing in the state.
Ei = Employment in the industrial group i in the country
Et = Total Employment in manufacturing.
SOURCE: Own calculations from table 5.2.
greater than one, with Chihuahua in the lead with a 
coefficient of 5.8. With regard to Telecomm Equip, there are 
greater coefficients in the border states plus Tlaxcala in the 
Central Region. In this case Baja California Norte and 
Tamaulipas have the greater coefficients of specialisation 
(4.5 and 7.9, respectively). I should recall from chapter IV 
that in the San Diego customs district (through which
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a s s e m b l e d  products from Baja C a l i f o r n i a  Norte go into US) the 
main p r o d u c t s  r e g i stered were t e l e p h o n i c  terminals, 
m i c r ophones, r a d i o t e l e p h o n i c  and r a d i o t e l e g r a p h i c  trans m i t t e r s  
(i.e. t e l e c o m m  equip.). In the L a r e d o  customs d i s trict (which 
reg i s t e r s  goods ass e m b l e d  in T a m a u lipas), the mai n  products 
were TV sets and subassemblies, and p a rts and a c c e s s o r i e s  for 
sound recorders (i.e. sound r e c o r d i n g  and r eproducing 
a p p a r a t u s  and equipment).
The data above examined suggests that the electronics industry 
in Mexico, in general, is heavily concentrated in the Northern 
Border to take advantage of the location close to the U£ 
market and the advantages offered under the in-bond plants 
regime. However, a closer view indicates the existence of 
electronics industry in other states of the country mainly in 
* the Central Region and in the other two main industrial cores, 
of the country, the states of Jalisco and Nuevo Leon. In the 
main, these plants locate there to serve the domestic market 
and take advantage of the infrastructural facilities, labour 
market, etc. which are undoubtedly better in those areas of 
the country.
2m this respect a study on the NICs published by the OECL 
(1988) affirms that apart from the in-bond plants, the Mexican 
electronics industry has been geared to the domestic market. 
"The industry suffers, however, from its heavy concentration 
on consumer electronics and its dependence dn imports since it 
consists in assembling imported components" (OECD, 1988:60). 
In this sense, the non-in-bond electronics industry in Mexico 
would tend to locate close to the market to minimise costs in 
the transport of heavy and bulky products. Also, it is argued, 
the importance of after-sale services and customised design 
for some electronic products as computers will call for closer 
links with the customer. However, these kind of services are 
usually given by the distribution shops which not always are 
owned by the manufacturing firms, thus rendering u n n e c e s s a r y  
the location of production facilities close to the market. In
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this case the existence of skilled labour force is the most 
likely location factor.
In what follows, the general characteristics of the firms 
surveyed will be examined to proceed in part 2 to analise the 
main factors thought to influence the location of the in-bond 
electronics industry.
c ) Production. Employment and Plant Size by Locality.
Although the intention was to get information from all the 
branches within the electronics industry in each city (i.e. 
Data Processing, Telecomm Equip., Consumer Electronics and 
Components) to be able to draw some comparisons among the 
different cities, it was not always possible to get the 
interviews sought. Nonetheless, the 20 firms in the survey 
produce a wide range of products which gives a good outlook of 
the industry in Mexico. For the sake of easiness plants are to 
be referred by their number (see appendix IV for the list of 
plants visited). As table 5.6 shows, among the firms there are 
5 assemblers of consumer electronics, phonographs, TV sets and 
radio sets, 1 assembler of components for printers, 1 of 
discreet devices, integrated circuits and hybrid circuits; 2 
firms engaged in the assembly of components for telecomm 
equipment and the rest assembles several electronic parts and 
components (including the three non-in-bond plants in 
Aguascalientes and Queretaro).
Most of the plants visited are devoted to the assembly of a 
single product, though some of them assembled more than one as 
the TV sets plant in Agua Prieta which assembles TV sets and 
power supplies for TV (firm 06); firm 12 in Reynosa assembles 
valves, control panels and thermostats; firm 14 (Reynosa) 
assembles parts and components for printers. Firm 15 also, in 
Reynosa, assembles discreet devices, integrated circuits and 
hybrid circuits and firm 16 in Matamoros, assembles power 
supplies and printed circuits.
TABLE 5.6: Kurbrr of
mini
LOCALITY FIRES
TOTAL 21
TIJUAKA(a)
NOGALES
AGUA PRIETA
CD. JUAREZ .
REYNOSA
MATAMOROS
AGUASCALIENTES(a ) 
QUERRTARO(a)
P i n s  by Locality and Product, 199C .
PRODUCT 
(SITC, R e v . 2)
01. Electronic switches ( 772 . 1 ).
02. Phonographs (763.1 ).
03. Electronic switches (772.1)
(for telecoc. e q u i p . ).
04. Parts and coiponents for licro- 
phones for telecoii. (764.92).
05. T r & n s f o n e r s  for radio and 
TV sets (764.9, 771.1).
06. Assenbly of TV sets and power 
supplies (761, 764.9).
07. Wire harnesses for autoiobile 
industry (772)
08. Chassis for colour TV sets (761)
09. Wire harnesses for military 
vehicles (772).
10. Electric accumulators (778.1).
11. Radio sets (762)( a ).
4 12. Valves, control panels and
t h e n o s t a t s  (776.2, 772.1 ).
13. Colour TV sets (761).
14. Nodular circuits, subassei- 
blies for printers, (752.5); 
printing heads, printer 
ribbons and printed boards, 
(759.9).
15. Discrete transistors, (776.3); 
integrated circuits, (776.4); 
hybrid circuits, (776.3).
2 16. Power supplies, (764.8);
printed circuits, (772).
17. Vire harnesses for autoiobile 
industry (772).
1 18. Electronics parts and coip.
for vehicles (772).
2 19. Electronics parts and corp.
for vehicles (772).
20. Electronics parts and cocp. 
for vehicles (772).
(a). Froi G a r z a , Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
SOURCE: Field-work in the Neiican Northern Border, 
Septerber-noverber, 1990.
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The overall employment in the plants v i s ited was 27953 
e m p l o y e e s  amounting to a plant size of 1398 employees per 
p l a n t  (table 5.7). Despite of being a se l f - s e l e c t e d  sample, 
the data shows a some concordance with the general trends in 
the in-bond industry.
TABLE 5.7: Employment and Plant Size by Locality, 1990
LOCALITY
NUMBER OF 
FIRMS
EMPLOYMENT PLANT
SIZE
TOTAL 20 27953 1396
Tijuana(a) 2 2101 1050.5
Nogales 1 69 69
Agua Prieta 3 1073 357.7
Cd. Juarez 5 11561 2312.2
Reynosa 4 10552 2638
Matamoros 2 1855 927.5
Aguas calientes(a) 1 105 105
Queretarofa) 2 637 318. 5
(a). From Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern 
Border, September-November, 1990.
For example, in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, the most important 
locations for this kind of industry, the average plant size 
was the highest (1050.5 and 2312, respectively) together with 
Reynosa (2638 employees per plant) in the state of Matamoros. 
It should be recalled from section (b) that this state had the 
highest localisation coefficient in the production of Telecomm 
Equip., Sound Recording and Reproducing App. and Equip. 
Nonetheless, these plant sizes are more greater than those 
for the in-bond industry as a whole and the in-bond 
electronics industry which in 1988 amounted to 248 and 392, 
respectively (see table 4.10, chap IV). The firms in 
Aguascalientes and Queretaro, have also greater plant sizes 
than the average for the Mexican manufacturing industry.
d ) Start of Production, Own e r s h i p  and L o c ation of 
H e a d q u a r t e r s .
As table 5.8 shows, most of the in-bond plants visited located 
in Mexico after the first crisis (1974-1975) in the in-bond 
industry, 6 during the oil boom (1975-1982) and 7 during the 
subsequent economic crises and recovery (1983-1990). The firms 
in Aguascalientes and Queretaro located also after 1975.
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TABLE 5.9: Firms by Kind of Ownership and Locality, 1990.
LOCALITY/FIRM
KIND OF 
ESTABL.
TYPE OF 
PROCESS
KIND OF 
OWNERSHIP
TIJUANA*
01 Branch Assembly TFO(a)
02 Branch Assembly TFO
NOGALES
.03 Branch Assembly TFO
AGUA PRIETA
04 Branch Assembly JV(b)
05 Branch Assembly TFO
06 Branch Assembly TFO
CD. JUAREZ
07 Branch Assembly TFO
08 Branch Assembly TFO
09 Branch Assembly TFO
10 Branch Assembly TFO
11* Branch Assembly TFO
REYNOSA
12 Branch Assembly TFO
13 Branch Assembly TFO
14 Branch Assembly TFO
15 Branch Assembly TFO
MATAMOROS
16 Branch Assembly TFO
17 Branch Assembly TFO
AGUASCALIENTES*
18 UE(c) Manufacture TNO(d)
QUERETARO*
19 Branch Manufacture JV
20 UE Manufacture TNO
* From Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
(a). Totally Forelgn-owned.
(b). Joint-venture.
(c). Unique establishment.
(d). Totally National-owned.
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern Border, 
September-Noveaber, 1990.
The general belief regarding the location of the headquarters 
of In-bond plants Is that they are mainly In the states along 
the US-Mexican border. In Chapter IV it was stated that, 
according to some analysts, the headquarters of those plants 
in Baja California state (mainly in the cities of Tijuana and 
Mexicali) are generally located in the state of California, in 
the US, side. For those plants in the state of Sonora (in 
Nogales and Agua Prieta) the headquarters, though supposed to 
be in Arizona state, were actually in states in the North and 
North-east of the United States. As table 5.10 shows the 
headquarters of the plants visited are located not only in the 
states along the border.
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TABLE 5.8: Date of Start of Production by Locality, 1990.
LOCALITY 1965/74 1975/82 1983/90 NO. OF 
ANSWERS
TOTAL 3 8 8 19
Ti juana(a) 1 1 2
Nogales r - 1 1
Agua Prieta 1 1 1 3
Cd. Juarez(b) 1 1 2 4
Reynosa - 3 1 4
Mataaoros 1 - 1 2
Aguascalientes(a) - 1 - 1
Queretarof a) ~ 1 1 2
(a). From Carza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 198&.
(b) In one of the fins the interviewed person did not know 
the start of production date.
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern 
Border, Septeaber-Novenber, 1990.
Regarding the kind of establishment and ownership, table 5.9 
shows that all the in-bond plants are branches of foreign 
firms and are totally-owned by the parent firms w-ith the 
exception of plant 04 in Agua Prieta which is a joint-venture 
between a foreign and a national firm.
Regarding the non-in-bond firms, firm 18 in Aguascalientes is 
a unique establishment and is totally national-owned. In 
Queretaro one of the firms is a branch plant jointly owned by 
a foreign firm and a national firm (firm 19); firm 20 is an 
unique establishment totally national-owned.
All the in-bond firms visited defined the production processes
0 4 *
• y yrrf) ncui ly . : ’’inspection and checking of
parts and components received from the parent firm, assembly, 
testing, quality control, packaging and sending either to the 
parent firm or to the market” (from one of the 
questionnaires). However, assembly of parts and components, as 
it will be seen when dealing with employment, implies more 
than the traditional labour-intensive assembly of parts and 
components. In fact, as Mertens and Palomares affirm (1987, 
1988), the insertion of new automated technologies requires 
not only of more skilled labour force but also a new attitude 
from the worker towards his/her activities within the 
workplace.
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TABLE 5.10: Location of Headquarters by Firr 
and Locality, 1990.
LOCALITY/FIR!' HEADQUARTERS’ LOCATION
TIJUANA U )
01 USA
02 JAPAN
NOGALES
03 North Carolina, USA.
AGUA PRIETA
04 Chicago, Illinois, USA
05 Douglas, Arir. USA.
06 Chicago, Illinois, USA
CD. JUAREZ
07 Ohio, USA.
08 Indianapolis, Indiana, USA
09 St. Luis, Illinois, USA.
10 USA
11(a) USA
REYNOSA
12 Milvaukee, Visconsin, USA.
13 Chicago, Illinois, USA.
14 Virginia, USA.
15 Corpus Christi, Texas, USA.
MATAMOROS
16 Nev York, USA.
17 Auburn, Alabaia, USA.
AGUASCALIENTES(a) 
18
QUBRETARO( a}
19 CANADA
20
(a). Froi Garsa, Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988. 
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in tbe Mexican 
Northern Border, Septenber-Noveiber, 
1990.
For example, from the plants located in Agua Prieta just one 
has headquarters in Arizona, the other two have headquarters 
in Chicago, Illinois, that is in the North-east of USA. This 
being also the case in Ciudad Juarez where the three plants 
which give information have headquarters in the states of 
Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.
In the case of Reynosa there is more diversity, two of the 
plants have headquarters in the North (Wisconsin and 
Illinois), one in the East (Virginia) and one in the adjacent 
state of Texas. The plants in Matamoros have headquarters in 
the South-eastern state of Alabama and as far as the state of
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New York. Finally, one of the firms in Queretaro has 
headquarters in Canada.
2. MARKETS. INPUTS, LABOUR AND LABOUR-PROCESSES.
Although it is widely thought that the in-bond plants only 
locate in Mexico to take advantage of the cheap labour-force, 
the purpose of this part is to examine in deep specifical 
characteristics of the firms thought to have an influence in 
the location or re-location of the different plants visited. 
For the sake of clarity, the organisation of information and 
data was done according to the geographical location of 
markets, origin of inputs and characteristics of the labour- 
force and labour processes. As it will be seen, to better 
understand the current redistribution of world production 
capacity it is necessary to take in account some other factors 
beyond of the scope of the above mentioned factors and much 
discussed throughout all the previous chapters.
a ) Products and the Importance of Markets.
According to the product-cycle approach the output of 
industries follow a pattern of introduction, expansion, 
maturity and eventual decline. As the market grows, product 
standardisation increases, and production is routinised and 
mechanised. Thus, as factor demands change specially that of 
labour which switches in favour of lower skill levels, so do 
the locational requirements which lead to a search of 
locational possibilities (routinisation and standardisation of 
external transactions) in places with lower factor prices in 
peripheral regions (Storper, 1988).
However, as pointed out in chapter I, the product-cycle 
approach is/questionableY today s firms adopT more than one 
strategy to remain competitive ■ .z . *
. V'.-~ * Products no longer are made as a whole
in one unique production site as the product-cycle approach 
implies, technology allows for the segmentation of production
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processes in several phases which can be performed in 
different places. Likewise, transactions are no longer done at 
arm’s length, today’s international trade is increasingly 
trade among firms. Thus, in many cases, market considerations 
are out of the scope in the production targeting of individual 
offshore plants. In the case of the in-bond plants visited it 
was found that from 20 plants, 8 send their production to the 
parent firm (table 5.11), 4 to other firms and 8 to the
consumer market. The persons interviewed were asked if they 
had knowledge as to what was the location of the main markets 
of their final products. Those plants located in the interior 
of the country (3) sell all their production in the national 
market whereas those located in the border (17) affirmed the 
final products w .ere destined for the US market (table 5.12).
TABLE 5.11: Destination of Production by Locality, 1990.
LOCALITY HEADQUARTERS
OTHER
FIRMS
CONSUMER
MARKET
NO. OF 
ANSWERS
TOTAL 7 5 8 20
Tijuana(a) - - 2 2
Nogales 1 - - 1
Agua Prieta - 3 - 3
Cd. Juarez 3 1 2 5
Reynosa 2 - 1 4
Matanoros 1 1 - 2
Aguascalientes(a) - - 1 1
Queretaro(a) - - 2 2
(a). From Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar.
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern 
Border, September-Novenber, 1990.
TABLE 5.12: Geographical Location of Main 
Markets, 1990(a).
LOCALITY MEXICO USA NO. 
OF ANSWERS
TOTAL 3 17 20
Tijuana(b) _ 2 2
Nogales - 1 1
Agua Prieta - 3(c) 3
Cd. Juarez - 5 5
Reynosa - 4(d) 4
Mataaoros - 2 2
Aguascalientes(b) 1 1
Queretaro(b) 2 2
(a). More than 75% of production.
(b). From Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
(c). One plant sells 10% in Mexico.
(d). One plant sells 15% in Europe and 5% in Japan. 
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern
Border, Septeaber-Noveaber, 1990.
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With regard to the destination of output by kind of product it 
was not found a consistent pattern in the plants. That is, it 
was expected that final goods, as TV or radio sets, to go
directly to the US market and components to the parent firms 
or another firm either within the corporation or not. But four 
out of five consumer goods assemblers send their output to the 
parent firm (the exception being the plant in Tijuana which 
assembles phonographs). Therefore, the two plants in Tijuana 
(phonographs and electronic switches send their output to the 
consumer market); two in Cd. Juarez (electrical accumulators 
and radio sets); and the assembler of discreet transistors, 
integrated and hybrid circuits. In all this cases, however, I 
was told that the marketing functions were performed by the 
parent firm.
With regard to the characteristics of the products assembled 
(weight, value, etc.), 8 out of 20 plants gave the requested 
information which appears in table 5.13.
TABLE 5.13: Main Characteristics of the Products, 1990.
LOCALITY
PRODUCT 
(SITC, Rev.2) VEIGHT
VALUE
(a) DESTINATION TRANSPORT
NOGALES 03. Electronic switches 50 gr $2.00 - $12.00 USA
(Radio Shack)
truck
AGUA PRIETA 05. T r a n s f o r m s  for radio 
and TV sets.
30 gr $1.50 Kansas, USA truck
06. TV sets. 94 gr - Arizona, USA truck
power supplies. 1.6 kg - Arizona, USA truck
CD. JUAREZ 07. Vire harnesses for 
for autoiiobile industry.
1.8 kg Nicbigan, USA 
(General Notors)
truck
08. Chassis for colour TV sets. 1.4 kg • Indiana, USA 
(Thompson Elec.)
truck
09. Vire harnesses for ailitary 
vehicles.
20 gr ■ 10 kg - St. Louis USA 
(Eierson)
plane
/truck
REYNOSA 12. Valves, control panels and 
t h e n o s t a t s .
0.5 - 1.8 kg - USA truck
14. Nodular circuits, 60 gr $12.37 USA truck
Subassezblies for printers, 510 gr $152.87 USA truck
printing heads, 30 gr $39.02 USA truck
. printer ribbons, 30 gr $4.45 USA truck
(a) Retail price in the lain sarket.
SOURCE: Field-work in the Nexican Northers Border, 
SepteEber-ooveitber, 1990.
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All the plants send their output by truck to places as far 
away as the state of Michigan. Unfortunately the few answers 
obtained about the value of the products do not allow for the 
construction of a weight/value ratio to test the assertion 
that for high-value/low-weight products the Asian NICs had an 
advantage over Mexican assembly plants.
However, the relative high weight of the products seems to 
confirm the findings of Sklair (1989) that for heavy products 
the substantial transport costs savings made up for the lesser 
productivity of the in-bond assembly plants.
b) Sources of Input Supply.
As stated in chapter IV, a recurrent criticism of the in-bond 
is the lack of backward linkages with the rest of the
economies, the utilisation of local materials has been minimal 
(as seen in chapter IV about 1.5 per cent average for the 
whole period considered) and limited to ancillary goods as 
packing materials and stationery and services. Thus, it is 
argued* external control over the local and regional economies 
renders them vulnerable to outside decisions made on the basis 
of the changing economic conditions at a global scale.
In the case of the plants visited it was found that a great
>portion ' ' ’■»' of the inputs (parts, components
and subassemblies) were of foreign origin coming from either
the parent firm or other firms vrithin the organisation. One of
the yepz&J&cb arguments was that this was a policy of the
firm so the managers did not even look for those materials in
the local/regional/national market nor even knew if they were
produced at all. The next mo$> mentioned argument was that the
input on question was not locally produced but one wonders if,
for instance, copperwire is not locally produced for instance, 
if
why/cannot be supplied by the regional or national market. In 
one case the interviewed person mentioned unreliability in 
supplies, low quality and unreasonably high prices as the 
reasons import/Mali the inputs. However, when asked about
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his willingness to acquire those inputs in the 
local/regional/national market should the negative factors 
disappear he affirmed that in that case the savings may
outweigh the additional tax on value-added charged by the US
under items 806/807. As shown in table 5.14 just in one case,
the firm which produces electronic switches in Nogales, one of 
the inputs (bobbins) is locally acquired while the rest of the 
inputs are imported on the grounds that they are not produced 
in the locality.
It is interesting to note what can be the presence of
specialisations in the production of electronics, two firms 
get their inputs from Asia (Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) for 
assembly, testing and packing in Mexico of the final product 
which will be shipped back to the United States. In this case 
of intra-firm trade the inputs are thought to be sophisticated 
and, hence, not produced in Mexico (as in the case of 
integrated circuits). However, it is important to recall from 
table 5.6 the existence of a firm which assembles discreet 
transistors, integrated circuits and hybrid circuits and from 
chapter IV the existence of plants which assemble those very 
components, capacitors, transistors, and resistors thus 
contradicting the "It is not produced" answers given in the 
interviews and the findings of Sanderson et.al (1987) who 
affirm that for less-sophisticated products Mexico has an 
advantage over the Asian NICs.
At this respect Scott and Angel suggest that "the kinds of 
devices typically assembled at any given location seem to 
depend more on the time at which the investments on assembly 
were made there (that is, on world market conditions), than on 
local level of economic development" (1988:1063).
Actually, the uncertainty about quality and reliability of 
supplies essential for the electronics industry reduces the 
scope for domestic linkages.
TABLE 5.14: Main Characteristics of the Inputs, 1990.
LOCALITY
NOGALES
AGUA PRIETA
CO. JUAREZ
PRODUCT , INPUTS ORIGIN QUANTITY WEIGHT VALUE IF NOT DOMESTIC
(SITC, Rev.2) (per unit of output) (US*) WHY?
03. Electronic switches 1. Bobins Locality 1 ~ T T g T " ~ ~ 3 0 7 2 4 ’ -
2. Arnours USA 1 5 gr 30.15 It is not produced
3. Pile-up USA 1 - 30.71' It is not produced
4. Mire reels USA/Japan 1 - - It is not produced
04. Parts and conponents for 1. Plugs for - South Korea - - - Pirn's policy
nicrophones for t e l e c o m c o m u n i c a t .  wires
2. Chassis for South Korea - - - P i r n ’s policy
c o m .  cartridge
05. Transforners for radio 1. Plastic bobins USA 1 30 gr 30.12 It is not produced
and TV sets. 2. Iron laninations USA 20 0.06 gr 39.00 It is not produced
3. Copperwire - 0.03 gr 31.50 It is not produced
4. Tape 5.5 n 30 gr 30.08 It is not produced
06. TV sets. 1. Capacitors Taiwan 200 - 400 20 gr 30.06 It is not produced
2. Resistors Japan 100 - 400 9 it 30.01 It is not produced
3. Transistors USA - 7 it 30.15 It is not produced
and 4. Integrated 
Circuits
USA 600 10 gr 30.83 It is not produced
06. Power supplies. 1. Transistors USA - 7 it 30.15 It is not produced
2. Resistors Japan - 9 it 30.01 It is not produced
3. Capacitors Taiwan - 20 gr 30.06 It is not produced
07, Mire harnesses for autonobile 1. NIre USA 27 n - Pi r n ’s policy
industry. 2. Plastic 
connections
USA 17 200 gr - P i r n ’s policy
3. Tape USA 21 n - Pirn's policy
Continues next page.
TABLE 5,14 (Continued),
REYNOSA
08. Chassis for colour TV sets.
09. Electronics parts and coup, 
for nilitary vehicles,
12, T h e m o s t a t s  
and
12. Electronic controls
13. Colour TV sets
14. Nodular circuits, 
and
14. Subasseiiblies for printers,
I. Board US
2. Integrated
Circuits
US
3. Resistors US
4, Capacitors US
1, Vire US
2. Plastic US
3. Connectors US
4. T e m i n a l 8 US
1. Aluninun US
2. Copper US
3. Plastic US
1, Board US
2. Resistors US
3. Capacitors US
4. Lead velding US
Blec. conponents us
1. Resistors Japan
2. Printed circuit USA
3. Integrated circ. Japan
4. Condensers USA
1. Metallic parts USA
2. Direct current Japan 
Botor
3. Rubber rollers USA
4. Bars USA
(a) Retail price in the sain larket,
SOURCE: Field-work in the Mexican Northern Border, 
Septenber-novenber, 1990.
5 - 10 227 gr - P i r n ’s policy
600 - - F i n ’s policy/It is
not produced
100 - 400 - - F i n ' s  policy
200 - 400 - - P i n ' s  policy
0,15 lit - 3 lit - F i n ' s  policy
0.15 lit - 3 at - F i n ' s  policy
2 - 20 100 gr - F i n ’s policy
2 - 100 5 gr - 25 gr - F i n ’s policy
1 115 gr - F i n ' s  policy
1 150 gr - F i n ’s policy
1 150 gr - F i n ’s policy
1 200 gr - F i n ' s  policy
1 200 gr - F i n ’s policy
I 115 gr - F i n ' s  policy
1 115 gr - F i n ’s policy
- - - F i r * 's policy
Unreliability
High prices
- - - P i n ' s  policy
- - - It is not produced
• - - - F i n ' s  policy
- - - F i n ' s  policy
- - - F i n ' s  policy
- - - F i n ' s  policy
- - - F i n ' s  policy
- - - F i n ’s policy
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Some of the in-bond plants themselves assemble products with 
high levels of precision and quality (as the plant in Cd. 
Juarez which assembles electronic components for US military 
vehicles), so if the high quality products can be assembled 
why many of the inputs cannot be supplied by the domestic 
industry with the same high levels of quality and 
reliability?. One of the often cited arguments is the lack of 
information and interest of local suppliers in the in-bond 
industry potential market which prompts some of the firms to 
import most of the inputs and acquire solely stationery and 
ancillary goods in the locality (Sklair, 1989). However, as 
stated above, in some cases it was found willingness from the 
part of the managers to advocate for the use of local 
materials should the suppliers fulfill the quality and 
reliability specifications required by the corporation.
c) Characteristics of the Labour-force.
As pointed out in chapter I, the product-cycle approach and 
the NIDL theory assumes the existence of an undifferentiated 
mass of unskilled or low-skilled workers who perform those 
routinary operations. However, as latter developments show, 
there is an increasing substitution of capital for labour in 
production processes (as the introduction of automated 
technologies, robots, and etc) which require more commitment, 
responsibility and attention from the production workers, 
deemed improbable before in "unskilled" or "low-skilled" 
workers, which in many cases blur the distinctions within 
blue-collar activities and supervisory and technical 
activities.
Unfortunately, in the case of the plants examined in this work 
was not possible to get information about the total operation 
costs of the plant to weight the importance of the different 
items in the value-added of the assembly operations. But, 
according to INEGI’s monthly data on the in-bond industry, in 
1988, wages, salaries and other social benefits to employees 
represented almost 50 per cent of the value-added generated in
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the in-bond industry as a whole whereas in, the in-bond 
electronics industry this item represented 56 per cent (INEGI, 
1989b:table 12). As shown in chapter IV (table 4.10), plant 
size in the electronics in-bond industry is bigger than in the 
in-bond industry as a whole. Thus, higher expenditures in 
wages and salaries can be explained, in part, by a bigger 
labour-force, but just in part. As the labour processes 
transform in more sophisticated ones, requiring major 
attention from the production worker, major supervision and 
technical support the wage and salaries bills go up (as higher 
wages or other social benefits) to hire more technical staff 
and retain the labour-force, specially in those places where 
the turnover rate is so high that results in a loss of
productivity and additional costs in training new employees. 
In some of the firms (firm 02 in Tijuana and firm 03 in 
Nogales) I was told that they had had a 100 per cent and 40
per cent turnover rate respectively in the past, this
phenomenon being the general complain in all the plants 
visited.
In the case of the plants visited it was found, in general, a 
predominance of females among the production workers and 
of males in technical and supervisory staff and in
administrative and managerial staff (see tables 5.15 and 
5.15.A). When asked about the predominance of females among 
production workers the interviewed persons pointed out that 
women are more fit for this routine , repetitive and delicate 
task which require great concentration and manual dexterity 
and they thought the tasks to be unsuitable for men’s 
capabilities. However, when reminded about the presence of 
males in assembly lines and asked about their performance I 
was told that the demand for labour is greater than the supply 
therefore firms were forced to hire males for the assembly 
lines finding them as fit as females for the job.
It is important to note that the production processes 
performed in the in-bond electronics industry no longer 
consists of those traditional assembly operations which 
require no special skill from the workers but just literacy
TABLE 5.15. Enplojncnt in In-bond Electronics Fins by Category, Fir® and Locality, 1990.
SAMPLB TOTAL NANAGER STAFF TECH. AND SUPERV. PRODUCTION WORKERS OTHER VORKBRS
LOCALITY/FIRH TOTAL Hale Fenale Hale Resale Hale Fenale Hale Fenale Hale Feiale Hale Fenale
TOTAL 27608 9764 17844 257 33 643 611 2714 594 6016 16221 134 385
TIJUANA* 2125 421 1704 37 5 15 30 62 10 300 1650 7 9
01(a) 537 124 413 2 0 5 10 12 100 400 5 3
02 1588 297 1291 35 5 10 20 50 10 200 1250 2 6
NOGALES 69 37 32 2 0 0 2 5 0 30 30 0 0
03 69 37 32 2 0 0 2 5 0 30 30 0 0
AGUA PRIETA 1083 533 550 15 2 25 52 259 81 230 410 4 5
04(a) 135 39 96 4 1 5 10 6 0 20 80 4 5
05 47 14 33 1 0 0 2 3 1 10 30 0 0
06 901 480 421 10 I 20 40 250 80 200 300 0 0
CD. JUAREZ 11269 2859 8410 133 17 264 151 495 66 1965 8175 2 1
07 1537 854 683 12 0 57 18 135 15 650 650 0 0
08 5750 395 5355 45 5 150 50 100 0 100 5300 0 0
09(b) 63 40 23 4 1 15 5 4 1 15 15 2 I
10 60 19 41 6 0 7 11 6 0 0 30 0 0
n * 3859 1551 2308 66 11 35 67 250 50 1200 2180 0 0
REYNOSA 10591 5081 5510 51 7 279 294 1797 417 2953 4792 1 0
12 910 454 456 9 1 200 200 45 5 200 250 0 0
13 8655 4190 4465 30 2 68 74 1689 394 2403 3995 0 0
14 987 431 556 11 4 10 20 60 15 350 517 0 0
15(b) 39 6 33 1 0 1 0 3 3 0 30 1 0
Continues next page...
TABLE 5.15 (Continues)..,
NATAHOROS 1809 466 1343 6 2 20 22 46 20 324 939 70 360
16(c) 1192 365 827 5 2 10 15 30 10 300 700 20 100
17(c) 617 101 516 1 0 10 7 16 10 24 239 50 260
AGUASCALIENTES* 113 103 10 2 0 5 10 12 0 84 0 0 0
18 113 103 10 2 0 5 10 12 0 84 0 0 0
QUERETARO* 549 264 285 11 0 35 50 38 0 130 225 50 10
19 302 72 230 2 0 25 30 15 0 30 200 0 0
20(c) 247 192 55 9 0 10 20 23 0 100 25 50 10
* Froi G a m a ,  Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
(a) Other workers = cleaning prenises
(b) Other workers = engineers in naintenance
(c) Other workers = non-skilled production workers
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern Border, Septenber-Novenber, 1990,
TABLE 5.15.A: Enploynent in In-bond Electronics Pirns by Category, Pirn and Locality, 1990.
" s a h p l r " TOTAL MANAGER STAPP TECH. AND SUPERV," PRODUCTION WORKERS' o t r e F w o r k e r s  "
LOCALITY/PIRH TOTAL Kale Penale Male Fenale Hale Penale Kale Penale Kale Fenale Kale Penale
TOTAL 100 35.37 64.63 0.93 0.12 2.33 2.21 9.83 2.15 21.79 58.75 0.49 1.39
TIJUANA 100 19.81 80.19 1.74 0.24 0.71 1.41 2.92 0.47 14.12 77,65 0.33 0.42
01(a) 100 23.09 76.91 0.37 0 0.93 1.86 2.23 0 18.62 74.49 0.93 0.56
02 100 18.7 81.3 2.2 0.31 0.63 1.26 3.15 0.63 12.59 78.72 0.13 0.38
NOGALES 100 53.62 46.38 2.9 0 0 2.9 7.25 0 43.48 43.48 0 0
03 100 53.62 46.38 2.9 0 0 2.9 7.25 0 43.48 43.48 0 0
AGUA PRIETA 100 49.22 50.78 1.39 0.18 2.31 4.8 23.92 7.48 21.24 37.86 0.37 0.46
04(a) 100 28.89 71.11 2.96 0.74 3.7 7.41 4.44 0 14.81 59.26 2.96 3.7
05 100 29.79 70.21 2.13 0 0 4.26 6.38 2.13 21.28 63.83 0 0
06 100 53.27 46.73 . 1.11 0.11 2.22 4.44 27.75 8.88 22.2 33.3 0 0
CD. JUAREZ 100 25.37 74.63 1.18 0.15 2.34 1.34 4.39 0.59 17.44 72.54 0.02 0.01
07 100 55.56 44.44 0.78 0 3.71 1.17 8.78 0.98 42.29 42.29 0 0
08 100 6.87 93.13 0.78 0.09 2.61 0.87 1.74 0 1.74 92.17 0 0
09(b) 100 63.49 36.51 6.35 1.59 23.81 7.94 6.35 1.59 23.81 23.81 3.17 1.59
10 100 31.67 68.33 10 0 11.67 18.33 10 0 0 50 0 0
11 100 40.19 59.81 1.71 0.29 0.91 1.74 6.48 1.3 31.1 56.49 0 0
REYNOSA 100 47.97 52.03 0.48 0.07 2.63 2.78 16.97 3.94 27.88 45.25 0.01 0
. 12 100 49.89 50.11 0.99 0.11 21.98 21.98 4.95 0.55 21.98 27.47 0 0
13 100 48.41 51.59 0.35 0.02 0.79 0.85 19.51 4.55 27.76 46.16 0 0
H 100 43.67 56.33 1,11 0.41 1.01 2.03 6.08 1.52 35.46 52.38 0 0
15(b) 100 15.38 84.62 2.56 0 2.56 0 7.69 7.69 0 76.92 2.56 0
Continues next page.
TABLE 5,15,A (Continues)...
HATAHOROS 100 25.76 74.24 0.33 0.11 1.11
16(c) 100 30.62 69.38 0.42 0.17 0.84
17(c) 100 16.37 83.63 0.16 0 1.62
AGUASCALIENTES 100 91.15 8.85 1.77 0 4.42
18 100 91.15 8.85 1.77 0 4.42
QUERETARO 100 48.09 51.91 2 0 6.38
19 100 23.84 76.16 0.66 0 8.28
20(c) 100 77.73 22.27 3.64 0 4.05
(a) Other workers = cleaning preaises
(b) Other vorkers = engineers in naintenance
(c) Other vorkers = non-skilled production workers
SOURCE: Table 5.14.
1.22 2.54 1.11 17.91 51.91 3.87 19.9
1.26 2.52 0.84 25.17 58.72 1.68 8.39
1.13 2.59 1.62 3.89 38.74 8.1 42.14
8.85 10.62 0 74.34 0 0 0
8.85 10.62 0 74.34 0 0 0
9.11 6.92 0 23.68 40.98 9.11 1.82
9.93 4.97 0 9.93 66.23 0 0
8.1 9.31 0 40.49 10.12 20.24 4.05
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and dexterity to assemble the products in long assembly lines 
in which the simplification of movements, the routine 
character of the work and the determined output expected from 
each worker resemble the Taylorism of the 1920’s. Indeed, 
there is a new element to consider which is the current 
ability to automatically grade products for quality, thus 
obtaining products with zero-error.
The quality control starts from the receiving of the inputs 
(parts, components and materials to be assembled) which are to 
be inspected and tested as in the case of the firms 06 which 
assembles the main module of TV sets and power supplies. 
Quality control operations, which include replacing of 
unusable components, represents about 25 per cent of the 
activities of the production process. The replacement and 
inspection of parts and components entails special visual 
attention, manual dexterity and much concentration on the 
worker’s part. To be hired, therefore, a worker must undergo 
a detailed eye examination.
For example, in the case of wire-harnesses for military 
vehicles (firm 09 in Ciudad Juarez). Since it is a strategic 
final application, the component requires stricter than usual 
norms and quality controls. As stated above quality control is 
an operation all along the duration of the production process. 
In this case quality (product reliability and the assurance of 
proper functioning) is the important thing not cost, volume or 
production time. For this product it is essential that the 
workers handle, one by one, the wires that will integrate the 
mechanism. Each worker is given a square board with the color 
scheme of the maze of lines representing the wires making-up 
the wire harness. The wires are installed one by one, and the 
internal division of labour is almost non-existent. This 
apparently less-intensive process means a greater 
responsibility of the worker, and greater stress. Also the 
training period extend from a few hours in simple devices to 
something like three-four weeks to allow the worker to reach 
a certain quality average.
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There is also the case of semiconductors where, as mentioned 
in chapter II, the production of semiconductors involves five 
stages, or different labour processes, which can be 
technically' disarticulated: R & D, mask making, water
fabrication, assembly and testing. The continued development 
of integrated circuit technology has had implications for the 
first three stages. Assembly and testing are still 
predominantly manual proqesses, which are performed offshore 
in sites like the NICs and New-NICs. But, later developments 
have allowed the automation of this tasks as well, so it can 
be found the application of computerised machine-tools, 
specially in soldering and automatic, final-product testing 
equipment. It is found in semiconductors assembly that the 
worker must exert more control and attention of a totally 
miniaturised process in which he/she has to solder the gold, 
aluminum, and molybdenum leads from the chip to the exterior. 
With the introduction of reprogrammable automated machinery 
(which cuts the wafer and solders the leads), the operator of 
this apparatus has to center, by means of a monitor, the 
points which are to be subsequently soldered by the machine.
A major part of the encapsulating process takes place in the 
so-called clean-rooms. These are closed spaces where the 
environment is controlled by vacuum and air filtration systems 
(like operating rooms or laboratories). Cleanness is required 
from the workers before entering these rooms (in some cases 
they have to have a bath upon arriving to the plant, and no 
make-up and nail-polish in the case of women) and they have to 
observe strict discipline -no talking or chewing gum. Also in 
the case of high-precision tasks as hybrid circuit assembly, 
the workers are invited almost every hour to leave the 
production line and do some exercises. All these require from 
the worker a longer training period than in other plants, 
about five weeks. It is important to remark that in the 
assembly of semiconductors in general workers are paid wages 
above the average to avoid high turnover rates.
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Finally, the assembly of consumer electronics consist of two 
parts, sub-assemblies and final assembly. In the case of 
subassemblies, a.ctive and passive components are inserted 
into a board called "printed circuit". In the case of TV sets 
there is a great quantity of inserted components, and a board 
may contain as many as 200 capacitors, 100 resistors and 600 
integrated circuits (see table 5.14). In general, the 
manufacture of television receivers, like that of most other 
consumer electronics products is thought to be less advanced 
technologically that the production of semiconductors. In 
product cycle terms, television sets were regarded as mature 
products in which technology had standardised so the emphasis 
was on reducing production costs through economies of scale 
and the use of less-skilled labour (Dicken, 1988a). This being 
true in the case of black and white sets, but in the case of 
colour television, as shown in previous chapters, it can be 
seen a process of technological rejuvenation (a * dematuring * 
as in the car industry) in process with the incorporation of 
new technology and in products which embody a wide range of 
new functions and in the emergence of new related products as 
video recorders and teletext.
For example, in the case of the firm assembler of TV sets in 
Reynosa, I was told that the production process consisted of 
five phases, automatic insertion ("surface mounting"), manual 
assembly, wave soldering and inspection and testing. Before 
the components were inserted by means of wire "pads" passing 
through the board and soldered from below. Now, with the 
introduction of surface mounting, the board is uniformly 
smooth and the components adhered with alloys of molybdenum, 
tin, silver, and polymers. With the higher density and 
miniaturisation of components the process is almost impossible 
to carry out by hand thus making necessary the use of 
automatic-reprogrammable systems. In this case it is also 
necessary the utilisation of clean rooms.
Electronic coaponents are divided basically into passive and active components. Passive 
components are resistors, capacitors switches, wires and cables, connectors, etc. Active 
components are diodes, transistors, rectifiers, semiconductors which are incorporated 
within integrated circuits and microprocessors (Dicken, 1988a:317).
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The operators of the surface mounting system comprise one 
technician, two semi-skilled assistants, and service personnel, 
(vacuuming and laundry), with the part-time support of an 
electronics engineer. The technical personnel are in charge of 
controlling the machinery and the process, which is highly 
delicate. The workers execute the task of feeding and removing 
pieces from the machine, and this is a simple routine task. In 
this case the speed of the surface-mounting line is whatever 
the system can bear and it is necessary great care and 
precision from the worker in inserting and removing the boards 
from the machine. The remaining phases of the production 
process are predominantly done by hand. Throughout the 
assembly line the electronic and electromechanic parts are 
mounted by hand, soldered, inspected and tested. The new in 
these phases is the emphasis in quality control, the workers 
compile the quality control statistics for his or her own work 
and the group, therefore sharing a responsibility previously 
borne by the managerial staff.
In general, the occupational structure of the plants visited 
exhibits a change in comparison with the early in-bond 
assembly plants and in concordance with the transformation of 
the industry shown in the statistics (see chapter IV). 
Although women still predomine in the assembly lines there is 
a noticeable trend in hiring males mainly due to problems of
o
labour shortages in all along the Mexican Northern Border . It 
was found that in some of the firms visited the number of 
engineers and technicians (mainly males) is greater than in 
the rest of the in-bond electronics industry and of the in- 
bond industry as a whole. Within the in-bond industry as a 
whole in 1988, 12 per cent of the workforce were engineers and 
technicians (up from 9 per cent in 1980); the proportion for 
the in-bond electronics industry was 14 per cent (up from 10.2 
per cent in 1980). For the firms visited this percentage 
raised to 18 per cent in integrated circuits assembly (firm 15
Q
Ve were told by the TV sets plant in Agua Prieta that due to a labour shortage in the 
city they have buses to go around the nearby villages taking the workers to and fron the 
plant. This point will be discussed later in relation to infrastructure.
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in Reynosa), 30 per cent average in assembly of TV sets (firms 
06 and 13 in Agua Prieta and Reynosa respectively).
In the survey it was also found that whereas in the rest of 
the in-bond industry production workers are required to have 
finished primary school, in most of the plants visited, 
production workers are required to have finished secondary 
school (11 cases) and in one case (firm 15, produced of 
integrated circuits) it was required preparatory school. In 
six cases it was required only primary school (table 5.16). 
With regard to technicians it was found that, predominantly, 
it is required technical school or a university degree 
(engineering) and in the case of supervisors in most of cases 
production workers are promoted. In hiring managerial staff is 
required a university degree whereas in the case of other 
administrative staff it is qualifications relevant to the job, 
secretary, accountancy, are required.
The changes in the labour-force in the in-bond electronics 
industry are not only in the proportions of the different 
classifications (by sex, skill, etc.) but also in the profile 
of the workers. As products and productions processes become 
more sophisticated, incorporating the latest technological 
innovations and requiring the highest possible level of 
precision and quality, it becomes necessary a change in 
behaviours, attitudes and skill from the workers. It is no 
longer enough to teach the worker to perform his/her specific 
task which mostly requires only minimum literacy. Now he or 
she has to fill ftuweTDt’S forms to register productivity 
levels which requires more schooling and has to perform 
his/her tasks with great precision to achieve the highest 
quality in products, etc., that is the worker must understand 
that his/her presence in the plant requires sharing the 
responsibility for production. Likewise, the kind of 
production processes performed demands an increasing number of 
technicians which are expected to have higher qualifications 
since their are in charge of controlling the machinery and the 
process.
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TABLE 5.16. Qualifications Required for Employment in In-bond 
Electronics Firms by Category and Locality, 1990.
LOCALITY/FIRM
MANAGER STAFF TECH. AND 
SUPERV.
PROD.
WORKERS
OTHER
WORKERS
TIJUANA*
01(a) 5 3 4 2 2
02 5 4 - 2 -
NOGALES
03 5 3 4 2 -
AGUA PRIETA
04(a) 5 3 4 2 1
05 - 3 2 1 -
06 6(d) 3 4 1 -
CD. JUAREZ
07 5 5 4 1 -
08 5 3 4 1 -
09(b) 5 3 k 4 3 1 5
10 5 4 5 2 -
11* 5 4 3 2 1
REYNOSA
12 5 5 5 1 k 2 -
13 5 5 4 & 5 1 & 2 -
14 5 3 3 2 -
15(b) 5 5 3 3 5
MATAMOROS
16(c) 5 3 k 4 4 2 2
17(c) 5 4 k 5 5 1 -
AGUASCALIENTES*
18 5 4 2 2 2
QUERETARO*
19 5 3 4 2 2
20(c) 5 3 3 2 1
* From Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
(a) Other workers = cleaning premises
(b) Other workers = engineers in maintenance
(c) Other workers = non-skilled production workers
(d) Other qualification = Master degree 
CODES:
1 - PRIMARY SCHOOL; 2 - SECONDARY SCHOOL; 3 - HIGH SCHOOL;
4 - TECHNICAL SCHOOL; 5 - UNIVERSITY; 6 - OTHER.
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern Border, 
Septeaber-Novenber, 1990.
Table 5.17 shows that, according to the localisation 
coefficients for the in-bond electronics industry as a whole, 
the existence of staff, technicians and female labour force 
does have an influence in the location of the industry. 
Looking by geographical location, the localisation 
coefficients are slightly greater in the non-border states 
than in the border states. This fact can be explained by the 
relative abundance of staff, technicians and female labour 
force in the interior which, considering the labour shortages 
in the border, is attracting in-bond plants.
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TABLE 5.1?. Localisation Coefficients for In-bond Electronics Industry 
by Job Category, 1988 (a).
Assembly of Electric and Electric and electronic 
CATEGORY ELECTRONICS Electronic K a c h . , Equip. materials, accessories
INDUSTRY Apparatuses and Appliances and components
BORDER STATES (b)
Technicians 1.177 0.129 1.109
Staff 10.062 10.085 10.092
Vorkers 0.973 0.957 0.983
Vomen 1.068 1.077 1.061
Ken 0.811 0.751 0.849
NON-BORDER STATES
Technicians 1.208 1.147 1.192
Staff 14.32 15.297 13.818
Vorkers 0.598 0.937 0.942
Vomen 1.113 1.045 1.152
Ken 0.643 0.751 0.583
(a) The location coefficient (LQ) indicated the importance of the job category within a given 
industrial group. By means of LQ it is possible to asses the locational orientation or degree 
of specialisation of the industrial group towards a job category in any locality. The magni­
tude of LQ in relation to the unity indicates, the degree of specialisation as follows:
LQ > 1, High degree of specialisation; LQ = 1, No specialisation; LQ < 1, Job category does 
have any incidence in the location of the industry. To calculate LQ,
LQ = (E c i / t i )/(Ecg/Tm)
Eci = Employment in job category in industrial group i. 
ti = Total employment in industrial group i.
Ecg = Employment in job category in all groups.
T b = Total employment in manufacturing.
(b) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja 
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
SOURCE: A u t h o r ’s calculation from INEGI, 1989b.
d ) The Role of Government.
The role of the government is an important factor in the
localisation of the industry since it contributes to reduce
the setting-up, operation, or capital costs of the firm
through subsidies, credits, financing or tax holidays. 
. J  v c h
Analyses/as Frobel’s (1980) see the valorisation process of 
capital as guaranteed by the compliant governments, thus 
devaluating the role of the nation-states to the simple 
provider of the optimum conditions for the successful 
performance of the production process. As pointed out in 
previous chapters this view is rather simplistic and leaves no
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place for the governments’ manoeuvreing in the promotion of 
development.
As with all the other aspects of the in-bond plants the role 
of the government has been much criticised in every respect, 
the lax enforcement of the labour and environmental 
legislation, the cheap leasing of industrial sites, tax 
holidays and the like. However, when asked about the role of 
the government in their selection of location most of the 
firms visited seemed to be either unaware or give, in 
appearance, little importance to this factor in general. One 
of the most often cited incentives were the facilities for the 
import of equipments, materials and inputs and for the export 
of the products (i.e. the in-bond assembly plants regime). In 
one case, the interviewed mentioned tax holidays as an 
additional incentive to locate. In one another case it was 
found that the government’s labour legislation (vrhose 
enforcement is very lax) and control of the unions was an 
"incentive" to locate.
The new provisions for in-bond assembly plants, reduction from 
40 to 36 per cent in corporation tax, exemption of value-added 
for all the sales to in-bond plants (to raise local content) 
and, specially, permission to sell up to 50 per cent in the 
local market, are more likely to influence the location of 
some in-bond plants in Mexico rather than other locations in 
Latinamerica. As Mexico recovers from the deep crisis in the 
1980*s, the internal market expands thus making it more 
attractive as location. Actually some big computer makers as 
IBM and Hewlett-Packard have established plants in Mexico to 
serve the domestic market and the Latinoamerican market both 
with high potential growth.
3. CRITERIA FOR CHOICE OF CURRENT LOCATION.
It is not my intention to repeat what already was exhaustively 
in the second part with regard to the characteristics of the 
firms, but rather to evaluate the importance of different
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factors in their choice of location from the point of view of 
the firms. That is, if the different factors here considered 
had an influence in the localisation of the firms in the 
country and in the city and if some of them can be regarded as 
an effective instrument in industrial location strategies and 
urban planning in Mexico.
In the survey, the firms were asked to choose between 
different factors, labour, .government incentives, 
accessibility to inputs and/or markets, industrial parks, 
infrastructure and access to means of transport, etc. to 
locate in the city and in the country. Although such questions 
are usually open to problems of perception (sometimes the 
person interviewed was hired years after the starting 
operations), subjectivity, categorisation, and memory lapse, 
it was hoped that the answers would give some indication of 
the underlying factors.
The importance of a particular factor is measured by a mean 
score calculated by dividing the sum of all the marks given to 
a factor by the number of firms. Those factors given a mark 
above of the mean are considered important for that particular 
firms in its selection of location. Likewise to evaluate the 
factors a simple mean was calculated by dividing the sum of 
the means and dividing by the number of factors, therefore 
those factors with marks above of the mean are considered to 
be important in the location of the in-bond electronics 
plants. In what follows it will be examined the weight of each 
factor in the location of the firms interviewed.
a) The Choice of City.
As stated above factors as availability of non-skilled cheap 
labour/ ■ non-labour problems, access to infrastructure,
existence of industrial parks and provision of public and 
industrial services, are considered important for the choice 
of a particular city as location.
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Before examining the importance of these factors in the 
location of in-bond assembly plants in Mexico it is necessary 
to point out that the economic activities of any country are 
concentrated in a few centres rather than forming an even 
distribution pattern. That is production, services and 
population concentrates in few points and this structure is, 
for some, self-maintaining and hinders the development of the 
country as a whole since the national economies develop a dual 
character which has been object of exhaustive research. That 
is why governments recognising the interdependence between 
industrial development and urbanisation engage in industrial 
location strategies (mainly tax holidays and subsidies, but 
also provision of some basic industrial infrastructure as 
industrial parks) with the aim of redirect investment, towards 
those less developed areas and thus achieve a more balanced 
urban growth and ultimately, economic development.
However, in several countries this kind of attempts has not 
been, in many cases, enough to attract industrial investment 
as in the case of the industrial parks and new towns programme 
in Mexico. Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar (1988) found in their 
survey that the existence of industrial parks was not a key 
factor in the location of industry in middle-size cities in 
Mexico and that their role in the deconcentration of industry 
was overestimated by the Mexican government. Actually, a great 
amount of investment in industrial infrastructure in 
industrial parks and else was a waste since it failed to 
attract private investment to those middle-range cities. 
However, Sklair (1989) in his survey on the in-bond industry 
found that in some of the most important locations for the in- 
bond industry, Tijuana, Mexicali and Ciudad Juarez in the 
border and Chihuahua City in the interior, the existence of 
industrial parks was important for the selection of the cities 
concerned, specially those which offered shelter plans (a kind 
of subcontracting) to potential in-bond investors.
In the case of the firms interviewed it was found that in 
Tijuana, both firms regarded as very important in their
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decision all the factors listed (with the exception of the 
access to market, see table 5.18), a v a i l a b i l i t y  of skilled and 
non-skilled cheap labour force, non-labour problems, access to 
infrastructure and existence of industrial parks, the 
provision of public and industrial services and government 
incentives.
In the case of the firm in Nogales only three factors were 
considered in the selection of the city, the inexistence of 
labour problems, the existence of industrial parks and 
government incentives as the in-bond industry regime. In the 
case of the firms in Agua Prieta it was found the only two 
factors can be considered to have been important since the 
average mark for these factors in this city is greater than 
the mark for all the sample, availability of skilled labour 
and the provision of public and industrial services.
With regard to the firms in Ciudad Juarez, it was found that 
seven out of nine factors were considered important to locate 
in that city, these seven factors have a mean well above the 
general mean of 6.5 for all the factors, availability of 
skilled and non-skilled cheap labour force, non-labour 
problems, access to infrastructure and existence of industrial 
parks, the provision of public and industrial services. Access 
to the market and government incentives and facilities were 
considered not decisive in the location decision.
The case of Reynosa is worthy to emphasize since according to 
the industrial relations manager of the firm assembler of 
colour TV sets there were not enough infrastructural 
facilities nor provision of acceptable public and industrial 
services. Likewise the industrial parks did not offer much in 
the way of infrastructure or administrative services as their 
counterparts in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. Therefore, in 
Reynosa it was found that only those factors related to the 
labour force seem to have been decisive in the location of the 
plants interviewed (table 5.18) as in the case of the plant 
located in Matamoros.
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TABLE 5.18. Reasons for Choice of Location IK THE CITY, by Firi and Locality, 1990(a)
LOCALITY/
FIRM
ACCESS
TO
MARKETS
AVAILAB. AVAILAB. 
SKILLED NON-SKILL 
LABOUR LABOUR
AVAILAB.
CHEAP
LABOUR
N O N ­
LABOUR
PROBLEMS
ACCESS
1NFRAST.
EXIST.
INDUST.
ESTATES
FROVISION GOVERN. 
PUB & IND INCENTIV 
SERVICES i FACIL.
FACTOR MAP.K(b) 4.05 6.15 6.85 7.35 7.,75 6.6 7.35 7.15 5.5
TIJUANA*
01 1 6 10 10 10 10 1C 6 10
02 1 10 10 10 10 10 1C 10 10
NOGALES
03 8 - - - 7 - 10 - 9
AGUA PRIETA
04 - 6 1 6 - - 1C 7 -
05 3 6 4 6 8 7 *I 8 1
06 9 10 10 9 10 10 9 10 9
CD. JUAREZ
07 10 8 2 9 6 4 pi 5 2
08 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 7
09 9 9 3 10 9 9 10 10 9
10 1 6 10 1 10 10 10 10 1
11* 1 . 6 10 10 10 10 1C 10 10
REYNOSA
12 3 8 7 2 6 4 f, 9 10
13 8 9 9 9 10 - - - -
14 2 3 4 10 9 5 f 7 8
15 8 9 9 9 8 8 10 10 -
MATAMOROS
1C - - - - - - - - -
17 7 9 8 10 2 5 6 4 3
AGUASCALIENTES*
18 1 1 10 10 10 10 6 10 1
QUERETARO*
19 1 1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
20 1 6 10 6 10 10 6 10 10
* Fros G a m a ,  Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
(a). Interviewed persons were asked to rank the factors according to their iiportance in the 
choice of location. 10 - VERY IKPORTANT, 1 - NOT'IMPORTANT.
(b). The factor rank is a siiple sean: SUM all larks/nuiber of answers = 6.5.
SOURCB: Pield-work carried on in the Mexican Northern Border,
Septeaber-Noveiber, 1990.
Sklair (1989:131) suggests that since Reynosa has a massive 
PEMEX (the giant petrol state company) plant, the local 
authorities did not place a very high priority on the 
development of the in-bond industry at that time (mid-1970s).
Regarding the two cities in Central Mexico, Queretaro and 
Aguascalientes (this last one with a textiles industry 
tradition) the factors associated with the labour force were 
considered of great importance by the plants but also
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infrastructural facilities, provision of public and industrial 
services and industrial parks were considered. It is 
interesting to note that the plants did give importance to 
government incentives and facilities which was not the case 
for the in-bond electronics plants in the North.
b) The Choice of Country.
When asked about the determining factors in choosing Mexico as 
location in general was agreed that the provisions for the in- 
bond industry, that is facilities for import of inputs and 
materials and export of finished goods was a very important 
factor, followed by the proximity to the US and the existence 
of cheap labour force (table 5.19).
Against the assumption that political stability had played an 
important role in the location decision it was found that in 
general firms gave little weight to this factor. In a close 
look city by city some slight differences are found, in 
Tijuana for example, the availability of non-skilled cheap 
labour force, non-labour problems and the in-bond industry 
regime were considered as decisive in the location followed by 
the access to the market, infrastructure, means of transport 
and political stability. In Nogales only three factors were 
considered, the access to market, availability of non-skilled 
labour and the in-bond industry regime.
In Agua Prieta, it was found that only four factors have means 
above of the respective general mean for that factor, 
availability to skilled labour, facilities to import inputs, 
access to means of transport and political stability. In 
Ciudad Juarez, almost all the factors have means above the 
respective general mean for that factor, overwhelmingly 
facilities to import inputs, access to markets, availability 
of skilled, cheap labour force and infrastructure and means of 
transport. With regard to Reynosa and Matamoros, those factors 
related with the labour force were considered more important 
than the provisions for in-bond industry.
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TABLE 5.19. Reasons for Choice of Location IK THE COUNTRY, by Fir® and Locality, 1990(a).
LOCALITY/ ACCESS 
FIRM TO 
MAREETS
AVAILAB,
SPILLED
LABOUR
. AVAILAB. 
NON-SEILL 
LABOUR
AVAILAB,
CHEAP
LABOUR
, NON­
LABOUR 
PROBLEMS
FACILIT. 
TO IMPORT 
INPUTS
ACCESS
INFRAST.
ACCESS GOVERN. 
MEANS OF INCENTIV 
TRANSPORT A FACIL.
POLIT.
STAB.
FACTOR M A K E (b ) 4.6 6.05 7.3 7.25 7.2 8.25 5.95 7.3 4.65 5.85
TIJUANA*
01 1 6 10 10 10 10 6 6 10 7
02 1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6
NOGALES
03 9 - 8 - - 7 - - - -
AGUA PRIETA
04 - 6 1 6 - 6 - 10 . - 1
05 10 6 4 6 8 10 7 8 1 8
06 9 10 10 9 10 9 10 9 9 10
CD. JUAREZ
07 10 8 2 9 6 7 4 5 1 3
08 6 9 7 9 9 10 10 10 9 7
09 9 9 3 10 9 9 9 9 9 7
10 1 6 10 1 10 10 10 10 1 6
11* 1 6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
REYNOSA
12 9 8 7 . 1 6 4 6 5 3 10
13 7 9 9 9 10 8 - 5 - 6
14 1 2 8 10 7 .9 3 4 6 5
15 8 9 9 9 8 10 8 10 - 8
MATAMOROS
16 - - - - - - - - - • -
17 7 9 8 10 1 6 4 5 3 2
AGUASCALIENTES*
. 18 1 1 10 10 10 10 6 10 1 7
QUERETARO*
19 1 1 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 6
20 1 6 10 6 10 10 6 10 10 8
* Fron Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988.
(a). Interviewed persons were asked to rank the factors according to their iiportance in the choice
of location 10 - VERY IMPORTANT, ..., 1 - NOT IMPORTANT.
(b). The factor rank is a simple lean: SUM all larks/nuiber of f i n s  - 6.46. 
NOTE: The f i n s  in Aguascalientes and Queretaro were excluded.
SOURCE: Field-work carried on in the Mexican Northern Border, 
Septexber-Novexber, 1990.
A s  c a n  b e  s e e n  f r o m  t a b l e  5 . 1 9 ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  f o r  c h o o s i n g  
M e x i c o  a s  l o c a t i o n ,  s e v e n  o u t  o f  t e n  f a c t o r s  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  
a s  i m p o r t a n t ,  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  m a r k e t  ( t h a t  i s  t o  t h e  U S ) ,  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s k i l l e d  a n d  n o n - s k i l l e d  c h e a p  l a b o u r - f o r c e , 
n o n - l a b o u r  p r o b l e m s ,  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  i m p o r t  i n p u t s  a n d  a c c e s s  t o  
m e a n s  o f  t r a n s p o r t ,  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  m a y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  o f  
s e c o n d a r y  i m p o r t a n c e  ( a c c e s s  t o  m a r k e t s ,  a c c e s s  t o  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  g o v e r n m e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  a n d  f a c i l i t i e s  a n d
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political stability. In the case for choosing a particular 
city as location it was found that six of the nine factors can 
be considered important for the location of in-bond plants and 
therefore should be taken into account in any industrial 
strategy to attract this kind of industry to particular 
locations, availability of non-skilled cheap labour-force, 
non-labour problems, access to infrastructure, existence of 
industrial parks and provision of public and industrial 
services (table 5.18). The results obtained with the simple 
means are consistent with those of similar surveys done for 
Brazil and Philippines (see Herrin and Pernia, 1987).
c) Problems of Past and Present Location.
As a way of deepening in the answers given all along the 
questionnaire, firms were asked where was the previous 
location (if applicable), the reason to locate in Mexico and 
what other place would they choose in case they could change 
location. Also they were invited to talk freely about the 
problems encountered in their present locations in general. 
Since not all the interviewed persons answered these questions 
in deep, I will examine just those cases were there is an 
answer or those considered interesting for the analysis..
We have, for example, the case of plant 03 (see table 5.6) in 
Nogales which assembles electronics switches. This plant was 
originally located in Haiti but, in view of the political 
problems in that country the parent company decided to change 
location to any other cheap location (in terms of labour- 
force). After some research it was decided, in 1986, to locate 
in Mexico which offered additional advantages as political 
stability and geographical proximity. However, as the manager 
of the plant recognises, the availability of labour force has 
been a problem since they had a 40 per cent turnover. 
Nowadays, although the turnover rate has decreased still they 
face problems. WThen asked what location he would choose in 
case he could change location he mentioned Ciudad Obregon or
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Navojoa, both cities in the south of Sonora state where costs 
are lower and the labour force cheap and abundant.
Plant 04 in Agua Prieta, in Sonora state, was located as a 
first time in this location and, as the general manager 
mentioned, because of the existence of a pool of cheap labour 
force. There have been minimal problems with the labour force 
but the manager complained about the low quality of the public 
services in the city*® and commented that he would change 
location to Merida the capital city of the state of Yucatan 
(in the Gulf of Mexico) if he could do so and where, due to 
the closeness to the state of Florida, many firms have 
established in-bond plants (mainly in textiles).
Plant 06, also in Agua Prieta, was located before in the city 
of Paris, in the state of Illinois, USA and assembles TV sets 
and power supplies. The parent company (American) decided to 
move production facilities offshore due to the strong 
competition from the Japanese electronic companies. Since it 
had already production facilities in Matamoros (established in 
1969-70 and nowadays the single largest employer in the whole 
in-bond industry, Sklair, 1989:120) and in Reynosa 
(established in 1977) the state of Tamaulipas it was 
relatively easy to move this plant offshore (in 1982), thus 
taking advantage of the cheap labour force (skilled and semi­
skilled) and the in-bond plants regime. The main problem faced 
by the plant was the high turnover rate, great absenteeism of 
the labour force (the plant has about 1 000 employees) and 
unavailability of labour force but also the insufficiency of 
public services in the city means the plant has to incur in 
some additional costs. The plant recruits employees in the 
nearby villages and therefore has to have some buses to take 
them to and fro. The manager pointed out that he would move 
the facilities to the city of Nuevo Laredo in the state of 
Tamaulipas in case he could change location since, as far as 
he is informed, the city counts with a pool of skilled and
*® The area of the industrial park and neighbourhood lacks paveaent and there is not 
drain so whenyrains it is really difficult to go around.
*//
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semi-skilled cheap labour force, infrastructural facilities 
and availability of public services.
In Ciudad Juarez, the same problems and complains about labour 
force and insufficiency of infrastructure were found. Firm 07, 
assembler of wire harnesses for the car industry located as a 
first time in Ciudad Juarez, the plant manager mentioned that 
the insufficiency of labour force for about 400 plants 
operating in the city, means a high turnover rate, and that 
there are great advantages in Chihuahua City as a location 
because of the availability of infrastructural facilities for 
the industry, public services and, above all, cheap labour 
force. Likewise Firm 09, assembler of wire harnesses for 
military vehicles, also faces a great turnover rate which has 
been the main reason to hire men for the production line. 
Nowadays 50 per cent of production workers are men.
Firm 12 in Reynosa which assembles valves, control panels and 
thermostats was originally located in Wisconsin (Milwaukee), 
and also had production facilities in the state of Kentucky in 
the United States. However in an attempt of reducing costs, 
increase productivity, quality and, ultimately, profits the 
plant moved to the city of Reynosa in 1983 where, as in all 
the other cities, there is a scarcity of labour force and, 
thus, high turnover rates in the plants which usually poach 
each other’s employees. This plant has also taken recourse to 
hire men for production lines. The manufacturing manager 
pointed out the city of San Luis Potosi (in that state of the 
same name in Mexico) as better location for the plant mainly 
due to the relative abundance of labour-force. Firm 13 (colour 
TV sets) and 14 (subassemblies for printers) and located in 
1977 and 1979 respectively also mentioned the scarcity of 
labour force (mainly skilled and semi-skilled) as one of the 
main problems encountered in their present locations. The 
operations manager in firm 14 pointed out that he would move 
the facilities to the city of Monterrey in the state of Nuevo 
Leon in case he could change location since as the second 
industrial core in the country, the infrastructural facilities
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are more available and also has a greater supply of skilled 
cheap labour force due to the existence the various 
prestigious universities and technical colleges.
As Can be seen from the above answers, the labour factor is 
considered one of the most important in the location of the 
in-bond electronics plants in Mexico. However, this is not as 
the NIDL theory assumes just a search for an undifferentiated 
mass of unskilled labour force from which a great amount of 
absolute surplus value is to be extracted. Also important for 
the performance of the assembly processes is the role of the 
government in the provision of infrastructure and public 
services, land, etc., apart form the financial incentives and 
tax holidays. One point important to recall is the awareness 
of the managerial staff of the fact that, locations in the 
interior of the country can offer, actually offer, great 
advantages for the in-bond electronics industry, as 
availability of cheap labour force either skilled or not, as 
well as the necessary infrastructure and public services 
without incur, in considerable additional transportation 
costs.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Without denying the existence of traditional sweatshops in the 
Mexican in-bond electronics industry, my survey revealed a 
change in the characteristics of both the labour force and the 
kind of plants established in accordance with what other 
surveys have found. Nowadays, in-bond plants use more skilled 
labour. Specially, the performance of more sophisticated 
assembly processes requires more attentiveness and skill from 
the workers, more supervision from technicians as well as the 
introduction of automated phases to secure productivity, 
efficiency in the use of inputs and better quality. Likewise, 
the importance of women in production lines is decreasing.
As to the factors influencing the location of this kind of 
industry in the Mexican Northern Border it was found that the
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availability of cheap skill and semi-skilled labour force was 
the main factor considered by the firms, as the location 
coefficients demonstrated in-bond electronics plants tend to 
locate in those places with abundance of technicians. The 
facilities to import inputs and equipment and export the 
assembled products, that is the in-bond industry regulations, 
are also an important factor. The access to markets and inputs 
are not determining in the location since, due to the 
existence of intra-firm trade, plants receive all the parts 
and components from the parent company (or any other firm 
within the corporation) and, once assembled, they are returned 
to the parent company for distribution and sale. That is why 
the local content of the assembled products is minimum and 
limited to some packaging materials. Moreover, most of the 
firms pointed out that, apart from the intra-firm trade policy 
of the parent company, the unavailability of inputs, quality 
control and unreliability of supplies was one of the main 
reasons to import all the inputs. However, in some cases 
managers showed willingness to incorporate Mexican parts and 
components if they attained the quality, cost and 
specifications demanded.
With regard to the inter-urban location of the plants I think 
that there is a great chance for the cities in the interior of 
the country to attract in-bond plants provided a good deal of 
information about advantages and etc. is given to potential 
investors. Due to the population growth brought about by the 
booming in-bond industry there are already bottlenecks in 
infrastructure, public services and housing in the cities 
along the Northern Border counteracting all the advantages 
gained from the existence of cheap labour force which itself 
is becoming relatively scarce due to the great demand. Many 
cities in the interior already count with the basic industrial 
infrastructure (industrial parks) and health and educative 
services which can secure the productivity of the labour force 
and the smooth performance of the in-bond assembly plants.
The changes in the profile of the worker are the ultimate 
expression of the redistribution of world production capacity. 
That is, as economies develop, the changes in their 
comparative advantage lead to shifts in the composition of 
output and eventually to changes in the structure of exports. 
These changes are expressed in the emergence of new patterns 
of industrial location within the country (and at the world 
level) and changes in composition of the labour force. 
Finally, it is necessary to emphasise the important role of 
the governments, which in fostering employment and ultimately 
growth, intervene either directly (tax holidays, repatriation 
of profits, etc) or indirectly (infrastructure and public 
services, hospitals, schools and other educative centres, etc) 
to attract this kind of industries.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE LOCATION OF IN-BOND INDUSTRY IN MEXICO.
Issues for Regional and Industrial Deve3opment.
INTRODUCTION.
At the beginning of this study it was argued that the changes 
in the structure of world production capacity has led to an 
increasingly more elaborated territorial pattern of 
specialisations in production. Since the mid-1960s there were 
some signs or relocation of some particular phases of 
production from the DCs to the most advanced of the developing 
countries, the so-called NICs. Subsequent waves of relocation 
have incorporated more and more countries to world production 
known as New-NICs and, in time, it is presumed, a third tier 
of NICs (New-New-NICs?) will integrate as well as the 
countries of Eastern Europe and of what used to be the Soviet 
Union.
To be able to understand this process of internationalisation 
of capital it was first examined those theoretical analyses 
which deal with the subject with particular reference to the 
electronics industry. However, as seen all along this 
examination, the process involves many factors which are 
difficult to grasp by appealing to any one theory. Ultimately, 
theories are attempts at interpretation of phenomena and thus 
limited by their one-sided view when confronted with the hard 
facts of reality.
As shown in the review of the literature about the 
internationalisation of production, and in particular that of 
the electronics industry "is not longer possible to understand 
local economic and social change in a global context by means 
of core-periphery categories...[since]...they appear to be 
simply too static and inflexible to be able to grasp the 
enormous range of development actualities and possibilities 
that exist within industrialisation (and other economic 
development) processes in various parts of the globe" 
(Henderson, 1989:154). Likewise, the use of outdated
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dichotomies like those TNCs versus the state, labour versus 
capital, labour versus technology, DCs versus NICs, LDCs, etc. 
only hinders the analysis by giving, in most of the cases, 
more weight to one than another, or defining a relation in the 
old dependency school when, actually, there is an 
interrelation and, at the very end there is a process of 
competition at work that permeates the relation among all this 
subjects. As there is no TNC laying the conditions of 
development of any particular nation state, neither there is 
an "undifferentiated mass of labour-force, easily exploitable, 
from which to extract absolute surplus value as the NIDL 
argues or a submissive state kneeling to please the great 
corporations.
Our purpose was to analyse the emergence of a new pattern of 
in Mexico, the in-bond electronics industry in the light of 
the increasing international integration of the sector. The 
main argument is that redistribution of world production 
capacity has had as a corollary, the emergence of a new 
pattern of location of the industry in the host countries, 
away from the old industrial cores which dominated the 
economy. As the new locational pattern consolidates and 
spreads into the country the labour processes upgrade and 
result in changes in the structure of the labour force in 
response to the need for more skilled labour.
In this context, the forces of competition which led the firms 
to seek minimisation of costs and increase productivity, 
either by technological innovation in products and processes 
or by relocation of some phases of the production process in 
lower cost location, were undoubtedly important impulses. 
However, these impulses could not, by themselves, have led to 
the redistribution of world production capacity. It was 
necessary that there were important economic and social 
changes in those countries potential hosts for the production 
processes to relocate. These changes were result of the direct 
and indirect intervention of the governments in the promotion 
of industrialisation and development.
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In essence, I hope this attempt was successful in demonstrate 
by means of the electronics industry the process above 
mentioned, that is, we are confronted with changing 
international division of labour in the electronics industry 
which is less organised on the basis of core-per iphery 
relations or dichotomic relations. In what follows I will 
indicate some general implications for the geographical 
distribution of the electronics industry at the wTorld levei . 
Then theoretical implications of the analysis will be 
examined. Finally the electronics in-bond industry as a new 
pattern of industrial location in Mexico and its viability for 
the regional and industrial development will be discused.
1. THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL 
DIVISION OF LABOUR.
As regards the electronics production,it is clear that a 
redistribution of world production capacity has emerged since 
the early 1960s, and it seems unstoppable as more countries 
integrate with the international arena like those of Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union and the booming Southern 
region of China. The most important factors contributing to 
the internationalisation of production are, the internal 
characteristics of the production processes (which allows for 
the spatial separation of phases of production) and strong 
competition between capitals in the industry. Competition has 
led the firms to look for strategies to increase productivity 
levels, whereas cutting dowTn cost per unit of output and 
prices. But, also, as mentioned above, there needed to be 
economic and social changes in those Third World countries to 
make them able to host production processes at the 
productivity levels required by the firms to maintain 
profitability levels.
Therefore, firms have looked for the best locations to perform 
the several phases of production process. Henderson (1989:155) 
suggests that there is a continuum of interrelated production 
activities at the global level. At the top end, decision­
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making, R&D and design activities locate in the US and Japan, 
then there is the location of production facilities in 
Scotland, West Germany and other countries of the EC and at 
the lower end, the assembly phases of production with lower 
skill-requirements locate in the most developed of the 
developing countries, the so-called NICs in a first stage and 
later, the New-NICs. However, the pattern of location and 
interrelations is more complicated.
Henderson affirms that Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Taiwan ’’play a more subservient role in the international 
division of labour than does Scotland" (1989:156). However, my 
own survey and other studies on the subject suggests that the 
Asian NICs as important producers of consumer electronics, 
computers and semiconductors are less dependent than Scotland. 
Crucial inputs to the electronics industry are much cheaper in 
Asia. Moreover, the cost of assembly labour and engineers are 
lower with higher levels of productivity (Ernst, 1985:339). 
More important, the Asian NICs count with local firms which 
already compete in the world market of consumer electronics, 
computers and semiconductors. As it was pointed out in chapter 
II, Taiwan and South Korea are leading exporters of terminals, 
Singapore is a major supplier of disk drives and Taiwan, South 
Korea and Hong Kong are expanding their shares in the world 
market for personal computers. In the field of semiconductors, 
according to Scott’s (1987) study on South-East Asia, in 1985 
out of 124 plants in the region, 61 were locally-owned from 
which 17 were engaged in diffusion and assembly (wafer 
fabrication was found only in Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Taiwan) and 44 only in assembly. Likewise, it is now seen 
that TNCs from these NICs are aggressively investing in the 
DCs to gain access to their markets. There is also the 
exceptional case of Malaysia which in less than ten years 
became the third producer of semiconductors in the world and 
is likely to host a number of integrated plants combining 
wafer fabrication with automated assembly and testing 
facilities. Thus, South-east Asia is becoming an important 
"core" in the production of electronics on its own right with
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an interregional division of labour where the more advanced 
phases of production are performed in the NICs (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and the less-sophisticated 
phases in New-NIC locations as Thailand, Philippines, 
Indonesia, etc., as a result of their upgrading and 
improvements in the performance of assembly activities and 
their cheaper labour costs. On this conditions it is hardly 
probable that the diffusion of automation in assembly-lines 
gives place to the ’exodus* from the NICs to the DCS as 
several authors foresee due among others to several factors. 
The Asian market will grow fastest for years to come than any 
other, the pace of reform in China suggests that the boom may 
not be limited to the Southern provinces making up for the 
biggest single market for electronics. Already Motorola 
announced the establishment of a $120m semiconductors factory 
in Tianjin, a port city near Beijing, due to go into 
production in 1994 (The Economist May 30th, 1992 ). The high
cost involved in ’automation* investment and the high rate of 
innovation which makes the life- cycle of products shorter, 
makes it necessary great flexibility in assembly-lines 
possible with the utilisation of labour force.
Likewise, recent developments in the Latinamerican economies 
are likely to raise incomes and improve living standards in 
those countries hence constituting another potential market of 
considerable size. In the late 1980s investments in production 
facilities were made in Mexico by IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Apple, 
Ericsson and Xerox aiming to the Mexican market in particular 
and the Latinoamerican in general. Apart from these 
investments, there is the in-bond electronics industry whose 
location in the Northern Border was in principle aimed to 
access the US market* and take advantage of the cheap labour 
force and the facilities to import materials and equipment and 
export the assembled goods. As the restrictions on location 
have relaxed together with labour shortages and bottlenecks in
However, since most of the assembled goods are sent to the parent coapany or to any 
other coapany within the corporation rather than to the retail market it is difficult to 
know if all the production is destined to the US market or to any other foreign market.
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public services this industry has spread into the interior of 
the country. Tax exemptions, the possibility of selling a 
great part of the output in the local market, the prospects of 
a free trade agreement with the US as well as the positive 
economic environment in Mexico means that the in-bond 
electronics industry will continue growing and the new 
locational pattern in Mexico will consolidate.
In the case of places like Scotland, the location is aimed to 
have access to the EC markets. The type of international 
production located by electronics firms in developed countries 
(like in Scotland) is substantially different from that in the 
Third World countries. For example, in the case of the 
semiconductors industry Scotland specialises in different 
production processes than those performed in the Asian NICs, 
for example firms make the masks (production of celluloid 
filaments that contain the microscopic electronic circuits) in 
the DCs (e.g. US), fabricate the wafers (process by which the 
circuits on the mask are transferred to the silicon wafer and 
etched into its surface) in Scotland; then, the assembly of 
transistors diodes and integrated circuits is made in some 
New-NICs (Malaysia, Indonesia, etc) and from there the ICs are 
sent to Hong Kong or Singapore to be tested and then they are 
distributed either directly to the markets or to other firms 
down the ladder to be assembled in electronic products as TV 
sets, computers, etc (as in the case of some in-bond plants in 
Mexico). In this context, it is difficult to say which country 
has a stronger electronics industry since they specialise in 
different activities.
2. THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ELECTRONICS PRODUCTION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY.
In the analysis of electronics industry in general and of the 
in-bond electronics industry in particular, it was tried to 
emphasise the complexity of the process of 
internationalisation of capital to be explained on the light 
of only one theory. It is not the pretension of this research
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to be conclusive at this respect but, taking a pragmatic 
stance, point out that, in the main, all the existent body of 
theory on the internationalisation of capital has idelogical 
connotations resulting from the own view of the theorists, and 
are not definite statements of facts.
For example, the NIDL thesis highlighted some which led to the 
offshore location of production facilities in the early 1960s 
as the need to reduce production costs while increasing 
productivity in the face of an intense competition. The fact 
that important changes were taking place at the time in some 
Third World economies was also acknowledged since it allowed 
for the location offshore of production facilities to take 
advantage of the "comparative advantage" which these countries 
possessed, a large pool of unskilled labour force mostly 
unemployed or underemployed.
However, and against what some other authors claim, the TNCs 
role was not one of bulling the nation-states to intervene in 
their favour and against the interest of the working class. 
Actually, state interventionism has been a product of the 
development priorities of the governments and very often the 
first concern is with the employment effects of a given 
strategy. As shown in chapter III with particular reference to 
the emergence of the of Mexico as NIC but extensive to the 
other NICs, many times foreign investment has been regulated 
or restricted to certain sectors or conditions like local 
content, export quotas, import restrictions, technology 
transfer, etc. to achieve important goals, as the upgrading of 
the labour force skills (as in Singapore and Hong Kong) and 
thus secure the investment in relatively high-skill capital 
intensive production processes or to encourage local firms (as 
in the case of South Korea) that soon would attain world level 
standards and hence compete with other TNCs in their own 
"play-fields".
At this respect, it becomes clear that the NIDL obsession with 
valorisation problems, absolute surplus value extraction and
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exploitation of the large supplies of cheap labour force; the 
product-cycle model production continuum in which the mass 
production of standardised goods takes place in LDCs or the 
pijraiy»i<4 ical structure of corporate power of Hymer ( 1979 ) 
failed to anticipate the complexity of the contemporary trends 
in the redistribution of world production capacity as, the 
movement of some segments of US industry from the old 
industrial areas to the "Sunbelt” areas in the West; the 
movement to backward areas within the DCs (e.g. Ireland, some 
areas of the UK and Spain); the upgrading of some NICs 
(notably the. Asian Gang of Four, Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan) which, thanks to either government policy or 
business activities, are location of more sophisticated 
labour-intensive processes and regional headquarters of 
important TNCs in the electronics industry giving place to the 
emergence of a regional division of labour. Also the New-NICs 
(and New-New-NICS ) and the emergence of TNCs in the NICs are 
object of concern of some academics nowadays. It is necessary 
to keep in perspective that the redistribution of production 
capacity is not simply the consequence of TNCs operations (as 
the dependence and development theories would argue) or 
nation-states intervention alone, world slump and the policies 
of international institutions (like World Bank or IMF) have 
also some influence in the economic policies of the countries 
concerned and thus in the shaping of the industrial geography.
The driving force in the internationalisation of capital are 
both the contradiction between capital and labour and the 
competition between capitals. To survive and expand, capital 
must maintain the rate of profit which requires increases in 
labour productivity which in turn can only be accomplished by 
large investments in education, health services and other 
public services. Those countries whose labour productivity is 
accompanied with investments in higher education capable of 
reproducing the skilled labour power required to perform 
relatively high-skill, capital-intensive production processes 
will go up in the ladder vacating their places to less
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developed countries able to perform low-skill labour 
processes.
All along the survey, it was tried to show that there cannot 
be a Great Theory about the redistribution of world industrial 
capacity due to the complexity of the phenomenon, it is 
necessary to understand the historical changes taking place in 
the potential host countries and the role of the nation states 
as well as the dynamics of development and competition in 
industrial production, the structure of the markets and 
technology,
3. THE ELECTRONICS IN-BOND INDUSTRY: A NEW PATTERN OF 
INDUSTRIAL LOCATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL POSSIBILITIES.
There is not pretension of giving a conclusive analysis on 
such a controversial subject, but it is thought that some 
important questions may have been better clarified with the 
findings of the survey as, for example, to what the extent the 
host countries* governments can influence the location of this 
kind of industry through the careful design of an industrial 
location strategy, which includes the provision of 
educational, public services and other infrastructural 
facilities, to improve productivity levels. However, there 
remain some questions to be answered, for example, What kind 
of policy instruments can increase the consumption of local 
inputs as to generate important linkages with the subsequent 
developmental effects throughout the rest of the economy?, 
What then are the effects of in-bond plants and the 
internationalisation of capital upon long-term regional 
development? in what follows I will try to give an answer to 
these questions.
From the analysis on the performance of Mexico in the last two 
decades in economic terms and international trade and more 
specifically in terms of electronics industry it was clear 
that the changes of comparative advantage over time led to 
shifts in the composition of output and eventually to changes
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in the pattern of exports, and in the geographical 
distribution of industry.
Despite of having great advantages as geographical proximity 
to the United States, market size and natural resources 
contributed to maintain longer than in the Asian NICs the 
import-substitution strategy while at the same time 
establishing the conditions for a full opening of the economy. 
Actually, some sectors performed outstandingly well throughout 
all the period considered as machinery and parts, specially 
automotive parts and the in-bond assembly industry located, 
mainly in the Northern Border. In particular, the in-bond 
industry became an important source (the second), after the 
petroleum sector, of foreign currency and a big generator of 
employment, nowadays it provides an estimated of 500 000 jobs 
for Mexicans. The oil-boom and the expansion of the domestic 
market further delayed the integration to the world economy. 
However, once it became clear that the expansion of 
manufacturing for export was a major source of employment and 
dynamism for the economy, the Mexican government committed to 
take the necessary measures to open the economy and make a 
more efficient utilisation of resources instead of pampering 
an uncompetitive industrial base, now exposed to competition 
from foreign companies.
The measures had, as a result, positive consequences for the 
economy in terms of growth, reduction of inflation, increase 
in DFI, increase in exports, and a major integration of Mexico 
to the world economy. In this respect is noteworthy the 
negotiations of a free trade agreement with United States and 
Canada which will bring further advantages to all the parties, 
spite criticisms, and specially to Mexico in terms of an 
increase in investment (foreign and domestic) and employment.
Therefore, the changes in the composition of industrial output 
towards a more export-oriented production have had, as a 
consequence the emergence of a new locational pattern 
different to that of the heavy industrial concentrations in
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the three metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara and 
Monterrey. This new locational pattern merged in the Northern 
Border in the way of in-bond plants mentioned above. The 
assembly of electronic products and components is a good 
example of this shift in Mexican industry. It is heavily 
concentrated in the Northern Border Region though the interior 
region is gaining importance in terms of the location of in- 
bond industry due to wage differentials, labour shortages and 
bottlenecks in the supply of public services and 
infrastructure in the Northern Border plants.
From the analysis it can be concluded that the incentives 
provided by the government (the BIP and the in-bond industry 
regulations and later reforms) were and are important in 
attracting production processes first to the Northern Border 
and nowadays to the rest of the country. But it is also the 
case that this area designated by the government provided the 
kind of low-cost labour suitable for routine and assembly-line 
tasks required by the TNCs and with the required levels of 
productivity. Also the geographical proximity to United States 
provided and additional stimuli.
Without denying the existence of traditional sweatshops in the 
Mexican in-bond electronics industry, the survey revealed a 
change in the characteristics of both the labour force and the 
kind of plants established. In-bond plants use more skilled 
labour and also more males in production lines. Likewise the 
kind of production processes established in Mexico is 
changing. Nowadays, there are more sophisticated assembly 
processes which require more attentiveness and skill from the 
workers, more supervision from technicians as well as more 
automation of some phases to secure productivity, efficiency 
in the use of inputs and better quality. These changes in the 
profile of the assembly worker and of the in-bond plants are 
the ultimate expression of the redistribution of world 
production capacity.
As to the factors influencing the location of this kind of 
industry in the Mexican Northern Border it was found that the 
availability of cheap skill and semi-skilled labour force was 
the main factor considered by the firms as well as the 
facilities to import inputs and equipment and export the 
assembled products. It was found that, due to the existence of 
intra-firm trade, plants receive all the parts and components 
from the parent company (or any other firm within the 
corporation). That is why the local content of the assembled 
products is minimum and limited to some packaging materials. 
Moreover, most of the firms pointed out that, apart from the 
intra-firm trade policy of the parent company, the 
unavailability of inputs, quality control and unreliability of 
supplies was one of the main reasons to import all the inputs. 
However, in some cases managers showed willingness to 
incorporate Mexican parts and components if they attained the 
quality, cost and specifications demanded. It will be 
necessary then to design a system of incentives to attract 
more in-bond electronic firms to the interior and hence boost 
the local content of the products. Recently, Mexico changed 
the tax regime for in-bond plants, including a 4 per cent cut 
in corporation tax from 40 to 36 per cent and exempted all 
Mexican sales to in-bond plants from value-added tax - an 
incentive to raise local content. Likewise according to a new 
decree in-bond plants can sell to the domestic market up to 50 
per cent of the value of their exports. However important 
these measures, it is considered that it is also necessary to 
provide in-bond plants with information about the range of 
possibilities in terms of availability of inputs in the 
country and also to design another system of incentives and 
provide information about potential customers to the Mexican 
manufacturers to encourage them to supply in-bond plants. For 
example tax credits and deferral can induce local firms to 
serve in-bond plants. Although a permanent tax give-up by the 
government would obviously be irrational, a short tax holiday 
could conceivably be efficient. It would allow potential 
suppliers to take maximum advantage of any deferral provision 
while forging a close customer-supplier relation with the
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efficiency, quality and reliability required. The government 
revenues sacrificed in this way would be more than compensated 
by the effects on employment and income in the concerned 
location.
As the boom in the Mexican Northern Border show, there are 
undeniably some positive impacts of in-bond plants in terms of 
employment, income and upgrading of the production processes 
that can be extended to interior locations with the changes to 
the tax regime above mentioned and also with a better 
promotion of the industrial structure in the way of industrial 
parks already existent in many interior locations. This 
industrial structure, being initially aimed to the domestic 
manufacturing industry, is underutilised, and in some cases 
semi-abandoned due to the economic crises of the 1980s and 
also due to a failure of the municipalities to provide in some 
cases the essential public services needed. This 
infrastructure and a better provision of public services, 
specially transport, and educational and health services can 
attract the in-bond electronics industry to the interior thus 
easing the pressure on land, public services and 
infrastructure that the border cities now face and diffusing 
those positive impacts. Actually, there are already signs that 
what I have called a new locational pattern of industry in 
Mexico is consolidating in the interior of the country as it 
is patent the growing importance of the interior locations in 
the relevant variables of the in-bond industry.
2
During sore than three decades a couplex of 131 industrial parks and industrial towns 
has been developed in Mexico. From the nicroeconomic point of view only 26.7 per cent of 
all industrial parks and new towns existent in 1988 can be considered successful. The 
entire coaplex has about 14 607 plots on which 2 752 firas are located, that is, it 
utilises only 18.5 per cent of the space available (see Garza, Ibarra and Aguilar, 1988).
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QUESTIONNAIRE
LOCALISATION OF IN-BOND ELECTRONICS PLANTS IN MEXICO
Date : __/__/.
No. ______
I - GENERAL INFORMATION CODES
- Name of the firm:..................................
- Person interviewed
and category:...................................
- Address and telephone............ .................
- City:...........................................
- Municipality and state:................... . ..___
- Date of establishment:..........................
1. What kind of plant is this? __
(state if more than one, e.g. subcontracting
assembly plant).
1. Headquarters (go to 9)
2. Branch
3. Subcontractor
4. Assembly plant
5. Other (specify)................. ........
2. IF APPLICABLE
a) What is the name of the headquarters company?
b) Where is it located?
311
3. What is the ownership regime of this plant? _____
1. Totally foreign owned
2. Totally national owned
3. Joint venture between two foreign firms
4. Joint venture between foreign and national firms
5. Other companies (specify).......... ..........
II - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRODUCT
4. What kind of production process is performed here?
1. Assembly
2. Manufacturing
3. Mixture
4. Other (specify)
5. Could you explain the main stages of the production 
process? _____
6. Can you list the main products of the plant and their 
main characteristics?
PRODUCTS WEIGHT VALUE* DESTINATION TRANSPORT
* Selling price in the sain Market, state in US$ if known.
7. Do you sell mainly to other companies?
1. Yes a) Which?_____________________
b) Where?_____________________
2. No
312
8 . Do you sell to retail markets?
1. Yes a) Where?__________
2 . No
9. Do you sell both other companies and retail markets?
a) Which companies?
b) Where are the companies
c ) Where are the markets?
10. Do you have any problem with the transportation of 
the product?
1. Yes
2. No
a). Cost________________________________________
b). Theft in deliveries ____
c). Time of delivering ____
d). Handling ____
e). Other (specify)...............................
11. Can you asses the share of your main markets in the
total sales of the plant?
(Please assess the percentage of each one)
a) Regional_________________________________
b) National ______
c) Latin America_______________________
d) USA________________________________ _____
e) Japan______________________________ ______
f) Europe (specify the country)...... _____
g) Asia (specify the country)..............
h) Other (specify the country)..... .....
12. If known, please state
a) Who you main competitor are_________ _____
b) Where they are located (headquarters)
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III - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INPUTS
13. What are i)the main materials (raw or semi-raw) processed, 
ii) the main components assembled, and iii) where do they 
come from (origin of plants, city and country)?
MATERIALS IF KOI
OE ORIGIN QUANTITY WEIGHT VALUE DOMESTIC
COMPONENTS City Country (in nuibers) (gr/unit) (US|) WET*?
PRODUCT I (specify)
1).
2 ).
3).
4).
- continue on another sheet(s) if necessary -
PRODUCT II (specify)
1).
2 ).
3).
4).
continue on another s h e e t ( s ) if necessary
PRODUCT 111 (specify)
1).
2 ).
3).
4).
- continue on another s h e e t ( s ) if necessary -
4 1. Not able to produce
2. Price
3. Not enough capacity of production (reliability of supply)
4. Government policy (encouraging iiports)
5. F i n  policy ( i n t r a - f i n  trade Mandatory)
6. Quality
7. Other (specify)
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V - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LABOUR FORCE
14. Specify the number of employees and sex in the different 
categories MEN WOMEN TOTAL
1 . Managers     '
2. Administrative personnel___________ _____  _____
3. Supervisors & technicians ______ _____  _____
4. Production workers     .
5. Others (specify)......... •••______ _____  _____
15. Specify the qualifications required for each category
1. Managers_________________________ ________________
2. Administrative personnel ________________
3. Supervisors & technicians ________________
4. Production workers ________________
5. Others (specify)................................
CODES:
1. Primary school
2. Secondary school
3. High school
4. Technical school
5. University
6. Other (specify)..............................
16. IF APPLICABLE is there any special reason to hire women?
17. What kind of problems do you have with the labour 
force? _
1. No problems
2. Stoppage
3. High turnover rate
4. Performance of the activities
5. Absenteeism
6. Low productivity per worker
7. Other (specify).............................
3 1 5
VI - GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES
18. Please thick if you receive any of the following 
incentives from the government
a) Financial _______
b) Subsidies and grants _______
c ) Loans _______
d) Tax exemptions _______
e) Facilities to take out profits .
f) Facilities to import machinery or inputs _______
g) Facilities in relation to the labour force 
treatment (social security fees,
control of unions ) _______
h) Provisions for the establishment of the plant
(land, services, infrastructure, etc.)______ _______
i) Others (specify).................... .......
19. Please specify the institution
VII - FACTORS OF LOCATION.
20. Was this plant located anywhere else before? ___
1. Yes
2. No
If yes, where?________ _ ______________________
21. Why wTas the plant located here?
Mexico?_________________________________________
State?__________________________________________
City?____________________________________________
22. According to your experience, if you could change 
location where would you go?
Another city or state?___________________________
Another country? (US, South Korea, etc.)
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23. Can you define the costs of the plant?
ITEM COST PERCENTAGE
1. EQUIPMENT
2. LAND
3. BUILDINGS
4 . INPUTS
5. LABOUR
6. INFRASTRUCTURE
7. OTHERS (specify)
a )
b)
- if necessary, continue on another sheet -
24. Please rank (1, 2, 3, so on) the following location
factors in relation to their importance in the location of the 
plant IN THE COUNTRY
a. Access to markets _______
b. Availability of skilled labour force _______
c. Availability of non-skilled labour force _______
d. Availability of cheap labour force _______
e. Non-existence of labour problems____________________
f. Facilities to import inputs and parts_______________
g. Access to infrastructural facilities _______
h. Access to the main transport means _______
i. Government incentives and facilities________________
j. Political stability _______
k. Others (specify).......................... .......
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25. Please rank (1, 2, 3, so on) the following factors 
in relation to their importance in the location of 
the plant IN THE CITY
a. Access to Markets ______
b. Availability of skilled labour force ■___
c. Availability of non-skilled labour force ______
d. Availability of cheap labour force ______
e. Non-existence of labour problems ______
f. Access to infrastructural facilities_______________
g. Existence of industrial estates _____ _
h. Provision of public and industrial service _____
i. Government incentives and facilities_______________
j. Others (specify).........................  ......
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TABLE 4.7.A: Mexico: Value-Added in the In-Bond Industry, 1974-19S9.
(Billion of pesos)
YEAR NATIONAL BORDER INTERIOR TOTAL ELECT. ELECT.IN
TOTAL STATES STATES ELECTR.. IN BORDER INTERIOE
(a) (b)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1974 3945.5 3614.8 330.7 2724.3 2450.1 274.2
1975 4014.5 3625.2 389.3 2601.7 2335.9 265.8
1976 5425 4843.8 581.2 3432 3098.3 333.7
1977 7114.6 6244.2 873.4 4453.1 3908.9 544.2
1978 9999.9 8813.5 1186.4 6144.9 5440.3 704.6
1979 14543 12305.3 2237.8 9016.9 7753.1 1263.8
1980 17728.8 15206.6 2522.2 10069.9 8623.4 1446.5
1981 23957 20734.8 3222.2 13305 11493.7 1811.3
1982 46567.7 40380.4 6207.3 25326.3 21481.5 3844.8
1983 99521.2 86682.1 12839.1 49800.2 41152.9 8647.3
1984 194756.6 168518.8 26237.8 96928.3 81976.3 14952
1985 325249.7 282838.4 42411.3 145265.8 121999.9 23265.9
1986 792017.1 669935.8 122082.1 356656.5 300865.3 55791.2
1987 2235150 1802748 432401.6 947946 778504 169442
1988 5263925 4204378 1059547 2179729 1745676 434053
1989(c) 6658320 5903730 754490 2723252 n.a. n.a.
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuhua, Sonora and Tanaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to electrical and electronic Kachinery, 
equipment, apparatus, parts and accesories.
(c) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1S89.
SOURCE: INECI, 1988a, 1989b and 1989c.
TABLE 4.7.B. Mexico: Rate of Growth of the Value-Added in the In-Bond 
Industry (selected years) (a).
1974/89 1974/80 1975/82 1980/89 1980/88 1S52/87 1987/88 1987/89
RATIONAL TOTAL 39.1 22.2 29.5 48.2 50.9 53.9 57.5 20.9
B ORDER MUNICIPALITIES 38.9 21.3 29.1 48.4 50.5 53.2 57.1 28.8
INTERIOR 40.3 28.7 32.7 46.9 53 57.2 59.2 -40.4
TOTAL BLECTR. IND. 36.9 19.6 27.8 46.3
C
O 51.5 56.5 20
ELBCT. IN BORDER MPOS.(b) - 18.9 27.2 - 48.5 51.2 55.4 -
ELECT.IN INTEP.I0R(b) • 24.2 31.7 * 51 53.1 61 •
(a) Annual rate of growth was calculated using the following expression 
1/n
r = 1 - (Po/Pf) *100 where Po and Pf are the population at the beginning and the end of the
period considered, respectively, and n is the nuiber of years,
(b) Data for 1989 not available.
SOURCE: Table 4.7.A.
320
TABLE 4.8.A: Mexico: Employment in the In-Bond Industry, 1974-19S9.
(yearly average)
YEAR NATIONAL
TOTAL
(1)
BORDER
STATES
(a)
(2)
INTERIOR
STATES
(3)
TOTAL
ELECTR.
(b)
(4)
ELECT.
IN BORDER
(5)
ELECT.IN 
INTER I OF.
(6)
1974 75974 71122 4852 50970 47172 3796
1975 67214 62145 5069 42376 38977 3399
1976 74496 67532 6964 47029 42772 4257
1977 78433 70681 7752 48339 43719 4620
1978 90704 82387 8317 56209 51183 5026
1979 111365 100537 10828 69862 63613 6249
1980 119546 106576 12970 69401 62110 7291
1981 130973 116450 14523 76187 68736 7451
1982 127048 113227 13821 74108 66428 7680
1983 150567 134915 15952 82690 73257 9433
1984 199684 176909 22775 108520 95007 13513
1985 211968 176800 25968 100859 87937 12922
1986 249833 212291 37542 113081 96495 16586
1987 305253 251403 53850 134477 109762 24715
1988 369489 298863 70626 161130 127455 33675
1989(c) 443682 354946 88736 171478 n.a. n.a.
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuhua, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to electrical and electronic machinery, 
equipment, apparatus, parts and accesories.
(c) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989.
SOURCE: INEGI, 1988a, 1989b and 1989c.
TABLB 4.8.B. M e x i c o : Rate of Growth of the Ecployient in the In-Bond 
Industry (selected years) (a).
1974/89 1974/80 1975/82 1980/89 1980/88 1[9:2/87 1987/88 1987/89
NATIONAL TOTAL 11.1 7.3 8.7 13.6 13.2 16.1 17.4 17.1
BORDER MUNICIPALITIES 10.2 6.5 8.2 12.5 12.1 14.7 15.9 15.8
INTERIOR 17.6 15.1 13.3 19.2 19.1 23.8 23.8 22.1
TOTAL ELBCTR. IND. 7.8 5 7.7 9.6 10 11.2 16.5 11.4
ELECT. IN BORDER KPOS.(b) - 4.5 7.3 - 8.6 9.6 13.9 -
ELECT.IN INTERIOR(b) - 10.3 11 - 17.4 20.8 26.6 •
(a) Annual rate of growth was calculated using the following expression
1/e
r = 1 - (Po/Pf) *100 where Po and Pf are the population at the beginning and the end of the
period considered, respectively, and n is the nuiiber of years.
(b) Data for 1989 not available 
SOURCB: Table 4.8.A.
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TABLE 4.9.A. Mexico: Plants in the In-Bond Industry, 1974-1989.
(yearly average)
YEAR NATIONAL
TOTAL
(1)
BORDER
STATES
(8)
(2)
INTERIOR
STATES
(3)
TOTAL
ELECTR.
(b)
(4)
ELECT.
IN BORDER
(5)
ELECT.IN 
INTERIOR
(6)
1974 455 429 26 204 189 15
1975 454 418 36 197 179 IS
1976 448 406 42 179 161 IS
1977 443 398 45 170 153 17
1978 457 420 37 174 160 14
1979 540 480 60 199 182 17
1980 620 551 69 223 200 23
1981 605 533 72 230 205 25
19S2 585 514 71 223 198 25
1983 600 533 67 224 201 23
1984 672 595 77 244 219 25
1985 760 672 88 274 250 24
1986 987 915 72 301 266 33
1987 1125 1017 108 334 297 37
1988 1490 1334 156 411 357 54
1989(c) 1699 1491 208 473 n.a. n.a.
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja
California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuhua, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
(b) Corresponds to electrical and electronic machinery, 
equipment, apparatus, parts and accesories.
(c) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989.
SOUBCE: INEGI, 19S8a, 1989b and 1989c.
TABLE 4.9.B. Mexico: Rate of Growth of the No, of Plants in the In-Bond 
Industry (selected years) (a).
1974/89 1974/80 1975/82 1980/89 1980/88 1982/87 1987/88 1987/89
NATIONAL TOTAL 8.4 5 3.6 10.6 10.4 12.3 24.5 18.6
BORDER MUNICIPALITIES 8 4.1 2.9 10.5 10.5 12.8 23.8 17.4
INTERIOR 12.9 15 9.2 11.5 9.7 8 30.8 27.9
TOTAL ELECTR. IND. 5.9 1.5 1.8 8 7.4 7.8 18.7 16
ELECT. IN BORDER MPOS.(b) - 0.9 1.4 - 7 7.8 16.8 -
E L E C T . I N ’IN T E R I O R (b ) - 6.9 4.6 " 10.1 7.5 31.5
(a) Annual rate of growth was calculated using the following expression 
1/n
r = 1 - (Po/Pf) *100 where Po and Pf are the population at the beginning and the end of the
period considered, respectively, and n is the nuiber of years,
(b) Data for 1989 not available 
SOURCE: Table 4.9.A.
TABLE 4.14.A. In-bond's Industry Inputs by Source and Geographical Location of Plants,
1975-1989 (Million pesos)
NATIONAL TOTAL BORDER STATES(a) INTERIOR STATES
YEAR TOTAL Foreign National TOTAL Foreign National TOTAL Foreign National
1975 8809.3 8689.3 120 8230.4 8164.4 66 578.9 524.9 54
1976 12205.6 11834.4 371.2 11291 11052.8 238.2 914.6 781.6 133
1977 18527.4 18252.6 274.7 16960.5 16778.1 182.3 1566.9 1474.5 92.4
1978 25914 25456.9 377.1 23903.5 23579.4 244.2 2010.5 1877.5 132.9
1979 36410.4 35895.3 515.2 33559.9 33263.4 296.6 2850.5 2631.9 218.6
1980 40792.7 40095.7 697 36761 36456.4 304.6 4031.7 3639.3 392.4
1981 55386.8 54679.4 707.4 50590.9 50175 415.9 4795.9 4504.4 291.5
1982 110346 108928.2 1417.8 100944.8 100124.2 820.6 9401.2 8804 597.2
1983 349318.9 344782.9 4536 315736.8 312624.7 3112.1 33582.1 32158.2 1423.9
1984 637770.4 629299.6 8470.8 577250.7 570917.3 6333.4 60519.7 58382.3 2137.4
1985 989439.6 980548.9 8890.7 902126.7 895858.6 6268.1 87312.9 84690.3 2622.6
1986 2684371. 2653200 21171.2 2417308. 2396768. 10539.7 267062.7 256431.2 10631.5
1987 7706729. 7588323. 118405.9 6827444. 6769219. 58225.3 879284.4 819103.8 60180.6
1988 17879487 17582455 297032 15489815 15338339 151476 2389672 2244116 145556
1989(b) 15326700 15091600 235100 14613700 14475000 138700 713000 616600 96400
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Coahulla, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaullpas,
(b) Corresponds to the period January-August, 1989. 
SOURCE: INECI, 1988a, 1989b and 1989c.
TABLE 4.15.A. In-bond Electronics Industry Inputs by Source and Geographical Location of Plants, 1979-1988.
(■lllion pesos)(a)
NATIONAL ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY
TOTAL IN BORDER STATES(a) IN INTERIOR STATES
YEAR TOTAL Foreign National TOTAL foreign National TOTAL Foreign National TOTAL Foreign National
1979 36410.4 35895.3 515.2 n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d n.d
1980 40792.7 40095.7 697 26378.3 26211.1 167.1 23621.2 23585.4 35.8 2757.1 2625.7 131.3
1981 55386.8 54679.4 707.4 35556.1 35377.8 178.1 32093.3 32021.7 71.5 3462.8 3356.1 106.6
1982 110346 108928.2 1417.8 70681.7 70301.3 380.5 63305.4 63211 94.5 7376.3 7090.3 286
1983 349318.9 344782.9 4536 197821.2 196593.9 1327.3 172426.1 172090.7 435.4 25395.1 24503.2 891.9
1984 637770.4 629299.6 8470.8 337100.2 336034.8 1065.4 292617.6 291922.4 695.2 44482.6 44112.4 370.2
1985 989439.6 980548.9 8890.7 471644.7 470220.7 1424 418965 418091.2 873.8 52679.7 52129.5 550.2
1986 2684371. 2653200 21171.2 1267122 1259676. 7445.8 1116660 1112174 4486.6 150462 147502.8 2959.2
1987 7706729. 7588323. 118405.9 3448120. 3420168. 27952.6 3043801 3030861 12940.3 404319.8 389307.5 15012.3
1988 17879487 17582455 297032 8185259 8112638 70621 7042908 7009558 33350 1142351 1103080 37271
(a) Corresponds to the sectors Electrical and electronic Machinery, equipment and parts, 
and Electrical and electronic apparatus, articles and accesories.
(b) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Coahulla, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Tamaulipas.
SOITRCE: INEGI, 1988a, 1989h.
TABLB 4.16.A. Enployaent in the In-bond Industry by Geographical Location of Plants and Category, 1975-1988.
q t a l  BORDER STATES(a) IKTE r Fo R_ STATRS
OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF
YEAR TOTAL Subtotal Kale Feiiale TOTAL Subtotal Nale Feiiale TOTAL Subtotal Nale Fenale
1975 67214 57850 12575 45275 5924 3440 61912 53569 11602 41967 5196 3147 5302 4281 973 3308 728 293
1976 74496 64670 13686 50984 6165 3661 67258 58563 12608 45945 5462 3233 7238 6107 1078 5039 703 428
1977 78433 68187 14999 53188 6348 3898 70494 61565 13892 47673 5609 3320 7939 6622 1107 5515 739 578
1978 90704 78570 18205 60365 7543 4591 82130 71446 16965 54481 6739 3945 8574 7124 1240 5884 804 646
1979 111365 95818 21981 73837 9569 5978 100138 86580 20173 66407 8529 5029 11227 9238 1808 7430 1040 949
1980 119546 102020 23140 78880 10828 6698 106208 91024 21329 69695 9562 5622 13338 10996 1811 9185 1266 1076
1981 130973 110684 24993 85691 12545 7744 116142 98682 22936 75746 10986 6474 14831 12002 2057 9945 1559 1270
1982 127048 105383 23990 81393 13377 8288 112875 94157 22135 72022 11915 6803 14173 11226 1855 937 1 1462 1485
1983 150867 125278 32004 93274 16322 9267 134086 111782 29494 82288 14690 7614 16781 13496 2510 10986 1632 1653
1984 199684 165505 48215 117290 22381 11798 175778 145886 44544 101342 20122 9770 23906 19619 3671 15948 2259 2028
1985 211968 173874 53832 120042 25042 13052 184664 151580 49260 102320 22239 10845 27304 22294 4572 1 7722 2803 2207
1986 249833 203894 6481 2 139082 30367 15572 210635 172431 58348 114083 2571 1 12493 39198 31463 6464 24999 4656 3079
1987 305253 248638 84535 164103 36740 19875 249595 203852 74175 129677 30245 15498 55658 44786 10360 34426 6495 4377
1988 369489 301379 110927 190452 443 1 2 23798 297127 242362 95991 146371 36246 18519 72362 5901 7 14936 4408 1 8066 5279
(a) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Coahuila,
Chihuahua, Sonora and Taiiaulipas.
SOURCE: INEGI, 1988a, 1989b and 1989c.
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TABLE 4.16.B. Growth of Employment in the In-bond Industry by Sex.
1975-1988
YEAR
NATIONAL
Male
TOTAL
Female
BORDER
Male
STATES
Female
INTERIOR
Male
STATES
Female
1975-1982 8.8 8 8.8 7.4 8.8 13.8
1982-1987 22.3 13. 1 21.5 11.1 29. 1 22.9
1987-1988 23.8 13.8 22.7 11.4 30.6 21.9
1975-1988 15.4 10.5 15 9.2 18.9 18.1
SOURCE: Table 4.16.A.
TABLB 4.16.C. Growth of Bnploynent in the In-bond Industry by Category, 1975-1988.
NATIONAL TOTAL BORDER STATES INTERIOR STATES
YRAR TOTAL OPKRATIV.TECHNICIANS STAFF TOTAL OPERATIV.TECHNICIANS STAFF TOTAL OPERATIV.TECHNICIANS STAFF
1975-1982 8.7 8.2 11 11.8 8.2 7.7 11.2 10.4 13.1 12.9 9.5 20.7
1982-1987 16.1 15.8 18,3 16 14.7 14.3 17 15.2 23.9 24.2 25.8 19.4
1987-1988 17.4 17.5 17.1 16.5 16 15.9 16.6 16.3 23.1 24.1 19.5 17.1
1975-1988 12.3 11.9 14.3 13.8 11.4 11 13.9 12.7 18.2 18.3 16.9 19.9
SOURCE: Table 4.16.A.
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TABLB 4.17.A. Bnploynent in the In-bond Electronics Industry by Geographical Location of Plants and Category, 1975-1988(a).
B ^ T O i i i ^ i i i D u s m  " b l b c t r o n i c F I n d u s t r y " b l e c t r o n i c s  i n d u s t r y
IN BORDER STATES(a) IN INTERIOR STATES
OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF OPERATIVES TECHNICIANS STAFF
YEAR TOTAL Subtotal Nale Feiiale TOTAL Subtotal Nale Fenale TOTAL Subtotal Nale Fenale
1979 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1980 69401 58151 10241 47910 7099 4151 62110 52393 9369 43024 6273 3444 7291 5758 872 4886 826 707
1981 76187 63127 11300 51827 8208 4852 68736 57384 10313 47071 7320 4032 7451 5743 987 4756 888 820
1982 74116 59823 10698 49125 9037 5256 66428 53974 9834 44140 8175 4279 7688 5849 864 4985 • 862 977
1983 82690 66483 13180 53306 10538 5659 73257 59094 11959 47138 9586 4577 9433 7389 1221 6168 952 1082
1984 105520 87510 19684 67826 14180 6830 95007 76631 18252 58379 12875 5501 10513 10879 1432 9447 1305 1329
1985 100859 79386 18598 60788 14714 6759 87937 69352 17020 52332 13100 5485 12922 10034 1578 8456 1614 1274
1986 113081 88950 21984 66966 16651 7480 96495 76122 19459 56663 14422 5951 16586 12828 2525 10303 2229 1529
1987 129842 102337 27813 74524 18527 8978 109762 86870 24502 62368 15676 7216 20080 15467 3311 12156 2851 1762
1988 152553 120442 35899 84543 21535 10576 127455 101196 31051 70145 1 7998 8261 25098 19246 4848 1 4398 3537 2315
(a) Corresponds to the sectors Blectrical and electronic nachinery, equipnent and parts, 
and Electrical and electronic apparatus, articles and accesories.
(b) Corresponds to the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, 
Chihuahua, Sonora and Tanaulipas.
SOURCB: INEGI, 1988a, 1989b,
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TABLE 4.17.B. Growth of Employment in the Electronics In-bond
Industry by Sex, 1980-1988.
NATIONAL TOTAL BORDER STATES INTERIOR STATES
YEAR Male Female Male Female Male Female
1975-1982 2.2 1.2 2.4 1.3 -0.5 1
1982-1987 17.4 8 16.7 6.7 23.6 16.3
1987-1988 22.5 11.9 21.1 11.1 31.7 15.6
1975-1988 14.5 6.9 13.9 5.9 19.3 12.6
SOURCE: Table 4.17.A.
TABLB 4 . 17.C. Growth of Bnployient in the In-bond Electronics Industry by Category, 1980-1988,
BLECTRONICS INDUSTRY BLBCTRONICS IN BORDER STATES ELECTRONICS IN INTERIOR STATBS
YRAR TOTAL OPRRATIV.TECHNICIANS STAFF TOTAL OPKRATIV.TECHNICIANS STAFF TOTAL OPERATIV,TECHNICIANS STAFF
1975-1982 3.2 1.4 11.4 11,1 3.3 1.5 12.4 10.3 2.6 0.8 2.1 14.9
1982-1987 10.6 10.2 13.4 10.2 9.6 9.1 12.2 9.9 17,5 17.7 21.3 11.1
1987-1988 14.9 15 14 15.1 13.9 14.2 12.9 12.6 20 19.6 19.4 23.9
1975-1988 9.4 8.7 13 11 8,6 7.9 12.3 10.4 14.3 14 16.6 13.8
S O U R C E : Table A , 17.A,
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TABLE 4.22. Mexico: In-Bord Industry, Value-Added in Electronics and Electrical 
Products by Custors District, 1986. (Iteis 806/807, till ions of dollars)
s i t ;
CATEC-CSY (Rev. 2)
TOTAL SAN 
MEXICO DIEGO NOGALES EL FASO LAREDO
TOTAL 713.1 93.7 95.1 266.5 237 .8
1. Personal computers 
lainboards (752.4)
52.39683 6.90569 0 0
0
45.49114
0
2. Television sets (761) 54.9472 1.11503 19.54305 23.493 10.79612
3. Eadio-braodcast sets ( 762 ) 25.36 1.22747 2C.5225S 1.23195 2.378
4. Telephonic teriinals (764.1) 7.31797 7.31797 0 0 0
5. Telephonic apparatus (764.1) 2.77905 0 0 2.77905 0
6. Microphones (and stands therefor) 3.96824 1.93022 0.26628 C.6203 1.14144
Loudspeakers and audio-frequency 
electric aiplifiers (764.2)
7. TV transiiitter-receivers (764 .3 ) 1.7835 0 0 0 1.7835
8. Radio-broadcasting transiitters- 57.95186 0 0 0 57.95186
receivers (764.3)
9. Kadiotelephonic and radiotele­ 0.06573 0.05622 0.00951 0 0
g r a p h s  transiitters (764.3)
10. Other parts and accesories 6.60063 5.87499 0.03804 0.6876 0
falling within heading 76 (764.9)
11. Tuning parts for TV sets (764.93) 22.48806 0 0.15216 5.2143 17,1216
12. Parts and accesories for sound 9.87849 1.23684 0.00951 0 8.63214
recorders (764.99)
13. Farts and acc. elec. (764.9) 18.17422 7.23364 0.42795 6.44625 4.06638
14. Cassetes (764.99) 1.11267 0 1.11267 0 0
15. Rectifiers (771.21) 60.95187 14.03626 3.34752 28.27755 15.29054
16. Inductors (771.22) 20.24604 2.94218 3.53772 8.9388 4.82734
17. Lightning arresters (772.1) 0.45551 0.38417 0 0 0.07134
18. Control panels (772.1) 0.86347 0.29047 0 0.573 0
19. Switchboards (772.1) 15.68916 0.2811 0.12363 4.44075 10.84368
20. Switches (772.1) 16.30866 6.43719 0.20922 7.87875 1.7835
21. Other connectors (772.1) 7.10189 4.61004 0.07608 2.32065 0.09512
22. Resistors (772.3) 11.19839 7.31797 0.00951 5.46665 0.40426
23. Other electrical apparatus (772) 37.79101 7.13994 6.77112 15.55695 8.323
24. Electrical insulated conductors (773.1) 57.52985 6.86821 24.45021 20.59935 5.61208
25. Light e m i t i n g  diodes (776.3 ) 0.31515 0 0 C.31515 0
26. Transistors and siiilar seri- 8.72459 0.39354 7.10397 1.2033 0.02378
conductor devices (776.3)
27. Microprocessors, NOS (776.4) 0.00937 0.00937 0 0 0
28. Integrated circuits (776.4) 0 0 0 0 0
29. Fieno-electric crystals (776.8) 0.25654 0.01874 0 0 0.2378
30. Parts of seiiconductors (776.89) 0.08541 0.02811 0 0.0573 0
31. Parts of cathode-ray (776.89) 4.94624 0 0 0 4.94624
32. Electrical Engines (778.31) 5.00181 0.0937 0 1.17465 3.73346
33. Electrical generators (778.31) 20.50732 9.85724 6.67602 3.0942 0.87986
34. Electrical starting eq. (778.31) 11.88182 0.07496 0.1902 0.6303 10.98636
35. Electrical ignition eq. for internal 168.4114 0.01874 0.52305 147.4902 20.37946
eoibustion engines (778.31)
SOURCE: A u thor’s calculations froi L F Puebla, 1988: Table 16.
APPENDIX III 
ELECTRONIC FIRMS IN MEXICO
GUADALAJARA. JALTSCO.
1. Computadoras y Sistemas Micros and disk drivers 
para Negocios, S.A.
Colonias No. 225, Sector Juarez 
44100 Guadalajara, Jal.
2. Hewlett Packard Mexicana, Minis, Micros and disk
S.A. de C.V. drivers
Manufac. Plant
Montemorelos No. 299, Fracc. Loma Bonita,
45070 - Zapopan, Jal. Tel. (9136) 314995.
3. IEP de Guadalajara, S.A. Electronic Cards
de C.V.
Calle Rotonda, No. 14.
Col. Valle del Alamo,
44440, Guadalajara, Jal. Tel. (9136) 119972
4. Industrias Mexicanas Electronic Cards,
Burroughs, S.A. de C.V. harnesses and circuits
In-Bond Plant
Calle 3, No. 1338, Zona Industrial 
44940, Guadalajara, Jal. Tel (9136) 120260
5. INFO-Espacio, S.A. de C.V. Micros and printers
Filial Grupo Microton
Pedro Moreno No. 1739, Sector Juarez 
44100, Guadalajara, Jal. Tel (9136) 153645
Micros (PC’s)
166718
Micros
168100 
Programable Electronic 
Controllers
157243
HERMOSILLO. SONORA.
1. PRINTAFORM, S.A.
Filial (Grupo Printaform) 
Carretera Bahia Kino Km. 5.5 
Hermosillo, Sonora, Tel (9162)
2. Printa Bowmar, S.A.
Carretera Bahia Kino Km. 5.5 
Hermosillo, Sonora, Tel (9162)
3. Festo Electronic 
Sierra Morena No. 127 
Col. Lomalinda
Hermosillo, Sonora, Tel (9162)
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4. Electro Digital, S.A. C.V. Micros
Veracruz 254, Col San Benito 
Hermosillo, Sonora, Tel (9162) 145313
MEXICO CITY
1. Abastecedora Internacional 
de Computacion S.A de C.V.
2. AESPRINTAFORM, S.A. de C.V.
Filial (Grupo Printaform)
Colima No. 439, Piso 3 
Col. Roma 06700, Cuauhtemoc 
Mexico, D.F.
3. Alternativa en Captura, S.A.
(Main Office)
Insurgentes Sur No. 263 Piso 1 
Col Roma 06700, Cuauhtemoc 
Mexico. D.F. Tel (915) 5846922
4. ATI de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
Amsterdam No. 46-402 
Col Hipodromo Condesa 
06100 Cuauhtemoc 
Mexico, D.F., Tels (915) 2869170, 2869489, 2860625
5. Honeywell Sistemas Mainframes, Mini, Micros
Sistemas de Informacion, S.A. Disk Drivers, Printers
de C.V. Videos
Av. Constituyentes No. 900 
Col. Lomas Altas, 11950 Miguel Hidalgo 
Mexico, D.F. Tels (915) 5702467, 2591966
6. IBM de Mexico Mainframes, Minis, Micros
Av. Mariano Escobedo No 595 Disk Drivers, Printers,
Col. Polanco, 11560 Miguel Hidalgo
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915) 2509011
7. Industria Mexicana de Integrated Circuits and 
Semiconductores, S.A. de C.V. Transistors
Blvd. A Lopez Mateos No. 163 
Col Mixcoac, 03910 Benito Juarez 
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915) 5635411
Minis, Micros, Videos 
Printers and Disk Drivers 
Micros and Disk Drivers 
Videos, Diskettes, etc
Disk Drivers, Cassetes
Disk Drivers
8 . Industries Digitales S.A. de C.V. Micros and Videos 
Plateros No. 7 Piso 1
Col. San Jose Insurgentes 
03900, Benito Juarez
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915) 6601495, 6601988
9. NCR de Mexico, S.A. de C.V7. Mainframes, Minis, Micros
Alfonso Herrera No. 75 Disk Drivers, Printers
Col. San Rafael, and Videos
06470, Cuauhtemoc,
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915) 5464845
10. Texas Istruments de Mexico Minis, Micros, Disk
S.A. de C.V. Drivers, Videos, Printers
Reforma No. 450, Piso 10
Col Juarez, 06600, Cuauhtemoc
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915)514-35-83.
11. Cibernetica AREX, S.A. de C.V. Micros 
(Main Office)
Angel Urraza, No 311
Col Noche Buena 03720, Benito Juarez 
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915) 6879464
12. Cintas VAC, S.A. de C.V. Disk Drivers
(Main Office)
Leibnitz No. 1, Piso 7,
Col. Anzures, 11590, Miguel Hidalgo 
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915) 5287420
13. Complementos en Informatica Disk Drivers
S.A . de C.V.
Filial (Corp. Tec. Avanzada)
Av. Patriotismo No. 4 
06170, Cuauhtemoc 
Mexico. D.F.
14. Computacion y Textiles, S.A. Micros 
Descartes No. 51, Piso 2,
Col. Anzures, 11590, Cuauhtemoc 
Mexico, D.F. Tel (915) 5140088, 5117585
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15. Corporacion Electronica Delta Peripherals 
Socrates No. 128, Piso 2 
Col. Polanco, 11560, Miguel Hidalgo 
Mex i co, D.F.
MONTERREY, NUEVO LEON.
1. Computacion, Instrumentacion Mainframes, Minis, Micros
y Control, S.A. de C.V. Disk Drivers, Videos
(Main Office)
Filosofos No. 211, Piso 3 
Col. Tecnologico, 64700 
Monterrey, Nuevo Leon.
2. Control Data de Mexico, Mainframes, Minis, Micros
S.A. de C.V.
Subsidiary
Av. Pablo Gonzalez No. 702 Pte.
Col. Chepe Vera, 64030
Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Tel (9183) 489933, 489780.
3. Data General de Mexico, Minis, Micros, Printers
Subsidiary (Main Office in Mexico City)
Vasconcelos No. 449 Pte.
Col. del Valle, 66220, Garza Garcia 
Monterrey, Tel (9183) 783598.
4. MAI de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. Mainframes, Minis, Micros
Subsidiary (Main Office in Mexico City)
Av. Lazaro Cardenas No. 2475
Col. Torrevilla, 66220, Garza Garcia
Nuevo Leon.
5. Micro Nacional, S.A. Micros (PC*s)
(Main Office)
Av. Gonzalitos No. 250 Sur, Desp. 116 
Col. Montel 64000 Garza Garcia 
Nuevo Leon, Tel (9183) 470792.
6. Sperry, S.A. de C.V. Mainframes, Minis, Micros
Subsidiary (Main Office in Mexico City)
Av. Lazaro Cardenas No. 2400,
Ed. Soles Piso 1 Col. 66220 Garza Garcia 
Nuevo Leon, Tel (9183) 786586
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7. T.C.A. Division Maquinas, S.A. Micros, Disk Drivers 
(Sigma del Norte)
Filial (Grupo Sigma)
Connstitucion No. 1247 Pte.
Col. Leones, 64600 
Monterrey Nuevo Leon.
8. Tecnor, Electronica y Control Electronic Circuits 
(Main Office)
Av. Vasconcelos Pte, No, 200, Desp 206 
Col. del Valle, 66220 Garza Garcia 
Nuevo Leon.
PUEBLA. PUEBLA
1. Integracion Electronica PC’s and printers
y Sistemas, S.A.
(Main Office)
Av. 31 Pte, No. 2317, Piso 2 
Col. Juarez, 72410 
Puebla, Puebla.
IN-BOND INDUSTRY
MEXICALI. BAJA CALIFORNIA.
1. AUTONETICA 
Periferico Oriente, Col. Rivera.
Tel. 660166/660113.
2. Ensambladora Electronica de Mexico 
Pasaje Reforma No. 90 Altos,
Tel. 540077.
3. Ensambladores Electronicos,
Ave. Navolato 8-9, Col. San Marcos.
Tel. 552601.
TIJUANA. BAJA CALIFORNIA.
1. Matsushita Electronic Components 
de Baja California, S.A. de C.V.
Calle Blvd. Pacifico, No. 14530 
C.P. 22610, Tel. 810006.
Integrated Circuits
Hibrid Circuits
Micros
Assembly of TVs and 
VCRs
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2. Kyusho Matsushita Electric de 
Baja California.
Subassemblies for TVs
and Computers
2o. Eje Oriente-Poniente s/n, 
Cd. Industrial Nueva Tijuana.
3. MICROELECTRA. Electronic Assemblies
Blvd. Salinas No. 698,
Fracc. Aviacion, Tel. 817455.
CIUDAD JUAREZ. CHIHUAHUA
Assembly Plants Exporters of Wire Harnesses
1. Arneses de Cd. Juarez. S.A. de C.V.
Prof. Rivera Lara No. 6622. Tel. 178614.
2. Autoelectronica de Juarez, S.A.de C.V.
Parque Industrial Juarez,
Post Code 2561, Sue E. Tel. 132811.
3. Conductores Tecnologicos de Juarez, S.A. de C.V. 
Parque Industrial Los Aztecas. Tel. 110964.
4. Sistemas y Conexiones Internacionales, S.A. de C.V. 
Carretera Panamericana 3339. Tel. 186645.
5. ENSAMEX, S.A. de C.V.
Carretera Panamericana, 9380. Tel. 131005.
Assemly Plants Exporters of Electronic Products.
1. Manufacturera Alemana S.A.de C.V. Radios & tape 
Hnos. Escobar No. 6965, recorders 
Parque Industrial Omega, Tel 167140.
2. Manufacturera del Bravo, S.A. de C.V. Tape recorders 
Hnos. Escobar No. 6965,
Parque Industrial Omega, Tel. 180739.
APPENDIX IV 
IN-BOND ELECTRONIC FIRMS 
VISITED IN THE FIELDWORK
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AGUA PRIETA. SONORA.
1. Sonidos Selectos de Sonora (microphones and radio 
equipment).
Calle 12 entre Ave. 10 y 11, Tel 823-27
2. Goleta Coil. S. A. (assembly of parts for radios and T.V. ). 
Calle Internacional y Avenida 27, Tel. 810-44.
3. TELSON S.A. (assembly and testing of T.V. receivers), 
subsidiary of Zenith.
Calle 17, Ave 6 y 10 s/n,
Parque Industrial, Tel. 801-45
NOGALES. SONORA.
1. CII-MEX (assembly of electronic switches and other 
telecommunications equipment).
Carretera Internacional Km. 7.5, Tel 24 7-00
CD. JUAREZ. CHIHUAHUA.
1. Componentes Electronicos, S.A. (electronic components for 
motor vehicles).
Carretera Juarez-Porvenir Km 3.5 
Po Box, 16-42-C. Tel. 181533/181099.
2. Electronica y Espacio, S.A.(assembly of electronic 
components for militar motor vehicles).
Ave. Amper s/n, Parque Industrial Bermudez.
Tel. 180585.
3. R.C.A. Components, S.A. (assembly of colour T.V. receivers) 
subsidiary of RCA.
Carretera Juarez-Porvenir Km. 3,
Parque Industrial Bermudez, Tel. 180000.
3 38
MATAMOROS, TAMAULIPAS.
1. AT&T (power supplies).
Ave. Lauro Villar,
Parque Industrial Cylsa, Tel, 60200
2. Industrias Thompson de Mexico, S.A. (electronic components 
for motor vehicles).
Alabama No. 9,
Parque Industrial Cylsa.
REYNQSA, TAMAULIPAS.
1. Controles Reynosa (electronic components).
Brecha E-99, Km, 3,
Parque Industrial Reynosa, Tel. 260-20
2. Partes de Television de Reynosa (assembly of colour T.V.
receivers), subsidiary of Zenith.
Carretera Matamoros/Brecha E-99 
Parque Industrial Reynosa, Tel. 270-60
3. DATACOM de Mexico, S. A.(components and subassemblies for 
printers).
Carretera a Matamoros Km. 109,
Parque Industrial Reynosa, Tel. 12-10-79.
4. LAMBDA SEMICONDUCTORS (assembly and packaging of discreet
transistors, integrated circuits and hybrid circuits). 
Carretera Matamoros/Brecha E-99, Edif. No. 8
Parque Industrial Reynosa, Tel. 278-18/278-68.
